Anglo-American negotiations 1938-1944 : strategy and the road to ANVIL.

Weiss, Steve

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This thesis is a critical study of the Anglo-American relationship between 1938 and 1944. The work is primarily concerned with the unifying and destructive forces that affected the partners, as they searched for a strategic solution to the war in Europe. Focusing upon the series of high-level strategy meetings which took place from 1938 onward, revealed is a growing divergence of strategic thought, a diminishment of mutual trust, and an awareness of unforeseen cultural barriers. An increasingly questionable negotiating process failed to match established civilian labor-management negotiations and codes of conduct or to produce comparable results. Further analysis highlights the interplay between the major participants within the civilian-military administrative structures in both countries. These dynamic structures, although not completely created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, were shaped, to an appreciable extent by these men. Roosevelt and Churchill's methods of leadership are compared and contrasted, their personal relationship investigated. It is argued that the 'Special Relationship' between these two major political figures and their civilian-military establishments was a public relations myth whose intensity varied with time. Inherent American suspiciousness of British strategic intentions is seen as a major factor demonstrating against it, in spite of the Axis threat. Anglo-American tensions are disclosed and assessed with regard to clandestine warfare, special operations and rearming the French. The strategic divergence which culminated in the ANVIL debate, reached its crescendo in July 1944. It marked the end of Britain's coalition dominance. The debate and the actual ANVIL operation, the invasion of southern France, is examined, not only for its value as an operational procedure, but as the embodiment, instrument and termination-point of the Anglo-American strategic conflict.

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the following men who served in the armed forces during the war all of them sat for interviews related to their areas of military expertise: Sir Ralph Kilner Brown (Logistics, OVERLORD planning, Law), General Sir William Jackson (British military doctrine and Staff planning in the Mediterranean), the late General James Doolittle (Army Air Force air crew replacement and training during 1944), Robert Reigle (Infantry hazards in Italy and France), Keith Sainsbury (strategic possibilities open to the Allies in 1943–44), Sir Robin Brook, Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, Geoffrey M. T. Jones (British and American clandestine operations), French Generals François Binoche, J–P de Lassus Saint Geniès and Jacques Brûle (The French Resistance and the French Army.).

I would like to mention some archivists who were most helpful during my period of research, Patricia Methven, Kate O'Brien and Marie Walsh (Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives), John Peaty and Sebastian Cox (Army and Air Historical Branches, MoD), John Taylor (NARA) and the staff at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Dr. Michael Dockrill, my supervisor at Kings, provided sound guidance, advice, humor and friendly criticism that was always both timely and appropriate. Professor Lawrence Freedman, head of the Department of War Studies at Kings, was generous in providing financial support for my research pertinent to this thesis. Special thanks go to Robin Kilpatrick, David London and Matthew Jones who were unstinting with their time and knowledge in most matters involving computer software, editing, history and language.

In closing, I hope that my children and grand children will not wait as long as I did to complete their education. As a former infantryman, I realize that there is much to be learned, much to be gained and so little time.

Abbreviations used in text and footnotes

AHB	Air Historical Branch
AAF	Army Air Forces (AAF US)
AAI	Allied Armies Italy
ABC	American-British Conversations
ABDA (COM)	Australian-British-Dutch-American (Command)
AFHQ	Allied Force Headquarters
AHB	Air Historical Branch, MoD, London
BL	British Library
C-in-C	Commander in Chief
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CEF	Corps Expépeditionaire Français
COMINCH	Commander in Chief, US Fleet
COS	Chief of Staff (British)
COSMED	Chief of Staff Mediterranean. (British)
COSSAC	Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
ETO	European Theater of Operations
FCNL	French Committee of National Liberation
FDR	Franklin D. Roosevelt
FDRL	Frankilin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY
FO	Foreign Office (British)
GSD	General Staff Division (US)
IWM	Imperial War Museum, London
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff, (US)
JPS	Joint Planning Staff
JRUSSI	Journal of Royal United Services Institute
JSM	Joint Staff Mission (British Representatives of COS, Washington)
JSS	Journal of Strategic Studies
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee, (US)
JUSSC	Joint US Strategic Committee
JWPC	Joint War Plans Committee. (US)
KCL	King's College London
LoC	Library of Congress (Washington)
MAAF	Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
MoD	Ministry of Defence (British)
NARA	National Archives & Record Administration (US Archives)

OAFH	Office of Air Force History
OPD	Operations Division, US Army
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PPF	President's Private Files
PSF	President's Secretary's Files
PRO	Public Records Office (British Archives)
RG	Record Group (US Archives)
RAF	Royal Air Force
SACAEF	Supreme Allied Commander Allied Expeditionary Force
SACMED	Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SCAEF	Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
SOE	Special Operations Executive (British)
USAAF	US Army Air Force
USACGS	CUS Army Command and General Staff College
WD	War Department, US
WSC	Winston S. Churchill

Code-names

ACCOLADE	Plan to capture of the Dodecanese Islands, 1943
ANAKIM	Plan for seaborne invasion of lower Burma, 1943
AVALANCHE	Invasion of Italy at Salerno, September 1943
ANVIL	Operation against southern France, 30 July 1944
BAYTOWN	British Eighth Army Landing in southern Italy, 1943
BOLERO	Buildup of US forces in UK, 1942-44
BRIMSTONE	Plan to capture Sardinia, 1944
BODYGUARD	Overall strategic deception plan for 1944
BUCCANEER	British plan to capture the Andaman Islands in 1944
DIADEM	Allied Offensive, May 1944
DRAGOON	Changed from ANVIL in summer of 1944
FORTITUDE	Tactical Cover Plan for OVERLORD
GYMNAST	Plan for landings in French North Africa, 27 July 1942
HABAKKUK	British idea of constructing seadromes out of ice/wood shavings.
HUSKY	Invasion of Sicily, July 1943
IMPERATOR	British plan to take a Norman French seaport, summer 1942
MAGNET	Buildup of US forces in Northern Ireland, 1942
MASSINGHAM	SOE base near Algiers
MODICUM	US Mission to London 1942
OLIVE	British Offensive in Italy, August 1944
OVERLORD	Libertion of Northwest Europe by Allied Forces
ROUNDHAMMER	Improved version of ROUNDUP for May 1944
ROUNDUP	Plan for landings in Northern France, 1943
SACMED	Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean
SHINGLE	Landings at Anzio, Italy, January 1944
SEXTANT	Cairo Conference, November – December 1943
SLEDGEHAMMER	Emergency landing plans in northern France, 1942
SUPER GYMNAST	The final version of operation GYMNAST
SYMBOL	Casablanca Conference, January 1943
TORCH	Landings in French North Africa, 25 July 1942
WORKSHOP	Invasion of Pantelleria, June 1943

Conference Code-names

ARCADIA	First Washington Conference, December 1941. January 1942
EUREKA	Teheran Conference, November 1943
QUADRANT	First Quebec Conference, August 1943
RIVIERA	Argentia, Newfoundland Conference, 1941
SEXTANT	Cairo Conference, November – December 1943
SYMBOL	Casablanca Conference, January 1943
TRIDENT	Second Washington Conference. May 1943

INTRODUCTION

The Anglo-American Coalition

The American historian, Maurice Matloff wrote in 1964 that,

> Many of the trends set in motion during World War II are still open-ended and our perspective is blurred. We cannot always be sure what is important, and it is difficult to evaluate with certainty what we identify. We have tons of records. No war was better recorded. Never have historians made such a concentrated assault on war documents so soon after a conflict.[1]

With the advent of the Freedom of Information Act in 1976, the American government declassified many documents that had previously been unavailable for scrutiny. More access compounded the problem, as Mark Stoler suggests.

> World War II records are so enormous that no individual historian can read all of them. Consequently, each historian writing on this period has concentrated on a specific set of documents. Studies based on such examinations have been extremely valuable. Such concentration, however, can easily lead to a distorted view of the entire picture.[2]

While the following thesis approaches certain controversial aspects of Anglo-American relations with a sense of 'mental self-liberation from the certain knowledge of its outcome',[3] it proposes to rectify distortions in the literature. It examines Anglo-American relations at the highest levels as they affected strategy in both the Mediterranean and European theaters of operations during the Second World War culminating in operation ANVIL, the Allied landing in southern France. The overall theme, supported by a wide variety of official documents and private papers, explores the problems generated by the coalition's efforts at co-operation, as well as the controversies raised by divergent strategic views. Clearly, despite British and American aberrations, which included attempts to dominate the coalition, an Allied victory was obtained.

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[1] M. Matloff, 'Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: FDR as War Leader', *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987*, Lt. Col. H. Borowski (ed.). (Washington, 1988), p. 107.
[2] M. Stoler, *The Politics of The Second Front*, (Westport, CT, 1977), p. 165.
[3] G. Weinberg, *World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes in World War II*, (Hanover, NH, 1981), p. xi.

The ANVIL debate was part of this greater controversy in which the search for an agreed, effective, war-winning strategy predominated. The coalition was disrupted by both the disunity and controversy within the American executive branch, which confounded and delayed British attempts to reach an expeditious, co-ordinated and mutually acceptable global strategy. During the early phases of the Alliance, the Americans, lacking an accountable executive organization from which an applied strategy could flow, failed to present a unified and coherent policy. Their strategic concepts uncertain, the virtual antithesis of British competence, the Americans not only undermined their negotiating possibilities, but aggravated their suspicions of British needs and intentions.[4] Treating the Americans as junior partners and behaving pretentiously, the British did not elicit cooperation.

Although disagreements were rife between the Allied Chiefs of Staff, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's strategic concepts (with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's concurrence) determined Allied operations from 1942 to 1943. Churchill recognized that wars created as many problems as they solved; that the art of grand strategy was to foresee the outlines of the future and the steps that were required to deal with it. Roosevelt, skeptical of the feasibility of a European invasion in 1943, confounded General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff who thought he had convinced the President.[5] Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff (COS), haunted by the memories of the previous war's attritional battles, sought to protect British manpower from a direct confrontation with the Germans in northwest Europe and chose to attack them in the Mediterranean instead. The British believed in wearing down the Germans with the assistance of indigenous resistance movements. The events of the war itself, specifically Britain being driven from the Continent and losing her principal ally, France, left few options between 1940 and 1941. During this period, Britain fought on alone, without any rational prospect of final victory. Its military philosophy was

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[4] F. Pogue Interview with Gen. G. Marshall, 15 January 1957, in *Ordeal and Hope*, (New York: 1966), pp. 76-79; H. Wynter (ed.), *The Higher Strategic Decisions of the War*, I & II, (London, 1945), pp. 15, 16, 112.

[5] G. Craig, 'The Political Leader As Strategist', P. Paret, (ed.) *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford, 1990), pp. 502-03.

influenced by such concepts as the 'continental commitment' (a version of the 'maritime school' strategy), the 'indirect approach' (avoidance of direct massed strategic confrontation with the enemy) and 'limited liability' (the commitment of the fewest possible troops).[6]

The American chiefs were opposed to the British tangential, 'soft-underbelly', 'closing the ring' approach.[7] Once Western Hemispheric defence was assured, the Americans wanted to defeat the German Army as quickly as possible in northwestern France. Feeling that Mediterranean military side-shows would only delay this purpose. American acceptance of the British Mediterranean strategy was viewed as acquiescence to Britain's imperial designs.[8]

John Erhman concluded that, 'the area of Anglo-American consent remained larger than the area of dispute, and that, even when differing, the partners remained closely tied to each other.'[9] For the most part, they had no other choice. They fought as a team, minimized discord, and caused serious injury to the enemy.[10] This was accomplished at various levels of command and during all the operations leading to Germany's defeat. However, the preceding assessment fails to reveal the shortcomings in the partnership that compromised Anglo-American strategy and operations.

This thesis describes the relationship as a marriage of expediency, more of a coalition than the 'grand alliance'. Alliances and coalitions are not the same thing, even though the terms are often used interchangeably.[11] 'An alliance is a more formal arrangement for broad, long-term objectives between two or more nations. A coalition is an informal agreement for common action.'[12]

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[6] Sir M. Howard, *Studies in War and Peace*, (New York, 1970), pp. 122-40; B. Bond, *Liddell Hart, A Study of His Military Thouglht*, (London, 1977), pp. 52-58.
[7] Gen. Sir W. Jackson to Author, *Some Thoughts on British Strategic Thinking*, 23 Jan. 1991.
[8] R. Weigley, *The American Way of War*, (Bloomington, 1973), pp. 328-29.
[9] J. Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, vol. V, (London, 1956), p. xvi.
[10] Marshall to Churchill, 8 June 1943, PREM 4, 72/3.
[11] Maj. Gen. J. Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, (New York, 1947), pp. 319-20.
[12] JCS Office of the Chairman, *Basic National Defence Doctrine*, Washington, 24 July 1990, (Department of Defence, Joint Pub 0-1), pp. III-35.

> Necessity drives nations to form coalitions, as going it alone normally imposes serious limitations. Individual nations are usually insufficiently capable of addressing a given threat. Mobilization resources or time [sic] may not be available, and few factors contribute to public legitimacy like a coalition effort.[13]

An entente, a friendly understanding between states? Possibly, but an entente subjectively describes a casualness and graciousness unheard of in wartime. Stationed in Washington during the period under consideration, one British official wrote, 'Britain and America are partners, but they are also rivals, each anxious to prove that its views on policy, indeed its way of life is superior to that of the other. It is this element of competition which distinguishes the partnership.'[14]

Mindful of this, the present study questions whether concordance was the predominant mood existing within the coalition and examines the issues where friction and conflict were prevalent. Inherent are themes of competition and opposition relating to a variety of conflicting national interests, customary spheres of influence and the historical balance of power, each representing a potential collision course between the two allied protagonists.[15] German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel put it succinctly:

> A war of alliance always causes difficulty and friction between the allies, as each country tries to work for its own ends rather than the other's. The right thing in these circumstances is to air all differences openly and not to cover them with a cloak of silence.[16]

He expresses another theme of this study: Allied policy and decision-making, the search for a coherent strategy, were marred by each nation's reluctance to reveal its hidden agendas. It was assumed that revelation would lead to further discord and loss of power, rather than closer collaboration. To the extent that an Anglo-American 'special relationship' existed, it was based on self-interest and a common threat, not on sentiment. Even if the British and Americans were comrades in arms, they were also

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[13] Lt. Col. W. Silkett, 'Alliance and Coalition Warfare', *Parameters*, XXIII, 2, (Summer 1993), pp. 74-85.
[14] W. Clark, *Less Than Kin*, (London, 1957), p. 1.
[15] T. Wilson, *The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill At Placenta Bay, 1941*, pp. 152-162. (Lawrence, KA, 1991); C. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, (London, 1978), pp. 101-105, 273-77.
[16] Sir B. Liddell Hart (ed.), *The Rommel Papers*, (London, 1984) p. 369.

rivals. The 'special relationship', viewed as a 'common-law alliance',[17] eventually revealed all the stresses of any protracted, intimate undertaking, however global in scope.

Another issue to be considered is the correlation between the ascending power of one partner and the declining power of the other, the recognition of their changing roles and how that influenced strategy. Lt. General Sir Frederick Morgan, Assistant Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) wrote,

> As a British officer of SHAEF, serving an American Chief, I was well placed to watch the distressing drift apart, the growing impatience on American part with British bombast and bland assumption of superiority in so many fields. While on the British side there appeared all the evidence of a growing inferiority complex, jealously of lavish American resources of all kinds and reluctance to acknowledge the scale of American achievement.[18]

The complex problems of a global war demanding resolution by negotiation included choosing between the European and Pacific theaters, arming the French versus applying limited resources elsewhere, Mediterranean operations versus those in northwest Europe and a landing in southern France versus operations in Italy.

At the administrative level, the managerial bureaus responsible for the allocation of resources (production and logistics), while proliferating within the American bureaucracy, co-operated and performed well on a day-to-day basis. Marshall remarked after the war, 'that is was the most complete unification of military effort ever achieved by two Allied nations.'[19]

His assessment was disputed by General Montgomery, C. in C. British 21st Army Group, who wrote to Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), during the summer of 1944, 'that the British officers at SHAEF must realize that in addition to being good Allied chaps, they must demonstrate definite loyalties to

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[17] Winston Churchill defined the term 'special relationship' in 1940, as the friendship that developed between him and President Roosevelt. A romantic by nature, Churchill used it to gain the President's assistance for Britain's war effort. Robert E. Sherwood, American author and one of President Roosevelt's speech-writers, called it a 'common-law alliance' in 1941, to describe the complex relationship that developed between Britain and America.

[18] Lt. Gen. Sir F. Morgan, *Peace and War*, (London, 1961), p. 211.

[19] H. Hall, *North American Supply*, (London, 1955), p. 353.

their side of the house; and in our side of the house, we must all pull together.'[20] Brooke kept a diary for most of the war, in which he recorded his doubts concerning the Americans, '...My God! What psychological complications war leads to!...I am tired to death with humanity and by all its pettiness. Will we learn to 'love our allies as ourselves?! I doubt it.'[21]

An Overview

Given the complexity of the material, offered is an outline of the main sequence of events leading to ANVIL, which are discussed in detail in the following chapters. In Chapter One three major ingredients are tied together and remain so during the period described in this thesis: the Allied leadership, the divergent strategic points of view and the varieties and perceptions of the external threat. They will remain central and changeable, acting upon each other in countless permutations, throughout the forthcoming chapters.

The thesis begins with an overview of the opening rounds of pre-war exploitative, non-binding negotiations between the British and the Americans in recognition of Axis threats. Early arousal of American prejudice and suspicion of British intentions cast a shadow on future negotiations. Although American preoccupation with western hemispheric defence acted as a brake upon British requirements, US military plans were drawn seeking to defeat Germany first. Early wartime negotiations revealed divergent customs, practices and misperceptions that inhibited timely solutions of economic issues and military programs. To reduce these problems, several executive agencies were created. The Allied leadership is introduced and its influence upon the higher direction of the war is considered.

Chapter Two provides a generic description of a summit conference and the negotiating procedures that were followed. Two early conferences in 1941, RIVIERA, in

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[20] S. Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower*, (Garden City, NJ, 1970), p. 159.
[21] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 'Notes On My Life, 3/B/XIII', Alanbrooke Papers, p. 987.

Newfoundland, and ARCADIA, in Washington, are described from both the British and American viewpoints. At RIVIERA, Anglo-American staffs met for the first time and took stock of each other, a process that was crucial to the future, if not to the survival of the coalition. While British negotiating and organizational skills were considered impressive, American disunity and prejudices were notable. Strategic interests were in conflict: the Americans worried over hemispheric defence, while the British attempted to protect their island from an enemy invasion. Greatly in need of material, they sought American supplies, but initially America's industrial production was unable to satisfy Britain's needs.

During the meeting, the *Atlantic Charter*, a declaration of American and British war aims, was written and proclaimed to the world, but the final version reflected existing political and economic divisions. The public's reaction was lukewarm. Churchill warned the President that if American participation in the war was not forthcoming, Britain and Russia would not only be unable to contain German aggression, but could actually lose. Unfortunately for the British, Roosevelt chose to follow American public opinion rather than to lead it.

Two weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, ARCADIA was convened in Washington. The American command remained disunited and did not have an operational plan to present. Churchill, who dominated the Conference, presented a strategy in concordance with that of *RAINBOW 5* and a 'Germany-first' approach, and he was relieved by his ally's acceptance. Since an executive inter-allied military organization seemed to be the best way of running the war on a day-to-day basis, the Chiefs agreed to form 'combined' agencies to do so. For the first time a theater command was established in the Pacific which was placed under the control of the newly established Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS).

Roosevelt expressed strategic ideas that included a desire to hold the line in the Pacific, display a powerful naval force in the Atlantic and send American troops into action as soon as possible. He was tempted by Churchill's recommendation of a French North

African campaign. Marshall, who advocated an attack in northwest Europe, was without an existing tactical plan or the means with which to implement one.

Chapter Three describes the meetings the major participants attended in London, Washington and Moscow. 1942 was the year in which the Russians demanded that Britain and the United States open a second front in northwest Europe. V. M. Molotov, the Russian Foreign Minister, petitioned both Churchill and Roosevelt. The President assured him that a second front would be forthcoming during the year. Roosevelt and Churchill were seriously concerned, not only about the severe losses inflicted upon the Russians by the invading German Army, but that the Russians might sue for a separate peace.

Churchill's influence over Roosevelt was demonstrated at the June Washington ARCADIA Conference. Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Churchill's emissary, visited and charmed the President before the Prime Minister's arrival. Because of Roosevelt's executive style, his Chiefs of Staff were only marginally effective and minimally accountable. Cross-Channel operations during 1942 (SLEDGEHAMMER) were discussed between the Anglo-Americans, but came to naught, because Roosevelt, insisting on action before the Congressional elections, was more interested in a North African campaign. These American political considerations coupled with Churchill's Mediterranean strategy overrode the views of each country's Chief of Staff. Although Brooke considered an invasion of French North Africa an inappropriate response to the German threat in the Middle East, he reluctantly sided with Churchill.

Chapter Four describes how the continuing disagreements between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and their planners slowed the negotiations with the more authoritative and better organized British. Roosevelt warned the JCS of British competence before the January 1943 summit meeting in Casablanca, but had no suggestions to offer. Only he could choose between continued action in the Mediterranean or action in northwest France.

SYMBOL, the code-name for the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, was considered to be the 'watershed' conference of the war, because it embraced a military strategy based on attrition rather than maneuver, on liberating land rather than defeating the German Army. Churchill felt that he was being punished by Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of US Naval Operations. Because Churchill had rejected SLEDGEHAMMER, men and material designated for BOLERO, the build-up of American forces in Britain, were sent instead to the Pacific. Brooke stressed the need to knock Italy out of the war before a landing in France. Already known as a competent negotiator and facilitator, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, the head of the British Military Mission to Washington (JSM), enhanced his reputation further at Casablanca. In spite of this, meetings were tedious and arguments were repetitious. The Americans sought modification of 'Germany-first'; because with increased productivity, Pacific operations could also be increased. The negotiations ended in unsatisfactory compromise. Agreement was not reached on the apportionment of resources between the two major theaters. However, the British view prevailed: Germany would be defeated first and Japan would be held in check with the existing Pacific forces.

Roosevelt's 'unconditional surrender' policy is assessed in the chapter. Its purpose and effect are considered. Congressional and Churchill's views are noted, alternatives to the policy are described. As the Conference concluded, Roosevelt met with French Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud, with the hope of improving relations between them. The Allies agreed to continue the bombing of Germany, to defeat the U-boat threat and to invade Sicily.

However, the Americans were unhappy with the result. American attempts to break the Casablanca agreement are considered in the light of language usage, contractual responsibility and lack of penalties for non-compliance.

Prior to the 1943 Washington TRIDENT Conference, the JCS continued to reorganize and improve its administrative structure. New committees were formed to advise the JCS in preparation for the conference with the British. The Americans devised a

method by which the fundamentals of their policy, the cross-Channel attack, no Mediterranean incursions and increased combat activity in the Pacific would be maintained. The British priority was to eliminate Italy from the war. Conflicts over the timing, the conditions, the feasibility, even the desirability of a cross-Channel attack remained.

Military versus civilian collective bargaining is examined in detail, particularly the use of 'going off the record', 'belief systems' and 'mind-sets'. An agreement was reached at TRIDENT which included a 1 May 1944 cross-Channel attack and the transfer of seven divisions from the Mediterranean to Britain. Brooke pleaded for future meetings to be scheduled more frequently, fearing that separation bred an even wider divergence of strategies. Churchill's attempts to defy the agreement failed, but he lobbied Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and George C. Marshall later in Algiers for an invasion of Italy.

Marshal Stalin's reaction to the Conference was severe and predictable. His demand for a second front in Normandy had been transformed by Churchill, with Roosevelt's concurrence, into another Mediterranean diversion.

Chapter Five explores a series of JCS preparatory meetings that preceded the 1943 Quebec QUADRANT Conference. At these meetings, the mood was sanguine; later, the same mood pervaded the Conference. The JCS, ready for a showdown on European strategy after two years of negotiating, was prepared by their planners to act decisively and choose either the European or Mediterranean theaters. King mocked British delaying tactics, insisting that if OVERLORD, an invasion of northwestern Europe in 1944, was to be enacted, a firm decision had to be reached before they left Quebec.

Eisenhower's chief planner, Maj. General Lowell Rooks, assured the JCS that, even without the seven divisions assigned to Britain as stipulated in TRIDENT, there were enough troops in the Mediterranean to fulfill operations in Sardinia, Corsica and

southern France. However, Balkans operations, if executed, would have a disastrous impact on OVERLORD. Churchill and Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, expressed conflicting views concerning future Balkan operations.

America's inability to campaign in Europe independent of Britain persisted throughout the war. It followed, therefore, that OVERLORD could not be mounted without the inclusion of the 15 British divisions stationed in Britain. If OVERLORD were to become a reality, greater planning would be required to meet production, training and shipping schedules. Even though the Americans considered future operations against Italy, the British did not feel that the acceptance of OVERLORD was a fair exchange. As part of a global strategy, OVERLORD would affect operations in all other theaters. During QUADRANT, the JCS was wary of many of the British proposals and plans. To help place them in perspective, a review of negotiating tactics and skills is advanced.

During the Conference, various strategic reports were given, some at odds with each other. While POINTBLANK, the 'combined bomber offensive', was favorably reported by British Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (CAF) and his American counterpart, General Henry Arnold, Chief of the US Army Air Forces, expressed concerned about the excessive loss of Army Air Force (AAF) air crews. The OVERLORD argument between Marshall and Brooke intensified. Their differences appeared to be irreconcilable: Marshall sought to assign OVERLORD top priority. Brooke countered with conditions for its acceptance that would reduced that priority, i.e., that OVERLORD should be linked to Italian operations.

Brigadier General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Marshall's chief advisor, in a pre-conference 'pep talk', took the JCS through a series of British positions to demonstrate the capriciousness of their Mediterranean strategy. The seven division transfer remained controversial with the Americans who insisted that the British live up to the TRIDENT agreement. Marshall refused to countenance further British circumlocution. An imminent showdown was averted by the arrival of Roosevelt and Churchill. After three

days of intense debate, a compromise emerged in which OVERLORD's priority was lowered. The intensity of debate was such that Brooke asked to clear the room of staff and 'go off the record'.

At QUADRANT, Eisenhower was asked to plan for ANVIL, designed to establish a beachhead in the Toulon-Marseilles area of southern France and then move northward. OVERLORD was targeted for 1 May 1944. If that was to prove impossible, consideration was to be given to the following: operations in northern Norway, pressure on the enemy in Italy and to supply the Resistance in southern France by air. It was agreed that an American would lead OVERLORD. Landing craft production, distribution, procurement and allocation problems were also discussed. JCS policy is reviewed and analyzed throughout the chapter. It closes with a description of Italian armistice negotiations and AVALANCHE, the landing at Salerno, near Naples.

Chapter Six reviews the three issues raised at the November 1943 Teheran EUREKA Conference: the Second Front, the French Resistance and the Free French Army. During the Conference, OVERLORD and ANVIL were considered as independent parts of the same operation. Churchill, fearing that Russian advances into central Europe would create post-war problems, tried to convince Roosevelt that his Mediterranean strategy was the only effective counter. More concerned with immediate political realities, Roosevelt tried to fulfill his Second Front promise to Stalin and would not tolerate any British delays or postponement. Stalin lobbied for implementation of OVERLORD and ANVIL, arguing that, if necessary, troops could be transferred to southern France from Italy. Churchill, no longer the dominant partner, could do little to alter the Russo-American strategic concept. Gone were his plans for operations in the eastern Mediterranean. It became clear, however, that the implementation of any plan depended on the availability of landing craft and shipping.

Chapter Six also deals with issues concerning the French Resistance and the Free French Army. The shock of the French surrender in 1940, resulting in a changed political climate, shifting social attitudes and modified military expectations, all

contributed to the Anglo-American perspective of French affairs. Vichy French Premier, Marshal Henri Pétain, and President of the Free French National Committee, General Charles de Gaulle, emerged from the French defeat as political rivals who influenced British and American foreign affairs.

When the British were driven from the Continent in 1940, the need for 'irregular' warfare grew in importance. British reorganization of its intelligence operations led to the establishment of Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the sub-organizations it controlled. SOE activities in France were co-ordinated with indigenous Resistance organizations. Both made the transition from 'intelligence gathering' to 'sabotage' and concentrated on actions designed to frustrate the German occupation forces. With the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an American organization analogous to SOE, the Allies built an effective covert force. Allied planning and the French Resistance suffered the consequences of distrust, poor organization and security lapses that resulted in the misuse or loss of invaluable officers and agents.

Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF) and inherited an administrative headquarters in Britain. He had little choice but to accept its recommendations, however prejudiced, concerning clandestine operations. The projected Normandy and southern France invasions were assisted by Special Force Headquarters in both London and Algiers. The Resistance in France is surveyed against the background of German intentions during the Occupation. The predictably tragic outcomes of pitched battles between the Resistance and the Germans typified and underscored errors in judgment by the local French command. Their sabotage activities were more successful. Allied air supply missions in aid of the Resistance were increased during the spring of 1944 and after D-Day, armed teams and groups were dropped throughout France in support of the landings. They worked closely with the Resistance. On 15 July, one month before the ANVIL, equipment was dropped in sufficient amounts to the Resistance throughout southern and central France. Thus, the role the Resistance played in the liberation of France is considered.

An important element of the whole ANVIL enterprise was the rearmament of the Free French forces in North Africa. Rearming the French Army involved not only the complicated issues of production, training and supply; but also the re-allocation of scarce resources, the redirection of global shipping and the quarrels between Churchill. Roosevelt and de Gaulle. Military discussions became deadlocked. a problem exacerbated by the fact that the objectives were frequently more political than military. The speed of Rearmament was linked to the availability of supplies and shipping and, as a result, came second to the needs of Allied forces in the Mediterranean. 'Agreement in principle', a term borrowed from real-estate law. proved troublesome between Roosevelt and Giraud. Roosevelt expressed his irritation regarding the French reaction to the Anfa agreement, the written instrument through which rearmament would be completed. Marshall attempted to assuage French doubts by satisfying their specific needs, subscribing to the argument that the United States would benefit if the French supplied the soldiers. However, arming, organizing, and training a foreign army to American standards posed a multitude of problems not encountered in raising an American army. Although the end results were impressive, inter-Allied political disputes delayed the process. De Gaulle demanded that the existing French forces and those newly raised in North Africa serve France in its projected liberation. He offered little objection to ANVIL's command structure when French combat participation was assured.

Chapter Seven looks at other aspects of the EUREKA and SEXTANT Conferences not covered in Chapter Five. These relate to the TRIDENT and QUADRANT agreements. which the President considered settled, but Churchill did not. Churchill wanted modification of the QUADRANT agreement, because of a deteriorating Italian winter campaign. Roosevelt accepted Churchill's entreaties to meet in Cairo, in late November 1943, but decided to avoid substantive conversations with him in preference to those with China's Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek. The Americans knew little of the preferred Russian strategy relating to Europe and the Mediterranean theaters. Roosevelt did not want to leave himself open to Stalin's criticism, if their strategic views varied.

Thus, the President wanted to arrive in Teheran without a common Anglo-American plan. This was unacceptable to Churchill and Brooke.

The first Cairo Conference, SEXTANT I, in late November 1943, was a grueling and acrimonious affair for the participants, whose nerves were frayed both by its content and by time pressures. Much was expected in the short time allotted; and as a result little was accomplished. Basic disagreements remained unresolved. Eisenhower supported an all-out winter offensive in Italy, but the primary quarrel was fought over future eastern Mediterranean operations versus those in the Far East. The British did not want Stalin to arbitrate an Anglo-American conflict.

The Russians surprised the Americans at the Tehran, EUREKA Conference, 28-30 November 1943, by revealing that they favored the two French landings, to the exclusion of Churchill's eastern Mediterranean forays. Caught between Roosevelt and Stalin, and the power they represented, the Prime Minister was marginalized.

The Americans returned to Cairo for a second SEXTANT conference, 3-7 December 1943, jubilant that the Russians accepted their strategy. The British delegation was dismayed. Far Eastern operations were in conflict with OVERLORD/ANVIL and both sides were once again deadlocked. There were not enough landing craft and shipping to accomplish both. Roosevelt yielded. The amphibious operation (BUCCANEER) in the Far East was canceled. Although the British were pleased, it resulted in one of the most bitter strategic arguments of the war. Almost everyone was exhausted from the ordeal. Brooke's pleas to meet more frequently were not supported in practice. Nine months would pass before both sides met again.

The ANVIL/Italy/Balkans Debate of 1944 is closely studied, because it demonstrates how the negotiators, by their intransigent positions, raised the stakes of the Anglo-American strategic conflict to one of 'winner-take-all'. A shortage of landing craft, increased manpower requirements and financing the French Army were just some of the problems that jeopardized ANVIL being a simultaneous operation with OVERLORD.

Recommendations that Brooke and Marshall meet in London to resolve these problems were avoided, but Eisenhower was chosen to act on Marshall's behalf. The COS sought to cancel ANVIL, giving first priority to the Italian campaign, but Roosevelt refused, because of his second front promise to Stalin. Eisenhower searched for a compromise and discovered that his proposal for separate OVERLORD tactical and logistical lifts was attacked and discounted by 21st Army Group planners. Matters worsened when the amphibious landing at Anzio in Italy miscarried and competed for scarce ANVIL resources and landing craft. British Intelligence discovered that the Germans were more concerned about a seaborne attack at the head of the Adriatic than one in southern France. On 21 March, ANVIL, caught between OVERLORD and the Italian campaign, was canceled by Eisenhower. Marshall was unyielding, and suggested instead that if the COS agreed to mount ANVIL on 10 July, the United States would transfer 68 Pacific landing craft to take part in the operation. The British accepted, but in seeking other options for an ANVIL-type operation, irritated the Americans. The British were outraged that the offer of the landing craft was linked to a southern France operation, but Marshal reaffirmed his decision not to squander these resources for an indeterminate ANVIL. Attempts to break the deadlock included an all-out offensive in Italy and developing a threat against southern France. However, without the required landing craft, ANVIL seemed incapable of supporting OVERLORD. Soon after the successful D-Day landings, Eisenhower demanded ANVIL be executed, because a severe Channel storm disrupted his logistical situation and increased his need for a seaport. To accomplish this, he wanted a three divisional ANVIL no later than 15 August.

The disagreements intensified between the Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff to such an extent that the Americans brought the negotiations to a halt. Deadlock was again a reality, until Churchill and Roosevelt were asked to intervene. Roosevelt was unmoved by Churchill's requests that ANVIL strategy be reconsidered. While the COS were forced to accept the inevitable, Churchill attempted to change Eisenhower's mind in

early August – to no avail. ANVIL's planning and execution are discussed and their value is considered.

Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter, assesses the different military, political and cultural aspects of the two countries that affected the coalition's search for a viable strategy in Europe.

CHAPTER ONE

Introductory Strategic Talks

A co-operative strategy, aimed at defeating Germany and Italy first, characterized the Anglo-American position when and if the United States entered the war. One historian labeled the 'Germany-first' approach the most important single strategic concept of the Second World War.[1] The position was expressed in a paper, *ABC-1*, produced by both parties at informal secret American-British conversations held in Washington, from January through March 1941. Both countries agreed that it was essential to co-ordinate joint action to meet and eliminate the German threat to the security of the North Atlantic and the British Isles. Clinging to their neutrality, the Americans proclaimed the paper to be hypothetical and non-binding in nature. Moreover, they insisted that the paper simply contained the force of 'professional predictability', and should not to be construed as a blueprint for future political commitments.[2] One of the officers defending this position was General Stanley D. Embick.

To Dissent or to Obstruct

Embick, General Marshall's strongly anti-British senior advisor on strategy, objected to any British 'Germany-first' plans leading to operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean.[3] An individual with 45 years of experience in national policy, diplomacy and grand strategy. He preferred to appease Hitler. In 1938, as Deputy Chief of Staff, he distributed and promoted the ideas of a prominent conservative anti-war and anti-military organization, The National Council for Prevention of War. It has been suggested that Embick was a dissenter.[4] However, it is one thing to dissent, and quite another to obstruct. During an interview in 1968, Eisenhower said, 'When they

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[1] K. Greenfield, (ed.), *Command Decisions*, (Washington, 1960), p. 11.
[2] E. Larrabee, *Commander in Chief*, (New York, 1987), p. 18.
[3] Notes on ABC Conference', Washington, 16 Apr. 1941, RG 165, Exec. 8.
[4] R. Schaffer, 'Gen. Stanley D. Embick: Military Dissenter', *Military Affairs*, Oct., (1973), p. 92.

say that soldiers ought to make political decisions...then they're showing their ignorance of what democratic government is. This is the kind of thing that makes Napoleons and Hitlers.'[5] Embick considered a general European war a colossal blunder and in April 1941 opposed an American declaration of war, because he thought that Britain's plight was less serious than his colleagues believed. Sent to Britain in 1941, he considered Churchill an amateur strategist, incapable of concentrating on the main issue. As Embick's pessimism about Britain's ability to survive increased, he opposed early landings in North Africa and disapproved of action in the eastern Mediterranean.[6] Although Marshall was less hostile, he was wary of dealing with a strategy motivated by British political interests. He also conceded Embick's point that it was nearly impossible to keep Churchill focused on the main issues.

Embick's eminent position on the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) gave him a new and powerful forum for expression of his Anglophobic views. He and his colleagues advised the JCS on all global and political matters and served as liaison with the State Department. Given extraordinary responsibilities and powers, the JSSC produced a series of papers which constituted, in the original, the eventual JCS position on virtually every wartime issue.

Concurrently, within the General Staff Division (GSD), referred to as Marshall's 'Washington Command Post', the Operations Division's (OPD) Strategy and Policy Group (S & P), called the 'Brain Trust', formed similar views after studying British strategy and policy in the Mediterranean. S & P was primarily responsible for most strategic thinking and war planning with the Army and for liaison work with the other military services and the State Department. Its members served on various planning committees, but the head of S & P, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Embick's son in-law, was Marshall's Chief Strategic Planner from June 1942 to October 1943. Wedemeyer, a US Army graduate of the German *Kriegsakademie* (which made an

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[5] A. L. Funk. 'Interview with Gen. Eisenhower', Washington, D. C., 31 July 1968.
[6] R. Schaffer. *Op. cit.*, pp.92-93.

indelible impression on him) in 1938, shared many of Embick's views. 'While not a member of the 'America First' Committee he was 'in accord' with many of its views. and immediately before Pearl Harbor found himself suspected of leaking the famous 'Victory Program' he had helped author to the isolationist *Chicago Tribune.*'[7]

Embick deeply distrusted British strategy, policy and leadership and had actively opposed American entry into the Second World War. Both officers were representative of a large clique within the armed forces with similar beliefs. For example, they were convinced that Britain did not intend to invade Europe and defeat Germany; instead Britain sought control of the Mediterranean in accordance with her traditional balance of power policy.[8]

These anti-British analyses and conclusions were not buried in their respective committees. They appeared throughout 1943 in formal OPD papers and in memoranda emanating from the Joint Committee, staffed with S & P members. Perhaps the most comprehensive memo on British strategy and policy came from the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) who reorganized and synthesized the various American viewpoints. It accused Britain of maintaining her world position at the expense of other countries, including the United States.

These S & P and JSSC ideas also found a welcome audience among the JCS. They surfaced in statements and notes by individual chiefs, and in Stimson's presentations and warnings to Roosevelt. In July Marshall offered his 'personal opinion' of British strategy. In August he forwarded what he described as a 'formidable' S & P paper emphasizing that Anglo-American strategic divergence reflected very deep differences in national character and interests. Searching for other fundamental causes, it found these in the differing geographic positions, national structures and basis of power of the two countries.

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[7] M. A. Stoler, 'The American Perception of British Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945', C. L. Symonds (ed.) *New Aspects of Naval History*, (Annapolis, MD, 1979), p. 330.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

Unaltered in their beliefs, Embick and Wedemeyer concluded that a slow, dispersed war of attrition centering on the Mediterranean would restore British control of that sea and avoid heavy casualties inherent in a cross-Channel attack. They believed that, despite adhering to the unconditional surrender formula, the British might attempt to delay a German defeat while Russia was made weaker. This evaluation avoided the fact that the Russians, fighting the bulk of the German Army, would register strong protest against Britain's behavior.[9] It is not known to what degree Roosevelt accepted or rejected these conclusions, but it is known that he criticized the British before the JCS.

During a 1948 interview, Major General Ian Jacob, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, agreed in principle,

> ...if we had not been driven by American confidence and enthusiasm we would never have dared to make the cross-Channel assault,...if the Americans had not been restrained by the British determination to guard against every mishap and to plan and prepare to the last detail the assault would almost certainly have been a ghastly failure.[10]

The American military directorate's fixed beliefs and prejudice poisoned and jeopardized inter-allied negotiations. To argue the relatives merits of different strategic view points was expected during discussions and negotiations. To argue strategy as a means of subverting one's coalition partner was not. Embick and the JPC felt that the United States could ill afford to entrust their country's national future to British direction. Both insisted that the United States could defend the North American continent and the Western Hemisphere without British assistance. The committee doubted British motives from the beginning, considering them to be self-serving. In accordance with the views expressed by Embick, Colonel Joseph McNarney, of the Army Operations Division (OPD) and Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Navy Director of War Plans, collaborated to write the following,

> It is to be expected that proposals of the British representatives will have been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the British Commonwealth. Never absent from British minds are their post-war

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 328-32.

[10] Sir B. Liddell Hart, 'Notes of Discussion with Maj. Gen. Sir Ian Jacob', 31 Mar., 15 Apr. 1948, 15/15/1, p. 5.

> interests, commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard our own eventual interests.[11]

Although no plans were drawn up for the use of American land forces in a major offensive against Germany, their build-up and employment was envisioned. The Joint Board, a corporate organization of American military chiefs, approved *ABC-1* on 14 May and sent the papers on for presidential approval. Roosevelt returned the paper unsigned, because Churchill had done likewise. However, Marshall felt that the lack of a presidential signature would not slow up troop movements of approximately 100,000 men to Britain. *ABC-1*, as a collaborative agreement, became the foundation on which all future Anglo-American strategic meetings were based, despite an underlying American distrust of the British position.

Admiral King's Pacific Preoccupation

The incident that propelled the American 'Germany-first' strategy towards a coherent operational plan, however difficult to implement, occurred at a meeting attended by both Marshall and King on 18 February 1942. King, seeking increased action against the Japanese, requested that the Army provide ground and air forces to garrison a number of small Pacific islands. Marshall objected, predicting that if he acceded to King's request, it would dilute the Army's Atlantic strategy, minimize his influence with the President and weaken Army and Army Air Force personnel at the desired point of European concentration. Moreover, if accepted, King's proposal would subvert Arnold attempts to create a separate air force.[12] Marshall argued this was a negation of a Germany-first policy. The Army, in short, viewed its own future to be interwoven with its concept of the correct way to defeat the Axis.[13]

Concerned that this modest request could lead to a full scale Army commitment in the Pacific,[14] a misdirection of the highest magnitude, Marshall demanded and received, a

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[11] Col. J. McNarney & Adm. R. K. Turner. 'Joint Instructions for Army & Navy Representatives', Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, 21 Jan. 1941, RG 165. Exec. 8.
[12] Marshall to King, Washington, 18 Feb. 1942, RG 165 Book 4, Exec. 8.
[13] M. A. Stoler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.
[14] A. D. Chandler, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, I. (Baltimore, 1970), p. 112.

complete strategic analysis. Eisenhower, as the new head of the War Plans Division, responded with a position paper, writing:

> We must differentiate sharply and definitely between those things whose current accomplishment in the several theaters over the world is 'necessary' to the ultimate defeat of the Axis, as opposed to those which are merely 'desirable' because of their effect in facilitating such a defeat.[15]

Defence of the Western Hemisphere

Many senior American and British officers having made a similar diagnosis, were fearful that the previous arrangements as expressed in *ABC-1* and listed in *RAINBOW 5*, which included an aggressive plan extending American security frontiers beyond the continental limits of the United States, would be abandoned in practice. Since the 19th century, the security and defence of the Western Hemisphere had always been a major consideration when defining American military policy. Even though the German Army was unable to cross the Channel to invade England in 1940, American planners were certain that it had the capability of crossing the Atlantic to invade the Americas.[16] Obsessed with this apocalyptic vision, the planners, reflecting traditional 'isolationist' doctrine, sought a line of defensive outposts to form a bulwark against a Nazi invasion: England and Iceland in the north and Dakar in the south. In 1941, General 'Vinegar' Joe Stilwell was ordered to plan a pre-emptive strike of the Azores, formative island links in the partially completed American hemispheric defence. Distorted American perceptions of German designs on North and West Africa increased the already existing anxiety in Washington. Only 1,800 nautical miles separated Dakar from Natal, Brazil, a potential target for German air attack and airborne invasion.[17] The suppression of potential fifth column activities, Axis influence in, and German expeditions to, South America, were subjects addressed by the planners.[18] Moreover, the Army was

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15 'Strategic Conceptions and Their Application to the Southwest Pacific', Army War Plans Div., Washington, 28 Feb. 1942, RG 165, Exec. 4.

16 A. Funk, 'The United States and TORCH: Strategy and Intelligence', Special Issue: Operation TORCH and its Political Aftermath: Franco-Anglo-American Relations in 1942, *Franco-British Studies*, (Spring, 1989), p. 16.

17 L. DeJong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War*, (Chicago, 1956), pp. 39-143.

18 H. Stimson, 'Diary quote in Pogue, *Op. cit.*, p. 266.

doubtful whether it could defend the eastern seaboard of the United States against a cross-Atlantic assault or prevent an enemy expeditionary force from landing.

Even after the Pearl Harbor attack, the American public sought hemispheric isolation, the majority of whom supported the war effort with an attitude of 'rational resignation'. Forty-five percent of the people questioned in a polling sample admitted they did not know what the United States was fighting for; 25 percent of the population favored an immediate end to the war with Germany through negotiation, and ten percent on any terms. Fifty-nine percent of those polled were willing to fight an all-out war against Japan.[19] Many Americans were unwilling to support active military ground operations overseas. The President realized that his words could not galvanize the public's martial spirit and its willingness to mobilize. Only military action focused on the German threat would reduce public indifference and increase its participation; if not, the whole war effort was imperiled. Projecting American power outward would have a twofold purpose: first, the occupation of West Africa and the Atlantic islands by American troops would prevent any hypothetical German seizure of those same areas; and second, It would also put the public actively in the war. Broadcasting to the nation on 9 December 1941, the President said, '...a German attack against Algiers or Morocco opens the way to a German attack against South America, and the [Panama] Canal.'[20]

The Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, considered the continued existence of Britain essential to the security of the United States, because it was Britain's naval power that secured the Atlantic frontier. President Roosevelt, in turn, believed that the continued existence of Britain as a world power was in the best interest of the United States, and that the aggressive foreign policies of Italy and Germany threatened Britain.

Roosevelt's willingness to co-operate with the British began as early as January 1938, a result of a naval incident the previous year between the Japanese and the Americans in China, in which the *USS Panay*, a US gunboat was sunk. By granting permission to

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[19] L. Mellet, 'Cantrill Poll', 10-16 Dec. 1941, PPF, FDRL.
[20] S. Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Call to Battle Stations, 1941*, 10, (New York, 1950), pp. 529-530.

institute Anglo-American Naval conversations, Roosevelt laid the foundation for assured military co-operation, although the subjects that were considered failed to result in an integrated strategy.[21] Two years later, conversations were held in London from August to September 1940, at which time closer ties were established with the creation of the Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee.[22] Roosevelt had approached the leading members of the Chamberlain government at the outbreak of the war, but only Churchill demonstrated any interest. The exchange of letters that followed between them, and the President's willingness to exceed the limits of co-operation by a neutral state, led Churchill to believe that the United States would enter the war on the side of Britain.[23] They received additional support from American Admiral, Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, who warned his superiors against a 'Japanese first' policy in his 'Plan Dog' memorandum: '...if Britain wins decisively against Germany, we could win everywhere; but if she loses, the problem confronting us would be very great; and, while we might 'not lose everywhere', we might possibly, not 'win' anywhere.'[24]

Further, he objected to an 'unlimited' commitment in the Pacific, that would place severe limitations on aid to the British and the Atlantic defence. He feared that even a 'limited' commitment in the Pacific could turn 'unlimited', if only as a result of public impatience. Once this happened, the Pacific would take precedence, undermining American strategic emphasis.[25] Germany's defeat, therefore, would be primarily dependent upon the efforts of Britain and Russia, a daunting prospect. In the light of subsequent ,events, Stark was prescient.

American planners envisioned sending task forces overseas to co-operate with Britain and France in a war against Germany and Italy. As an offensive strategy, based on

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21 T. B. Kittridge, *U.S. British Co-operation, 1940-1945*, n. d., Naval Historical Center, Washington
22 Maj. C. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, (Washington, 1990), pp. 38-41.
23 J. Leutze, 'The Secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence', September 1939-May 1940', *JCH*, 10, 3, (1975).
24 Adm. G. Dyer, *The Amphibians Came to Conquer*, (Washington, 1969), pp. 156-160; T. Higgins, *Winston Churchill and The Second Front*, (New York, 1957), pp. 43-46.
25 M. Matloff & E. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, (Washington, 1953), pp. 6-10.

ABC-1 and in agreement with the Joint US-Canada War Plan 2 (*ABC-22*), the first Army draft of *RAINBOW 5* was completed on 7 April 1941, and submitted to the Joint Board for approval by the Joint Planning Committee on 21 April.[26] Directed against the European section of the Axis, forces were to be increased in preparation for a predetermined Mobilization Day (M Day), which might precede a declaration of war or hostile acts.

Concurrently, the Joint Board considered a potential German-Japanese threat to seize strategic Atlantic and Caribbean outposts, construct U-boat bases in West Africa and Brazil, in order to cut America's sea-borne supply lines. The Army's ability to thwart any Axis attempts to gain a South American foothold during 1940, particularly in Brazil and Uruguay, was limited. American planners believed that a massive build-up of enemy ground and air forces in various collaborationist South American nations would precede an Axis invasion of the United States via Mexico or the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. According to the British, American planners were obsessed with Latin America,[27] but the United States was only too aware that British and Dutch Guinea of South America refined 95 percent of the oil sent to the eastern seaboard of the United States. The occupation of Dutch Guinea was under consideration by American forces.

In mid-June, 1941, Adolph Hitler ordered German armies east into Russia, thereby embarking upon a war of annihilation, rather than sending them west on a war of conquest into the Iberian Peninsula, across to North Africa and into the distant reaches of the Western Hemisphere. There was little to be gained in a German move to the west, i.e., restricted space and few resources offered little compared to the Russian heartland. Hitler's move east relieved the Americans of any immediate threat to the Western Hemisphere, lifted the danger of an invasion of the British Isles until 1942, and improved Britain's position in the Middle East. Stimson believed that a significant

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. xii.

common strategic goal was required for Europe. Writing in his diary entry of 5 March 1942, he stated,

> Sending an overwhelming force to the British Isles and threatening an attack on the Germans in France; that this was the proper and orthodox line of our help in the war as it had always been recognized and that it would now have the effect of giving Hitler two fronts to fight on, if it could be done in time while the Russians were still in. It would also heavily stimulate British sagging morale.[28]

Inhibitors to Negotiations

British and American senior officers, on whom the future of coalition policy was to rely in 1941, had the unenviable two-fold task of not only achieving synthesis in negotiations, but achieving a viable working atmosphere. Even a common language could at times prove divisive.

Differences in military, social and political backgrounds were exaggerated by language difficulties.[29] During the 1943 Casablanca Conference, British General John Kennedy discovered a remark in Oscar Wilde's, *The Canterville Ghost* that seemed appropriate to the discussions then in progress, in which the author suggested that the Americans and the British had everything in common except a language.[30] When British General Frederick Morgan was assigned to Eisenhower's Headquarters in early 1944 and received his first orders from the American General, he later wrote,

> But there came a terrifying shock, when his formal orders in writing were conveyed to me by his staff. It was a lovely job, no doubt, compiled according to the best War College standards. The words were all pure English but the whole document as it stood meant not a thing to any of us. So we began by getting ourselves instructed in US staff language and procedures. It is strange to think that less than twenty years ago the mutual ignorance of American and British fighting services was complete.[31]

The combination of language interpretation, persistent prejudices and personal deception were bound to effect the meetings between the British and the Americans. Many senior American Army officers, were Anglophobic, anti-Empire, and isolationist;

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[28] H. Stimson & M. Bundy, *Op. cit.*, p. 214.
[29] Interview with Gen. Sir W. Jackson, London, 20 January 1991.
[30] Maj. Gen. Sir J. Kennedy, *The Business of War*, (London, 1957), pp. 280-281.
[31] Lt. Gen. Sir F. Morgan, *Op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

the word 'Allies' was alien to them and British strategy and 'generalship' were suspect. Settling for an armistice in 1918 rather seeking outright victory meant that the British military record inspired little respect in 1939-1941. Britain sought to reap post-war political benefits at the expense of the United States and exploited the resources and peoples of other nations to ensure her dominant position.[32] To some, the tactical principles expressed in writing by Guderian and Rommel were compelling.[33] McNarney, considered to be an 'immediatist',[34] who argued for increased American involvement, was of the opinion in the Spring of 1941 that if Britain capitulated, the internal unrest created by this disaster could lead to a Communist take-over within the United States.[35] Like their British counterparts, the Americans were more fearful of Bolshevism than Fascism.

Most senior British Army officers were either 'pan Anglo-Saxonists' or 'Imperial isolationists'. Moreover, described as 'Easterners', in First World War parlance, they advocated the peripheral or 'indirect approach', as the only pragmatic way of defeating the Germans.[36] Many British officers criticized the American Army's lack of experience in modern war, discounted its officers because of limited overseas experience and questioned its performance in the First World War, i.e., the United States raised large armies, but failed to equip them properly. Defined as Westerners, accustomed to working with vast amounts of manpower and material, the Americans chose to concentrate their superior forces on the shortest, albeit, the most heavily defended route to victory.[37] Once fully mobilized, the Americans were sure that the 'direct approach' was the best way to use their unlimited resources.[38]

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[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.
[33] FM E. Rommel, *Infantry Attacks*, (London, 1990); L. Addington, *The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941*, (New Brunswick, NJ,1941); Gen. H. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, (London, 1952).
[34] T. Wilson, *Op. cit.*, p. 41., (note: the term 'immediatist' is used to describe an American who argues for an immediate declaration of war or a changeover to a war footing.)
[35] Col. J. McNarney, 'Strategic Considerations Peace or War Status', Washington 16 Apr. 1941, RG 319.
[36] D. C. Watt, *Succeeding John Bull*, (Cambridge: 1984), pp. 91-93.
[37] H. Stimson, *Op. cit.*, 25 Sept. 1941, 'there was a long distance between getting into war and crushing Germany'.
[38] FM Lord Brammal & Gen. Sir W. Jackson, *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

Strategy dictated that a number of unforeseen issues required reconciliation between the Allied services. For example, Britain described the first day of operations as 'D Day', followed by 'D+1' , 'D+2' etc., whereas the United States used the version 'D.1', 'D.2', 'D.3', etc. Thus there was a critical difference of one day in the operational dates. In signal procedure, the British used '12/2' to denote February 12 whereas the Americans used '2/12' to denote the same day. The British used GMT for all overseas operations, whereas the Americans used local time. When American officers of JPS Allied Force Headquarters Algiers were engaged in a planning study for post HUSKY (the 1943 invasion of Sicily) operations with their British associates, they were occasionally piqued by them:

> ... we were at work by 8 o'clock, took a short break for lunch, and knocked off at about 6:30. The British, however, began work about 9 or 9:30, took a long lunch break and worked until about 8:30. On a few occasions we would find on our desks in the morning a revised plan, prepared by the British after we had left, to conform to their views and altering our previous plan. The hassles that followed did little to promote international relations.[39]

These and many other operational and procedural points had to be resolved and each nation was reluctant to change its own procedures. Not only did national differences in language usage and interpretation cause difficulties, but the legal differences in contractual law underlined the variations between the British and the American approach. Combed, they added to the prolongation of the negotiating process and increased the possibilities of assumptive outcomes. Hypothetically, if one of the partners were replaced by the Russians, the language barrier between them would have been insuperable and negotiations would be painfully protracted and the outcome doubtful.[40] Concerning the 1942 London SLEDGEHAMMER meetings, Marshall surmised that the British operated on the belief of an agreement in principle while the Americans depended upon the formal interpretation of written agreements. 'Agreement in principle' represented the spirit of the law and 'formal interpretation', the letter. Moreover, it can be presumed that each country had integrated its contractual behavior

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[39] Brig. Gen. M. MacCloskey, *Planning for Victory in World War II, (New York, 1970)*, p. 96.
[40] Interview with T. Dudina, Professor of Moscow Linguistic University, London, 3 Nov. 1992.

within its military ethos. British flexibility was regarded by the Americans as lacking in commitment and certainty, while American determination was regarded by the British as inflexible, over-determined, and insufferable. As TORCH, the British choice prevailed over ROUNDUP, the American one, the British soon learned that 'formal interpretation', as applied to 'CCS-94', could be just as frustrating as their 'agreement in principle'. It resulted in a turn towards the Pacific by the Americans in 1942.[41]

Sir Ralph Kilner Brown, a former British Brigadier GHQ planner and retired High Court Queen's Counsel, concluded that 'agreement in principle', predicated on *caveat emptor*, 'let the buyer beware', originally applied in British real-estate law. Neither interested party was bound by the agreement, usually accomplished by oral approval and a hand-shake. As soon as agreement was arranged in writing and signed by both parties, in which both were bound by contractual liability if either defaulted, it changed from an 'agreement in principle' to one of formality. Moreover, it followed that any Anglo-American strategic agreement based upon real-estate law could only bind by mutual good faith and not by financial constraints. The usual civil financial penalties, therefore, for binding the two coalition partners together were inapplicable.[42] Specific to the April 1942 London Conference, Marshall had cause to worry when he wrote, 'Everyone agreed in principle, but many if not most of the participants held reservations regarding this or that. It would require great firmness to avoid further dispersions.'[43]

During the August 1943 Quebec Conference, when Brooke had enough of American intransigence; he cited,

> ...the strain of arguing difficult problems with the Americans who try to run the war on a series of lawyer's agreements, which when once signed can never be departed from, is trying enough... but I suppose that when working with allies, compromises, with all their evils, become inevitable.[44]

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[41] CCS 32 Meeting, Washington, 24 July 1942, Reel III.
[42] Interview with Brig. Gen. Sir R. Kilner Brown, London, 24 Sept. 1993.
[43] Gen. G. Marshall, 'Cable Message to Gen. McNarney', Washington 13 Apr. 1942, Rg 319, CM-IN 3457.
[44] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/IX, p. 775.

The problem with an 'agreement in principle', as in the case of SLEDGEHAMMER, was that it harbored a number of unwritten and unspoken British reservations. Since these concerns and objections were not revealed to the Americans present, they assumed that the British had agreed to their plan. The cost of British subterfuge was high: alternate, viable strategies were delayed, trust was eroded, and the coalition weakened.

Churchill drew a description in his post-war memoirs of the differences between the thinking processes of the two peoples:

> The American mind runs naturally to broad, sweeping logical conclusions on the largest scale. It is on these that they build their practical thought and action. They feel that once the foundation as been planned on true and comprehensive lines all other stages will follow naturally and almost inevitably.
>
> The British mind does not work quite in this way. We do not think that logic and clear-cut principles are necessarily the sole keys to what ought to be done in swiftly changing and indefinable situations. In war particularly we assign a larger importance to opportunism and improvisation, seeking rather to live and conquer in accordance with the unfolding event than to aspire to dominate it often by fundamental decisions. There is room for much argument about both views. The difference is one of emphasis, but it is deep-seated.[45]

Whatever may be laudatory and intuitive in Churchill's revelations, Eisenhower had a number of pre-D-Day administrative problems to face. Arriving in London on 16 January 1944, seeking consensus from a gathering of some fifty or sixty British officers at SHAEF, Eisenhower spoke forthrightly to them,

> Now I want you British to know that all Americans when they go to school learn in history that it was 'John Bull', the red-coat, who was always the nigger in the wood pile, and when Americans grew up they did not forget this teaching until they were put in contact and learned to know the British.[46]

A Special Relationship

To what end did Churchill try to create a 'special relationship', knowing that either nation's self-interest was inviolate, believing that their survival was determined by what

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[45] W. Churchill, *The Second World War*, III, (Boston, 1950), p. 673.
[46] Air Vice Marshal E. McCloughry, *The Direction of the War*, (London, 1955), p. 117.

was best and efficacious? As a politician, he knew that American economic and defence interests were part reflections of its sovereignty. The Americans demanded British gold, 'new-world' bases and scientific secrets in payment for armaments; these assets were held hostage to protracted Anglo-American military trade negotiations, while Britain needed interim finance policies, on which its survival depended. He addressed these concerns to Roosevelt with self-imposed restraint on numerous occasions, such as 'I am convinced that the assistance from the United States on a far larger scale...is essential, if we and you are to escape disaster, and we are fighting for our lives.'[47]

The British and the Americans had deliberated on the benefits of mutual survival, but even when both nations' leaders seemed to be speaking with one public voice through the *Atlantic Charter* proclamation, the difficulties of converting rhetoric into action exposed more differences than similarities and more division than agreement. Moreover, the formulation of a coalition strategy was corrupted, in part, by each nation's self-interest, regardless of the combined communiqués avowing unity of purpose. London officials frequently assumed that a mutual identity of interests existed, to which the Americans were not always willing to agree. The British, dependent upon American goodwill, had little choice but to focus on the United States, while for the Americans, the Britain's good will was not nearly as vital. Strength is easily recognizable between nations.

Sometimes a nation may sense its own identity in war-time, but that does not imply that it is easily translatable to its allies. De Gaulle's clear and resolute personification of a fragmented France ran into difficulties with the Anglo-Americans, because of mutual variations and misunderstandings in language, custom and practice. Churchill had an easier time molding public opinion in an essentially uni-racial wartime Britain, and therefore had a freer hand. Roosevelt, directing a multi-racial non-belligerent America, suffered from an unclear mandate and chose to follow public opinion rather than mold

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[47] W. Kimball, *Op. cit.*, Pt. 1., pp. 91, 93, 101, 115, 182.

it. Even though this drawback existed, Roosevelt's expressions of good will were expressed in general terms, much to Churchill's chagrin. Aware of Roosevelt's sensitivity to the public mood in 1941, Churchill mused that, if a question of peace or war had been placed before Congress, there would be a lengthy three month debate. This in spite of Roosevelt's sentiments revealing a sympathy for Britain.[48] He hoped Roosevelt would become more and more provocative and create a maritime incident. Without a resultant composite strategy, however compromised and lacking in vitality, neither nation could survive for long: while both nations had reasons to coalesce, national precepts and policies created difficulties. A common policy, war and post-war arrangements had to be found for their treatment of Franco's Spain, Japanese Pacific expansion, commercial competition in Argentina, commodity arrangements, merchant shipping and civil aviation. It seemed as if the European war was once again enabling the New World to 'fatten on the follies of the Old.'[49]

Regrettably for both countries, with the President shifting between indecision and provocation on the one hand, and Churchill continually and desperately appealing for America's participation on the other, confusion prevailed at Placentia Bay. Measured against accomplishment, Churchill could exult little, although he believed that the partnership had to be maintained at all costs with other considerations subordinated to it. Churchill stated, 'that a complete understanding between Britain and the United States outweighed all else',[50] and told Eden, 'My whole system is based upon my partnership with Roosevelt.'[51]

Churchill, having the accepted Roosevelt's frequent invitations to dine with him aboard the President's ship at Placentia Bay, believed he had created and furthered a special and personal alliance. This tie was not without discord, and it became increasingly one-sided as time passed. The relationship, as process, was subject to the same pressures as the rest of international relations. For Britain to survive, Churchill

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[48] CAB 65/19, WM 84(41) 1, Annex, 19 Aug. 1941.
[49] M. Peterson, *Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation*, (Oxford, 1970), p. 416.
[50] W. Churchill, *Op. cit.*, p. 555.
[51] Churchill to Eden, 5 Nov. 1941, PREM 4/ 27/1, .

idealized the American relationship: Churchill's post-Placentia Bay report to the War Cabinet, proclaiming that the President had given the US Navy an order to shoot U-boats on sight had more to do with 'wish-fulfillment' than actuality, because no evidence exists proving that any such order was issued.[52] Roosevelt needed the relationship less so, although he sometimes liked Prime Minister's company. Churchill never wavered in his belief that it was the Anglo-American partnership that mattered, exclusive of Stalin. He wrote to the President, 'Our friendship is the rock on which I build for the future of the world, so long as I am one of the builders.'[53]

Policy makers in Washington did not return such intimacy; although Britain was needed for America's safety, it was not needed for its survival. From Washington's point of view, British policy, all too often, displayed short-sightedness, arrogance, even duplicity. Distrusting Washington, some British officials, misunderstanding Churchill's intent, had warned, as early as the 1940, that too close an embrace with America would be akin to exchanging one master for another.[54]

Churchill's 'special relationship', lacking a quorum of adherents, could not overcome British or American self-interest regarding modifications in military strategy, protectionist trading policies, spheres of influence, and colonial independence.[55] Regardless, Churchill perpetuated the myth. Assessing Britain and her prerogatives of empire, Roosevelt, in a prescient mood, felt that, 'We will have more trouble with Great Britain after the war than we are having with Germany now.'[56]

Prior to America's entry into the war, American sensitivity in defence of its national interests took priority over any real or imagined kinship with Britain. When British warships severely damaged the German pocket cruiser, *Graf Spee*, during a sea battle off Uruguay in December 1939, the American State Department protested Britain's

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[52] CAB 65/19, WM 84 (41) 1, Annex, 19 Aug. 1941.
[53] Adm. W. Leahy 'Letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, London, 19 Sept. 1944, *Leahy Papers*, Library of Congress, Washington.
[54] Beaverbrook to Churchill, 26 Dec. 1940, PREM 4/17/1, pp. 104-107.
[55] Hull to Roosevelt,, L. Pasvolsky, *Pasvolsky File*, Box 2; Washington 19 Nov. 1941 State Dept. 841 24/1073B.
[56] C. Taussig, 'Memo', 30 Nov., 1942, *Taussig Papers*, box 46, FDRL.

western hemispheric intrusion.[57] Co-operation on a personal basis, founded on the belief that some shared aspects of history, institutions, ideologies, language and an identified common enemy, was encouraged by a small minority. However, Brooke, as CIGS, deduced that the manifestations of commonality were more of a hindrance than a benefit when both sides conferred.[58] Marshall and Dill discovered that their new friendship could serve as an incentive for improving the negotiating process. British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, Admirals Turner and King remained aloof and prejudiced against similar possibilities. Nevertheless,

> Individuals might help to dissipate genuine ignorance or genuine misunderstandings, a Lothian, a Halifax might make relations easier...a Purvis break through the jungles of red tape that might have strangled lesser men...But the great issues were decided as a result of factors outside their control.[59]

To Roosevelt and his advisors, their relationship with the British was defined as a combative kinship. The popular image of the British ambassador neatly illustrated many of the unsavory qualities which millions of Americans held in contempt: wily, polished, and thoroughly unscrupulous, seeking to disadvantage his unsuspecting American counterpart.[60] Historically, American tension and distrust had always been paired with the sense of a 'special relationship', as a reaction to the Revolutionary War, Britain's meddling in the American Civil War, and British challenges to America's expression of 'manifest destiny' during the 19th century. Anti-British sentiments existed in the United States, and 'twisting the lion's tail' was not only expressed by Irish-Americans.[61] Therefore, the 'special relationship' may have been nothing more than a realization that the military and socio-economic competition between the two powers had to be subordinated to one of co-operation, in view of the Axis threat.[62]

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[57] W. Kimball, *The Juggler*, (Princeton, NJ, 1991), pp. 117-118.
[58] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 'Notes For My Memoirs', 2/V, 15 January 1943, p. 4.
[59] M. Beloff, 'The Special Relationship: An Anglo American Myth', M. Gilbert (ed.), *A Century of Conflict*, (London, 1966), p. 169.
[60] R. Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership, Britain and American, 1944-1947*, (New York, 1981), p. 8.
[61] A. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*, (Baltimore, 1935), p. 145; K. Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908*, (London, 1967).
[62] 'Roosevelt Letters: 12 April 1938 & 11 Jan.1941', E. Roosevelt (ed.), *FDR, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, 2, (New York, 1950), pp. 1103-5.

Facing their common enemy, British and American reactions were comparable to those of the settlers crossing the American west after the Civil War, who, in their attempt to survive, had placed their wagon trains in a fortified circle as a defence against attacking Indians, while preparing to take the offensive. The analogy can not be carried too far, because of the imbalance of power and production between the two countries. At this stage of the war, although America moved towards industrial supremacy, for the moment there existed a rough equality between the British and Americans. Even if Britain were given the tools, Churchill knew that despite his rhetoric, it could not finish the job. Considering the fears and jealousies that exist between nations of equal stature, Britain's emerging relative weakness *vis à vis* America may have evoked an American paternal-benevolence, in the short-term, that furthered co-operation between the two countries, noted as a 'special relationship'. Transcending the divination of a 'special relationship' was the real sympathy expressed and the military aid offered by Roosevelt and Marshall to Churchill when Tobruk fell and its garrison of 33,000 men were taken prisoner by Rommel's forces on 21 June 1942.[63] If Lend-Lease were considered as America's most unsordid act, a questionable evaluation, the American offer of military assistance in the Middle East, at its own expense, was the most unconditional and immediate; the Prime Minister was deeply touched.[64] Brooke who was present at the White House that day, recorded the event in his diary later, 'I remember vividly being impressed by the tact and real heartfelt sympathy which lay behind these words. There was not one word too much, not one word too little.'[65]

The fall of Tobruk, the British North African fortress was portentous, Churchillian rhetoric notwithstanding, because the balance of power had tipped ominously towards Washington. Churchill was intelligent and realistic enough to create a belief system, albeit with limited but acceptable credibility and appeal, to which he and others could turn to in an uncomplicated way. The title 'special relationship' was simple enough to

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[63] Adm. J. McCrea, 'Unpublished Memoirs of John L. McCrea', *McCrea Papers*, Box 1, FDRL.
[64] D. Acheson, 'Memo of a Conversation', Washington 28 July, 1941, FRUS, *Conferences at Washington 1941-42*, III, pp. 10-13.
[65] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, Vol. 3/A/VI, p. 418.

cover aspects of personal relations, a real or imagined goal to be achieved, within the war's bureaucracies. By way of contrast, Robert Sherwood described the relationship between the Anglo-Americans as 'common-law allies', indicating that they were allies by reason of their conduct rather than as a result of official signatures to that effect, i.e., an unsigned integration of effort.[66] The problem with this phraseology, however accurate, was that it lacked the color, emotion and connectedness that the term 'special relationship' evoked.

Churchill described the 'special relationship' as if it were a romance, a love-affair between two people. They could be perceived visually, up close, a strong point in the selling of an idea. He went as far as to suggest, 'No lover ever studied the whims of his mistress as I did those of Roosevelt.'[67] Two great democratic states, teeming with millions of inhabitants, were reduced to one loving couple, identified as easily as icons. When the United States became a belligerent, Churchill, his eyes twinkling, responded to a question regarding its change in status: 'Oh that is the way we talked to her when we were wooing her, now that she is in the harem we talk to her quite differently!'[68]

Churchill added a metaphorical variation to his original theme. The Prime Minister's 19th Century Romanticism described the relationship as a later Grand Alliance, which he compared favorably to the relationship Marlborough had forged with Prince Eugene of Austria. He wrote of this coalition against Louis XIV of France, with unparalleled intimacy, 'No one can comprehend the battle of Blenheim unless he realized that Eugene and Marlborough were working like two lobes of the same brain.'[69]

Churchill understated his case when addressing the House of Commons in 1940; he alluded to the informality of the Anglo-American relationship, descriptive of Sherwood's Common Law Alliance, 'These two great organizations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be

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[66] R. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, (New York, 1948), p. 270.
[67] J. Coleville, *The Fringes of Power, (London: 1985)*, p. 634.
[68] FM Lord Alanbrooke, '*Op. cit.*, 2/V, p. 32.
[69] W. Churchill, *Marlborough, His Life and Times*, (New York, 1937), p. 62.

somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage.'[70]

Nevertheless, he repeatedly returned to his favorite theme, romance, marriage and a love-affair with all its vicissitudes. He told the King that after months of 'going out'. Britain and America were now married.[71] Churchill's attempts to forge the myth are poignant because, in reality, the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Washington were fighting rear-guard actions in defence of a position and prestige which was no longer supported by requisite power. Without this essential ingredient of successful diplomacy, relying on experience and maturity instead, the British discovered that their partners were more interested in tanks and gold than advice. Even if the old story that made the rounds in Whitehall at this time, revealed that the two most important things in the world were 'love' and the 'special relationship', American officials rarely expressed the same interest and remained indifferent. 'It was this cavalier treatment, this apparent indifference to relations with Britain that so infuriated, and the same time perplexed, those in London who were responsible for devising a British policy toward the United States.'[72]

Portal, cast the relationship in a similar but more complicated mold a few years later at Casablanca. Churchill appealed to the public, Portal to the professional, 'We are in the position of a testator who wishes to leave the bulk of his fortune to his mistress. He must, however, leave something to his wife and the problem is how little in decency he can set apart for her.'[73]

This analogy relates to a conflict of resource allocation between the two major theaters of war; it distorts reality, and thus fails, because the British had little control over American resources - a major problem. Portal implied that the British are the 'we' in the above. To the contrary, the Americans are the 'we', testator and wife combined,

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[70] R. James, (ed.), *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches*, (New York, 1974), 364 H. Debs. column 1171, 20 August 1940.
[71] M. Gilbert, *Road to Victory, Winston S. Churchill, 1941-1945*, (London, 1986), p. 64.
[72] R. Hathaway, *Op. cit.*, p. 6.
[73] D. Richards, *Portal of Hungerford, (London, 1977)*, pp. 257-258.

the British the mistress. The analogy may serve the additional purpose of identifying the subjective British negotiating position, i.e., common-law alliances and mistresses are not recognized, and lack influence in many jurisdictions. Britain's influence over American goods and services declined when the enormous power and resources of the United States came to dominate the partnership.

Moreover, the idea of a 'special relationship', however ascribed, may have had more to do with Anglo-American public morale rather than with the men who were in positions of leadership, particularly when considering the American public. There was much to be gained by advancing the myth, because many Americans, according to a *Life* magazine poll, were not prepared to fight just to keep the British Empire intact,[74] but the reality at the command level was something different, as written by Eisenhower in January 1943,

> I am not so incredibly naïve that I do not realize that Britishers instinctively approach every military problem from the viewpoint of Empire, just as we approach them from the viewpoint of American interests. One of the constant sources of danger for us in this war is the temptation to regard as our first enemy the partner that must work with us in defeating the real enemy.[75]

Churchill spent all of the war trying to overcome American distrust of Britain as shaped by competition, naval rivalry, tariff restrictions and war debts, which almost precluded the possibility of any significant political and military co-operation. What might have been achieved if these hindrances to co-operation had never existed, or had been at least neutralized. 'Churchill's idea of a lasting Anglo-American partnership ended in the dustbin of history.'[76] By 1944, not only did American infantry divisions outnumber British and Canadian forces by a ratio of four to one in Europe, but American industry dominated munitions and supply production, out-producing all the Allies combined. Under these conditions, Churchill, however he fumed, whatever his strategic viewpoint, had little option but to follow where Roosevelt led. Churchill, demoted to junior partner, said, 'Up to July 1944, England had considerable say in things; after

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[74] W. Louis, *Op. cit.*, p. 198.
[75] A. Chandler, (ed.), *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, (Baltimore, 1970), p. 928.
[76] E. Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War*, (London, 1978) p. 138.

that I was conscious that it was America who made the big decisions.'[77] In turn, British prejudice had been expressed earlier by Neville Chamberlain, 'It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words...'[78]

To some extent, as demonstrated, that was true. The incident that Churchill had waited for, the condition that was to relieve his immediate anxiety and deep concern for the future, was the attack on Pearl Harbor. He wrote, 'So we had won after all!...All the rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force.'[79]

Economics, The Victory Program and Lend-Lease

America, no less than other countries, was not simply a vast politico-economic monolith, but a mosaic of conflicting beliefs which affected its foreign policy in a world at war. The battle for an acceptable Lend-Lease program was fought between the Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, each with a view that either demanded dissolution of British Empire economic preference and economic nationalism or the defeat of Hitler's Germany without economic extortion. Morganthau saw Britain's fight against Hitler as just compensation for Lend-Lease.[80] Hull, as an anti-colonialist, wanted Britain to post $2 to $3 billion dollars of collateral written into an agreement, believing that Britain possessed $18 billion dollars in Imperial wealth.[81] Both sides represented a portion of the President's thinking, but he did replace Morganthau with Hull during the final Lend-Lease negotiations. Linking economic nationalism with the perceived quality of peace in the post-war world, the American government attempted to drive a hard bargain in concrete contractual terms. Instead of an outright subsidy for an ally admittedly fighting America's war, the Roosevelt administration wanted continuing assurance that Britain

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77 W. Kimball, '*Churchill and Roosevelt: The Personal Equation*', *Prologue*, 6. (Fall, 1974), pp. 169-82.
78 A. Turner, *The Unique Partnership: Britain and the US*, (New York, 1971), p. 65.
79 W. Churchill, *Op. cit.*, III, p. 539.
80 Roosevelt to Morgenthau, 13 Mar. 1941, *Roosevelt Papers*, FDRL.
81 E. Roosevelt, *FDR, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, (New York, 1947-1950), pp. 1103-5; E. Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, (New York, 1950), pp. 42-44.

was fighting as hard as it could. As Britain's liquidity dwindled, her ability to buy arms on a 'cash and carry' basis diminished. Roosevelt indicated that she was prepared to divest herself of an estimated $7 billion dollars worth of American financial investment to continue her fight for survival. Both Secretaries and other cabinet members were ardent supporters of the sale of privately owned British shares in American companies, and advised English officials to sell such direct investments as Shell Oil, Lever Brothers, etc. Courtaulds, whose subsidiary, American Viscose produced 60 percent of all American rayon and accounted for half of its parent company's income, was pressured by the American government to relinquish its control. Sold at a loss in order to protect American nominal national security, it was the American government who benefited financially.[82]

Moreover, American businessmen were concerned that Britain was re-exporting Lend-Lease goods for profit into areas it had once dominated, and which were now being exploited by the Americans. Although the Americans respected British national pride and sovereignty, their assumption persisted during the Lend-Lease negotiations that Britain's policies had led to depression and war and these had to be changed to suit the American image. Calculations indicate that Britain received $27 billion dollars worth of Lend-Lease aid from the United States , without cash payments, and Britain, in her turn, provided America with $6 billion worth of Reverse Lend-Lease, a rarely mentioned amount. This was at a time when the official exchange rate was four dollars to the pound, when a box of breakfast cereal cost just over three pence and petrol slightly less than ten.[83]

Britain emerged from the First World War impoverished and financially indebted to the United States. In turn the United States, a debtor nation at the beginning of the war, emerged as the world's leading creditor. American revisionist historians argued that Britain had gulled the United States into fighting and financing a war on their behalf,

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[82] W. Kimball, '*Beggar My Neighbor: America and the British Interim Finance Crisis*, 1940-1941', *JEH*, 58, (1971), pp. 758-72.
[83] R. Allen, '*Mutual Aid Between the US and the British Empire*', *JRUSSI*, 109, (1986), p. 245.

had created an unjust peace at Paris and had torn President Wilson's principles to shreds.[84] Once again, in 1940, Britain had to swallow its pride and trust in American goodwill, for immediate political necessity outweighed long-term economic considerations.[85]

If Roosevelt fought for an improved post-war world, both he and Congress referred to more immediate and tangible matters without admitting to long-term British exploitation. Unfortunately, by avoiding the difficult Lend-lease questions, Roosevelt delayed enactment of policy, which increased the sense of drift.[86] While the British were vainly trying to avoid having to barter 'Imperial-Preference' in exchange for money and goods, Marshall awaited the formalization of Lend-Lease and its effect on the Victory Program, portions of which were inter-connected, with trepidation, because of the potential brake they might impose on the Army's growth. Nevertheless, both would provide the United States and its Allies with a substantive method of achieving maximum economic productivity and military effectiveness.

While Britain and Russia's constant demands for equipment continued to vex the War Department, contracts for the manufacture of Lend-Lease material served to establish major military production lines well before America went to war. Industry generally refused to convert to war production unless some sort of guarantee sustained production. Lend-Lease provided such a guarantee, and the War Department found that an important segment of industry was already mobilized by 7 December 1941.[87]

General Sir Ian Jacob, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, during a 1948 interview with Sir Basil Liddell Hart, represented British strategic wartime thinking, which misconstrued Marshall's systematic approach to the nation's total mobilization.[88]

Marshall did not propose to raise a force of over eight million men without knowing

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[84] W. Cohen, *The American Revisionists – The Lessons of Intervention in World War I*, (Chicago, 1967).
[85] R. Sayers, *Financial Policy, 1939-1945*, (London, 1956), pp. 398-405.
[86] G. Herring, 'The United States and British bankruptcy, 1944-1945: Responsibility Deferred', *PSQ*, (1971), pp. 260-80, 286.
[87] C. Kirkpatrick, *Op. cit.*, pp. 102, 108-109.
[88] Sir B. Liddell Hart, *Op. cit.*, 15/15/1, p. 1.

how and where they were to be equipped and employed. To him, that smacked of opportunism, devoid of strategy and lacking in preparation. The reverse was true, as expressed by General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, speaking for Marshall in 1941,

> We must first evolve a strategic concept of how to defeat our potential enemies and then determine the major military units required to carry out the strategic operations.[89]
>
> Wars are won on sound strategy implemented by well-trained forces which are adequately and effectively equipped. The ultimate question was where military operations should be conducted in order to produce decisive results.[90]

The American Victory Program: (The Brief of Strategic Concept & (AWPD/1)

On 9 July 1941, Roosevelt requested that the Secretaries of War and Navy, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, estimate the overall production requirements needed to defeat America's potential enemies.[91] By 11 September the Joint Planning Committee of the Army and Navy's Joint Board submitted a strategic estimate, which provided a basis for future military production. Moreover, it asserted that Britain could only defeat Germany with American military participation, a reflection of Stimson's view; Germany was considered the prime enemy, and once defeated, Japan would retreat from the territory she conquered. The Board had no faith in the British idea that aerial bombardment could defeat Germany, concluding that only land armies could finally win wars, as an integral part of combined arms.[92]

Although the President had turned to Marshall to place America on a war-footing, a resourceful American supply policy was lacking. British competition for scarce resources and demands for American assistance provoked an acerbic diary comment

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[89] R. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, (Washington, 1951), pp. 60-63.

[90] Gen. A. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, (New York, 1958), p. 74. Note: John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary for War, did not understand Wedemeyer's method of calculation, which began with men before considering materiel, i.e. amount of soldiers to defeat the Axis, and from such numbers determining the number of weapons.

[91] Roosevelt to Stimson, Washington, 9 July 1941,, Rg 165, No. File 1921.

[92] 'Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements, Sept. 11, 1941', *FDR Papers*, PSF, Box 1, FDRL.

from Colonel Orlando Ward, Secretary General Staff: 'We are like a pointer pup. If someone with a swagger stick and a British accent speaks to us, we lie down on the ground and wiggle.'[93] Roosevelt's highly personal style of administrating included three small cliques within the White House whose advisors were not necessarily qualified to solve the major military supply problems. Ward promptly noted in his diary, 'GB [Great Britain] has asked Santa Claus for equipment totaling about 25 billion dollars. It is tragic that we can't shape our course on a long-range, clearly-thought out program.'[94] Adding six weeks later, 'The story of the British fifth column and how it captured our Govt. without anyone knowing it will be amazing indeed in the light of future history.'[95]

Concurrently, some British military leaders in Washington had concluded that America was not only utterly unprepared for war, but doubted its will to fight. This was not startling news to Marshall, who not only recognized the political divisions within the country, but had struggled to reorganize the Army since his accession as Chief of Staff in 1939. Marshall, having witnessed the Army's chaotic attempts to mobilize in 1917, hoped that the mobilization and training plans he presently envisioned would go far to reduce this disorder and dispel British prejudice. 'gradualists' within the Army hierarchy were beginning to embrace the tenets of *ABC-1* and *RAINBOW 5*, which he advocated. They were also separating themselves from the isolationist position of Embick and his devotees.[96] The Chief of Staff was under no illusions. The White House cabal was seeking greater control of economic mobilization, which, if accomplished, would curtail War Department autonomy. To limit the demands by Britain, Russia, and China for American arms, which at times seemed excessive and unrealistic, Marshall's advisors and planners advocated the establishment of an agency in which the acquisition and disbursement of munitions would be placed under military control. Marshall clearly defined the need for a unified command over war orders,

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[93] Col. O. Ward, 'Ward Diary', Dec. 1940, quoted in T. Wilson, *Op. cit., p.p. 41-44.*
[94] *Ibid.*, 18 January 1941.
[95] *Ibid.*, 8 July 1941.
[96] R. Schaffer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-95.

which, in part, would effectively assist the American Army to rearm in timely fashion.[97] The establishment of a central military agency would eliminate the chaotic 'blank-check' policy of supply as espoused by the White House. In a letter written to the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, Roosevelt stated, 'I wish you would explore the munitions and the mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies.'[98]

Marshall felt that the British view of American participation was in the area of war production alone. If the Office of Production and Management was placed in charge of American production, the Army was under threat of not only becoming another claimant for its nation's arms, but a competitor against Britain and Russia as well. To neutralize this threat and counter the British effect upon White House thinking, Marshall, growing impatient with British arrogance, demanded a clear, orderly plan for the Army to follow in the months ahead. This and other deeper priorities, discussed between American military chiefs, were never shared with the British during the war, as Marshall stated, 'We discussed political things more than anything else...But we were careful, exceedingly careful, never to discuss them with the British, and from that they took the count that we didn't observe these things at all.'[99] He reasoned that politics was the domain of the heads of government, but strategy was based upon policy. Therefore, ideas and assumptions could be excluded from Allied military discussions.

Recognizing the enormity of his task to transform a small pre-war army into a world-wide effective fighting machine in eighteen months, Marshall assigned Major Albert C. Wedemeyer of the War Plans Division in July to produce a position paper on the subject. The paper, 'Brief of Strategic Concept', suggested that the two existing plans, i.e., the inappropriate 'Protective Mobilization Plan' and its supporting 'Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939' were outmoded and had to be replaced. Moreover, the

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[97] J. Alsop, 'George C. Marshall Interview', Washington Spring 1941, *Joseph Alsop Papers*, Library of Congress, Box 32.
[98] Roosevelt to Stimson, Washington, 9 July 1941, RG 165, Box 498.
[99] E. Larrabee, *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

administration needed to be provided with current data and estimates required for the mobilization of manpower, industry and shipping to defeat the Germans. Further, based on this information, these goals were to be achieved without causing the internal economy to suffer. The survey was not politically motivated by the President who, according to Stephen E. Ambrose, was more interested in post-war markets than full mobilization.[100] On the contrary, the President sought a formula by which victory could be achieved in the most cost-effective way, although he compounded the problem by failing to make distinctions between American and Allied supply priorities during the spring of 1941. Wedemeyer, the paper's author, in collaboration with personnel from the Navy and Army Air Corps, speculated that if Germany defeated Russia in 1941, Britain faced invasion and defeat in the spring of 1943, at the same time that American mobilization would reach its practical level of effectiveness. If Russia could hold on, he opined, Britain would survive, because American industrial capacity, productivity, and military forces, of a size and quality described and recommended in his paper would achieve its goals. The recommended estimates therein, combined with those of Britain's, would suffice to defeat the Germans.

Using the 'Brief of Strategic Concept' as its foundation, the paper, produced as a booklet in conjunction with the Army Air Forces estimate, 'AWPD/1', briefly defined the Army's approved strategy with regard to war plans, geo-politics, military philosophy and Army infrastructure. The 'Brief of Strategic Concept' and 'AWPD/1' originally lacked compatibility, because of their divergent views concerning the final battle of concentration and victory through air power. Wedemeyer accommodated both points of view in his final version, in an attempt to satisfy the proponents of either side, since there was too much at stake to do otherwise. With regard to British and American strategic theories, based on *ABC-1*, they varied for an additional reason, at one important point: the same American Army planners believed that the German Army had to be defeated on the battlefield and its will to fight broken in combat by future Allied

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[100] S. E. Ambrose, *Op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

armies; the British did not, relying instead on an overall German collapse, as defined in 'closing the ring'.[101]

Wedemeyer estimated manpower requirements, the probable size and composition of task forces, the possible theaters of operations, and the probable dates at which forces would be committed. 2,500 ships would transport five million men overseas. By 1945, bombers would have a 4,000 mile radius of action. Although criticized by segments of the tabloid press, it was popularly called the Victory Program upon completion in September 1941.[102] Henceforth, it served as a fundamental, albeit flexible[103], planning document in preparing the country for war.[104] Matched against the reality of 1944, manpower proposals erred in three categories:

> 1.) the men needed for the 'divisional slice' (the troops in support the infantry)
>
> 2.) provision for individual infantry replacements
>
> 3.) the amount of armored formations, anti-aircraft artillery, and tank-destroyers required[105]

Originally, Marshall conceived of an US Army consisting of over 200 infantry divisions, but for political, economic and strategic reasons, the great expansion of the Army Air Forces being one, this number was changed to approximately 85. Therefore, theater commanders were always short of infantrymen, which placed great strain upon the generals and soldiers alike. On the ground, operations would suffer and more had to be accomplished with less.

How well the Victory Program succeeded can be judged by the following assessment: before the Japanese attack, US Army trainees were using broom sticks in place of rifles, and the gross national product was $100 billion dollars. By 1943, the American

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[101] 'Brief of Strategic Concept', Washington, Sept. 1941, RG165, Exec. 4. Note: 'AWPD/1' was based on *ABC-1* and *RAINBOW 5*.

[102] C. Kirkpatrick, (ed), *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-17.

[103] R. Cline, *Op. cit.*, p. 60, 130 'The Victory Program Troop Basis Report' prepared by the Army Resources and Requirements Section in December, 1941 attempted to translate Army strategic and operation plans into terms of troop units so that munitions and supply production could be scheduled in conformity with ultimate Army needs].

[104] 'The Victory Plan' superseded the 'Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939', which was intended for the defence of the US territory and inadequate for a global war.

[105] C. Kirkpatrick, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 112-115

'arsenal of democracy' produced more war material than all the other belligerents combined and its military budget alone would reach $100 billion dollars. The United States would reach levels of production within the next two years that were scarcely believable, e.g., 45 percent of the world's arms, nearly 50 percent of the world's goods, and 66 percent of all the ships afloat.[106] In 1955, the Army staff calculated that Lend-Lease had equipped the equivalent of 101 US type divisions to eight of its Allies including the British Empire.[107] Japanese Admiral Yamamoto remarked after Pearl Harbor, 'We have awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve.'[108]

The benefits accruing to Marshall and the Army if the 'Victory Program' were approved by the President were manifold: the Army could achieve its manpower expansion levels within the allotted time span, because industry and production would be geared to meet these targets. It would be pre-eminent in the allocation of resources. Attempts by the White House and the Office of Production Management to control the allocation of munitions and the production and distribution of war material to allies would be eliminated. Britain's needs would be evaluated accordingly in conjunction with those of Russia and China's.

With Britain fighting for survival while America dithered, Churchill's need to create the myth of a 'special relationship' was vital. In so doing, he attempted to cover over national differences and draw the two nations closer together at any level, however superficial, because Britain desperately needed American support. Lacking substance, since Churchill and Roosevelt had not met in the nineteen years before Placentia Bay, the 'special relationship' was perceived as a good public relations approach. Myths die slowly, but at least now sentiment was replaced by a plan.

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106 S. Ambrose, *Rise To Globalism*, (London, 1988), pp. 28-31.
107 C. Kirkpatrick, *Op. cit.*, pp.108-110
108 P. Seabury & A. Codevilla, *War: Ends and Means*, (New York, 1989), pp. 57, 69.

Anglo-American Bureaucratic Structures

The variations in the bureaucratic structures of both nations indicated that the search for and the acceptance of and the application of a mutually agreed Anglo-American strategy would be an arduous and complex process. Article II, Section 2 of the American Constitution provided that the service Chiefs were to carry out the duties of their Commander in Chief. Policy was to be determined by the civil authorities, strategy by the Chiefs, but what if there were was no real direction from above? Was the building of an army to have top priority or was it to be all-out aid to Britain? American strategy, made unsteady by the divergent views of the Chief of Staff, and the President as Commander in Chief, was erratic and inconclusively drawn.[109] The absence of a much needed civilian-controlled staff-system coupled with Presidential ambivalence towards formalizing the strategic process, diluted purpose and delayed effective planning. By describing the power of Commander in Chief as an 'office' rather than a 'function', the Framers of the Constitution left undefined the Commander in Chief's specific powers and functions.[110] Unlike the bureaucratic British system, in which Churchill as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence was linked to the Chiefs of Staff, a Secretariat, Defence Committee for Operations, and the War Cabinet, all of which combined to form a unified and organic chain of command[111], the President could interpret his role accordingly without comparable intervention or assistance. Churchill, as controller of both the executive and legislative branches, had his agents serving on all the major governmental committees connected with the war effort. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff and Churchill met daily, ran the war and worked together to forge Britain's strategy. If the Chiefs of Staff could not reconcile their differences, Churchill stepped in to resolve the issue.[112]

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[109] Marshall to President, 'Ground Forces'', Washington 7 Oct., 1941, RG165, Exec. 4, item 7.
[110] S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (London: 1957), pp. 178-189
[111] S. Roskill, *Hankey*, 3, (London, 1974), p. 419.
[112] A. Wilt, *War From The Top*, (London, 1990), pp. 40-41.

However, in practice, by devising his own executive military system predicated on his dual roles, Churchill breached the jurisdictional subdivision of responsibility by which the formal independence of the bureaucracy was maintained. When Churchill formed a small inner cabinet, over which he presided as Minister of Defence, the three Chiefs of Staff were left without a civilian chief in the War Cabinet who could champion their case against him. Jurisdictional boundaries were also breached by the Prime Minister when he insisted that either he or his personal representative, General Ismay, attend Chiefs of Staff meetings on a regular basis. This prevailing situation limited the Chiefs' opportunities to consult in private, to view matters from their own perspective, and to co-ordinate a strategy against the Prime Minister should they fundamentally disagree with him. The Chiefs could only fight it out directly with either Churchill or Ismay on a day to day basis. Under this system, Churchill as Minister of Defence could not remain dispassionate or critical regarding plans, which as Chairman of the COS he had helped to formulate. It was a system that favored Churchill's demanding personality and strategic perceptions, and limited the Chiefs' ability to parry and counter.[113]

> What Churchill called the 'large issues' were first thrashed out by the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff and only then brought for formal approval to the War Cabinet, whose meetings were thus transformed into something akin to briefings sessions...Thus it was that the framework of decision making constituted a triangle with Churchill at its apex. It was he who directed and managed British 'grand strategy' by means of an intimate dialogue...with the Chiefs of Staff on one hand and Eden on the other.[114]

Theoretically, the chain of command differed between the two allied systems, but in practice one aspect was common to both, i.e., each system was interpreted and defined by the President and Prime Minister according to their idiosyncratic views of leadership, regardless of the table of organization. Both had created a small decision-making apparatus cut from his own cloth. Roosevelt rejected the idea of a war council, choosing instead to surround himself with a clique of personal advisors on war strategy

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[113] B. Villa, *Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and The Dieppe Raid 1942*, (Toronto, 1989), pp 258-259.

[114] T. Ben-Moshe, *Churchill: Strategy and History*, (Boulder, 1992), pp. 124-125.

set between him and his regular military advisors.[115] The Service Secretaries were relegated to the periphery by an executive degree, Military Order of July 1939. [116] Although each system provided for advisors and planners at every level of fact-finding, consultation, and decision-making, both Churchill and Roosevelt could manipulate the system to their advantage. This is not to imply a whimsical disregard for the office of high command within the political process; it simply demonstrated that these men were flexible and inquisitive enough to maximize their own investigative and strategic techniques and abilities collaterally. In addition, as national leaders and politicians, they demanded timely responsiveness and expertise from their subordinates on demand. If it suited them, they by-passed the accepted chains of command.[117] With no set of rules for compliance indicated, some sensitive personalities might disapprove, but the leader's recognition of accepted political custom and practice within a war-time frame of reference kept that within reasonable limits, even though Churchill tried the patience of many, one of whom was Brooke.[118] Theoretically, there was a difference in power between the President and the Prime Minister. Roosevelt formulated foreign policy whenever he chose, whereas Churchill directed foreign policy subject to the decisions of the War Cabinet. However, in practice, the differences were not as great, since Churchill frequently led the Cabinet and Roosevelt often deferred to the wishes of his advisers.[119]

Without benefit of a Secretariat or a linkage to a Chiefs of Staff Committee, the President's formulation of American military strategy was handicapped, i.e., Army responsibility for war strategy diminished and its body of professional military opinion ill-used.[120] Both Marshall and Stimson were concerned with the President's

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[115] S. Huntington, *Op. cit.*, p. 320.
[116] W. Emerson, 'Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II', *JMH*, 22, Winter, (1958-1959), pp. 183.
[117] Roosevelt agreed to by-pass the CCS, in 1942, sending his emissaries to argue the case for SLEDGEHAMMER in London with the COS; Churchill followed suit in 1943 when he disregarded the La Marsa agreement (ACCOLADE postponed) and sought further British action in the Eastern Mediterranean through C-in-C Middle East.
[118] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/VI.
[119] W. Kimball, (ed.), *Churchill and Roosevelt, The Complete Correspondence*, (Princeton, NJ, 1984), p. 128.
[120] R. Steele, *The First Offensive-1942*, (Bloomington, IL, 1973), p. 38.

unorthodox approach to strategy the Army's limited influence.[121] Unlike Churchill's day to day handling of the war, the President and Chief of Staff rarely met to explore and review their strategic aspirations. Misperceptions and assumptions occurred between the two men, but until April 1942, Marshall had few alternatives to counter Roosevelt's strategic predilections and his demand for action.[122] Clausewitz wrote, 'No one starts a war without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.'[123]

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff

Prior to February 1942, the center of American military power was the Joint Board, a corporate military executive established in 1903. It consisting of eight high-ranking officers, four from each service. Throughout its existence, the Joint Board was not a staff agency but simply an inter-departmental committee established by agreement between the Army and Navy service secretaries, from whom approval for action would have to sought and created to make recommendations in the interests of inter service co-operation.[124]

The exigencies of the coming war led to an expansion of the Joint Board in 1939 and the establishment of the JCS in 1942. On 5 July 1939, Roosevelt, conscious of the war's approach and jealous of his authority, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, issued a Military Order which transferred the Joint Board, the joint Munitions Board and several other military procurement agencies from the service departments into the newly established Executive Office of the President.[125] With the signing of this executive order,[126] the two boards were superseded by the JCS, but formal legalization to this structural change did not follow. In the end the JCS emerged by reason of semantics: whenever the services chiefs met, they simply called themselves the JCS.

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[121] H. Stimson & M. Bundy, *Op. cit..*, pp. 151-152.
[122] R. Steele, *Op. cit.*, pp. 18-45.
[123] Sir M. Howard & P. Paret, (ed.), *Carl Von Clausewitz, On War*, (Princeton, NJ, 1976) p. 579.
[124] E. Larrabee, *Op. cit.*, pp. 18-20.
[125] W. Emerson, *Op. cit.*, p. 183.

Lacking authorization as a separate entity, its status obscure, its power undetermined, the JCS was left to interpret its role from within, relying on presidential guidance. The role of the JCS was to keep the President informed on all inter-service matters, which included manpower needs, munitions, production and distribution, and strategy. Any JCS directives, the result of special sub-committees' studies that set operations into motion, required presidential approval Direction suffered because JCS Presidential recommendations demanded unanimity. The variations of the personalities involved increased debate. King's temper caused problems, and the President's availability was limited. Admiral Leahy, who had direct access to the President, summarized the views of the JCS to him, a role in which the Admiral excelled. Moreover, the President came to rely on Marshall, as his military consultant, regarding the consideration and application of grand strategy.[127] Permission granting the JCS to function rested simply on an exchange of letters between the President, Marshall and King, which added to the jurisdictional confusion. Provoked by a series of military disasters in 1942, the American press and Congress clamored for a Department of National Defense under a civilian secretary reporting directly to the President. King opposed the idea, claiming that he and Marshall, in their individual capacities as service chiefs, always had authorization to confer directly with the President on strategic, tactical, and operational matters pertaining to their respective services.[128]

Churchill gave a brief summary of Roosevelt and his Administration when he returned to Britain in early 1942:

> The President had no adequate link between his will and executive action. There was no such organization as the Secretariat of the Cabinet or the Chief of Staff Committee. When the President saw the Ministerial heads of the Fighting Services, who were little more than private secretaries and responsible to him only, meetings were quite informal...Harry Hopkins...played a great part in helping the President to give effect to his policies. There was little risk of the Americans abandoning the conventional principles of war...Roosevelt said to me on leaving, 'Trust me to the bitter end.'[129]

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[126] R. Cline, *Op. cit.*, p. 45.
[127] H. Stimson & M. Bundy, *Op. cit.*, p. 662; Sir A. Bryant, *Op. cit.*, p. 335.
[128] T. Buell, *Op. cit.*, pp. 182-83.
[129] CAB, 65/25 WM (42), 17 Jan. 1942.

The JCS's close identification with the President rested upon his concept of executive control. He preferred quasi-formal legal positions coupled with informal personal relationships. However, top army and navy commanders were chosen, because they possessed a sense of statesmanship that enabled them to consider the political as well as the purely military aspects of the global situation.[130]

> The JCS became, next to the President, the single most important force in the overall conduct of the war, the level and scope of their activities far transcending those of a purely professional body. As a result, the JCS ended the war with no experience in functioning simply as a military organization. Four years of war had given them a political tradition and role.[131]

Although King could lay claim to the above, his personality did little to facilitate negotiations. Colleagues described his demeanor as bleak, composure as fixed, resolute, grim, harsh, and ruthless.[132] 'Tough as nails, carrying himself as stiffly as a poker, he was considered to be blunt and arrogant, almost to the point of rudeness.'[133] When they met in Washington in 1942, Admiral A. B. Cunningham believed King to be,

> ...a man of immense capacity and ability, quite ruthless in his methods, he was not an easy person to get on with. He was tough and liked to be considered tough, and at times became rude and overbearing...He was offensive and I told him what I thought of his method of advancing allied unity and amity...he could hardly be called a good co-operator. Not content with fighting the enemy, he was usually fighting someone on his own side as well.[134]

Liaison between the White House and the Joint Chiefs was unreliable and faulty; needed decisions were delayed, papers lost. Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the JSM described their functioning as follows.

> There are no regular meetings, and if they do meet there is no secretariat to record their meetings. They have no joint planners and executive planning staff...Then there is the great difficulty of getting the stuff over to the President. He just sees the Chiefs of Staff at odd times, and again

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[130] R. Cline, *Op. cit.*, pp. 315-317.
[131] S. Huntington, *Op. cit.*, p. 318.
[132] E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, (Boston, 1960), p. 567.
[133] Gen. Lord Ismay, *The Memoirs of Gen. Lord Ismay*, (London, 1960), p. 253; Admiral E. King & W. Whitehall, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record*, (New York, 1952), p. 417.
[134] AF Viscount A. Cunningham, *A Sailor's Odyssey*, (London, 1951), pp 611-612.

> no record...The whole organization belongs to the days of George Washington.[135]

Marshall convinced the President, over King's objections, that Roosevelt's affable and trusted friend, retired Admiral William D. Leahy, pre-war CNO (Chief of Naval Operations), two-term governor of Puerto Rico and former Ambassador to Vichy France, would be an excellent choice as his personal chief of staff. Leahy joined the JCS as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the US Army and Navy, became its extra-legal chairman through seniority, and remained an equal among equals without any command authority. From the summer of 1942 onwards, the JCS consisted of King, Marshall, Leahy, and Arnold.[136] Lacking the power that their quasi-legal status imposed when dealing with government agencies over war-related issues, they solicited for an Executive order to rectify the situation. Roosevelt refused, insisting that it would inhibit their flexibility. Left to serve solely at the President's pleasure, basing their authority on his approval, confidence, and tacit consent, the JCS sought self-identification and failed.

Since Roosevelt wanted to control American war policy, he disallowed the creation of a civilian-military council. Henceforth, the civilian departmental secretaries of War, Navy, and State were refused entry into any organization dealing with policy. Responsibility in all matters of strategic policy resided with the newly created JCS and the President. Without the additional contribution of civilian-political viewpoints, the JCS, as arbiter, lacked the experience and qualification necessary to originate and advise on strategic possibilities; to that extent an imbalance existed and policy-making was distorted.

It was on firmer and more familiar ground when it kept the President informed on all common Army and Navy matters of policy, including manpower needs, munitions production/distribution, and strategy. Subordinate to it were subsidiary groups and

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[135] Sir A. Bryant, *Op. cit.*, p. 234.
[136] V. Davis, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: Organizational Developmnt of the JCS Committee Structure*, 2, (Washington, 1972), p. 370-965).

specialized committees that dealt with a multitude of problems. Their findings were reported to the JCS and the President. Leahy, as go-between, briefed the President on the committee's findings as well as the actions of the JCS, who sometimes joined the President to discuss the concepts of grand strategy privately. Usually it was Marshall who maneuvered the other Joint Chiefs into a unified position on particular issues. With the President's approval, the JCS issued the directives that put men and weaponry in motion. In effect, the President determined the general objectives, the JCS worked out the policies and logistics, and theater commanders determined the details. Whatever its shortcomings, the JCS provided the President with the support he needed.

The Wider Role of the JCS

A Substitute for a war council, redefining its role, seeking direction from above, the JCS was forced to extend its activities and interests far beyond the normal confines of military direction into areas of diplomacy, politics, and economics. Although it dealt with military issues such as the evacuation of sick and wounded from overseas, naval escort operations in the Atlantic, and munitions assignments, the JCS also considered the appropriation of critical raw materials.

As the war progressed, more and more political questions had to be addressed and decided. The formulation of American policy preparatory to the great inter-allied war conferences, for example, was normally done by the military and the President, at the exclusion of the civilian Secretaries, who were left to deal with Congress and their departmental operations. From 1940 onward, the Secretaries of War and Navy were excluded from matters of grand and military strategy[137]. The JCS dominated the established system, discovering that the lack of a formal charter facilitated the expansion of its functions. Concurrently, close alignment to the President tended to expand its interests and power, as his expanded. To its surprise, no rival agency, therefore, could juridically accuse the JCS of exceeding its authority.

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[137] P. Hammond, *The Secretaryships of War and Navy*, Ph.D. Thesis, (Harvard, 1953), pp. 306-11.

> So far as the major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war. In this area of policy and strategy, the military ran the war just the way the American people and American statesmen wanted it run....On the domestic front control over economic mobilization was shared between military and civilian agencies. [138]

On 11 September 1941, two months before America's entry into the war, the Joint Board had compiled a list of American 'eventual' interests, as opposed to those of Britain. This confidential position paper, signed by both Marshall and Admiral Stark, defined the major national objectives of the United States as:

> ...preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of further extension of Japanese territorial domination; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as is practical, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty.[139]

The above statement by the Joint Board represented pre-war limited executive military thinking. Incrementally influenced by the President's interpretation of wartime foreign policy, its previous thinking underwent an inexorable change. Rather than maintain the accepted military views of balance of power and military security, the JCS acceded to the President's assumptions and values of civilian thinking. Moreover, it exchanged balance of power and military security for two other components: first, military victory was to be the overriding goal; and second, the requirements of military strategy to be decisive in national policy.[140]

Clausewitz and the JCS

If the purpose of war was to express a nation's political will by an extended admixture of other means, the American military was not prepared to apply Clausewitz's basic tenet, that of the duality of and the interplay between political Ends and military Means to achieve that purpose.[141] During the early phases of the war, the JCS tried to separate

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[138] S. Huntington, *Op. cit.*, p. 315.
[139] R. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, (New York, 1950), p. 410ff.
[140] JCS 79 Meeting, 10 May 1943, Reel II.
[141] Sir M. Howard, *Clausewitz*, (Oxford, 1983), pp. 34-46.

the political Ends from the military Means, referring the former to the White House, while focusing on the latter. The military floundered without any clear notion as to the government's policy. Since war aims can change as a war progresses, the JCS needed the President's guidance and direction on which to base strategy. This was rarely forthcoming. The Americans failed to see that strategy and statesmanship were synonymous at the highest levels. The Clausewitzian concept of violent means as the mere servants of political deliberations was poorly adhered to. While keeping the political Ends, the first of the dicta, at arm's length, the Americans simply included the last part, the military Means by which an enemy was totally destroyed in battle. In a different command structure, the redefinition and assessment of America's war aims and policy could have clarified the purpose of the JCS. 'No war was better recorded than World War II, but all too often the historian who has struggled through mountains of paper finds the trail disappearing, at the crucial point of decision-making, somewhere in the direction of the White House.'[142]

Nevertheless, the basic outline for action was the President's. The JCS had to translate the general blueprint of his grand strategy, at times unclear, and then fit it into a specific application. Roosevelt would reject any proposal by the JCS if it were in conflict with the animating principles of the American effort.. The edifice he created mirrored his view of governance: he liked to work in an unstructured and competitive environment in which he held all the strings and made all the final decisions.[143]

Roosevelt's Use of Secrecy

The President who arbitrarily cloaked his affairs in secrecy, frequently chose, when sending a message to the Prime Minister in London, to withhold its content from his Chief of Staff. British bureaucratic policy, by contrast, required that copies be supplied to designated governmental officers on a 'need to know' basis. Roosevelt's methods of confidentiality, excessively misplaced here, were disruptive and time consuming.

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[142] M. Matloff, *Op. cit.*, p. 3.
[143] W. Emerson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 190-193.

Dill supplied COS copies of secret Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence to Marshall, his close and trusted friend, the discovery of which would have ruined his career.[144] Marshall, the recipient of this intelligence, not only knew what was happening, but for what reasons.[145]

Roosevelt believed in flexibility and improvisation while practicing a highly personal form of government. He had done much to create an administration whose weaknesses were those of informal and overlapping confusion rather than rigidity, by which he chose to keep everybody guessing. Reminiscent of the New Deal years, Roosevelt formed committees of men with divergent views and invited them to seek consensus. He dissolved and reconstituted his own committees, and neglected their proposals. Although he had admired President Wilson's systematic attempts to secure peace in the world, he was determined not to entrap himself as did his predecessor. In politics, Roosevelt was perhaps the finest intuitive politician of modern times. He had learned to solve problems not by reasoned analysis but by intuition. Bored by administrative procedures, he left clear and precise directives unwritten; as a consequence, his own office was not tightly organized and his bureaucracy was often chaotic.[146]

He strove to do many things simultaneously, even though this meant keeping all parts of the war effort going at varying tempos in all directions. While he tended to compartmentalize military and political affairs, the JCS could not. As a military leader, he had an easy and casual way with his Chiefs of Staff. Meetings between Roosevelt and the JCS were impromptu affairs, usually convened to deal with a specific problem. He listened carefully to their recommendations, trusted them to carry out his orders, remained amiable, and overruled them at times. The President decided who would attend, presumably inviting only those specialists whose advice he needed. Scheduled

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[144] FM Sir J. Dill, 'Situation Report', 9 Mar. 1942, RG 165.
[145] F. Pogue, Interviews with Marshall, 29 Oct. 1956, 14 Nov. 1956 and 20 Feb. 1957, quoted in Pogue, *Op. cit.*, pp. 329-330.
[146] A. Campbell, 'Franklin Roosevelt and Unconditional Surrender', *Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War*, R. Langhorne (ed.), (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 221, 223, 237.

appointments diminished from 1942 onwards, in sharp contrast to Churchill's almost daily meetings with the COS Committee.[147]

The British Chiefs of Staff

The chaos that beset the Americans searching for and designing a military/executive administrative system suited for global war did affect the British to the same extent. When their negotiators met at various inter-allied conferences, faults in the American system slowed agreement However, a major problem that distinguished the British system from the American was Churchill, as noted by Brooke,

> Marshall's relations with the President were quite different from my relations with Winston. The President has no great military knowledge and was aware of this fact and consequently relied on Marshall and listened to Marshall's advice. Marshall never seemed to have any difficulties in countering any wildish plans which the President might put forward. My position was very different. Winston never had the slightest doubt that he had inherited all the military genius from his great ancestor Marlborough! His military plans and ideas varied from the most brilliant conception at the one end to the wildest and most dangerous ideas at the other. To wean him away from these wilder plans required superhuman efforts and was never entirely successful in so far as he tended to return to these ideas again and again.[148]

Britain's system, by comparison possessed a level of accountability, realism, flexibility, and systematic co-ordination unknown to the Americans. Churchill took immediate action to establish and consolidate his position as Prime Minister in May 1940, by making some changes in Lord Maurice Hankey's (minister without portfolio) existing bureaucratic structure. Even if Churchill had achieved his position through a spontaneous Parliamentary revolt, which reflected Britain's mood, rarely had a prime minister in a time of crisis grasped unlimited power. Much like Roosevelt, he excluded his service ministers from the War Cabinet, a body consisting of five members of whom he was one. The War Cabinet acted as an occasional court of last resort for his ministers and committees, before he decided. The Prime Minister's domination of foreign policy was clear and complete, and in effect, his direction, leadership, and

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147 W. Emerson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 185, 187-190.
148 FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/VI, Vol. VI., p. 418.

action obtained. Furthermore, Churchill added to his power by creating and assuming the post of Minister of Defence. To achieve the most flexibility, he deliberately kept the powers of this post imprecise. He wanted to force a highly structured bureaucracy into more energetic action as part of Britain's war effort. Churchill made a subtle and ill-defined change rather than a legal and constitutional one, affording him great power without any interference from any other lawful supervisory authority.[149] As both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, he supervised the war effort, and became its chief director through the exercise of political authority and the formulation of defence policy.[150]

In addition to the permanent machinery of government, Churchill made a practice of establishing *ad hoc* committees over which he presided whenever he wanted to focus dramatically on a particular aspect of the war effort, e.g., the 1941 U-boat menace. In other similar organizational efforts, he demonstrated a pragmatic flexibility, searching for the most efficient ways to direct total war.[151]

Churchill established the post of Minister of State, a position accountable to the War Cabinet, with direct access to the Prime Minister, created to provide the local British Commanders-in-Chief with the political guidance not hitherto available. The appointment of Harold Macmillan as Cabinet-ranked Minister Resident to Eisenhower's Allied Headquarters, North West Africa, demonstrated Churchill's need to have the British point of view placed before the American commander.[152] Restraint was not one of Churchill's virtues: during March 1944, he attempted to wrest the Joint Planners from the COS Committee. He argued that they belonged to his staff all along and not to the COS. Known as the 'Planners', it was an operational branch of the COS Committee, composed of two main inter-service sub-committees, Planning and Intelligence, without which the parent organization could not function as a national military headquarters. Through these two branches the COS gathered all information

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[149] E. McCloughry, *Op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.
[150] *Ibid.*, p. 160.
[151] *Ibid.*, pp. 158-166.
[152] H. Macmillan, *Memoirs: The Blast of War, 1939-1945*. (New York, 1968), pp. 169-174.

and intelligence on which plans were prepared for future offensives, and events of current operations were kept under review. Brooke rejected any change of structure, commenting that,

> To suggest, as the Prime Minister was doing, that the 'Planners' were part of his staff and not that of the COS Committee, was the equivalent of depriving the headquarters of command of its Operational Branch. The idea was fantastic for even if he did complete a plan with the planners the plan would still have to come before the COS Committee. All that he was doing was wasting the planners time, and they were very busy people...[153]

In the end, Britain's organizational machinery for prosecuting the war achieved an important balance between Churchill's application of leadership and the Defence Committee's ability to restrain him by a variety of military and civilian resources. At the beginning of his tenure, Churchill often called 'full' meetings of either the Defence Committee or the War Cabinet to address a myriad political-military issues, to prepare for eventualities and to determine policies associated with total war, at least once a week.[154]

The results of these deliberations led to more detailed planning by government agencies created for that purpose. However, both the Defence Committee and the War Cabinet fell increasingly into disuse as the war continued. Churchill had replaced the Military Co-ordination Committee with a Defence Committee consisting of two sections, 'Operations' and 'Supply'. The Defence Committee (Operations) was composed of the Deputy Prime Minister, the three Service Ministers, and later, the Foreign Minister. The Chiefs always attended Operations meetings, as did other ministers when required; it was this organization, as well as Churchill himself, that became the focal point where the political-military elements of power were synthesized. The Defence Committee (Supplies), usually chaired by the Prime Minister, separated the many detailed logistics issues from policy and operations, ensuring that this important link was addressed.

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[153] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit*, 3/B/XII, p. 920.
[154] F. Loewenheim, H. Langley, M. Jonas, (eds..), *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

In another brilliant move, Churchill placed the military wing of the War Cabinet Secretariat under him, as his own machinery for action rather than a Ministry of Defence. Thus actual power soon shifted from the War Cabinet to Churchill, even though it had represented the supreme executive authority. As its influence waned, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, subordinate to the Defence Committee (Operations), presided over by the Prime Minister, gained ascendancy. Through this committee the Chiefs operated as a joint headquarters, using two principal subordinate structures, the Joint Planning Board and the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. These committees, composed of either statutory members or liaison officers, as well as civilian specialists from the key ministries of War Transport, Home Security and Economic Warfare, emphasized inter-service co-operation. With the clear lines of a unified command structure established, Churchill was free to form an intimate relationship with his Chiefs, something Roosevelt failed to accomplish with his own. The Chairman chaired the meetings, acted as spokesman for the Chiefs before the Defence Committee or Cabinet, and advised on matters concerning his service. The strategic questions as well as the day-to-day running of the war devolved upon the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs. At the same time, rather than convene the whole Defence Committee, Churchill tended to rely more and more on meetings between the Chiefs and those ministers whose jurisdiction covered a particular problem or issue. These changes represented practical improvements to the original system's functioning commensurate with total war.[155] Demand for an independent principal strategic adviser never arose, which suited Churchill, who always believed in straight-forward dealing with the responsible professionals. There was undoubtedly disadvantages, perceived and termed by the military as operational interference; nevertheless, a unique political-military bond emerged that favorably affected those involved in directing the war.

To operate this organization, Churchill relied on what he termed his 'handling machine', General Hastings Ismay, called 'Pug', who became his representative on the

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[155] *Ibid.*, pp. 164-166.

COS Committee. As head of the Cabinet Secretariat, Ismay brought years of invaluable experience on the Committee of Imperial Defence to his new position. Ismay was a hard worker, of unchallenged reliability, a consummate bureaucrat, and a negotiator who could elicit decisions and compromises without antagonisms.[156] Churchill admitted that he owed more to him than to anybody else in the whole of the war. How was Pug treated by Churchill during the war? Brooke comments,

> I should like to pay tribute to Pug Ismay and all the work he did as an intermediary between the COS Committee and the Prime Minister. He bore all the brunt of the first storms which some of our papers created, and was able next morning to warn us as to what the reactions were. He was kept up practically every night by Winston, was abused and sworn at, and seldom received any word of encouragement, and yet he went on serving Winston with utmost devotion.[157]

To the extent Ismay was abused, he succeeded in his position, partly, because of his ability to handle an extremely complex job: he served on the Chiefs of Staff Committee as Churchill's 'Chief Staff Officer' and functioned as his personal representative. Though junior in rank to the three members of the COS, in his capacity as Principal Staff Officer to the MoD, he qualified for full membership on the basis of this position, but the right to sign the Committee reports was disallowed.[158] Analogous in function to Dill in Washington, he had influence but final responsibility lay elsewhere, with Churchill and the COS. Like Leahy, his chief function was to make rough ways smooth; unlike Leahy, who presided over the JCS meetings, Ismay was not a member of the British Chiefs of Staff. Ismay kept the Prime Minister informed of the routine meetings of the COS Committee, often submitting reports and plans to him for approval. Sometimes Churchill approved immediately; on other occasions, Churchill would withhold approval until he had discussed their proposed action or some associated issue that required political guidance.

Additionally, Ismay's duties, performed through the small but efficient Defence Secretariat, included keeping Churchill in touch with all organizations concerned with

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[156] Gen Lord Ismay, *Op. cit.*, pp. 165-170; J. Leasor, *War At The Top*, (London, 1959), p. 11.
[157] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/B/XII, p. 901.
[158] Gen. Lord Ismay, *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-159.

defence; he conveyed his instructions to those responsible for action with the appropriate follow-up, and co-ordinated actions whenever more than one department was involved in a defence decision.[159] Finally, the debt to Ismay included the general's resistance to the attempts by Churchill to fill the Office of the Minister of Defence with such well known court favorites as Professor Lindemann and Major Desmond Morton. Ascribing power to them in defence matters without responsibility could have been disastrous.

By 1942, Cabinet meetings and Defence Committee (Operations) meetings decreased, superseded by informal meetings between the Prime Minister, a few invited ministers, and the COS. Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff were now running the war. Their relationship was never precisely defined, but it was close and constant. He met the three service chiefs and Ismay once a day, and more often on an informal basis as well. At first, Churchill had some difficulty getting service representatives with whom he was comfortable, but when Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal in '1940, General Sir Alan Brooke in 1941, and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham in 1943 replaced their predecessors, the membership was set. Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, participated as needed for his expertise. The actual running of the services was left to the vice chiefs, who like their superiors, met together daily.

In general, while Churchill and the chiefs worked together to forge Britain's war strategy, the COS had to deal with day to day problems and the conduct of the war: available resources; allocation of forces, shipping, and munitions; operational plans, orders and directives transmitted between London and its theater commands; and the development of intra- and inter-allied strategy and the co-ordination of the political aspect of military actions.[160]

The COS Committee was composed of the CIGS, CAS, the First Sea Lord, and the Prime Minister's representative, if the Prime Minister was unavailable. The work of

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[159] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.
[160] A. Millett & W. Murray, *Op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

COS was to advise the Government through the Prime Minister on all questions of British military policy and strategy. Between the wars, the Imperial Defence College offered a one year course designed to familiarize and prepare chosen senior officers for high command. The IDC 'old school' tie, worn by each of the COS members, came to represent a lessening of inter-service rivalry and the augmenting of a heretofore unknown high level of co-operation. The COS, moreover, combined with the American Chiefs of Staff to form the CCS who advised the President and Prime Minister together on matters affecting American and British forces jointly. [161]

The British had developed a blueprint for a system of sequential responsibility and accountability, which included the military leadership, the War Cabinet, and Parliament. Thus a collective body rather than an individual exercised supreme authority, allowing it to approach decision-making realistically. This was achieved as a result of the COS being given broadly defined powers and having excellent information on which to base decisions. The British system was flexible; it maintained centralized control, but there was considerable appreciation for versatility between the British nerve center and the war theaters.[162] It seemed to work; co-ordination was finely honed, and apparent in all aspects of the decision-making process, i.e., among joint military committees and civilian and military agencies as well. For most of the war Churchill's organization, redesigned from Maurice Hankey's original system, was rational and efficient, creating, as he claimed, 'a stream of coherent thought capable of being translated with great rapidity into coherent action.'[163]

This is theoretically true, but it was a Churchillian exaggeration. Even though the COS expressed a remarkable degree of unity, it suffered from persistent, strong inter-service disagreements. To its credit, the chiefs remained friendly, not allowing argument to degenerate into acrimony, sublimating special service interests to the needs of victory. In this, both Ismay and Portal played an important part. As the war progressed, the

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[161] D. Richards, *Op. cit.*, (London, 1978), p. 181.
[162] Gen. Lord Ismay, *Op.cit.*, pp. 166-172.
[163] R. Lewin, *Churchill as Warlord*, (New York, 1980), p. 34.

chiefs achieved a higher level of solidarity, tempered by time and experience. They approached and confronted strategic problems, in like manner, as highly trained intelligent professionals, despite their varied temperaments.[164]

Some British Personalities

COS records rarely described the rough and tumble process of committee debate by which issues were resolved and agreements reached. The stress and tension of the many meetings and inter-allied conferences in which the COS attended was alleviated by the chiefs shared interest in fishing as an art and science; it brought the three men closer together in and out of the conference room. In addition, both Brooke and Portal were expert bird-watchers, who found the odd moment away from the war to enjoy their hobby.[165]

Churchill's relationship with his Chiefs of Staff was heavily dependent on personality factors, a condition manifest throughout the war by the taking of strong adversarial positions. Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, maintained a certain resistance to the Prime Minister; it is not clear and still debated whether this attitude was based on Pound's personality *per se* or as a reaction to Churchill's ideas. One of Pound's methods of diffusing Churchill's wilder schemes was to delegate planning officers to undertake a full-scale investigation of his proposals. The planning staff would then produce a detailed refutation of the project which usually resulted in the project's quick demise. Since Churchill found Pound congenial, he accepted him professionally.[166] Neither Pound's successor as First Sea Lord, Cunningham nor Dill, as CIGS, ever achieved the same kind of acceptability, regardless of talent or professionalism.[167] Dill wrote, shortly after assuming the position of Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) on 27 May 1940, 'I am not sure that Winston isn't the greatest menace. No one seems able to control him. He is full of ideas, many brilliant, but most of them

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[164] FM Lord Brammal & Gen. Sir W. Jackson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 200.
[165] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 'Notes For My Memoirs', 2/XI, pp. 8-10.
[166] A. Marder, *Winston is Back, Churchill at the Admiralty*, (London, 1972), p. 5.
[167] J. Colville, *The Churchillians*, (London, 1981), p. 141.

impractical. He has such drive and personality that no one seems able to stand up to him.'[168]

Three years later, Dill had not changed his mind, and in a letter dated 26 August 1943, he wrote, 'I often wonder if the people will ever know of the difficulties and the dangers of Winston. It may be a great privilege to work with a genius, but my Lord it is difficult and terribly wearing. I wonder where we should be now if Winston had his untrammeled way.'[169]

Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, whose fortunes as a commander had reached their nadir in the Mediterranean in 1941, wrote to Brooke after the war that, '...I know how much the success of our strategy owed to your personal efforts and direction, and to your ability to handle with patience and yet firmness that very difficult personality, Winston...'[170]

With someone as irascible as Churchill, it might have been too much for Dill and Wavell, representative of military organization and methodology, to deal satisfactorily with him, even though they had dealt with other politicians before. Both men found it difficult to work with the Prime Minister; Wavell could be inarticulate in his presence and Dill lacked self-confidence.[171] One outcome of Churchill's behavior was manifested by an insensitivity toward members of his inner professional circle. Even though he could be considerate, Churchill did things to suit himself, regardless of how he inconvenienced others. Lacking the capacity to develop close friendships, he used people for the immediate service they could render and replaced them according to need.[172]

If Churchill had difficulty making friendships, he had no difficulty forming an important relationship with Portal. For his own part, Portal early conceived a

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[168] A. Danchev, 'Dill', *Churchill's Gen.erals*, J. Keegan (ed.), (London, 1991), p. 226.
[169] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 'Documents of a Semi-Official Nature', 7/2/1-17.
[170] *Ibid.*, FM Wavell to FM Alanbrooke, 30 May 1946.
[171] Lord Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965*, (Boston, 1966), p. 21.
[172] A. Storr, 'Churchill the Man', A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), *Churchill Revised* (New York, 1969), p. 242.

corresponding admiration and affection for Churchill. No serious disagreement, professional or otherwise, occurred to mar their relationship. If Churchill made inaccurate statements about the RAF, Portal put the facts straight, but kept his temper. He recognized that though the Prime Minister's incessant probing might be a nuisance, or on any other given occasion, wholly unfounded, it was the Prime Minister's right and duty to probe, and that by such energy at the top would the war be won.[173] An exchange of letters revealed the frequent clashes between the domineering Prime Minister and his skillful Chief who refused to be dominated. By a display of tact, good manners, and patience, Portal usually won the argument. In another, in which he violently disagreed with Churchill, Portal's recognition of his heated behavior led him to apologize. A broad smile appeared across Winston's face, and he said to Portal, 'You know, in war you don't have to be nice, you only have to be right.'[174]

Brooke, promoted to CIGS after an exhausted Dill was relieved in November 1941, reassessed his relationships between the COS Committee and Churchill as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, recognizing that the best method of getting along with him was to give way on nonessentials. When a matter of vital importance arose, the CIGS would say to the Prime minister, 'I am your subordinate. I'll only carry out what you wish if you give it to me in writing and sign it.'[175]

On these occasions, Brooke heard nothing more about the matter; Churchill had dropped it. With Brooke's ascendancy, Churchill discovered that he admired his intelligence, his ruthlessness in dealing with unsuccessful commanders, and his strategic sense. Moreover, the new CIGS was also quick, decisive, methodical and not afraid to decentralize.[176] In addition, Brooke suffered from an underlying vein of pessimism and uncertainty that was an invaluable complement to Churchill's constant self-confidence and occasional euphoria. Brooke's reaction to his appointment as CIGS was in direct contrast to Churchill's ebullient acceptance of his office in May 1940:

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[173] Sir B. Liddell Hart, *Op. cit.*, 15/15/1.
[174] Lord Moran, *Op. cit.*, p. 29.
[175] W. Morgan, 'Lord Allenbrooke', N.D., WDM 1/3, IWM.

> I had never hoped or aspired to reach those dizzy heights, and now that I am stepping up onto the plateau land of my military career the landscape looks cold, bleak and lonely, with a ghastly responsibility hanging as a black thundercloud over me.[177]
>
> ...I have felt that every day of this war was taking off a month of my life.[178]

Churchill's self-confidence were misleading. Recurrent fits of depression and mania affected Churchill's behavior, which in turn, affected relationships with his professional staffs. Ceaseless activity coupled with obsessive thinking mitigated against his 'black dog' mentality and lassitude. Relaxation was out of the question. He achieved a number of successes functioning this way, but it was Brooke who bore the brunt of his incessant mental pounding and persistent energy. The CIGS tried to parry the Prime Minister's strategic requests by keeping him on a tight rein.[179] Brooke constantly rebuked him in his diary, dwelling on his overbearing and inconsiderate nature.[180] Another diarist, Admiral Cunningham, wrote of Churchill, 'No decisions were reached; in fact, a thoroughly wasted day. What a drag on the wheel of war this man is. Everything is centralized in him with consequent indecision and waste of time before anything can be done'.[181]

Part of Brooke's outbursts were certainly due to the constant efforts by the Chiefs throughout the war to dissuade Churchill from his penchant for tangential enterprises that dissipated the energies of staff and his commanders. Planning staffs, for example, were ill-used, wasting time on either secondary or wholly irrelevant objectives, particularly when there was a lull in the war's action, i.e., Operation WORKSHOP (an invasion of Pantelleria), Operation JUPITER (a Norwegian expedition) and Operation ACCOLADE (an invasion of Rhodes).[182] None of these plans were activated, because

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[176] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/V, pp. 374-377.
[177] Sir A. Bryant, *Op. cit.*, p. 213; J. Coleville, *Op. Cit.*, p. 142; J. Kennedy, *Op. cit.*, p. 203; R. Lewin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126.
[178] Lord Moran, *Op. cit.*, p. 304.
[179] A. Storr, *Op. cit.*, pp. 271-273.
[180] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/X, p.798
[181] AF Viscount A. Cunningham, *Correspondence*, BL., Add MS 52577, 8 August 1944.
[182] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/B/XII, p. 895.

the Chiefs opposed him on strategic grounds, and Churchill, at heart a compromiser, however recalcitrant, grudgingly respected their judgment.[183]

> All those who worked with Churchill paid tribute to the enormous fertility of his ideas, and the inexhaustible stream of invention which poured from him...They agreed that he needed the most severe of restraints, and that many of his ideas, if activated, would have been utterly disastrous.[184]

According to Martin Gilbert, Dill and Eden, who were sent to Athens to study the Greek situation, failed him. When they recommended an early 1941 military expedition to Greece, he agreed, but had warned beforehand, 'Do not consider yourself obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your hearts you feel it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plans can be made please say so.'[185] Even though the COS warned against British inability to repel a German invasion of Greece, Churchill sought active military action in the Balkans.[186]

The British expeditionary force sent to Greece precipitated a German invasion of that country. Fortunately, this and other mistakes that Churchill made were not fatal, except to the Greeks. Dill, assigned to India in December 1941, was reassigned to Washington as Head of the British Joint Staff Mission the following month. Serving in this capacity, Dill was considered by Marshall to be the guarantor against the American perception of Churchill's imperial pretensions and strategic prejudices. Brooke described the position as one that combined the duties of a deputy ambassador and deputy minister of defence. He wrote in his diary:

> ...to see Prime Minister about sending Dill to the USA. as head of our mission there...This agreement was not arrived at without a good deal of discussion. Winston's dislike for Dill was nearly upsetting my plan at one moment. I had to press for this appointment and pointed out to him that with Dill's intimate knowledge of working of the COS Committee and of our strategy, there could be no better man to serve our purposes in Washington...Thank heaven I succeeded...few men did more in furthering our cause to final victory than Dill...I look upon that half hour's discussion with Winston at 10 Downing street ...as one of my most important accomplishments during the war.[187]

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[183] Gen. Lord Ismay, *Op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.
[184] A. Storr, *Op. cit.*, p. 215.
[185] M. Gilbert, *Winston Churchill*, VI, (Boston, 1983), p. 1013.
[186] CAB 69/8 (40) 42 WSC to Wavell, 14 Nov. 1940.
[187] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/V, p. 329.

Marshall believed that Dill's search for an acceptable 'combined' global strategy, as a member of the JSM and the CCS, was never fully appreciated by Churchill, and he reminded the Prime Minister of this in writing, when Dill died in November 1944. 'I doubt if you or your Cabinet associates fully realize the loss you have suffered.'[188]

The Prime Minister's demanding behavior increased Marshall's wariness of Churchill. Without benefit of an American nucleus mission in London and without the access the Prime Minister afforded to the British Chiefs of Staff, Marshall took Churchill's pronouncements seriously and literally. To him and his colleagues, Churchill appeared to be unpredictable and unreal, his talk extravagant. Moreover, stirred by an admixture of distrust and appeal, the American Chiefs approached him with caution, because they were unable to place his strategic imagination within the context of practicability. When he advocated the occupation of Norway's North Cape, the Americans thought him mentally unsound, although their British counterparts recognized the idea simply as the exploration of his manifold thoughts. Portal considered the American mind to be pedestrian and practical; this increased the difficulties of understanding Churchill:

> ..they were susceptible of his personality, because they were frightened of being carried away by him and so they tended to oppose from him ideas which they might have willingly accepted from a more restrained and less captivating personality. They admired and respected him, but they were doubtful of his strategic judgment and suspected his political motives.[189]

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[188] F. Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, III, (New York, 1987), p. 482.
[189] Sir B. Liddell Hart, *Op. cit.*, 15/15/1, pp. 1-3.

CHAPTER TWO

Conferences

Between December 1941 and August 1944, eight major summit conferences convened: two were held at Quebec, two at Washington, two at Cairo and one each at Teheran and Casablanca. The designated conference participants met to discuss strategy and the war's crucial issues. Cities in foreign countries became the preferred venue, because neutral ground offered a more relaxed atmosphere in which to work, away from the intrusive, easily available, self-serving bureaucratic machinery. Summits usually occurred when strategic planning had reached a point at which decisions on Allied strategy and policy demanded resolution at the highest levels.[1] They were designed to hammer out strategy based on the approved grand strategy, although this was not always adhered to. In attendance were the CCS, COS and their retinues, capped and often superseded by the presence of the civilian leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill (and occasionally Stalin), whose final approval was required. Left behind were the American Secretaries for State, War, and Navy, and their British counterparts. They were expected to administer their departments and to carry out policies, not to formulate them. The ground-work for each conference was done by staffs with varied competence based in either Washington or London. They preceded the arrival of the Combined Chiefs, the Prime Minister and the President. The strategic issues placed on the agenda followed traditional negotiating procedures designed to produce a solution. Sometimes certain issues were tabled, carried-over, poorly compromised, or dropped during the course of these meetings.[2]

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[1] Brig. Gen. M. MacCloskey, *Op. cit., (New York, 1970)*, p. 96.
[2] JSSC to JCS, 'QUADRANT', Washington 24 July 1943, RG. 218, JCS Records.

The General as the Negotiator

The members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as professional military officers were not experienced negotiators, although Marshall had learned the rudiments in dealing with Congressional committees. He was politically intuitive. During 1941, he lobbied extensively for a bill extending the Selective Service Act. Even though a national emergency existed, and an external belligerent threat existed, one vote separated victory from defeat when it was passed by the House of Representatives — a clear indication of the nation's political divisiveness. The bill scraped through, but without Marshall's tireless and non-partisan efforts, it would have been defeated.[3]

Marshall and his service colleagues had reached the pinnacle of their military careers in a hierarchy of limited dissent. Cultural, service and personal eccentricities affected their approaches to problem-solving. Since the JCS and the COS rarely met in executive session, unfamiliarity conspired against optimum results, although a few co-operative members helped to contain the friction.[4] The planning staffs serving these officers improved with time, but the presentation of an individual strategic paper, read by one of the major participants, followed by the usual discussion, was no guarantee to either side that a desired outcome would or even could be attained. Envy, distrust and prejudice, acting as a catalyst for protracted debate ranged from aggravation to acrimony, inhibited the speed of deliberations and undoubtedly affected their outcome.

Whatever was achieved by negotiation meant nothing without a Presidential directive or approval. Roosevelt was not one to look at the world and its terrors through the proper end of the telescope, nor could much be accomplished by his devoting only two days a week to the war.[5] John Maynard Keynes, the British Treasury's expert on external finance, considered the Americans as wayward Anglo-Saxons, who mangled the English language into what he openly and contemptuously referred to as 'Cherokee'.

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[3] F. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope*, (New York, 1966), p. 58.
[4] M. Stoler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 332-336.
[5] C. Thorne, *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

Keynes warned the British Cabinet, upon his return from Washington in 1941, that negotiating with the Americans was provisional until the last moment, and that an orderly progression in the quest for a final settlement was non-existent.[6] The Americans continued to suffer from confusion, division and indecision during the Allied meeting at Placentia Bay.

PLACENTIA BAY and ARCADIA

The 1941 meeting at Placentia Bay, Argentia, Newfoundland, code-named RIVIERA, was held against the backdrop of a British victory over the Italians in Libya, the neutralization of the French fleet in North Africa, the British loss of Greece, and the possibility of further German Mediterranean incursions. Churchill, seeking American approval, hoped to achieve a joint declaration of war aims. The meeting was held without an agenda and without any sharing of views beforehand. This did not prevent Roosevelt from demanding two preconditions for the meeting: no discussions regarding a possible American declaration of war; and no economic or territorial deals for a post-war world. Sumner Wells, Assistant Secretary of State was concerned about rumors of deals made by Britain with the deposed Greek and Yugoslav monarchs in return for their wartime support.[7]

British Organizational Skills and American Corporate Disunity

At Placentia Bay, the British Chiefs impressed the Americans with their negotiating and organizational skills. One of their favored techniques was to present a 'united-front'. The COS never admitted to internal dissension. Disagreements between government and military, between the services themselves, were ironed out in advance or obfuscated within formidable studies. King and Marshall, by contrast, expressed differences at Placentia that continued to reveal American disunity and caused their

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[6] J. Wheeler-Bennett, *Special Relationships*, (London, 1975), p. 16.
[7] 'Memorandum of Welles-Cadogan conversation', Washington, 9 Aug. 1941, *FRUS, Conferences at Washington*. 1941, 1:351.

interests to suffer.[8] Roosevelt refused to offer guidance to them and remained evasive. seemingly until he was assured of the American public accepting the inevitability of war. By keeping his strategic intentions private, by maintaining a nebulous national policy, little could be accomplished during the forthcoming military discussions and the application of the Victory Program suffered.[9]

Churchill's party included General Sir John Dill, CIGS; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord; Air Vice Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, VCAS: Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Professor F. A. Lindemann, scientific adviser and Lord Moran, Churchill's personal physician. These men were assisted by an array of deputies, all ready with position papers and supporting studies. If British staff work were not necessarily better, it was certainly more comprehensive.

The American delegation, by contrast, was small, with few aides and planners. Joining Roosevelt in the American delegation were his three military chiefs, Marshall, Stark, and Arnold; besides King, Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State; and two civilian advisors, Harry Hopkins, Personal Assistant and Special Advisor to the President and Averell Harriman, Director of the Lend-Lease program. Having been impressed with British thoroughness on a visit to Britain earlier in the year, Arnold felt the Americans were going into the conference cold.[10] Staff arrangements were so limited that Army Air Force Captain, Elliot Roosevelt, the President's son, was asked to perform as a recording secretary during military discussions.

Placentia Bay offered the first opportunity for many of the British and American senior officers to assess each other's professional abilities, but the anti-British attitudes, expressed by several senior American staff planners, did not bode well for the future. However, when Marshall and Dill first met at Placentia, there began a close

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[8] T. Buell, *Op. cit.*, p. 146.
[9] C. Beard, 'Roosevelt Deceived the Public', R. Dallek, (ed.,). *The Roosevelt Diplomacy and World War II*, (New York, 1948), pp. 9-16.
[10]Gen. H. Arnold, *Global Mission*, (New York, 1949), p. 240.

professional friendship that would benefit Allied co-operation. Since 1935, Dill's approval rating had remained high with the Americans who dealt with him. Reports of Dill to the President from virtually all of the Americans who came in contact with him were favorable The two sides assembled at Placentia were less apprehensive than ambivalent toward each other. Their approval ratings of each other, *in situ*, would directly impinge upon the coalition Roosevelt and Churchill had in mind. Wilson, Churchill's physician, believed that Marshall was the key to the situation, having been told by Churchill that the American Chief of Staff, in his quiet way, meant business. 'If we are too obstinate', the Prime Minister observed, 'he might take a strong line. That would avail us little, because neither side could contemplate going forward without him.'[11]

Only by working closely together ahead would personal antagonisms or questionable abilities be exposed.[12] Attempts to form a coalition were considered ill-conceived, if not impossible to these senior officers, because of their disparate backgrounds. King, for example, while not openly hostile like Embick, was distinctly cool toward the British, influenced no doubt by his earlier thinking, when he considered Britain a maritime adversary. Even the ship on which the Americans traveled, the *USS Augusta*, had been a pawn in the United States-British rivalry over the definition of 'cruiser' during the early 1930s. He epitomized the prevailing attitudes of the previous 20 years, i.e., indifference, suspicion and bitterness. Regarding Britain's national, imperial and balance of power concerns, Roosevelt was to say shortly after Pearl Harbor that, '...I've been trying to tell Churchill that he ought to consider it; it's in the American tradition, this distrust, this dislike and even hatred of Britain.'[13] Questions of trade, shipping and naval strength precipitated Anglo-American tensions during the inter-war years. Britain was regarded as a serious and dangerous competitor.[14] For example, early in the decade, Roosevelt had adjured his officials in London that if Britain even

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[11] Lord Moran, *Op. cit.*, p. 21.
[12] M. Schoenfeld, *The War Ministry of Winston S. Churchill*, (Ames, IA, 1972), p. 247.
[13] R. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, (Oxford, 1979), p. 324.
[14] T. Buell, *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

concluded any separate trade agreements with Japan, he would try to convince the British that their future security was linked to the United States.[15] The English, not to be outdone, went so far as to break at least one of the United States State Department codes.[16]

Divergent Strategic Philosophies

The British believed that the Germans could be defeated without an Allied landing on the Continent. This was in direct conflict with American strategic thinking. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that the war to be fought could be won by a combination of blockade, propaganda, armies of liberation, and strategic bombing. The coalition's application of economics and psychology against Germany would it was hoped eliminate the need for a huge invasion army striking at the Continent. Modern armored divisions accompanied by a popular Continental uprising, secretly armed from without, would ultimately defeat Germany.[17] This favorite Churchill theme, approved by the COS, carried over to the next conference. In essence, Britain did not need another American Expeditionary Force. What was needed was America's productive genius.[18] The British recognized America's wish to remain neutral, for the time being they even encouraged it, preferring that they continue manufacturing and supplying the vast amounts of military hardware needed to support Britain's war effort. In their final analysis, Europe would be re-occupied, not liberated. When the British landed troops in Europe they would 'go as policemen'.[19]

Marshall and some of his planning staff thought otherwise: the conflict was over grand strategy. It was the British emphasis on strategic bombing versus the American emphasis on massive ground assault at the chosen point of concentration. 'Closing the ring' left the Americans unconvinced. The military chiefs did not get on any better than

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[15] E. Nixon (ed.), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs*, II, (Cambridge, MA, 1969), p. 263.
[16] Churchill to Roosevelt, 25 February 1941, *Roosevelt Papers*, Map Room, box 7A, FDRL.
[17] COS, 'Review of Future Strategy', A51667, June 1941, PRO WO 193/326.
[18] FO 371/24329, A3242. W. Scott 'Minutes', 28 Feb. 1940; K. Hancock & M. Gowing, *British War Economy*, (London, 1949), pp. 380-387.
[19] Moffat to Dunn, Washington, 16 July 1941, RG. 59 D.F. 740.0011, European War 1939/13577.

their diplomatic colleagues, Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office and Sumner Welles. They had failed to agree on an endorsement that would have warned the Japanese to desist in their encroachments in the south-western Pacific. Too strong a warning could lead to war in the Far East, a war the Anglo-Americans were in no position to wage against the Japanese – a war that, in British eyes, would divert desperately needed assets to that area. Waving a number of British proposals aside, the Americans agreed to convoy all shipping, including Britain's, from Newfoundland to Iceland. The British were stunned by American concerns about western hemispheric defence and their 'Monroe Doctrine' approach, concluding that the American military planners were too parochial in their outlook and lacked an appreciation of global strategy. To them America's preoccupation with the defence of the Panama Canal seemed misguided at best, when the Suez Canal was threatened.[20] Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner believed that, as they became allies, American interests would be subordinated to British interests, because the British did not understand or appreciate the fundamental policies and strategic necessities of the United States.[21]

Variation of National Interests

The variation of each nation's perceptions regarding the war's priorities, and the application of strategy exposed the fundamental differences in each nation's position. Britain was engaged in a war; while the United States was neutral, wobbling on the verge. National interests and perspectives did not coincide, even though Roosevelt viewed Germany as the greater threat. Before the meeting, the Americans, however lacking in consensus, had the temerity to send a series of cables to London expressing a position that argued if the British did not fight the American way, they might not win at all.[22] However unrealistic, Anglo-American suppositions were based on a conflicting set of expectations: would America simply be an arsenal of productivity or would it

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[20] 'Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies', *Op. cit.*
[21] McNarney and Turner to JPC, *Op. cit.*
[22] M. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, (Washington, 1950), pp. 406-410.

actively engage and defeat the Germans with an army of its own? Only the President could clarify America's grand strategic view. Although Churchill and Roosevelt, having much in common, got along better with each other than with their own chiefs, little progress could be made without a clarifying political statement from them. The British military desired an American presence in Europe, but Dill was disturbed by the American emphasis on protecting their own hemisphere.[23] Disregarding Dill's assessment, Marshall believed in a strategy culminating in a northwestern Europe campaign. Between the parties, readiness clashed with actuality, prejudice affected understanding, preconceived notions persisted, and expectations ended in disappointment. Many present protected their national and service interests, and their professional reputations; all of which combined to affect the extent to which they were prepared or willing to cooperate.

Anglo-American Commitments

The following will demonstrate diverging attitudes: American planners were not concerned with saving the British Empire; nor were they intent on preserving territories for British exploitation. Roosevelt could easily irritate Churchill by mentioning freedom for India.[24] Churchill countered by attacking American exploitation of the Philippines, but Roosevelt defended his own country's management of prospective Philippine independence as a 'model' for other states to follow. Dill was disappointed by Marshall's seeming lack of interest in grand strategy. The Americans spoke only of production and mobilization rather than operations. Marshall did not lack for operational zeal, but he was well aware of American unpreparedness. At the time 40 tanks were apportioned between four armored divisions. Clearly, America lacked the tools for a global war. Air enthusiasts, including Roosevelt, eagerly awaited the massive production build-up of air forces as envisioned in *ABC-2*, thereby eliminating (according to the theory) the need for large ground forces. Germany would be bombed

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[23] D. Haglund, 'George C. Marshall and the Question of Military Aid to England, May-June 1940', *JCH*, 15, (1980), pp. 746-759.

[24] W. Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, (New York, 1977), pp. 108-109.

into submission.[25] Churchill could defend his willingness to invade the Continent, under the foregoing conditions, from this time hence, executed only at Germany's total collapse. This view differed considerably from the American viewpoint as expressed by British General Morgan:

> On the US side there were several considerations. They were forming one hell of an army, navy and air force. A big navy had plenty of uses, so had a big air force, but when you came to look for a theatre of war where you could deploy such an army there weren't many. That factor was dominant from an early stage. The best theatre for such an army was western Europe...[26]

Within this maze of opinions, judgments and varied national positions, the conflict between a British peripheral strategy and an eventual American battle for the 'heartland' remained; therefore, a mutually acceptable strategy seemed a distant goal, but one that demanded immediate attention and resolution.[27]

The Atlantic Charter

The meeting at Placentia Bay resulted primarily in a combined political document entitled the *Atlantic Charter*, an eight point contract for world peace once Germany was defeated. Although some hesitant steps were taken to improve existing military co-ordination, it was a document that philosophically bound the two nations together in a common cause.[28] This notwithstanding, Churchill and Roosevelt failed to resolve the impediments to world trade – American high protectionism and the British Ottawa agreements, a combination of restrictions and artificial controls. No viable compromise was reached and Article Four became a declaration of intent to remove tariff barriers rather than a directive for trade liberalization. Roosevelt capitulated, Welles was infuriated at the result, as Churchill had been before the final draft. Controlled

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[25] Air subcommittee, 'ABC-2', 29 March, 1941, *Letter to CoS, CNO, Br. CoS*, AWPD.
[26] Sir B. Liddell Hart, Interview with Gen. F. Morgan, Dep. CoS, formerly 'COSSAC', November 1945, 15/15/24, p. 3.
[27] T. Kittridge, 'US Defence Policy and Strategy', *US News and World Report*, 3 (December 1954).
[28] E. Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, (New York, 1946), pp. 42-44; A. Danchev, *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance*, (London: 1990), pp. 6-8. Note: Representatives of fourteen countries, meeting at an Inter-Allied Conference in London on 24 September 1941 signed a resolution adhering to the principles set forth in the Charter and on 1 January 1942, twenty-six nations signed the United Nations Declaration, with each subscribing to it and pledging cooperation with its principles.

capitalism had prevailed over free trade. Less controversial and more attractive were points one to three in which Britain and the United States respected the existing territorial sovereignty of nations, sought no territorial changes against the wishes of the people therein and allowed the right of all nations to choose their own form of government. Articles Five and Six were concerned with world-wide improvements in living standards, and Articles Seven and Eight were concerned with freedom of the seas and general disarmament after the war.[29]

A Question of the United States Assuming Power

Beyond that, the United States chose to maintain its neutrality. Churchill could not lead America into war at Placentia Bay, however hard he tried, although many people in Britain expected it. During the previous year, in an exchange of letters between Harvard University president, James B. Conant, and Budget Director, Lewis W. Douglas, both men agreed that not only must the United States become the dominant world power, but an expression of that dominance had to be its willingness and capacity to fight to maintain that power when necessary. They concluded that if the American people did not think the assumption of that power was worth it, all would be lost.[30] There was little sympathy in America for the cost Britain had to pay in human and economic terms. Roosevelt, aware of that reluctance, understood that American public opinion was deeply pacific. Recognizing that obduracy, he used hemispheric defence as an excuse to rearm. Moreover, until the prevailing mood changed, the United States would leave Britain to fight the war alone. Aid moved slowly, but on 23 February 1941, the United States and Britain decided to exchange British bases for American war material. Article VII of the recently Lend-Lease Agreement referred to post-war international economic policy, which read '...to pursue the avoidance of harmful discrimination and generally the economic goals of the *Atlantic Charter*.'[31]

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[29] R. Lamb, *The Ghosts of Peace, 1935-1945*, (London, 1987), pp. 219-20; T. Wilson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 168-72.
[30] J. Conant, *Conant-Douglas Letters*, 4, (9 Oct. 1940). University of Arizona Library.
[31] D. Acheson, *Present At The Creation*, (New York, 1969), pp. 56-9.

Although Roosevelt had it watered-down to please British sensibilities, Churchill believed that its inclusion would undermine the system of 'Imperial Preference' established by the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. Little was written of economic post-war trade liberalization, a goal of the Roosevelt administration. However objectionable trade barriers and colonial inequities were to the Americans, on which the British remained intransigent, they were over-shadowed, for the moment, by Churchill and Roosevelt finally meeting.

A working alliance seemed possible, even if their timing were different.[32] By agreement, hundreds of tanks and planes were destined for the Middle East, some American shipping would be shifted to British control, and 150,000 rifles were ear-marked for Britain's Home Guard.[33] American reluctance to accede to British increased material requests was used as a ploy to assess Britain's actual needs; meanwhile Britain agreed to overhaul its purchasing mission in Washington to achieve greater co-ordination. Finally, the 'shoot on sight' order regarding the protection of Atlantic convoys was soon to be announced by the President, but Congress would not revoke the Neutrality Act of 1939, containing its 'cash and carry' provision, until the first week of November, one week after the sinking of the American destroyer, *USS Rueben James* by the German *U-562*, six hundred miles off the coast of Ireland.[34] Returning from a supply allocation meeting in Washington, Lord Beaverbrook reported to the British War Cabinet in London, 'There isn't the slightest chance of the United States entering the war until compelled to do so by a direct attack on its own territory, and it seems that this could not happen until Britain and Russia have been defeated.'[35]

Even if Beaverbrook was prescient and Churchill bewildered as to how America would come in on Britain's side, Roosevelt had taken a step closer towards active belligerency. Hitler regarded Roosevelt's avowal of the Lend-Lease agreement and the

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[32] E. Roosevelt, *This I Remember*, (New York, 1949), p. 226; M. Gilbert, *Finest Hour: W. S. Churchill, 1939-1941*, (Boston, 1983), pp. 1176-77.
[33] D. Richards, *Portal of Hungerforrd*, (London, 1977), pp. 257-258.
[34] Presidential Radio Broadcast to the American Nation, 11 Sept. 1941, FDRL.
[35] D. Reynolds, *Op. cit.*, p. 215; Sherwood, *Op. cit.*, p. 368.

extension of the Atlantic neutrality zone as an American declaration of economic warfare. As a retaliatory measure, on 25 March Hitler extended the North Atlantic war zone as far west as Greenland. Japan and Germany would solve Roosevelt's dilemma four months later.

American Public Opinion and Presidential Efforts

In spite of the President's efforts, American public opinion considered the meeting a failure. The meeting had little effect upon the level of American aid designated for Britain; originally low, the increase was minimal. Immediately after the meeting became public knowledge, a Gallup poll on 18 August inquired, 'Should the United States enter the war against Germany today?' The respondents revealed that 20 percent supported entry, 74 percent were opposed, and five percent were undecided.[36] Welles felt that by the time the public's mood shifted, the Allies could have lost the war. An American political tendency, almost religiously adhered to by Roosevelt, to follow rather than lead public opinion, was no match for the German *Blitzkrieg*.

Returning to London on 19 August, Churchill reported to the War Cabinet. He revealed the depth of Roosevelt's concern for Britain, but recognized that the American people and particularly Congress were determined to remain neutral. He admitted that the President's and his perceptions of the American public's mood differed, the Prime Minister choosing to discount the polls, regarding them as less than representative. He acknowledged a lack of urgency in Washington, sensing that if Roosevelt were to put the issue of peace and war to Congress, they would probably debate it for three months. He had warned the President that he could not answer for the consequences if Russia collapsed while the United States remained neutral. Roosevelt, in agreement, but still the dependent upon the opinion polls, hoped to provoke the Germans into hostilities by creating an incident in the Atlantic naval war.[37]

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[36] H. Cantril, *Public Opinion Polls*, 19 August, 13 Sept. 1941, FDRL.
[37] CAB 65/19 WM 84 (41), 19 Aug. 1941

The Chiefs of Staff, in their assessment of the Atlantic talks, recognized the lack of direction within the American hierarchy and stated: 'We neither expected nor achieved startling results. The American COS are quite clearly thinking in terms of the defence of the Western Hemisphere and have so far not formulated any joint strategy for the defeat of Germany.'[38]

ARCADIA

Two weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on 23 December 1941, the Americans officiated at a second Anglo-American Conference (code-named ARCADIA) attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and their military staffs series of meetings from 22 December 1941 through 14 January 1942 in Washington. The American Chiefs of Staff, lacking an experienced and unified command structure, such as Britain's Ministry of Defence, were ill-prepared to cope with such an abrupt entry into war. With the nation reeling after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, with a public clamoring for revenge, American administrative procedures were criticized by an incredulous Dill. Writing to his superior, Brooke in London, Dill said,

> They have no joint planners and executive planning staff...Then there is the great difficulty of getting the stuff over to the President. There are no regular [Joint Chiefs of Staff] meetings, and if they do meet there is no secretariat to record them. He just sees the JCS at odd times, and again no record. There is no such thing as a Cabinet meeting, and yet the Secretaries for War, Navy, etc. are supposed to function... Eventually they will do great things... [39]

Even before the ARCADIA Conference began, Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff, traveling from Britain aboard *HMS Duke of York*, telegraphed the Americans that they wished to discuss the following five main topics:

1. Fundamental basis of joint strategy
2. Interpretation of the joint strategy in terms of immediate military measures
3. Allocation of joint forces to conform with (1)
4. Long-term program based on (1), including forces to be raised and equipped.

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[38] CAB 79/13, 19 Aug. 1941.
[39] Sir A. Bryant, *Turn of the Tide*, (London, 1957), p. 234.

5. Establishment of joint machinery for implementing (2) and (3), and (4).[40]

Churchill had reason for traveling to Washington so soon after Pearl Harbor. He needed reassurance that Roosevelt and Marshall would remain steadfast to their *RAINBOW 5* strategy even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. During United States neutrality, he had said to his son, Randolph, in the summer of 1940', I shall drag the United States in.'[41] Now, he hoped that wooing the Americans no longer required his previous customary caution, stating that, 'Now that she is in this harem, we talk to her quite differently.'[42]

Desperate for American assistance, a determined Churchill wished to discuss future collaborative ventures in the Mediterranean and French North Africa, a reiteration of the defensive Anglo-French basic war plan of 1939. In turn, American strategists viewed German control of West Africa as a major threat to American Atlantic communications lines. The American strategists, in 1941, still considered such 'peripheral' areas as Brazil, the Azores, Morocco, and Dakar as posing a more immediate threat to American security than a German victory in Europe.[43]

At ARCADIA, the American position was finally and clearly enunciated: joint war plans recognized the North Atlantic as the principal theater of operations. The first essential of which was the preservation of communications across the North Atlantic using the British Isles as a fortress covering the British Fleet. The decision to establish an American force in Britain was immediate.[44]

Withal, the Prime Minister's proposals relating to a combined British and American amphibious operation in North and West Africa (GYMNAST) in 1942 interested the President. He considered operation SUPER-GYMNAST, the final development of operation GYMNAST a distinct possibility. This would focus the attention of the

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[40] COS to JCS, 'HMS Duke of York', Washington, 18 Dec., 1941, RG. 165, Exec. 10.
[41] M. Gilbert, *Finest Hour, Winston S. Churchill, 1939-1941*, (London, 1983), p. 358.
[42] Sir A. Bryant, *Op. cit.*, p. 225.
[43] T. Wilson, *Op. cit.*, p. xii.
[44] H. Simpson & M. Bundy, *Op. cit.*, p. 213.

American people, bruised and angered by Pearl Harbor, on their troops in action, thereby raising their morale and giving them a sense that they were in the war. Discussions of the British agenda and the American paper, 'Estimate of the Military Situation' did not result in a detailed plan of operations at ARCADIA, but a comprehensive memorandum entitled 'WWI' which emerged before the conference closed in March 1942.[45] ARCADIA was a most difficult conference with little pattern, because a new alliance was being forged, an amalgam of partners meeting soon after Pearl Harbor as so-called equals. The resulting discussions were long and wearisome.[46] To defeat the Axis in Europe, the following were thought necessary:

> 1. To achieve an armaments program for victory, the utmost priority is to be given to the areas of production, which are to be held secure and protected, i.e., the United States, England and Russia.
>
> 2. The U-boats are to be defeated, thereby assuring lines of communication and supply.
>
> 3. The ring around Germany is to be closed and tightened, as expressed by supporting the Russian front, supplying Turkey with arms and military supplies, increasing our strength in the Middle East, and retaking all of the North African coast.
>
> 4. German resistance is to be warn down by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and psychological warfare.
>
> 5. The inexorable goal of offensive action, even though it can not be achieved on the scale in mind for 1942, may become a reality in 1943 as exemplified by a return to the Continent, a). via the Mediterranean, b). from Turkey into the Balkans, or c). by landings in western Europe.[47]

Preoccupied with the latest events in the Pacific, the Americans were ill-prepared to question the British proposals. Although they had signed the document, having made only slight changes, it remained largely a British in design. The Americans were uneasy, and in the ensuing months their uneasiness was to increase.[48]

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[45] Sir B. Liddell Hart, 'Notes of Discussion with Major Gen. Sir Ian Jacob', *Liddell Hart Papers*, 15/15/1, London, 31 Mar. & 15 Apr. 1948.
[46] J. Leasor & Gen. S. Hollis, *War At The Top*, (London, 1959), p. 29.
[47] COS to JCS, 'American-British Strategy', Washington, 22-24 Dec., 1941, *Arcadia Papers*, RG. 165, Exec. 4.
[48] Sir M. Howard, *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War*, (London, 1968), pp. 19-20.

Strategy and the New System

Marshall believed that the military should be in charge of its own supplies: although a firm defender of civilian control of the military, he opposed the creation of a two man civilian resource board, as originally conceived by Roosevelt and Churchill, that could interfere with established military plans and operations. The Americans distrusted the British and, led by Marshall, refused to countenance this kind of organization which might have the power to control military activity.[49] The negotiated inter-allied preliminary agreement, which became permanent over time, favored Marshall's view. During a White House meeting at the end of the conference, Roosevelt recommended that in case of disputes, the civilian board members could appeal to the President and Prime Minister. Churchill reluctantly agreed to try it on a temporary basis. On 14 January 1942, the Munitions Assignments Board became responsible for the allocation of munitions, under CCS supervision.[50] For the first time, finished war material would be allocated in accordance with strategic needs. The economic boards (Assignment, Shipping, Raw Materials, Production and Resources, and Food) were soon established under the direction of the President and Prime Minister, and co-ordinated with the military.

If these new boards and committees were organized to successfully prosecute the war, to what extent did ARCADIA formulate a strategy that would set the wheels in motion? Before and during the early phases of the Conference, the Americans were reluctant to define their position, because of the widening Japanese attack then in progress. If the Japanese could be held by a minimum of means, the President wanted to demonstrate Allied naval power in the Atlantic. Moreover, the British and Americans had independently concluded, then mutually agreed, that 'holding the line' against Japan was in the interest of both nations. Its corollary was to defeat 'Germany-first'. The combination of interlocking global concerns and limited military resources dictated their

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[49] W. Kimball, (ed.), 1, *Op. cit.*, p. 326.
[50] 'Higher Direction of War in ABDA Area to ABC-4/5', Washington, 14-28 Jan. 1942, RG. 165 WDCSA.

choices. Problems demanding immediate attention were the need for basing an air force in Australia, increasing strength in the Pacific, reinforcing British troops in the Middle East, acquiring bases on the Atlantic Islands, Brazil, and Africa, and relieving British forces in Northern Ireland and Iceland.[51] The President and Marshall, disagreeing over priorities, waited until they had an opportunity to talk with their British counterparts. Churchill and Roosevelt exchanged ideas: the President wanted American troops in action during the year, and the Prime Minister sought to avoid any future action that would echo the attritional battles of the previous war. ARCADIA represented the beginning of a concerted search for a practical European invasion plan.[52] The spectrum of thought ranged from British 'peripheral strategy' ('closing the ring', 'liberating populations', and a 'final assault on the German citadel') to the American 'cross-Channel assault'.[53] At this time, neither side could predict how increased American concern for the Pacific or additional British interest in the Mediterranean would influence strategic deliberations.

Active Participation of the CCS

Within the same period that the political leaders conferred, the American and British Chiefs of Staff met twelve times. Not surprisingly, the two air chiefs, Arnold and Portal, were proponents of winning through air power and stood agreed. The two admirals, Pound and King, were fighting two different naval wars – one in the Atlantic against the U-boats, the other in the Pacific against the Japanese advance; therefore, they had different strategic priorities and little in common. As indicated, the army strategists were preoccupied with a 'peripheral' versus 'direct approach' controversy. Marshall was yet to meet Brooke who had recently taken over from Dill. He was to find Brooke's view of strategy quite different from his own; and in the 30 month long invasion debate culminating in ANVIL, it was again Dill who eased many CCS policy misunderstandings.

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[51] Gen. G. Marshall, 'Notes GCM', Washington, 23 Dec. 1941, RG. 165 WPD 4402-136.
[52] Col. C. Bundy, 'Memo for CoS', Washington, 24 Oct. 1941, RG. 165 ACOS WPD.
[53] COS to American COS', Washington, 22 Dec. 1941, RG. 165 Exec. 4.

Marshall and Brooke's differences reflected their different backgrounds and military experience, the outcome of which was Marhall's interest in logistical and organizational considerations in support of an eventual concentrated effort across the Channel, and Brooke's interest centered on battle experience, understanding the Wehrmacht's abilities, and the traditional British maritime strategy of 'closing the ring'.

During the conference, the British oft repeated the strategic theme first expressed at Placentia Bay the previous August: the destruction of Germany's ability to fight, its collapse, followed by landings of armored forces supported by an armed popular uprising by the occupied population on the European Continent during the summer of 1943. Churchill stated,

> In principle, the landings should be made by armoured and mechanised forces capable of disembarking not at ports but on beaches, either by landing-craft or from ocean-going ships specially adapted. The potential front of attack is thus made so wide that the German forces holding down these different countries cannot be strong enough at all points...expeditions should be marshalled by the spring of 1943 in Iceland, the British Isles, and, if possible, in French Morocco and Egypt. The main body would come direct across the ocean.[54]

The majestic sweep of Churchill's sense of strategy is noted in the above quotation, because it not only contained the essence of future amphibious operations, but included expectations far beyond the scope of Allied ability, even at full mobilization and production capacity. Claiming to be a proponent for an invasion of northwest Europe, Churchill could point to his own definitive role in the pioneering and development of landing craft, although his support of the landing shifted precariously as the war progressed.[55] No wonder that the Americans remained skeptical of his strategic concepts and usually feared the worst when he and the President met in closed session. Even though they were both highly talented, each man required the balancing restraint of carefully organized staff advice, which they avoided at times.[56] Under Churchill's guidance, Roosevelt usually succumbed to the Prime Minister's strategic rhetoric, leaving much to be undone by a concerned American Chief of Staff. For instance, on

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[54] W. Churchill, *Op. cit.*, 'The Campaign of 1943', 18 Dec. 1941, pp. 657-658.
[55] Cmdr. K. Edwards, *Operation Neptune*, (London, 1946), p. 23.
[56] H. Stimson & M. Bundy, *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

Christmas Eve, 1941, Roosevelt agreed to a Churchill suggestion for 1942 Pacific operations, that if a convoy of American reinforcements and planes sent to the Philippines could not break through the Japanese blockade of the islands, it should be re-routed to Singapore, described by the Prime Minister as an 'impregnable fortress'. Marshall, upon receipt of this memo, fearing a dangerous precedent, protested its method and content to Stimson. Shocked and angry, the Secretary of War considered it improper to discuss such matters with another nation while the fighting in the Philippines continued. Protesting to Harry Hopkins, he argued that if the President continued to make such arbitrary decisions on matters of extreme urgency without benefit of his Chiefs of Staff present, he and other top-level War Department personnel would resign. Faced with the actual British report, advised by Hopkins to be careful about the formality of his discussions with Churchill, the President recanted and never bypassed Marshall again.[57]

Global War, a Supreme Commander and British Misgivings

Stung by the President's incursion into strategy without consultation with his Chief of Staff, Marshall proposed that a supreme commander be designated for the Pacific. Negotiations between the British and American Chiefs of Staff began immediately and resulted in the existing British-American Chiefs of Staff committee, headquartered in Washington, being installed as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Brooke thought it a bad idea, criticizing false arrangements made in Washington.[58] It was created not to originate, but to inform and assist both political leaders on strategic requirements, prosecute the war on a global scale, and to direct the ABDA theater commander in timely fashion. The Combined Chiefs were not the ultimate decision-makers, that prerogative was reserved for both Roosevelt and Churchill, but it served them as a decision making body.[59] Representing the strategic will of both countries, it was expected that the theater commander would follow its directives. Not only would it

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[57] H. Stimson, *Op. cit.*, 'Diary (MS)', 25 Dec. 1941.
[58] Sir A. Bryant, *Op. cit.*, p. 254.
[59] A. Wilt, *Op. cit.*, pp. 40-1.

issue orders to all theater commanders, but it would allocate vital supplies as needed through the Munitions Assignment Board, functioning under its control. Marshall said,

> We had to come to this in the First World War, but it was not until 1918 that it was accomplished, and much valuable time, blood, and treasure had been needlessly sacrificed. If we could decide on a unified command now, it would be a great advance over what was accomplished then.[60]

It was a vital achievement for Marshall, and Stimson hoped that the Pacific example could be applied to other theaters of operations.[61] The British thought otherwise, calling the proposal 'wild and half baked'; Brooke felt its emphasis on the western Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean was misplaced; the more the COS looked at their task the less they liked the American proposal; even the British Cabinet doubted its value.[62] To counter the American stroke, Brooke sent well-instructed British representatives to Washington to present the British staff's case. Under similar circumstances, this procedure of direct confrontation by London-based military emissaries was not always carried out subsequently. Brooke sought London as the base for military planning and strategy, not Washington, at this stage of the war.[63]

> Ever since Portal and Pound came back from the USA, I have told them that they 'sold our birthright for a plate of porridge', whilst in Washington, they had up to now denied it flatly. However, this morning they are at last beginning to realise that the Americans are rapidly snatching more and more power with the ultimate intention of running the war in Washington. However, I now have them on my side.[64]

Dill feared that it would be fatal to have a British commander responsible for the disasters looming in the Pacific.[65] Roosevelt and his military chiefs, concerned more with Western Hemispheric protection attacking Germany from Egypt and Morocco, disagreed between themselves and surprised the British. Both the President and Marshall agreed that the first American combat venture against the Germans had to succeed, because failure would have an extremely adverse effect on the morale of the

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60 'Second Mtg., COS Conference', Washington, 25 Dec. 1941, RG 165 'ABC 337'.
61 *Ibid.*
62 FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 2/V, p. 45.
63 *Ibid.*, 3/A/V, p. 355.
64 *Op. cit.*, 2/V, pp. 46-48.
65 Dill to Brooke', 28 Dec. 1941 quoted in F. Pogue,*Op. cit.*, p.281.

American people, particularly in an election year.[66] Seeking to assist the Russians. Marshall viewed the North African operation as a threat to his idea of pushing as many men and arms across the Atlantic in 1942, preparatory for a cross-Channel attack. He believed that the battle of northwest Europe to be final battle of the war; therefore. the Mediterranean theater was viewed as a subsidiary theater in which the enemy was to be 'held' and not logistically overwhelmed at the expense of plans soon to be identified as BOLERO and ROUNDUP.[67] Rather than win by bleeding one's opponent to death while almost doing the same to oneself, rather than fight a war of attrition when one had the wherewithal to fight a war of annihilation. American planners were determined to apply the concepts of mass and concentration in the manner of American Civil War General Ulysses S. Grant. A stalemated war was unacceptable to them.[68]

Before negotiations ended, the British gave way on two counts: rather than an integrated command structure, they wanted theater commands and staff to be composed of one nationality and the war perceived as a whole unit, thereby eliminating geographical divisions based on national responsibility. The Americans refused. The British Chiefs of Staff wrote the following memo and sent it to Washington,

> This system, arbitrarily laid down on a geographical basis, would be dangerous and wrong...The strategy of war must be looked at as a whole, and predominant roles in the fields of operation allocated in accordance with the general strategic situation and the resources of the allies.[69]

During the conference's sessions the British seemed highly organized, experienced, and able; the Americans were unsure, ill at ease, and traumatized by events in the Pacific. Naval captain, John L. McCrea, one of the President's aides, wrote of the British, 'They all talked exceedingly well and made much sense. The staff organization was superb as well.'[70] Although the British were less suspicious of American aims. most of the American planners distrusted British strategy, believing it was based on an

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66 'ABC 337', *Op. cit.*
67 'Gen. Strategic Review', Washington, 21 Dec. 1941, RG. 165 Exec. 4.
68 R. Weigley, *Op. cit.*, p. 313.
69 R. Parkinson, *Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat*. (London. 1973), p. 342.
70 Adm. J. McCrea, *Op. cit.*

ulterior design, the preservation of the British Empire. Unperturbed. the British may have thought that the Americans were not smart enough to worry about.[71] Laurence S. Kuter, a talented young American Army Air Force colonel, observed at a number of meetings, that if a controversy reached boiling point between the participants a few cooler heads prevailed:

> ...with Admiral King red in the neck and inarticulate, General Arnold apparently furious but quiet, Brooke equally red-faced and inarticulate, it was Portal on the British side and General Marshall on the American side that calmed things down in very simple language: 'We can't blow up on things like this. Something has to be done...let's get on with it.[72]

Divergent Views of GYMNAST

Preliminary planning for the North African operation, code-named GYMNAST, reached impasse, because of the divergent views expressed by either side regarding,

1.) the size of the force
2.) the level of French assistance and German reaction
3.) air support
4.) the practical use of Casablanca as a seaport

Maximum forces that could be landed after the initial embarkation totaled approximately 180,000 evenly divided.[73] Shipping, particularly cargo vessels, was the critical factor; in short supply, these ships were needed to stem the Japanese in the ABDA theater. The desperate need for cargo shipping at this stage of the war was similar to the landing craft shortage that followed, and both injuriously limited and delayed operations. Once the Pacific crisis was past, the President and the Prime Minister wanted North Africa revived.[74]

ARCADIA succeeded in creating needed administrative structures. The Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Joint Planning System, a unified theater command structure, division of responsibility among theaters, a fixed,

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71 F. Pogue, *Op. cit.*, Interview with Gen. G. Marshall, 29 Oct. 1956.
72 *Ibid*. Interview with Gen. L. Kuter. 10 Nov. 1960.
73 'Operation SUPER-GYMNAST', Washington, 10 Jan. 1942 RG 165 'ABC 337'.
74 'White House Conference', Washington, 4 Jan. 1942. RG 165 'ABC 337'; Churchill, *Op. cit.*, pp. 684-5.

but not necessarily rigid, distinction between the terms 'Joint' and 'Combined' were created or defined during the conference. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, assigned to meet continuously rather than periodically, were to be served by several subordinate and permanent staff sections identified by 'combined' as the first word in their title: Planning Staff, Intelligence Committee, Secretariat, and the Military Transport Committee.

Churchill's Domination at ARCADIA

ARCADIA closed with Churchill's domination of allied strategy, both in theory and practice: bombing, blockade, aid to Russia, and clandestine European operations were emphasized. Co-operative allied naval ventures in the Atlantic, exchanges of American for British units at various locations, such as Iceland and Northern Ireland, were organized, against the background of an inexorable war. For the Americans, harsh reality outstripped wishful thinking. Ill-prepared to fight a global war, it would take more than a year after Pearl Harbor to mobilize, equip, train, and deploy its forces in any appreciable numbers.[75] No agreement had been reached to use Britain as a base for future amphibious operations. The American desire for direct offensive action was subordinated to British strategy that operated at the circumference, as the only practical alternative. Marshall's plan for a cross-Channel attack to relieve Russia in 1942 was substituted for a blocking action against a possible German threat to Spain, Portugal, and Morocco. The CCS asserted, 'In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in western Europe.'[76] Continuing strategic differences between the Allied Chiefs of Staff increased their antagonism.

Roosevelt and Churchill had told little to their Chiefs about national policy on which strategy could be based.[77] Killing more and more Germans, victory at all costs, and

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[75] C. Kirkpatrick, *Op. cit.*, pp. 114-16.
[76] CCS 11 Meeting, Washington, 2 Feb. 1942, Reel III.
[77] D. Drew & Col. D. M. Snow, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security and Problems*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, 1988), pp. 27-36.

demanding total enemy capitulation were not war aims on which an improved and peaceful post-war world could be built. Strategic planning suffered, because Allied political objectives remained unclear.[78] Politically, the conference produced *the Declaration of the United Nations*, which reaffirmed the principles of the *Atlantic Charter*: the war was being fought to defend and perpetuate life. liberty, justice. and human rights throughout the world. No nation would make a separate peace, and the resources and energy of all were to combine until the enemy was defeated. Twenty-six nations signed on 1 January 1942.[79]

General Sir Leslie Hollis, second in command of the Prime Minister's Defence Office. considered the ARCADIA Conference to be,

> ...the most difficult of all conferences, for the Anglo-American alliance was still untempered steel. The Americans were reeling under the disaster of Pearl Harbor, and possibly a little nervous that the war-tried British might try to tell them what to do. We, on the other hand, were anxious to show that we had no desire to act as senior partners in the new formed alliance, but as equals. We had no pattern to guide us, and the discussions were therefore long and wearisome.[80]

General Hollis who collaborated with the author, James Leasor, after the war, was correct regarding American reactions during the conference, but naïve to think that the British, from the Prime Minister on down, did not want to impose their will upon the new-comers regarding strategy and experience. At the conference's close, the British had their way with the Americans who were devoid of a tactical plan on which to base their 'Germany-first' policy.

'Trust me to the bitter end', were Roosevelt's parting words to Churchill at the end of the conference;[81] that trust was to be sorely tested, as the war intensified.

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[78] Gen. A. Wedemeyer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 88-92.
[79] W. Churchill, *Op. cit.*, III, p. 605.
[80] J. Leasor, *Op. cit.*, p.29.
[81] W. F. Kimball, (ed.). *Op. cit.*, I, p. 327.

CHAPTER THREE

Events Leading to a June Washington Conference

Prior to the 19-25 June 1942 Washington meeting, top-level conversations were held in London, Washington and at Hyde Park, New York, the President's home. First Churchill in London, then Roosevelt in Washington, met with V. M. Molotov, Stalin's Foreign Commissar. Mountbatten, Churchill's emissary, conferred with the President ten days before the Prime Minister arrived. Regarding Anglo-American-Russian relations, two disparate points emerged from conversations with Molotov: Britain was prepared to meet its obligations under the Second Protocol, an Anglo-American Lend-Lease agreement extending aid to Russia, but remained non-committal on a second front. Refusing to guarantee that a landing would take place in September 1942 on the Continent, the best Churchill was willing to offer was to continue planning for one.[1] Interpreting this as Churchill's intention to abandon a second front, Molotov cabled his views to Stalin, '...consequently the outcome is that the British Government does not accept an obligation upon itself to establish a second front this year; and declares, and that conditionally, that it is preparing some kind of experimental raiding operation.'[2]

Doubting they could fulfill supply obligations to the Soviets under the agreement, due to shipping losses on the Murmansk run to Russia, Roosevelt, in contrast to Churchill, promised to open a second front in 1942, if Russia would accept a reduction in tonnage. After Molotov's visit to Washington, a communiqué issued on 12 June indicated that he and Roosevelt had reached full agreement regarding the establishment of a second front in Europe in 1942, notwithstanding a landing craft shortage that plagued Marshall.[3] The second reason was that future Anglo-American strategy for

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[1] 'Future Operations', 2 July 1942. WP (42) 278.
[2] Molotov to Stalin quoted in R. Edmonds, *The Big Three*. (London, 1991), p. 287.
[3] FRUS, *Washington 1941-42*. III, p. 577. (Washington, 1968). R. E. Sherwood. *Op. cit.*, pp. 556-578.

1942 and 1943, remained inconclusive.[4] The JSM had warned the COS that progress towards the formulation of an acceptable Anglo-American strategy had proved disappointing. One cause centered on American unwillingness to pursue the strategic argument to any logical conclusion, specifically that one theater of war was more important than another.[5] To settle these problems and any other difficulties that could not be satisfactorily dealt with by correspondence, Churchill decided on another personal visit to Washington.[6] Roosevelt agreed to meet between the 17-21 of June. As will be seen, later in the war, this concept of 'face-to-face' confrontation was not followed during the ANVIL debate of 1944.

Mountbatten's Meetings with Roosevelt

Mountbatten's conversations with the President represented Churchill's views concerning Britain's disenchantment with SLEDGEHAMMER, a proposed landing on the Norman coast of France in 1942, and advanced a method of private military diplomacy whose express purpose was to convince the President to accept GYMNAST. By choosing to confer alone with Mountbatten, a favorite of Churchill's, the President not only circumvented the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also put himself at a disadvantage. Having learned of the meeting and its agenda, Marshall and King both expressed concern over the President's failure to include them in his forthcoming strategic discussions with the head of Combined Operations.[7]

Fascinated with royalty, Roosevelt was infatuated with Mountbatten, the King's cousin, who had been a social success on his last trip. The newly appointed Chief of Combined Operations, holding exalted rank in each service, an ambitious Beaverbrook protégé and a Churchill 'front-man', was considered to be more skilled in public

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[4] 'Confidential Protocol of Conference of Allied Representatives'. Washington, n. d.; 'Draft of Joint. Statement with Draft of Second Protocol', 19 Apr. 1942, RG 165 ABC 400.3295.
[5] JSM to COS, 11 May 1942. COS (42) 60th meeting (0) Min. 2.
[6] W. Churchill, 20 June 1942 PM/402/3. Argonaut Diary.
[7] FRUS, *Op. cit.*, Washington, pp. 582-583; M. Sommers. 'Why Russia Got the Drop On Us', *Saturday Evening Post*, 8 Feb. 1947, p. 25.

relations than in naval operations by the COS.[8] As a master in verbal gymnastics and a consummate weaver of epic tales, Mountbatten captivated the American president by suggesting that a 1942 TORCH (formerly GYMNAST) was a fair exchange for a 1943 ROUNDUP. The stakes were high. If he failed to convince the President, British would lose its influence over war production and weapons allocation.[9]

Mountbatten's reasoning for the British decision to abandon SLEDGEHAMMER, as a strategic operation focused on its small size. He argued that it was limited by a shortage of landing craft and short-range fighter aircraft arrayed against a powerful enemy force of twenty five divisions. Placed in extreme jeopardy, this stunted Allied force would fail to take pressure off the Russians. Even if the technical and production problems could be overcome by delaying the operation a few months, the deterioration of Channel weather and the onset of winter would lessen the possibilities of maintaining the bridgehead or seizing a port such as Cherbourg. These efforts were beyond the abilities of the force engaged. Before Mountbatten's arrival, the President had begun shifting his support from SLEDGEHAMMER, as advocated by Marshall and Stimson, to GYMNAST. Accepting Mountbatten's views without the benefit of those of his Joint Chiefs, the President compounded their sense of isolation and ineffectiveness by neglecting to inform them of the meeting.

Mountbatten, after favorably impressing the President, sent a summary of the meeting to his superiors in London, who in turn, relayed it to the Joint Staff Mission in Washington. This information was then revealed to the American Chiefs at a 19 June CCS meeting by their British counterparts. Roosevelt remained silent.[10] Previous studies of this period have omitted the CCS meeting of 10 June at which Mountbatten had participated. He addressed the committee by giving a summation of his five hour meeting with the President, failing to reveal his aversion for SLEDGEHAMMER. Representative of the British position, he strongly advocated other operations.

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[8] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 2/V, 4-9 Mar. 1942, p. 367.
[9] COS, meetings related to 'Mountbatten, SLEDGEHAMMER, GYMNAST and ROUNDUP', COS meetings on 5, 11, 27 May, 1, 25, 30 June, 1 July 1942.
[10] CCS 27 Meeting, Washington, 19 June 1942, Reel III, pp. 1-3.

Mountbatten had explained the SLEDGEHAMMER operation to the President as if it were an accepted and viable plan.[11] To the American members of the CCS, he had been economical with the truth, which would increase their entrenched suspicions of British intent and purpose. From Dill's intelligence, Marshall and the JCS were well aware of Mountbatten's dissembling, having received two views of his meeting with the Roosevelt: Marshall had a copy of Mountbatten's letter to the President, which included a summary of their talk, and an account of their conversation from Hopkins. In this case, Dill, an honest broker, was trying to prevent something stupid from happening that would not only prolong the war, but disrupt the fragile sense of Anglo-American unity.[12]

Roosevelt's Desire to Help the Russians

Moreover, Dill, as Churchill's agent, informed the COS of a conversation he had with Hopkins, the substance of which included the President's desire to help the Russians by engaging American troops for that purpose in 1942, possibly in a North African operation.[13] Even before Churchill arrived, Marshall guessed from Dill's information that Mountbatten had influenced Roosevelt for GYMNAST and against SLEDGEHAMMER. Both Marshall and Stimson, restated their positions to the President by letter, in which they attacked GYMNAST and recommended SLEDGEHAMMER; to add weight to their arguments, Stimson and Marshall enclosed a 'letter of concurrence' signed by informed members of their staffs. Hopkins, discouraged by Roosevelt's change of mind, thought that the United States deserved to get into the war on the basis of its growing military strength.[14] Mountbatten, ordered by Churchill to convince the President that the entirety of allied strategy needed re-thinking, considered this to be his most important assignment of the whole war.[15]

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[11] CCS 24 Meeting, Washington, 10 June 1942, *Op. cit.*, p. 4.
[12] Dill to Montgomery-Massingberd, 19 Sept. 1941, *Montgomery-Massingberd Papers*, 160/23a.
[13] Dill to COS, 15 June 1942, CAB 105/39.
[14] H. Stimson, *Op. cit.*, 17.18.19, Jan. 1942; R. E. Sherwood, *Op. cit.*, pp. 580-581; 'Winant to FDR', 3 June 1942, PSF, FDRL.
[15] J. Terraine, *The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten*, (London, 1968), pp. 94, 506.

CCS Meetings in Opposition

The results of the President's meeting with Mountbatten at the White House and later with Churchill in Hyde Park were in direct opposition to the results of the CCS series of meetings held concurrently in Washington. Brooke, who disliked SLEDGEHAMMER and feared any North African amphibious operation that would draw supplies away from the threatened Middle East, thought it worthwhile to continue planning for a 1943 landing in Northwest Europe. Failing to convince Brooke of SLEDGEHAMMER's immediate value, Marshall agreed with the British Chief of Staff that GYMNAST was not a viable operation in 1942, because of the successive Russian defeats. BOLERO's strategic reserves in Britain required strengthening and the British Eighth Army's retreat in the western desert had to be checked. The Combined Chiefs concluded that even if amphibious attacks against Hitler's western European fortress contained certain hazards, justified for compelling reasons, they would be preferable to GYMNAST.[16] Even if this report had been sent to the President and the Prime Minister meeting in Hyde Park, it is doubtful whether it would have affected their deliberations. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that BOLERO served two purposes: as a bulwark against a German invasion of Britain or a launching pad for an invasion of the Continent, the application contingent upon the battles in Russia. Allied Intelligence estimates indicated that by early winter Russia would either thwart German aggression or be defeated. The Prime Minister hammered away at the President by asking,

> But in case no plan can be made in which any responsible authority has good confidence, and consequently no engagement on a substantial scale in France is possible in September 1942, what else are we going to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic Theatre during the whole of 1942? Ought we not to be preparing within the general structure of BOLERO some other operation by which we may gain positions of advantage and also directly or indirectly to take some of the weight off Russia? It is in this setting and on this background that the operation GYMNAST should be studied.[17]

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[16] CCS 27 Meeting, 19 June, 'CCS 83, Offensive Operations in 1942 & 1943', Washington, 21 June 1942, Reel III.

[17] Churchill to Roosevelt, Washington, 20 June 1942, quoted in FRUS, *Washington, 1941-42*, pp. 461-462; W. Churchill, IV, pp. 381-82.

Churchill insisted that he was willing to listen any alternative American plan whose immediate employment would achieve similar results as GYMNAST. Divided between Atlantic and Pacific operations, the Americans had only SLEDGEHAMMER to offer, which was moribund. Roosevelt, politically committed to the Russians, refused to wait for a 1943 BOLERO/ROUNDUP, even though a cross-Channel invasion of such magnitude might have been the most expeditious means of winning the war.[18] Both Allied leaders refused to have their ground forces stand idle until 1943. King and Arnold were ready to supply sufficient naval and air forces for a North African operation to meet the President's criteria. However, King, speaking to Pound at a CCS meeting in June, voiced his opposition to any North African operations in 1942.[19] The Americans failed to question Mountbatten's opinions about landing craft availability for GYMNAST, but not for SLEDGEHAMMER. Unlike GYMNAST, a diversionary SLEDGEHAMMER, even as a threat, would have directly helped Russia. Similar traps, to bleed an enemy white, were laid by the Germans at Verdun in 1916 and later by the Allies over German air-space in February 1944. Scarcity of manpower was not an overriding problem for Marshall, in the long term, as it was for Brooke. The Americans could absorb the losses attendant to a sacrificial operation, even if the odds were unfavorable; the British could not in any case.

Martin Blumenson, in a recent journal article, criticizes the coalition for concocting a strategy whose primary purpose was to liberate territory rather than destroy the German Army in France during 1942. Doubting the quality and effectiveness of their own land forces, fearful of a direct confrontation with German forces in northern France, they chose a Mediterranean strategy, which, he concluded, prolonged the war beyond 1944. Blumenson failed to define the Anglo-American strategic controversy, as considered here, which resulted in an additional move to the periphery.[20] Moreover, by failing to draw a distinction between the British and American strategic positions, as did Michael

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[18] K. Sainsbury, *Churchill and Roosevelt at War*, (London, 1994), pp. 24-27, 180.
[19] CCS 28 Meeting, Washington, 20 June 1942, Reel III.
[20] M. Blumenson, 'A Deaf Ear to Clausewitz: Allied Operational Objectives in World War II', *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, XXIII 2, Summer (1993), pp. 16-27.

Howard, Blumenson disregarded Churchill's awareness of the prevalent American attitude: its military leaders, suspicious of British intentions, favored a massive cross-Channel attack and suspected that GYMNAST (renamed TORCH) would serve to protect British interests rather than to defeat Germany. Churchill pressed Roosevelt for a full and irrevocable commitment to British strategy.[21]

The Americans realized that the British would maintain their position, even in the face of a Russian collapse in 1942.[22] Within a military context, the divided JCS aside, Marshall might have argued that if SLEDGEHAMMER and IMPERATOR (a divisional strength three day hit-and-run raid in France) were abandoned, there was little to convince the Germans (or the Russians) that a second front landing was imminent.[23] The German High Command, free from the threat of a cross-Channel attack, could transfer more of their ground and air reserves to the Eastern Front with impunity.

Defining a second front in the broadest practical terms, Roosevelt concluded that American forces could be in action sooner and in greater strength in the Mediterranean than in northern Europe. The benefit of employing green American troops and inexperienced leaders against German positions there afforded them the opportunity to gain combat experience on more favorable terms. German combat strength and fighting-power in North Africa was only a fraction of what it wielded in Europe. Moreover, by engaging German troops gradually and in relatively small numbers, American troops would gain in experience while taking fewer casualties. However distant from the main theater of war, German defeats in the Mediterranean just might affect the stability of the German regime. Thus, by engaging American troops in combat before 15 September in a relatively safe operation set in French North Africa, Roosevelt surmised that he would gain public support for the war effort, lessen the

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[21] H. Loewenheim, M. Jonas, H. Langley (eds.), *Op. cit..*, pp. 254-256; Marshall to Dill 'CCS-94', Washington, 14 Aug. 1942, RG. 165 Exec 10 Box 59; Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, pp. 122-140.

[22] *Churchill to Roosevelt, 'Second Front'*, London, 28 May 1942, *Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence*, pp. 495-500, FDRL.

[23] P. Ziegler, *Mountbatten*, (London, 1985), p. 184.

strain on Russia, and win the November congressional elections for his political party.[24]

America had only been in the war eleven months, beginning with scant, archaic equipment and a small peacetime military cadre. With such meager beginnings, transforming them into a large, modern and aggressive fighting force capable of amphibious operations under combat conditions was daunting.[25] Marshall was to say in 1956,

> We failed to see that the leader in a democracy has to keep the people entertained. The people demand action. We couldn't wait to be completely ready. Churchill was always getting into side shows. If we had gone as far as he did we never would have got out. But I could see why he had to have something.[26]

By having the President's ear and dramatically arguing for the acceptance of GYMNAST, as the centerpiece of British strategy, Mountbatten and Churchill succeeded in turning the weaknesses of the American system to their own advantage. Roosevelt's manipulations precluded the use of balanced inquiry, and inadvertently contributed to the outcome his visitors were seeking. Moreover, even before the British arrived, the President was biased towards a French North African operation. Banished from these meetings, the American Chiefs were frustrated and confused. The foregoing informal American process, seemingly flexible and expeditious was defined by a President capricious in his decision-making, who discounted the participation of qualified observers and advisers appointed to safeguard the nation's strategic interests. Marshall recognized that the source of the problem stemmed from the President's interpretation of his role as Commander-in-Chief and his intermittent use of the JCS. Where the British COS were the military advisers to a small ministerial body, the JCS were held accountable to the President, a military leader with no military experience, as C-in-C of the American Army and Navy.[27]

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[24] R. Steele, 'Political Aspects of American Military Planning, 1941-1942', *Military Affairs*, XXXV, 2, (1971), pp.68-69, 71-72.
[25] M. Stoler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 53, 63.
[26] F. Pogue, Interview with Gen. G. Marshall, 13 Nov. 1956.
[27] CCS 38 Meeting, Washington, 28 Aug. 1942, *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

Lack of Administrative Accountability

Unfortunately, the President did not take Churchill's argument under advisement, as a means of buying time, even though it had been previously agreed that planning would take place in London, not Washington. As a military non-professional, a poor second to Churchill who had benefited from a military education, however archaic, the President made military decisions for political reasons without the benefit of professional advice. Two months later, to avoid a recurrence of this error, the Joint Chiefs recommended to the Combined Chiefs that where military and political considerations were both involved, it must be accepted that no military commitment should be entered into on the political level without prior consultation with the CCS.[28]

With SUPER-GYMNAST neutralized by the loss of Tobruk, with BOLERO, not an action in itself but the logistical build-up that would lead to an action across the Channel, with SLEDGEHAMMER failing because of a lack of resources, GYMNAST was revived. Two years later, shortages of landing craft continued to plague the Allies. In a telegram to Marshall, Churchill remarked that, 'history would never understand how the plans of two great empires should be so hamstrung and limited by a hundred or two of these particular vessels.'[29]

Marshall, dismayed over what he considered to be a wasted effort in an inconclusive theater, was strongly opposed to GYMNAST. He and King argued in a memo sent to the President that 'the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the GYMNAST plan as compared to other operations, particularly 1942 emergency BOLERO operations, leads to the conclusion that the occupation of Northwest Africa this summer should not be attempted...'[30] During an August meeting of the CCS, Cunningham stated that GYMNAST, renamed TORCH, was intended to relieve German pressure on the Russians by clearing the Mediterranean for Allied shipping, relieving the threat to Malta, and by securing Egypt. Once this was achieved, North Africa would become a

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[28] *Ibid.*
[29] Churchill to Marshall, Washington, 16 Apr. 1944, RG 165, Item 16 Exec. 8.
[30] Marshall & Adm. E. King to Roosevelt, 'Gymnast Operations', 28 July 1942, *PSF*, FDRL.

departure point for the invasion of Europe. King and Marshall disagreed with Cunningham's interpretation. They believed that the British had designed TORCH to relieve the Middle Eastern convoy routes and to deny naval bases to the enemy from which they could attack Allied South Atlantic convoy routes. Moreover, the Americans subscribed to the Russian view, that only a cross-Channel attack in 1942 could provide the relief Russia sought. BOLERO leading to SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942 and ROUNDUP in 1943 were the operations required; anything else was a dispersion of force, an abuse of resources and tangential to Russian demands and needs.

If the landings were compared, TORCH was less fraught with danger than SLEDGEHAMMER, because the bulk of German military strength lay primarily in Russia, along the northern coast of Europe, and not in Vichy controlled French North Africa. Approximately 200,000 German troops were stationed in Tunisia, but only a small German Armistice Commission was based in Algeria and French Morocco.[31] Moreover, Marshall, arguing against TORCH, revealed that its failure would bring only ridicule and loss of public confidence, while a failure in SLEDGEHAMMER, for which the public had been adequately prepared, would have been more acceptable. This did not square with Roosevelt and Churchill's mutual conception of the Channel being made red with the blood of Allied dead, if a landing were attempted.[32] Leahy concluded that since the reputation of the American armed forces was at stake, success in TORCH was essential. If they failed, he warned, plummeting American prestige would result in appalling political consequences for the patriots and peoples of China and Russia. Leahy did not raise similar concerns for SLEDGEHAMMER.[33] Both Chiefs of Staffs extolled the virtues and discounted the hazards of their pet operation, in an attempt to sway the other, all to no avail. Marshall had no alternative to offer.

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[31] *Battle Summary No. 38, Operation Torch*, (London, 1948), pp. 104-5.
[32] R. Sherwood, *Op. cit.*, p. 581.
[33] CCS 38 meeting, Washington, 28 Aug. 1942, Reel III.

The Washington Conference was representative of the British attitude towards negotiations, in which the application of the 'Yes/But' method was applied. The following is an example:

> ...Plans and preparations for the operations in this theater (western Europe) are to be pressed forward with all possible speed, energy and ingenuity...If a sound and sensible plan can be contrived, we should not hesitate to give effect to it. If a detailed examination shows that despite all efforts, success is improbable, we must be ready with an alternative.[34]

The wording smacks of double-talk, with the unmentioned alternative, GYMNAST, preferred. Mixed messages on 'Grand Strategy', as related above, contributed to the conference's inconclusive outcome. It was moot in any case, as Churchill knew that Roosevelt favored GYMNAST, as a means of hustling American troops into action. Before GYMNAST became formalized, however, the President sent Marshall, King and Hopkins to London once again – their mission: to settle the controversy on which Allied strategy had foundered. It seemed as if he were directing them to perform in a calculated charade of his own making, since the President had secretly decided upon North Africa beforehand. The difference between the two American visits to London, within the space of four months, must have been apparent to them and a cause for concern, as they flew across the Atlantic.

Marshall and Hopkins had previously flown to London in early April 1942, taking with them a plan, originally conceived by Eisenhower and his operations staff and re-shaped by Marshall; it defined an operation that would threaten the Germans directly in Northwest Europe and relieve pressure on the Russians. Known as the 'Eisenhower Memorandum' of 25 March, it emerged with modifications in its final form, as the 'Marshall Memorandum' of 1 April.[35] The plan, presented by Marshall at a White House meeting the following day, was supported by Stimson and Hopkins, and

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[34] Office of American Secretariat, 'Offensive Operations for 1942-43', Washington, 21 June 1942. RG. 165 WPD Exec. 1 Item 4, Ismay Paper included.
[35] COS 942) 97(0), Washington, 13 Apr. 1942. RG. 165, Exec. 1.

approved by the President, who immediately authorized both his Chief of Staff and Chief Advisor to bypass the newly organized CCS, 'where it would simply be pulled to pieces and emasculated.'[36] Taking it directly to Churchill and the COS in London, Marshall would negotiate in the name of the President.[37] The CCS, an organization that Marshall created was discounted in the name of expediency. The circumvention failed, because Dill notified his superiors in London on 5 April that, 'You may shortly be seeing a paper from a high US source operations in western Europe which we have today been able to glance at unofficially.'[38]

The name of his source was omitted, but it did contain a summary of the American plan three days before Marshall and Hopkins arrived, time enough for Churchill and the COS to explore it thoroughly and prepare for their rebuttal. Alex Danchev, in his biography of Dill, attributes certain appellations to him, but 'operative'[39] is not one of them. At the same time, both American representatives were buoyed by the prospect of not only showing something new to the British, but having it approved. The author, Brian Loring Villa, wrote:

> The arrival in April of General Marshall and his advisors, who were determined to keep alive the possibility of an emergency landing in Europe in 1942, gave Mountbatten his opportunity by reopening the question of what operations should be undertaken in that year. What followed turned out to be the most important strategic debate of the war.[40]

Soon after arriving on 8 April, the Americans entered in a series of meetings, called MODICUM, with their British hosts. The general concept of 'closing the ring' advocated in the First World War had now been drafted by the Americans into two specified cross-Channel attacks separated by time and magnitude. Differing from earlier British SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP proposals, which depended upon a severe German collapse before attempting a Channel landing, the American proposal

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[36] H. Stimson & M. Bundy, *Op. cit.*, quoting Hopkins, pp. 214-215.
[37] Gen. D. Eisenhower to COS, 'BOLERO and Plans for Operations in Northwest Europe', Washington, 25 Mar., 12 Apr. 1942, RG 165 Exec. 1 Box 1 OPD 381.
[38] Dill to War Cabinet, 'Operations in Western Europe', Washington, 5 Apr. 1942, CAB 105/39.
[39] A. Danchev, *Op. Cit.* He used titles such as 'Broker', 'Fixer' and 'Agitator' for his chapter headings.
[40] B. Villa, *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

recommended forcing that collapse with their own military formations.[41] There were two main considerations: first, the continuance of Russian resistance; and second, that northwest Europe was the place where the expanding American Army and Air Force could engage in active operations and gain war experience. To the Americans, ROUNDUP was their major war effort, and, once agreed upon was considered irreversible. The plan described the following operations: a.) BOLERO, a logistical build-up in Britain of thirty American divisions, plus air power within 12 months, and, b.) ROUNDUP, the deliberate invasion of Europe by 30 American and 18 British divisions in Normandy, supported by 5,800 combat planes in 1943.

Marshall gave his reasons for the choice of western Europe:

> 1.) The shortest route to the heart of Germany passed through France.
>
> 2.) The theater in which the first major Allied offensive could be staged.
>
> 3.) Effective results could be obtained more rapidly than elsewhere.
>
> 4.) Nowhere else could the Allies attain the overwhelming air superiority vital to success.
>
> 5.) The United States could concentrate and maintain a larger force in that area than it could in any other.
>
> 6.) Combined Allied combat power could be employed, and maximum support given to Russia in 1942.
>
> 7.) SLEDGEHAMMER, an emergency landing of approximately five divisions with supporting air on the Cotentin peninsula on 15 September 1942.[42]

The British were skeptical, setting the stage for a prolonged Anglo-American strategic debate that began here and reverberated throughout the war. Although the British found the American ROUNDUP acceptable, they harbored reservations, doubts and objections regarding SLEDGEHAMMER's practicality and timeliness in 1942, but remained non-committal regarding its defects. Brooke, transcribing from his diary, wrote, 'With the situation prevailing at that time it was not possible to take Marshall's

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[41] Gen. B. Paget, Adm. Lord Mountbatten, AM S. Douglas, 'Re-entry into France', 21 Mar., 1942, CAB 79/19; CAB-JPS Study, 9 Dec. 1941, 'Operations on Continent in Final Phase' CAB 79/17, JP(41) 1028.

[42] CAB 79/19 (42), 112, 9 Apr. 1942.

'Castles in the Air' too seriously. His strategic ability was of the poorest! It must be remembered that we were literally hanging on by our eye-lids!'[43]

A British Ruse

Fearful of an American move towards the Pacific, the British resorted to subterfuge, while at the same time seeking to irrevocably involve America in defeating 'Germany-first'. An agreement would establish an American concentrated production effort, an increased material allocation program, an intensification of training and Britain bound troop movements, a contribution specifically geared to fighting directly across the Channel. All the British had to do to achieve their goal of supply and theater priority was to accept Marshall's proposals. By comparison, Marshall considered British operations in the Far and Middle East secondary and diversionary to the primacy of future operations in Europe. He relied on BOLERO, as it gathered momentum, to refocus British interests and eliminate such dispersions. Marshall urged that operations on the Continent 'not be reduced to the status of a residuary legatee.'[44] Measured against this main effort were the calculated risks to be taken by the allies at the expense of the Middle East and the Pacific. Further Japanese incursions would have to be stopped with the current level of resources.[45]

On 14 April the COS accepted the American proposal 'in principle', agreeing that planning in London should begin immediately for a major offensive in Europe in 1943 and for an emergency landing, if necessary, in 1942.[46] However, the British wavered over SLEDGEHAMMER. The inclusion of the phrase 'if necessary' in the agreed document signaled that the COS considered SLEDGEHAMMER subject to further negotiations, if future conditions demanded other alternatives. Marshall knew that the substantive 'agreement in principle' remained a treacherous problem with regard to

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[43] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 2/V, 12-15 Apr. 1942, p. 383.
[44] Marshall, 'Notebook', Washington, 13 Apr. 1942, RG 165 Exec. 1 Item 5d.
[45] JCS 6 Meeting, Washington, 16 Mar. 1942, Reel I.
[46] COS-USCOS Meeting, 'Minutes', London, 14 Apr. 1942, RG. 165 OPD, Exec 1 Box 1 ABC 381 BOLERO.

SLEDGEHAMMER. Churchill's post-war memoirs reveal that the Prime Minister harbored grave doubts regarding SLEDGEHAMMER's feasibility, but chose to say little regarding the plan during the meeting. Butler. writing in the British Official History, ascribed an unreserved concurrence:

> British officers gathered that in spite of our efforts and intentions to do the contrary, the Americans thought we did not mean to really do business on their plan - this because of our insistence on the seriousness of the situation developing in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.[47]

This does not square with the feelings of the British planning staff who advised the COS. They considered the Marshall Memorandum to be strategically ridiculous, a pipe dream of colossal proportions, produced in a mood of totally unjustifiable self-confidence. They concluded that he was far too optimistic in thinking that American troops could face the Germans and do well in an action of major proportions in late 1943 or even early 1944.[48] Ralph Kilner Brown, one of the British planners, said in a 1993 interview,

> The month of June 1942 saw the relationship between the British and the Americans strained and stretched almost to the breaking point. It was only the personal friendship between Roosevelt and Churchill, and the admiration each felt for the other, that enabled them to overcome the mutual suspicion which existed between the British and American service Chiefs, to build upon the shaky foundations of the Allied war effort...[49]

Part of the discussion centered on the landing sites and the variations of German strength in each locality: for SLEDGEHAMMER, the COS opted for the Pas de Calais. the Americans for Cherbourg; for ROUNDUP, the COS opted for Normandy, the Americans for the area between Dieppe and Le Havre. However, could the expected German reaction to a sacrifice landing lead to the destruction of the Luftwaffe above the beach area?

The British behaved in a disingenuous manner. Motivated by their need for American supplies, filled with doubts regarding the American plan and fearful of their reprisals if expressed. Churchill and the COS defaulted. Marshall and Hopkins were led to believe

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[47] W. Churchill. *Op. cit.*, pp. 323-324.; J. Butler. *Grand Strategy*. III. (London, 1964), p. 577.
[48] Sir R. Kindler Brown, *Top Brass and No Brass*. (Lewes. 1991). pp. 68. 69. 77.
[49] Interview with Sir R. Kilner Brown, London, 24 Sept. 1993.

that a military settlement had been reached. Remaining unresolved were the problems of shipping, landing craft and experienced troop manpower shortages (problems which were well known to the British), which were far more crippling to SLEDGEHAMMER than the Americans envisaged.

Air Power in Support of SLEDGEHAMMER

This was defined as a combined Anglo-American air offensive beginning in mid-July 1942, followed by a landing in Normandy six weeks later by five divisions with the aim of destroying all German forces in that part of France. Once fixed firmly ashore, air and ground bases would be established to press the attack towards Germany.[50] Before the effect of the Victory Program could be felt, the British would have to supply the bulk of the forces in an operation in which they did not believe. The Americans could send 700 aircraft and four divisions to Britain by September 1942. These ground formations, having had minimal training and no combat experience, could not be expected to do well against the German defences. This was the cost of trying to conscript a citizen army in the shortest possible time. Accepting these constraints, Marshall created his army on engineering principles, training men who could serve their weapons automatically, without thought. As its goal, men were to be mass-produced in assembly-line fashion, in the same cold manner that Henry Ford produced automobiles. To support this inexorable movement, stood a political and economic system, which was enormously productive, but it tended to turn men into adjuncts of their machines, relying more on the machines than in themselves.[51]

Specific to SLEDGEHAMMER, The British, having failed to discuss most of its problems openly with the Americans, not only evaded their responsibility to the alliance, but helped to distort and perpetuate American delusions by their duplicity. The Americans believed SLEDGEHAMMER to be possible and necessary. The British did

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[50] 'Strategic Deployment of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces of the US'. Washington, 6 Mar. 1942. RG 165 OPD. JPS 2/6.

[51] M. Crefeld. *Fighting Power, German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945*. (London.1983). pp. 73-79. 167-173.

not, but feared the Americans would abrogate the 'Germany-first' agreement and turn unilaterally towards the Pacific, leaving Britain to fight on alone. Eisenhower had recommended a Pacific alternative if the British rejected the Marshall Memorandum.[52] During the evening of 14 April, at the end of a War Cabinet Defence Committee meeting attended by the Americans, Churchill formally accepted Marshall's proposal.[53] The Americans had been frank, the British had not. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt on 17 April, 'We wholeheartedly agree...' as the meetings in London concluded.[54] There would be no more thrashing around in the dark, or so it seemed.

The British conferees in London deliberated over SLEDGEHAMMER from the time the Americans had left in mid-April and on 8 July they reached a decision. The Prime Minister informed the President by letter, the first paragraph of which read,

> No responsible British General, Admiral or Air Marshal is prepared to recommend SLEDGEHAMMER as a practicable operation in 1942. The Chiefs of Staff have reported 'The conditions which would make SLEDGEHAMMER a sound sensible enterprise are very unlikely to occur.'[55]

Marshall was dispirited by Churchill's repudiation of the April agreement. Ismay said of that time,

> Our American friends went happily homewards under the mistaken impression that we had committed ourselves to both ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER...When we had to tell them that we were absolutely opposed to it (SLEDGEHAMMER), they felt that we had broken faith with them....[56]
>
> We should have come clean, much cleaner than we did, and said, 'We are frankly horrified because of what we have been through in our lifetime...you see, we are not going into this until it is a cast-iron certainty.'[57]

While the British equivocated, the Americans were forthright. If Marshall was strategically naïve, Churchill and Brooke were less than candid, avoiding any direct confrontation. Between Marshall and Brooke there was always something of a

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[52] Eisenhower, 'Memo for COS', Washington, 25 Mar. 1942, *Op. cit.*
[53] COS-USCOS Meeting, *Op. cit.*
[54] H. Loewenheim et al, *Op. cit.*, p. 206.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 222.
[56] Ismay, *Op. cit.*, pp. 249-250.
[57] F. Pogue, Interview with Gen. Lord H. Ismay, 18 Oct. 1960.

temperamental barrier, the British general reserving his true feelings over SLEDGEHAMMER for his diary. By not arguing for his strategic beliefs, he missed an opportunity to ensure the cohesiveness of the coalition by being forthright with the Americans, i.e., 'agreement in principle' only applied to ROUNDUP and not to the plan as a whole, as they believed SLEDGEHAMMER required further study. On 29 April Churchill, unknown to Marshall and Hopkins, said to the War Cabinet, 'While preparations should proceed on the basis that we should make a resolute effort to capture a bridgehead on the Continent in the late summer (of 1942), we were not committed to carrying out such an operation.'[58]

The War Cabinet agreed. Thus the euphoria of a 'noble brotherhood of arms' disintegrated into an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust. There was grave danger that the coalition would disentangle. The differences between British and American thinking were analogous to those of Sherman and Grant during the American Civil War. Comparing Grant with himself, Sherman said,

> I'm a damn sight smarter man than Grant....but I'll tell you where he beat me and where he beats the world. He don't give a damn for what the enemy does out of his sight but it scares me like hell...I am more likely to change my orders or to countermand my command than he is.[59]

To get on with the war, qualified men, predisposed towards co-operation, good faith and action were needed to negotiate on behalf of the coalition, rather than for their own nation's interests; both Hopkins and Churchill thought they were qualified,[60] unfortunately they were not; and MODICUM ended by re-defining itself as a 'trifle' with indeterminate results.

Before Marshall's second journey to London on 16 July, accompanied by his two colleagues, Hopkins and King, the President insisted that if SLEDGEHAMMER was definitely canceled, Marshall had to find another place where American troops could fight in 1942. The American conferees were instructed to work for an absolute co-

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[58] CAB. 65/30, 28, 29 Apr. 1942.
[59] L. Lewis, *Sherman: Fighting Prophet*, (New York, 1932), p. 424.
[60] R. Sherwood, *Op. cit.*, pp. 534-542. R. S. Cline, *Op. cit.*, p.159.

ordinated use of British and American forces. Roosevelt was convinced that only a second front would ease the German pressure on Russia; he said,

> It must be constantly reiterated that the Russian armies are killing more Germans and destroying more Axis material than all the twenty-five united nations put together. Therefore it has seemed wholly logical to support the great Russian effort in 1942...to develop plans aimed at diverting German land and air forces from the Russian front.[61]

Nevertheless, in late June the President doubted if a second front could be established with the means available before the November congressional elections. Time was running out. The President, lacking viable alternatives, either in the Pacific or the Middle East, leaned towards GYMNAST as the only economical choice in the war against Germany. Churchill and Brooke knew that Roosevelt secretly wanted a September GYMNAST, and that the American conferees were strategically in disarray: King preferred action in the Pacific, Hopkins in Africa and Marshall in Europe.[62] The concatenation of events in Russia and divergent American attitudes proved insurmountable to Marshall. If Churchill and Brooke remained steadfast, and at the same time supported BOLERO, GYMNAST would become a reality.[63]

Churchill and the COS prepared and agreed upon a tactical plan to use against the Americans. United against SLEDGEHAMMER, the British would not mention GYMNAST, but allow the Americans to make their case for the cross-Channel attack. The British believed that once the plan was rejected, the Americans, charged to follow Presidential instructions, would agree to GYMNAST. Meeting in closed session, the American conferees and their London staffs, seeking ways to overcome British reticence, revised SLEDGEHAMMER to mean a landing on the Cherbourg peninsula. The British had prepared a revision of their own, i.e., their government required permanent landings, a condition that the COS believed impossible to satisfy. Alone, this condition would defeat Marshall.

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[61]Roosevelt to COS and Hopkins, Washington, 6 May 1942, PSF..FDRL.
[62] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/VI., 26 June 1942, p. 425.
[63] H. W. Wynter, *Op. cit.*,, p. 77.

GYMNAST Prevails

The meetings began on 20 July and lasted four days. The Americans presented their case, the theme of which was support for Russia in the guise of a cross-Channel attack either as a 'sacrifice operation' or the 'first-stage' of ROUNDUP: the British considered that a 'sacrifice' operation against the Pas de Calais, if it were to absorb German forces and help the Russians, would end in disaster with the loss of six divisions, and furthermore, as a 'first-stage' operation, the landing could not be maintained, because of rapid German military intervention and poor Channel weather after September. Marshall admitted that there was little time to activate SLEDGEHAMMER as a 'sacrifice' operation, but he persisted in arguing for it as a 'first-stage'. With 15 German divisions available along the Channel coast, with Cherbourg as the chosen port at the limit of fighter support, and the usual weather deterioration to come, the British rejected the American proposal as unrealistic. Churchill, sure of success, requested that the Americans inform Roosevelt of the impasse, as a means of opening the way for conversations on alternative operations.[64]

The President replied a few hours later, instructing his American representatives to reach consensus quickly. British concerns were dispelled during the stalemate, when Roosevelt requested that GYMNAST be considered for immediate consideration. Roosevelt compared an Allied invasion of North Africa with the German invasion of Norway, an operation that returned a large dividend on a small investment. Marshall was under no illusions; GYMNAST would have little or no direct effect upon any critical front of the war, but it did have the full support of both the President and Prime Minister, controllers of vast supplies and forces. He and King maintained that,

> ...Great Britain is the only area from which the combined strength of the United Nations can be brought to bear against our principal enemy - Germany, so that no avoidable reduction in our preparations for ROUNDUP should be considered as long as there remains any reasonable possibility of its successful execution.[65]

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[64] Churchill to Roosevelt, London, 23 July 1942, CAB 65/31, p. 26.
[65] Marshall & King to Roosevelt, London, 28 July 1942, RG.165 OPD WDCSA 319.1 (TS).

Roosevelt responded to a second cable by Hopkins, indicating that he wanted an invasion date no later than 30 October, including orders of 'full speed ahead'.[66] The American conferees noted that without active Russian participation and the continuation of BOLERO, it would be impossible to attain a continental operation in 1943. The only option left was a defensive line of action against Germany. The British insisted that GYMNAST, now renamed TORCH, did not break with *ABC-1*'s combined strategic concept of sea blockade and air operations. The Americans disagreed, because GYMNAST was a defensive operation and ROUNDUP was not. They were also concerned that approval of TORCH would delay a 1943 ROUNDUP until 1944, a conclusion already reached by the British chiefs. On 24 July although Marshall had complied with his Commander-in-Chief, and both sides had agreed that a second front in Europe should be postponed until 1943, 'CCS-94', the combined statement of policy, read as if it were Marshall's creation:

> ...if the situation on the Russian front by 15 September indicates such a collapse or weakening of Russian resistance as to make ROUNDUP appear impracticable of successful execution, the decision should be taken to launch a combined operation against North and North West coast of Africa at the earliest possible date before December 1942...[67]

As long as SLEDGEHAMMER did not interfere with TORCH, preparations for it should continue for the purposes of deception or exploitation, if either an emergency arose or the Germans collapsed. In addition, he persuaded the British to agree to the withdrawal from BOLERO of 15 groups of the US Army Air Force and a division's worth of assault shipping for use against the Japanese.[68] Because it would take over three months of planning and preparation to mount a North African operation, Marshall and King sought a definite decision on TORCH from the President and Prime Minister. Contrary to Marshall and King's thinking, Dill and Leahy thought that both political leaders had decided favorably. However, the two American Chiefs believed that by choosing TORCH, both Roosevelt and Churchill would have to acknowledge the

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[66] Roosevelt to Hopkins, Marshall and King, Washington, 25 June 1942, RG 165, OPD WDCSA 381, 1 (SS).
[67] CCS 32 Meeting, 'CCS-94', Washington , 24 July 1942, Reel III.
[68] *Ibid.*

consequences of dooming ROUNDUP: left unchallenged in the West, free from a cross-Channel attack for at least a year, the Germans could arrange their forces elsewhere at little cost to themselves. Consequently, TORCH would increase the strain on limited Allied resources because of longer shipping distances, additional tonnage requirements and repetitive shipment of manpower between Britain and the Mediterranean.[69] Marshall and Stimson tried to prolong the strategic debate as long as possible by accepting GYMNAST as the operation of last resort, i.e., if a Russian collapse led to an overflow of German troops into the West, GYMNAST would supersede ROUNDUP for 1943. As recorded by General Walter Bedell Smith, Roosevelt ended all speculation at a White House meeting attended by the JCS on 30 July:

> The President stated very definitely that he, as Commander-in-Chief, had made the decision that TORCH would be undertaken at the earliest possible date. He considered that this operation was now our principal objective and the assembling of means to carry it out should take precedence over other operations as, for instance, BOLERO...we are now committed to the provisions of 'CCS-94', which calls for the final decision to be made by September 15.[70]

The After-Shock of Roosevelt's Decision

The President's approach in making his decisions continued to be cavalier. As usual, none of the major American participants were taken into his confidence. Rather than discussing the relative merits of his position with his Chiefs in London or with their surrogates in Washington, he informed them of his decision after the fact. Contrary to Marshall and King's thinking, Roosevelt, ignoring the need for further inquiry, insisted that his TORCH decision would not prevent ROUNDUP in 1943.[71] Although Churchill and Brooke had been initially divided on GYMNAST, by 17 June after further conversations held between them, the other Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet, they agreed that the North African operation offered the only alternative for an

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[69] T. Higgins, *Winston Churchill and the Second Front*, (New York: OUP, 1957), pp. 134-35, 144, 155, 159.

[70] Army Secretariat, 'Notes on White House Conference, 30 July 1942', Washington, 1 Aug., 1942, RG 165 Exec. 5, Item 1, for JCS.

[71] McNarney to Marshall, Washington, 25 July 1942, RG. 165 OPD, CM-OUT 7303.

allied offensive that year.[72] Taking comfort in their unified viewpoint, supported by Dill's confidential information, they could exploit American strategic fragmentation to their own advantage, which they did throughout the conference. Frustrated, Marshall and King sought refuge in 'CCS-94', in an attempt to lessen the effects of the decision. No sooner had the agreement been reached, that Marshall and King considered 'taking up their dishes and going away', a figurative description of an increased American presence in the Pacific, and a de-emphasis of *ABC-1*.[73] Although the President had contributed to the scuttling of both SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, he refused to allow any such reprisal, proclaiming that TORCH remain pre-eminent. Marshall considered it to be a momentous change in grand strategy and Eisenhower considered it to be the blackest day in the history of the war.[74]

During the controversy in London, the Pacific theater was in no way being treated as a back-water. The Americans increased the intensity of the conflict in the Pacific to such an extent that the Japanese realized that the Americans had the means and determination to defeat them. As the British could not be held directly accountable or liable for abrogating the SLEDGEHAMMER agreement, the Americans could not seek redress in binding arbitration. However, they could exact penalties. Direct sanctions applied against an ally were unconscionable, but with rearranged priorities and limited shipments to Britain, the effect was the same. For the rest of the year, resources flowed as fast to the Pacific as they did to the Mediterranean; while supplies to Britain slowed to a trickle.[75] As a result of the TORCH decision, the Army had more troops deployed against Japan by the end of 1942 than deployed against Germany. Both in an attempt to limit the feared dispersion of forces and in the belief that the turnabout was fair play, Marshall and King adopted to the British technique of interpreting a contract on the basis of 'agreement in principle' (in spirit) rather than on 'formal interpretation'

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[72] CAB 79/22, 24 July 1942.
[73] Admiral E. King & W. Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record*, (New York, 1952), pp. 190-200; H. Stimson & M. Bundy, *Op. cit.*, p. 425.
[74] H. Butcher, *My Three Years With Eisenhower*, (New York, 1946), pp. 29, 294.
[75] K. Greenfield, *Op. cit.*, p. 7; Sir M. Howard, *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War*, (London, 1968), p. 35.

(the letter). Dill made the distinction in a personal letter to Marshall, 'To what extent does 'CCS-94' alter *ABC-4*/CS.1?...it certainly covers TORCH...At present, our Chiefs of Staff quote ABC-4/CS.1 as the Bible, whereas some of your people, I think, look upon 'CCS-94' as the revised version!'[76]

Although Brooke admitted that an African operation involved a necessary dispersion of forces which would otherwise have been available for ROUNDUP, he felt TORCH was the only worthwhile operation: he stressed that strong forces were always needed in Britain, and plans should be made for them to re-enter Europe as soon as possible.[77] When that would happen was questionable, but as late as 27 July, after the agreement had been reached, Churchill telegraphed Roosevelt: '...as I see it this second front consists of a main body holding the enemy pinned opposite SLEDGEHAMMER and a wide flanking movement called TORCH...'[78]

The TORCH plan, even the later cautious American version, based on concerns over a shortage of shipping, mistrust of Spanish intentions and a reluctance to commit their green troops to a fierce initiation fitted easily into British strategy, whereas American strategy had to be fitted into TORCH.[79] Some of the more cynical amongst the American planners felt that they had been deceived by 'perfidious Albion'. They thought that Britain, leaving the defence of her island to the Americans, was free to pursue its imperial policies and post-war settlements elsewhere. Stimson, embittered over the decision to land in North Africa, forcefully expressed his dissatisfaction to the President. The Secretary's behavior encouraged army officers in the War Department to reveal their doubts and opposition to this change in strategy. Roosevelt's response was swift in coming: the Secretary was ostracized for several months. The importance of the London negotiations were expressed by Brooke at the end of the conference, 'It has certainly been a trying week! The major strategy of the war had been at stake, and

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[76] Dill to Marshall, Washington, 14 Aug. 1942. RG. 165 OPD WDCSA.
[77] B. Wynter. *Op. cit.*, p. 440.
[78] H. Loewenheim. et al. *Op. cit.*, p. 227.
[79] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, pp. 33-35.

the Americans intent on carrying out an attack that could only result in disaster, and might well vitiate the whole of our future strategy.'[80]

Churchill's Meeting with Stalin

Approximately one month later, Churchill met with Stalin in Moscow to report on the TORCH agreement reached in London. Stalin's reaction differed from Brooke's. The Soviet leader concluded that his western allies had invalidated their arrangement with him for an Anglo-American landing in northern France. He said on 15 August 1942:

> ...the refusal of the Government of Great Britain to create a second front in 1942 in Europe inflicts a moral blow to the whole of Soviet public opinion...prejudices the plan of the Soviet Command...deteriorates the Military situation of England and all the remaining Allies....most favorable conditions exist in 1942 for a second front in Europe, because almost all the forces of the German Army have been withdrawn to the Eastern Front...the creation of a second front in Europe is possible and should be effective....[81]

TORCH not only delayed the cross-Channel invasion until the spring of 1944, but exceeded its original operational estimates because of Hitler's decision to fight for Tunisia and denuded the European theater of operations of men and material – leaving it as a standby theater manned by a skeleton crew.[82] If it were Roosevelt's intention to pit American combat units against the Germans, he failed. French, not German, troops opposed the Americans during the TORCH landings in November 1942. TORCH not only failed to give Stalin the relief he needed, but it allowed Hitler to move twenty-seven divisions, including five armored divisions, from Northwest Europe to Russia.[83] With the Allies failure to execute SLEDGEHAMMER, either as a landing or the threat of one, the Russian Army, which represented the only force capable of defeating or containing the German Army, faced near destruction. The twenty-five German divisions in France would have contained and eliminated a 1942 SLEDGEHAMMER, but the threat almost certainly would have 'contained' those twenty-five divisions.

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[80] FM Lord Alanbrooke. *Op. cit.*, 3/A/VI. 24 July. 1942, p. 449.
[81] W. Kimball, (ed.), *Churchill and Roosevelt, The Complete Correspondence*, (Princetown, 1984), p. 567.
[82] R. Leighton & R. Coakley, *The Logistics of Global Warfare 1940-1943*, (Washington, 1955), p. 487.
[83] S. Richardson & H. Steirman, *The Secret History of World War II*, (New York, 1986), pp. 82-83.

While the German armies in Russia intensified their unrelenting pressure on the Soviets, the Germans in Tunisia were preparing to teach the Americans an unforgettable combat lesson, but not before another summit conference ended at Casablanca, Morocco in late January 1943.

CHAPTER FOUR

The SYMBOL and TRIDENT Conferences

On 7 January 1943, one week before the Casablanca Conference. Roosevelt convened a meeting of the JCS at the White House to discuss future strategic options. He asked if they were united in advocating a cross-Channel operation. He discovered that not only were there differences of opinion regarding the issue between the members of the JCS, but also between their planners and the Chiefs themselves. Marshall discounted further Mediterranean action on the basis of logistics and shipping demands, advocating a cross-Channel attack.

> The losses in northwest France would be in troops, but to state it cruelly, we could replace troops, whereas a heavy loss in shipping which would result from the BRIMSTONE (Sardinia) operation, might completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations against the enemy in the near future.[1]

Marshall had failed to raise this argument during the two London meetings of April and July 1942, when he had proposed SLEDGEHAMMER as a sacrificial operation to satisfy both Russian demands and American military thinking. By acknowledging the scarcity of American troops and the appalling Allied shipping losses to U-boats, Marshall's lobbying for SLEDGEHAMMER might have either exposed or limited British dissent. Timely, binding agreements were nearly impossible to attain throughout 1942 and 1943, largely because the President continued to equivocate on the issue of a European grand strategy. The impasse between the British and American strategies was described, 'as one thing or the other with no alternative in sight'. Roosevelt remained uncommitted under the circumstances, deferring decisions, seeking compromise, and allowing events or the British to take charge, rather than giving the JCS the clear direction it needed. As Commander-in-Chief, only he could choose between European and Mediterranean strategies on which policy could then be based.

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1 'White House Meeting, 7 January', Washington, 7 Jan. 1943, Rg 165 *OPD*, Minutes Meeting at White House.

but he felt vulnerable and was wary of public criticism and his domestic political adversaries who could easily turn questions of foreign affairs into partisan politics. This he had learned from President Wilson's ill-fated attempts to dictate public opinion; he chose to obfuscate instead. He warned the JCS that the British would have a comprehensive plan at Casablanca, but he offered nothing comparable to his own staff. Disadvantaged, disorganized and disunited, all they could do was to fight a rear-guard action against the British.[2]

Casablanca was the 'watershed' conference of the war. It was here that decisions were made to politicize the war in an utterly irretrievable manner[3] and to develop a military strategy based on attrition rather than on maneuver, on the acquisition of space rather than the elimination of the German Army.[4] The outcome was stalemate. Incompatible differences increased the tensions between the British who advocated a war of attrition ending with a landing in France as the *coup de grâce* and the Americans who advocated a war of concentration beginning with a collision of forces.

Roosevelt, Churchill and their staffs, with Marshall and Brooke as the chief protagonists, met at Anfa, near Casablanca from 13 to 23 January 1943. Roosevelt's mood was optimistic and carefree, as if he were delighted to be out of the intemperate politics and cold weather of Washington. Sub-tropical Casablanca offered superb accommodations to the visiting dignitaries. Harold Macmillan wrote soon after arriving,

> ...I christened the two personalities [Prime Minister and the President], the Emperor of the East and the Emperor of the West, and indeed it was rather like a meeting of the later period of the Roman Empire...there was a curious mixture of holiday and business...in these fascinating surroundings.[5]

During the life of the Conference, the major participants attended thirty one meetings, some of which were presided over by the President and Prime Minister. Stalin had

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[2] *Ibid.*
[3] A. Wedemeyer, *Op. cit.*, p. 169.
[4] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, p. 35.
[5] H. Macmillan, *War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean*, (New York, 1984), p. 193.

declined his invitation, because of the critical situation in Russia. The British arrived at the conference more united and better prepared than the Americans, having learned that the JCS had approved their agenda with minor modifications. To be discussed were issues of Anglo-American global strategy and future operations within each theater. In addition, a daunting agenda of force structures, logistics, training, area commands, Lend-Lease and assistance to Allies were to be considered.[6]

After the conferees assembled, the CCS agreed to thrash out the problems of combined strategy first, and then inform the Prime Minister and President of the work in progress later. Between the meetings of the CCS, the British and American Chiefs of Staff met separately to consider the points raised at the combined meetings. Churchill felt that it gave the representatives of both nations ample time to discuss and explore the various problems and possibilities based on personal contact. For the summit meetings at least, gone was the arrangement that separated the two Chiefs of Staffs Committees who depended upon the exchange of trans-Atlantic cables to resolve their strategic differences.[7]

While the British were outwardly unified, portraying a firm and consistent line, the Americans suffered from an absence of unanimity. Since Dill had informed his superiors in London that the Americans lacked a 'united front', Churchill decided to apply the same inexorable approach at Casablanca that had worked so successfully during the previous July in London. With the meetings following no set program, he waited until the Americans exhausted themselves talking, before applying the logic of British Mediterranean strategy.[8] The British conferees arrived with a headquarters ship, the *HMS Bulolo*, containing a full planning staff with elaborate secretarial, tele-communication, library and cipher facilities; the preparation of factual basis reports for the meeting was compiled by the GHQ Planning Staff in conjunction with Combined Operations Headquarters. Organized to present the British position and to counter

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[6] CAB 122, CAB 138, JSM 673 'Major Topics for Discussion at Casablanca', London, 8 Jan. 1943.
[7] CAB 'Note by the Prime Minister', WP (42) 543; COS (Symbol) 1st Meeting, 13 Jan. 1943; COS (S) 3rd Meeting, 15 Jan. 1943.
[8] PRO CAB 122/229 JSM 660, 'Sir J. Dill to COS', 24 Jan. 1943.

American arguments, Brooke's personal staff officer, Brigadier Guy Stewart, the Director of Plans at the War Office, headed a staff of specialists that supplied timely information to the British conferees upon request.[9]

By contrast, the American contingent, its preparations incomplete, was at a disadvantage; with no comparable infrastructure, and only three planning consultants on whom to rely. They were demonstrably out-classed at the conference table.[10] Brigadier Ian Jacob, military assistant secretary to the War Cabinet, intimated that he never could have foreseen a result so comprehensively favorable to British ideas which prevailed almost throughout.[11]

Both Marshall and King were of the opinion, to Churchill's surprise, that TORCH would delay the cross-Channel invasion until 1944, thereby eliminating the assistance Russia so desperately needed.[12] Churchill expected ROUNDUP in 1943. Fearing that Russia might collapse or sue for a separate peace and concerned about the defence of the British Isles, Churchill pleaded concurrently for greater allied activity in the Mediterranean and a rapid BOLERO build-up at home. Since BOLERO's place had slowed as the American shift to the Pacific increased, he concluded that Marshall was penalizing him for abandoning SLEDGEHAMMER, postponing ROUNDUP and promoting TORCH: late November War Department directives decreed that Lend-Lease supplies and materials formerly ear-marked for BOLERO's expansion were being cut-back. Concurrently, British construction costs and building responsibilities were increased in Britain, as the United States decided to lessen its financial burden there. Churchill, as a junior partner, had to plead his case with Roosevelt on 24 November 1942.

> ...This has caused us very great concern, not so much from the standpoint of Lend-Lease but on the grounds of grand strategy. We have been preparing under BOLERO for 1,100,000 men, and this is the first intimation we have had that this target is to be abandoned...I do beg

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[9] J. Grigg, *Op. cit.*, p. 68.
[10] A. Wedemeyer. *Op. cit.*, p. 174.
[11] J. Grigg. *Op. cit.*, p. 71.
[12] PREM 3/499/6/40-56 'American-British Strategy Report 1942'. London, 30 Oct. 1942. COS (42) 345 (O) Final.

> of you, Mister President, to let me know what has happened. At present we are completely puzzled.[13]

At a 16 January presidential meeting, King, doubtful of British strategic intentions, informed the President that the JCS had attempted and failed to obtain the COS's concept of how the war should be won. He concluded that the British had definite ideas as to what the next operation should be, but doubted that they had an overall plan for the conduct of the war.[14] Later the same day, during a CCS meeting, King continued his inquiry before the British. How was the war to be conducted? What were the overall plans for the defeat of Germany, of Japan? What percentage of the war effort was to be applied to Germany, to Japan? Was Russia to carry the burden as far as the ground forces were concerned? Do we decide on a planned step by step policy or do we continue to rely on seizing opportunities? Since Europe was in the British area of strategic responsibility, he needed answers to these questions.[15]

Although Churchill admitted that TORCH was no substitute for ROUNDUP, and agreed that it ought not be abandoned, he and his Chiefs offered the Americans the strategy they had recently constructed, which identified an Italian defeat as the first priority for 1943. Their list placed BOLERO and ROUNDUP seventh in a field of seven. Even though the British plan was riddled with contingencies and ineffectual compromises, the COS hoped that its design might eliminate the need for Roundup altogether. The British view, as recorded on 31 December 1942, obtained with some minor changes, i.e., action in the Mediterranean would have top priority, but sufficient resources would be allotted to the Pacific, and BOLERO would be slowly resuscitated.[16] The British seemed obsessed with preventing ROUNDUP. On 22 January, the British Joint and Combined Planning Staffs offered two position papers, 'CCS-167' and 'CCS-169'. 'CCS-167' examined various cross-Channel operational landings in the light of existing German morale and levels of disintegration, with a

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[13] H. Loewenheim, et al. *Op. cit.*, pp. 284-285.
[14] 'Anfa Camp Conference Minutes, Casablanca', Washington, 16 Jan. 1943, Reel I.
[15] *Ibid.*, CCS 58 Meeting, Washington, 16 Jan. 1943, Reel III.
[16] *Casablanca Conference, Papers and Minutes of Meetings*, CCS-151, Office of the CCS, Jan. 1943, pp. 18-19; W. Churchill, IV, p. 606.

target-date of August. The second paper, 'CCS-169' proposed an organization of command, control, planning and training for a cross-Channel operation in 1943. Raids would be considered on a contingency basis, but, as predicted, ROUNDUP was declared dead for 1943. However, it recommended that preparations and planning continue.[17] No American paper was offered in rebuttal. The results of the Conference conformed to Wedemeyer's view. As one of the attending American planners, he wrote:

> We had gone to Casablanca without an agreed or clearly defined position among the American Army and Navy representatives. Nor did the President Roosevelt bring mature leadership to our own JCS. While permitting them freedom to state their personal views, he seldom gave them any specific knowledge of his own plans and policies. So once again we had no assurance that the President would support our own choice of concentration, and, on the military level, we were without agreement among ourselves as to how to convince the British of the danger of frittering away our combined resources on indecisive, limited operations.[18]

Wedemeyer paid tribute to Dill's ability to state the American position on innumerable occasions during the Conference; he described him as a friend rather than, as he once implied, a British informer. The following is an example of how Dill, before his reclamation, reported the American position to Churchill, as if the Field Marshal were part of the JCS and privy to its intimate thoughts.

> 15 July 1942...Marshall is convinced that there has been no real drive behind the European project. Meetings are held, discussions take place, and time slips by...King's war is against the Japanese...May I suggest with all due respect that you must convince your visitors that you are determined to beat the Germans, that you will strike them on the continent of Europe at the earliest possible moment even on a limited scale, and that anything which detracts from this main effort will receive no support from you at all?[19]

Wedemeyer wondered how Dill, who clearly described the American position, procured this classified material. Alex Danchev, one of Dill's biographers, discounted Wedemeyer's suspicions as nothing more than the response of a planner protective of American interests.[20] By contrast, at the Chiefs of Staff level, if Marshall perceived

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17 66 Meeting, *Ibid.*, Washington, 22 Jan. 1943, 'CCS 167 & 169'.
18 A. Wedemeyer, *Op. cit.*, p. 185, 188.
19 *Ibid.*, pp. 165-167.
20 A. Danchev, *Op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

Dill as doctrinaire, rather than as an 'honest broker', Dill's influence and credibility would have been damaged. Wedemeyer failed to explain his changed opinion of Dill and the Briton's newly acquired prestige. In fact, Dill was now portrayed as a man who garnered immense respect and affection in Washington for his efforts to state the American case. Wedemeyer lamented, 'We had no Dill of our own in London. Even had we had one, it is doubtful that he could have penetrated the glacis set up by the British conviction that their decisions were beyond argument.'[21]

General John Kennedy, Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had written of the Conference that,

> On the afternoon of the first day, the British Chiefs held a short meeting to enable Dill to bring us up to date about the Americans' point of view.... They were still opposed to operations across the Mediterranean.... This estimate of the American attitude was what we had expected. We were still convinced that they were wrong and we were right. Now our problem was to get them to accept our strategy, without causing them to lose interest in the priority of operations against Germany. We all felt that the Americans had bigger ideas than ours and more drive; but we had as yet no great respect for the quality of their staff work, and did not regard their strategical conceptions as being based on realities, but we found the American officers difficult to know.[22]

A concerned Kennedy reported that the following day's meeting went round in circles. Both sides stuck to their guns; and for the first week, no progress was made. Opposing arguments were repeated *ad nauseam*.[23] King, with Roosevelt's approval, indicated that some modifications to the 'Germany-first' policy had to be included in any bilateral agreement. The Americans sought to shift to the offensive against Japan, and as soon as United States productivity increased, more and more resources would flow to the Pacific.[24] This was worrisome for the British conferees, who knew that neither ally could afford to delay the assault on Germany, because of Britain's diminishing resources and the American public's demands for revenge in the Pacific.

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[21] A. Wedemeyer, *Op. cit.*, p. 185, 188.
[22] Sir J. Kennedy, *Op. cit.*, pp. 280-281.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 280-281.
[24] K. Greenfield, *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

On 15 January, opposing position papers were read, expressing each side's strategic views. The American paper emphasized increased action in the Pacific, while the British paper continued to assign the top priority to a 'Germany-first' policy. The differences seemed irreconcilable and pointed to the papers' underlying message: How did each side perceive the adequacy of resources, their availability and distribution? To the Americans, the cup was always half full: they could supply both theaters. To the British, it was always half empty: enough was never enough. To the Americans, living in the 'land of plenty', shortages were an easily overcome inconvenience; but to the British, living in a land of limited resources, shortages were a hard learned lesson of war. To them resources of every kind would always be limited and insubstantial, creating difficulties in every theater that demanded them.[25] King resented British attempts to review American naval strategy in the Pacific and inquired,

> ...who was going to bear the principal burden of defeating Japan once Germany was defeated? If you are afraid that we would become totally absorbed in the Pacific to the exclusion of Europe, we can not shake off the suspicion that the you might run out on us altogether once the war in Europe had been, largely by use of American resources, brought to an end.[26]

King's questioning hid his true intentions, that of keeping British naval power out of the Pacific, where he chose to remain dominant. Coupled with Marshall's avowed distaste for further Mediterranean excursions, King's accusatory approach could have been an attempt to extract strategic concessions from the British. Admiral Sir Percy Noble, a member of the JSM in Washington, had this to say about King, in a letter to Cunningham,

> ...they would like to feel that they could take on the Pacific without any assistance from us... I have a feeling that King does not want to see too powerful a British fleet in being when peace eventually comes. To sum up, I believe that if Admiral King were to speak his mind for once, he would say something like this: 'Blast these British, they scrounge round getting everything they can out of us and have let us down repeatedly...'[27]

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[25] Sir M. Howard, *Grand Strategy*, IV, (London, 1972), pp. 248-249.
[26] CCS 55 Meeting, Casablanca, 14 Jan. 1943, Reel III.
[27] Adm. Sir P. Noble to AF Viscount A. Cunningham, London, 12 Jan. 1944, *Cunningham Papers*, MSS. 52571, 72, BL.

British policy had by no means been decided before the Conference, but there was general agreement between members of the COS that some Mediterranean operation should be mounted. Increasingly focused in the Pacific, if they considered Europe at all, the Americans preferred a landing in northwest France, rather than face possible entrapment in the Mediterranean. When enough steam had been blown off, Brooke wrote of the Americans,

> It is a slow and tiring business, which requires a lot of patience. They can't be pushed and hurried....It is a slow and tedious business, as all matters have to be carefully explained before they can be absorbed...I was in despair and in the depths of gloom....It is no use, we shall never get agreement with them.[28]

Dill helped Brooke recognize that an agreement was closer than he realized, and that the time had come to produce a draft statement of strategic policy. According to Dill, it would be a mistake to allow a catalogue of unsolved problems to fall into the hands of the President and the Prime Minister. If Brooke were willing to demonstrated some flexibility, he could break the stalemate and secure the agreement he sought. Brooke agreed.[29] The statement that followed was translated by the combined planners into a definite program for consideration. Surprisingly, the CCS accepted it the following day with only a few trifling changes, allowing practical planning to begin.[30] Dill's ability to perform both as a consultant and an interpreter of American and British intentions to both Brooke and Marshall eased some of the tensions. Selflessness aside, because final responsibility lay elsewhere, armed only with the power to influence and persuade, he was well-equipped and in a position to play the 'honest broker'. Marshall held Dill in high regard and praised him in a memo to the President.

> Dill accompanied me to the Casablanca conference at my suggestion.... His presence there I believe was of vital importance and at one time practically prevented a complete stalemate regarding the differences between Admiral King and Sir Alan Brooke over the Pacific-European issue. Throughout the conference it was apparent that after each difficult meeting a great deal was done by Dill to translate the American point of view into terms understandable to the British, also the fact that

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[28] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/VIII, 16-18 Jan. 1943, pp. 600-608.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 603; CCS 66 Meeting, 22 Jan., 'CCS 155/1 Conduct of the War in 1943',Casablanca, 19 Jan. 1943, Reel III.
[30] Sir J. Kennedy, *Op. cit.*, p. 281.

> in certain matters there could be no compromise. It was useless for them to further complicate the discussion.[31]

Nevertheless, the negotiations ended in unsatisfactory compromise, because both sides failed to agree on the percentage of resources required for each of the major theaters. King, Pound, Arnold and Portal mirrored what Churchill and Roosevelt wanted, a strategy that would open the Mediterranean to shipping, employ an expanding army and establish air bases from which southern Europe could be attacked. Moreover, so many conditions had been placed on ROUNDUP that the Americans began to suspect that the British lacked commitment. The British learned that the threatened increase of American action in the Pacific was not only used to extort a cross-Channel attack agreement from the them, but to satisfy the needs of an American public more angry with Japan than Germany. Withal, the British prevailed: Japan would be held in check with the existing forces in the Pacific, with limited aggressive action planned, while Germany was defeated.[32] Although Marshall submitted without rancor, he still believed that only a head-on collision of forces would eliminate the Germans from the war. He felt 'land-liberation' was both more costly and more time-consuming than 'force-concentration'.

The three major aspects of an emerging British Mediterranean strategy were as follows: it was essentially opportunistic, politically as much as militarily, it provided the battle ground on which to defeat the Germans, and it would relieve the Russians of German pressure. The Mediterranean would gain prominence as a theater in which opportunistic military operations after Torch would continue. Wedemeyer felt that the British test of friendship placed limited value on loyalty and reciprocity, more on enticement and manipulation. He blamed the British for their lack of flexibility, seeking to take more than they gave, as epitomized in negotiations by the voluble Prime

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[31] Marshall to Roosevelt, Washington, 20 Feb. 1943, *FRUS: Washington and Casablanca*, p. 721.
[32] J. Grigg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 72-76.

Minister and his sensitive Chief of Staff.[33] In turn, Wedemeyer, as Marshall's chief military planner, criticized the American chain of command:

> There were several weaknesses in the planning work of the American staff: we lacked pre-prepared studies, and were forced to rely on memory. Our Army and Navy should have scrupulously avoided airing their differences in the presence of foreigners. The President should have been better briefed on the logic of our proposals.[34]

Wedemeyer was impressed with the large and well-organized British delegation:

> They swarmed down upon us like locusts, with a plentiful supply of planners and various other assistants, with prepared plans to insure that they not only accomplished their purpose but did so in stride and with fair promise of continuing in the role of directing strategy the whole course of this war....They had us on the defensive practically all the time.[35]

The American Handicap

Even if the Americans had come to Casablanca with a well-conceived strategic plan, and equipped with an excellent administrative structure, it is unlikely that they could have recommended ROUNDUP as a viable option in 1943. Roosevelt, seeking further operations in the Mediterranean, was against it and Marshall's planners disagreed over ROUNDUP's feasibility. Eisenhower, deliberating further, believed ROUNDUP could not be staged before August 1944.[36] After post-Torch conversations with Eisenhower, Marshall considered fighting a strong rearguard action in ROUNDUP's defence rather than risking a direct confrontation the British and the reluctant members of his own team. However, Roosevelt and Churchill took even that option from them: they did not believe the Allied armies in North Africa should remain idle, awaiting the amalgamation of men and supplies needed for a Channel crossing, when the Russians were engaged in titanic battles in the East. Inaction in 1943 would not, indeed could not, be tolerated.

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[33] A. Wedemeyer, *Op. cit.*, p. 188.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 191-192.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[36] 'Eisenhower to Gen. T. Handy', A. Chandler, (ed.), *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, (Baltimore, 1970); M. Matloff, *Op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

American airmen, including Arnold, joined their British counterparts in advocating the need for Mediterranean air bases from which to bomb southern Germany and Romania. These would have to be taken by force of arms. Marshall and his compatriots may not have been overcome or out argued by the British, or even forced to accept their decisions reluctantly. A kinder interpretation is that their thinking at Casablanca may have reflected American open-mindedness and flexibility. This was in sharp contrast to Wedemeyer's position, who represented a view far more complex than simply coming to terms with the military realities of 1943.[37] Privately, some top American officers had lingering doubts about British intentions, and they expressed little appreciation for Britain's war effort, battle experience and strategic planning. If differences of opinion between the Americans had not weakened their negotiating position, and if Brooke were less formidable and convincing at the conference table, the results at Casablanca might have limited future Mediterranean operations, thus benefiting ROUNDUP.[38]

At the highest civilian level, there were problems at Casablanca. On 24 January, Roosevelt demonstrated a form of state-craft that was at best casual and at worst irresponsible. His controversial policy of 'unconditional surrender', consented to by Churchill with feigned surprise, was proclaimed to the world at the final press conference. For Stalin, King, Marshall and Hull, the surprise was genuine. They had not been consulted or notified beforehand. The President would have been wiser to gather his thoughts and to disengage from people holding conflicting points of view, particularly during an overburdened and stressful summit, before announcing his policy to the world. The President first aired his notion, which had the quality of Churchill's personal and unofficial free-floating 'Morning Thoughts', at a White House Meeting on 7 January.[39] No discussions followed at the White House concerning the political-military ramifications of the formula. Subsequently, Churchill, members of the War Cabinet, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Eden were notified between 19-21

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[37] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, IV, pp. 243-244.
[38] B. Pitt, *Churchill and the Generals*, (Newton Abbot, 1988), pp. 155-158.
[39] 'Morning Thoughts' represented Churchill's personal views and were not a product of full consultation with the War Cabinet.

January. They responded approvingly, but objected when the formula failed to include Italy.[40]

'Unconditional surrender', immortalized by Union General Ulysses S. Grant during the American Civil War, could be argued to be the appropriate tactic for that war – particularly for the siege of Ft. Donelson. To appropriate the term as a slogan eighty years later did not suggest a sound strategic policy, however dramatic.[41] Churchill notified the War Cabinet and offered his interpretation: the Germans had forfeited their rights to any particular form of treatment. They were to be completely disarmed and deprived of the power to re-arm. They were to stand trial for atrocities and prohibited from all uses of aviation. In addition, Germany was to be broken up into separate states and some of its population shifted. Prussia, always the heart of German militarism, was to be erased from the map of Europe. Germany once again had to pay reparations. The entire German Army and its General Staff were to be disbanded.[42] Goebbels called it 'total slavery' and 'castration for the whole male population.' And the German population believed him, accepting that a total war was being waged against the German nation, not just the Nazi party; and consequently, the formula nearly destroyed six years of work by the anti-Nazi opposition.[418] Eisenhower would look for a softening of the formula when his armies were poised to attack the Germans on the continent.[43]

During Congressional Subcommittee hearings in May 1942, members concluded that while 'unconditional surrender' would undoubtedly be preferred, if the military situation permitted, study should also be given to the possibility of an armistice and a negotiated peace. Taking into account the Russian position, the President chose 'unconditional surrender' over these options, after being informed of the

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[40] M. Balfour, 'The Origin of the Formula, Unconditional Surrender in World War II', *Armed Forces and Society*, 5, 2, (1979), p. 283.
[41] Sir B. Liddell Hart, 'The Background of Unconditional Surrender', 31 July 1943, *Op. cit.*, 11/1943/50.
[42] R. Lamb, *The Ghosts of Peace, 1935-1945*, (London, 1987), pp. 226-227, 'Note by the PM to the War Cabinet', London, 15 Jan. 1944.
[43] A. Armstrong, *Unconditional Surrender*, (Westport, CT, 1974), pp. 249-262; M. Matloff, *Op. cit.*, p. 431.

subcommittee's findings.[44] Moreover, experts on political warfare, specialists on Axis internal affairs, or 'post-war planners' in London and Washington were not asked for their opinions. Alan Wilt, in his journal article on Casablanca simply reported Roosevelt's choice without further analysis.[45] The President's abhorrence of the Axis narrowed his war aims to simple destruction of the enemy regime, and discouraged consideration of policy once the fighting stopped. The United Nations, controlled by the victorious 'Big Four', would supersede the previous balances of power in the post-war world. Winning the war and punishing the enemy became his administration's eventual political and military objectives, with all other political considerations becoming irrelevant. Churchill and Eden were willing and enthusiastic collaborators.[46] The President remarked that he as 'Dr. Win-the-War' had replaced 'Dr. New Deal'.[47] Author, Stephen Ambrose wrote that, 'Unconditional surrender was a brilliant stroke of policy, because by keeping this and other war aims vague, Roosevelt prevented bickering among the Allies.'[48] This observation is debatable, because even before Roosevelt's announcement, the Allied leadership was already treating each other with doubt, suspicion, and mild contempt. The evidence suggests that the President's views on policy were vague all along; and his decision to speak out, without prior consultation, was a manifestation of that vagueness. Was this proclamation the means of unifying uneasy partners? The unconditional surrender statement can only be understood if such 'bickering' is seen as analogous to 'appeasing', i.e. as a means of reassuring Stalin. However, Roosevelt failed, because Stalin could not be assuaged with words alone, particularly when an Anglo-American second front remained still-born. A more plausible reason emerges, that of soothing an American public outraged over Eisenhower's dealings with Admiral Jean Darlan, commander of all Vichy forces in French North Africa, which resulted in the French agreeing to a cease-fire. Even

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[44] N. Davis, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945*, (Washington., 1949).
[45] A. Wilt, 'The Significance of the Casablanca Decisions, January 1943', *JMH*, 55, 4, (1991), pp. 517-529.
[46] T. Ben-Moshe, *The Origins of the Declaration of the Policy of Unconditional Surrender– A New Interpretation*, unpublished, (Hebrew University, 1981).
[47] P. Seabury & A. Codevilla, *Op. cit.*, p. 92.
[48] S. Ambrose, *Op. cit.*, p. 25

though the agreement saved American lives, an anxious public considered Eisenhower to be politically naïve, and the President to be losing sight of the war's purpose. Within the context of 'total war', an explanation of 'unconditional surrender' was superfluous, unless it was needed to project an ulterior motive, that of softening American public opinion. Recognizing that to jump too far ahead of his constituency was politically dangerous, Roosevelt pitched his declaration to the folks at home and achieved the desired result.[49]

The Allied leaders lost an opportunity to deeply reflect on the question of 'whether total victory is necessarily the surest foundation for a lasting peace' over the Hitler regime.[50] Understanding Russian intentions regarding Roosevelt's notion was difficult to assess, but ten months later, in late October they acceded to its principles. 'Unconditional surrender', made public as an Allied war aim, had deleterious effects: it stiffened the enemy's will to resist, it delayed Italian armistice negotiations at a most critical time, and it contributed much grist to the German propaganda mill. If the 'unconditional surrender' document formalized the destruction of Germany and precluded the existence of a German government with which to negotiate, what was its purpose?[51] The argument is circular. Whatever Roosevelt's deeper reasons, e.g., to avoid a repetition of Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', to quiet the public over the Darlan deal, to change the geographical and social map of Germany, to convince Stalin that his western allies were not intending a separate peace with Germany and to prevent him from doing the same, it smacked of vengeance. However, if it had been Allied policy (rather than Roosevelt's), negotiated in conference by qualified staff and applied to Germany alone, 'unconditional surrender', with modifications, could have contributed to the attainment of security from post-war German ambitions. William Cavendish-Bentinck held a senior position in the Foreign Office in 1943. He stated,

> When news of the unconditional surrender formula came through from Casablanca I told Cadogan, 'There are two old men out there who have

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[49] A. Campbell, 'Franklin Roosevelt and Unconditional Surrender', R. Langhorne, (ed.), *Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War*, (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 222-225.

[50] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, p. 285.

[51] The term 'Unconditional Surrender' was meaningless in the Spring of 1945, because there was no real German Government in existence.

> done this without thinking while they were full up with rough red Moroccan wine.' Later my view was that this formula did make the Germans fight harder; on the other hand it led to the complete break-up of the German officer corps and their being absolutely discredited.[52]

It failed even to demonstrate that the war's mission was for 'good' to triumph over 'evil', because the inclusion of Stalinist Russia as part of the Grand Alliance had already corrupted that perception.[53] The time to fight a different kind of war for different ends was long past because primary war aims with regard to Germany had never been clarified, and both the Britain and Russia had hidden agendas. Nevertheless, the scourge of Third Reich had to be obliterated, and if Russia was the vehicle with which to proceed, Churchill and Roosevelt recognized that her participation was crucial.

On 10 March 1944, The JSSC enclosed a proposed memorandum, 'Effect of Unconditional Surrender' Policy on German Morale to be approved and forwarded by the JCS to the President. The committee recommended that the President make a statement, following a large scale bombing raid and before OVERLORD, that would reduce the existing level of German morale increased since the original formula was announced more than a year before. Hopefully, it would separate the Nazis from the German people, free the population from its criminal leadership and ease Allied entry into Germany.[54] Roosevelt refused.

The Notables' Reaction

Impressions at Casablanca hardened rather than softened Roosevelt's opinion of Churchill. 'On specific issues, [Roosevelt] could also be more acerbic toward the Prime Minister than he was toward Stalin.'[55] Roosevelt had concluded earlier that Churchill was an old fashioned imperialist bent on protecting the Empire. With a certain disregard, he decided that it was pointless to discuss political issues with him,

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[52] R. Lamb, *Op. cit.*, p. 223.
[53] J. Grigg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 72-75.
[54] JSSC, 'Effect of 'Unconditional Surrender' Policy on German Morale', Washington, 10 Mar. 1944, RG165.
[55] H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York, 1994), p. 401.

and only did so when there was no other choice, i.e., the Giraud-de Gaulle French leadership problem.

The President and de Gaulle, leader of the fighting Free French forces, met for the first time in Casablanca. Roosevelt was already prejudiced against him, because of his involvement in the ill-fated Dakar expedition and his involvement in seizing Vichy held islands off the Canadian Atlantic coast. Little is known of what de Gaulle said when they met in private, because he spoke in low tones, recorded as grunts by both Elliot Roosevelt and Captain John L. McCrae waiting outside.[56] In this, Churchill colluded, sometimes behaving as Roosevelt's henchman against de Gaulle.[57] Putting both French generals together at Casablanca, in what seemed to be a 'shotgun wedding', turned out to be a poorly staged-managed affair, that soon ended in divorce. Roosevelt commented in a letter to Hull,

> We delivered our bridegroom, General Giraud, who was most co-operative on the impending marriage, and I am sure was ready to go through with it on our terms. However, our friends could not produce the bride, the temperamental lady de Gaulle. She has got quite snooty about the whole idea and does not want to see either of us, and is showing no intention of getting into bed with Giraud...[58]

Thinking that Giraud, High Commissioner of French Africa, and de Gaulle would accept and execute an Allied policy concerned with those parts of the French Empire free of Vichy control, both the President and the Prime Minister failed to realize that an insurmountable political and military gulf existed between the Frenchmen. The meeting, at which the two generals posed shaking hands, was nothing more than a charade that ended with a vague declaration of Gallic resolve. Grudgingly, the Prime Minister knew that de Gaulle would not sacrifice his country's dignity in his dealings with the President the way he had over TORCH. This combination and interplay of

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[56] Adm. J. McCrea, 'Roosevelt-de Gaulle Conversation – President's Villa', Casablanca, 22 Jan. 1943. Unpublished papers of J. L. McCrea, FDRL; Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 279-280.

[57] Gen. C. de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre*, (Paris, 1954-1959), p. 256.

[58] Roosevelt to C. Hull, Washington, 18 Jan. 1943, PSF, FDRL.

prejudicial attitudes and concrete intransigence between Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle added little to the speed of French revival or getting on with the war.[59]

Although Roosevelt was a steadfast ally in the war against Hitler, he opposed rather than shared Churchill's 'imperial' point of view. When the *Atlantic Charter* was being formulated, Roosevelt wanted it to apply, not only to Europe, but everywhere, including the colonial areas. Churchill and the British War Cabinet rejected the suggestion out of hand, insisting that the *Charter* was not intended to deal with the internal affairs of the British Empire...or the Philippines.[60] Roosevelt commented to his son, Elliot, at the conference, 'The English mean to maintain their hold on their colonies. They mean to help the French maintain their hold on their colonies. Winnie is a great man for the *status quo*. He even looks like the *status quo*, doesn't he?'[61]

Attritional Warfare

Setting aside his respect for and adherence to military-civilian doctrine, and his oath as an officer, Marshall failed to convince the President, before complying, that ROUNDUP was worth defending. Although against attritional wars and inconsequential operational 'pin-pricking' stabs, Marshall sacrificed ROUNDUP, because the President and the JCS had abandoned his policy. Hypothetically, if Marshall had disputed Brooke's Mediterranean strategy again, while advancing his own theories for a 1943 ROUNDUP, he might have persuaded the opposition on both sides to join him.

Failing to do this, fighting a lonely rearguard action, Marshall's only recourse was to agree to the reduction of the Tunisian bridgehead from which no armed forces were to be deflected.[62] Its destruction was given 'top priority' at Casablanca, thereby eliminating any consideration for other timely, more rewarding, opportunistic actions

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[59] Gen. C. de Gaulle, *Op. cit.*, pp 241, 251. J. Grigg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 156-160.
[60] CAB 65/19 WM(41) 80, 81, 11 Aug. 1941.
[61] E. Roosevelt & J. Brough, *A Rendevous With Destiny*, (New York, 1975).
[62] J. Grigg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.

with a higher rate of profitability. Commenting on the allied failure to capture Tunis in late 1942, Liddell Hart wrote,

> This failure turned out to be one of the biggest blessings in disguise that could have happened. For without such a failure Hitler and Mussolini would not have had the time or the encouragement to pour very large reinforcements into Tunisia and build up the defence of that bridgehead to a strength of over a quarter of a million – who had to fight with an enemy-dominated sea at their backs, and if defeated would be trapped.[63]

Failure to take Tunis might have been a blessing, but plans for its reduction were not. Opportunities for victory were missed. For example, if after sealing off the bridgehead by the convergence of and the co-operation between the Allied air, naval, and ground forces, and after ringing the bridgehead with a minimum force, threatening but not activating large-scale ground combat, the Allies could have employed the bulk of their forces in strategic operations elsewhere. Moreover, potential operations in Northwest Europe and Norway would have loomed large. Diminished in power, cut off, weakened by losses, starved of reinforcements and supplies, the German *Afrika Corps*, as if by decree, could only wither in Tunisia and surrender anyway. The projected date of collapse, according to statisticians, was 1 June. The predicted demise of the *Afrika Corps* could have been achieved by an economy of effort, with patience, and an intelligent use of manpower, but this was not to be. Allied victory in the deserts of Tunisia followed victory in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, and not the other way around. Once applied, a strategy for action elsewhere, relegated Mediterranean operations as 'a threat only'.

The Chances of a Normandy Invasion in 1943

The final defeat of the Axis in North Africa was a singular and unimaginative operation, imprinted on Brooke's strategic flag. Most Allied theater forces were involved, because of the tactics employed, which resulted in a final battle, insensitive to time and alternate opportunities. According to historian, John Grigg, Axis action in the bridgehead ceased to exist on 13 May and, for eight months, from January to August

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[63] Sir B. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, (London, 1970), pp. 450-455.

1943, most troops and landing craft that could have been used in assaulting Normandy from England, engaged in reducing the bridgehead or achieving results, if the alternative strategy obtained, best left to others. Grigg concluded that the Germans defending the bridgehead, gained the time needed for their countrymen in Northwest Europe to construct and improve Channel fortifications along the French coast. With impunity, they transferred seventeen divisions from western Europe between November 1942 and February 1943 which added, not relieved, pressure on the Russians. American disunity, portrayed at the conference table, the President's inability to clarify his aims, precluded closing in on and attaining an important 'glittering' prize, the reasonable possibility of winning the war one year earlier.[64]

Grigg's view is an oversimplification, albeit with some merit, because TORCH, regarded as the first major amphibious assault planned and executed by the Allies, posed problems of unknown dimensions. The whole range of amphibious procedures and the utilization of inter-service communications, air power, close-in naval supporting-gunfire, regimental combat teams, combat-loading logistics, controlled by an overall commander were in their infancy and lacked the proficiency a Normandy invasion demanded. Some experience from and evaluation of two recent smaller amphibious operations could be drawn. Guadalcanal, an island in the South Pacific, and Dieppe, a French port on the English Channel, were stark reminders if the enemy in North Africa had been preponderantly Japanese or German. Grigg erred again when he wrote the following:

> Those who persist in arguing that an invasion of France had been out of the question in 1943, because the Allies did not yet have enough landing-craft for such an enterprise, should note carefully that in the first stage of Husky nine divisions were simultaneously afloat – two more than in the first stage of Overlord the following year. Marshall might have fought harder for Roundup 1943 and won, if those around him had remained steadfast.[65]

Although Grigg's plans for the reduction of the North African salient, its aftermath and post-TORCH operations in 1943 remain a valuable theoretical contribution, it does not

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[64] J. Grigg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

follow that a released Mediterranean Allied force could have accomplished a beachhead in Normandy from which to breakout and pursue, any more than Marshall could have convinced the President to exchange 1943 Mediterranean operations for ROUNDUP. Even though Sicily was the largest amphibious assault in history, an operation which included 3,000 ships, over 200 air squadrons, upwards of 500,000 men and two airborne divisions, there were only 200,000 Italians soldiers and 62,000 assorted German troops of questionable fighting ability on the island to offer resistance, a far cry from the 15 to 30 German divisions obstructing entry into northwestern France. Unlike Normandy, the loss of Sicily, in the long term, presented no threat to Germany, regarding the outcome of the war in the West.[66]

Grigg's assessment failed to compare Sicily with Normandy: the requirements of each, and the levels of German response to either landing were not seriously considered. He believed that if Normandy had been chosen over Sicily and Italy, it could have been accomplished according to American doctrine at an earlier date. No doubt, but at what expenditure? Grigg's recommendation for a 1943 cross-Channel attack is plausible if viewed as a sacrificial SLEDGEHAMMER operation to assist the Russians, regardless of cost; otherwise, OVERLORD demanded time, will and technology in order to succeed. Lt. General Frederick Morgan's directive of 15 July 1943, addressed to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee at the QUADRANT Conference made the comparison between the two operations:

> Finally, I venture to draw attention to the danger of making direct comparisons between operation HUSKY and operation OVERLORD. No doubt the experience now being gained in the Mediterranean will prove invaluable when the detailed planning stage for OVERLORD is reached, but viewed as a whole the two expeditions could hardly be more dissimilar. In HUSKY the bases of an extended coastline were used for a converging assault against an island; whereas, in OVERLORD it is necessary to launch an assault from an island against an extended continental mainland coastline. Furthermore, while in the Mediterranean the tidal range is negligible and the weather reasonably reliable, in the English Channel, the tidal range is considerable and the weather capricious.[67]

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[66] T. Higgins. *Op. cit.*, pp. 76-87.
[67] Lord Ismay. 'QUADRANT Directive', London, 15 July 1943. *Op. cit.*, VI6/13.

War is chaotic even when the best of plans are made. The tactical lessons learned off the North African shore and on its beaches may have prevented greater loss of life in subsequent operations such as HUSKY. Competence demanded that failed procedures, unreliable equipment and poor leadership be changed before the next amphibious operation. The aftermath of TORCH revealed that the operation was hastily organized and carried out under very difficult sea conditions, that the troops were inadequately trained and that planning was more theoretical than practical. The odds favor the defender, particularly when they enjoy the benefit of superior weaponry, advanced land mobility and land-based air power.[68] Only seven percent of the Allied military were at the 'sharp end' of the fighting in the Second World War, they deserved the highest standards of leadership and technology, if only for the reason that experienced combat soldiers were difficult to replace.

During the summer of 1943, General James Christiansen, Army Ground Forces COS, was sure that when Marshall decided to freeze the Army at 7.7 million with 3.2 million of the 'best and the brightest' allocated to the Air Force, he had made a fateful decision i.e., that an Anglo-American air offensive plus a Russian ground war would produce a decisive victory. Marshall's revision of the Victory Program increased the immoderate pressures facing the regimental combat teams, revealed a flaw in his expectations and questioned his commitment to a head on collision with the enemy. By reducing the Army from 200 divisions to 80, he gambled with the future of the United States and placed the responsibility of success on 750,000 front line soldiers.[69] The replacement problems in northwest Europe, during the fall and winter battles of the campaign, under extenuating circumstances, would reveal this gross error in judgment: 'In Lorraine, General George Patton 'drafted' five percent of army and corps troops for retraining as

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[68] J. A. Isley & P. Crowl, *The US Marines and Amphibious War*, (Princeton, 1951), pp. 37-38; Brig. A. Head, 'Amphibious Operations', *RUSI*, XCI, (1946), pp. 485-494.
[69] 'Interview with J. G. Christiansen', Washington, 12 May 1944, RG 319, Box 19.

infantry, and when bloody fighting along the Westwall sent infantry losses soaring, he 'drafted' an additional five percent.'[70]

The Results of the Conference

The Casablanca conference ended in enfeebled compromise, resulting in the British feeling satisfied and the Americans disappointed. Churchill and Roosevelt felt that the agreement fell short of great-power capabilities, although British strategy remained pre-eminent. Stalin's demands for a second front were once again delayed. King self-righteously denounced British attempts to review operations in the Pacific; he failed to uncover the COS's plan for winning the war and concluded that, although the British had definite ideas concerning the next operation, they lacked an overall strategic plan.[71] Remaining unsettled were the strategic differences between the two Allies that slowed agreement. The Americans were haunted by conflicting plans, disunity, poor administration and distrust of British intentions. A talented black baseball pitcher, Satchel Paige's adage, 'Don't look back, somebody might be gaining on you', was an apt description of the avoidance and compulsion procedures used by the Allies to delay the Northwest European campaign on the one hand and to further Mediterranean operations on the other, while they both assiduously debated and defended the ends and means of either. The President, having continued to occupy a military position half way between Marshall and Churchill, looked favorably on action in the Mediterranean. Both Allied leaders insisted on it, and General Marshall and the JCS agreed to a Sicilian operation, defined as an expedient action dictated by current circumstances.

The Specifics of the Casablanca Agreement

On 19 January the essentials of the agreement were revealed:

> 1.) To assault and occupy Sicily, allowing for the safe and economical passage of shipping through the Mediterranean.

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[70] C. Gabel, *The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944*. (US Army Command and Gen. Staff College, 1985), p. 30, Combat Studies Institute.
[71] 'Anfa Camp Conference Minutes', Washington, 16 Jan 1943, Reel I.

2.) To force Italy to leave the war, thereby increasing pressure on Germany to fill the Italian vacuum.

3.) To divert German pressure from the Russian Front.

4.) To seek Turkey's active support.

5.) To Increase the bombing of Germany from Britain, and to prepare for re-entry on the Continent, if Germany weakened.

6.) To defeat the U-boat and win the war at sea (adequate forces should be allocated to the Pacific and the Far East).

7.) Due to a shortage of landing craft, time constraints, and inadequate planning, HUSKY, the code-name for the Sicilian assault, not ROUNDUP, was the landing of choice.[72]

The Americans considered the above agenda as defensive 'pin-pricking', the British as aggressive action.[73] In addition, the agreement divided the Mediterranean into two commanded structures, one British, one American, which were to prove impracticable.

Further Reactions and Considerations

According to Michael Howard, not all American ideas suffered: the British delegates approved of Admiral King's Pacific policy and General Arnold's bombardment program for Germany. Even though ROUNDUP 1943 was a major loss to Marshall and tacitly dead, Morgan was designated Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and a special Allied Inter-Service Planning Staff was created to plan for the execution of a cross-Channel attack, with the vague proviso, 'as soon as circumstances allowed.'[74] Brooke summed up British policy to include continuing actions in the Mediterranean, and proposed returning to the Continent *en masse* in 1944. This subject reminded some Americans of SLEDGEHAMMER's loss and the meetings held in London the previous July.[75] According to author Barrie Pit, 'the results were remarkable, far better than many had thought likely before the conference began, infinitely better than had seemed possible at some of the more difficult phases of the conference itself.'[76]

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[72] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, pp. 251-255.
[73] M. Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, (Washington, 1959), p. 25.
[74] CCS 67 Meeting, Washington, 22 Jan. 1943; 3rd Anfa Meeting, 23 Jan. 1943, Reel III.
[75] M. Matloff, *Op. cit.*, pp. 254, 278.
[76] B. Pitt, *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-159.

If this be true, why were 'sops'[77] offered to King and to Marshall by the British? King's was in the form of a British recapture of Burma: Marshall was offered two, both pertaining to BOLERO and ROUNDUP, although time constraints were vague.[78] Pitt's assessment glosses over the resentment felt by Marshall and the American planning staff. Michael Howard, in the official British version, reported that in five days of hard bargaining the British reached an agreement with the Americans over fundamentals.[79] He does not describe the American reaction. Nonetheless, Wedemeyer's response to British negotiating techniques and concepts were interpreted in this manner: 'We came, we listened, and we were conquered.'[80]

The American Chiefs recognized their ineffectiveness when arguing their case against British logic, reality and preparedness; a sense of one's own inferiority does not lend itself to co-operation and good-will even while co-signing with other signatories. British General Sir Ian Jacob, Ismay's deputy, stated,

> They had left most of their clubs behind.... On thinking it over, I do not believe that this was an unreasonable result. After all, we were not two business opponents making a deal in which one was bound to profit at the other's expense. We were partners, trying to hammer at a common line of action.[81]

Having to submit, and not admit that British Mediterranean strategy seemed more appropriate than American Northwest European strategy in 1943, increased the difficulty of acceptance. Brooke wrote in his diary in May,

> ...the Americans are taking the attitude that we led them down the garden path by taking them to North Africa. That at Casablanca we again misled them by inducing them to attack Sicily. And now they do not intend to be led astray again. Added to that the swing toward the Pacific is stronger than ever, and before long they will be urging that we should defeat Japan first.[82]

The Americans regarded Churchill's Mediterranean intentions with increased suspicion as the year progressed. The more he shoved Brooke's Mediterranean policy at them,

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[77] Aptly described as 'something given to a formidable or troublesome animal'. *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, (London, 1964), p. 1221.
[78] Gen. Sir W. Jackson, *Overlord: Normandy 1944, (London: 1978)*, pp. 70-71.
[79] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, p. 244.
[80] A. Chandler, *Op. cit., no.* 796.
[81] E. Larrabee, *Op. cit.*, p. 185.; B. Liddell Hart, *Op. cit.*, 15/15/1.
[82] J. Gregg, *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

the more they attributed his aggressive behavior to be a manifestation of self-serving imperialistic designs. Sometimes, he could be withering, as he was towards Eisenhower.[83] Frustrated, the Americans were as irritated with themselves for succumbing to British pressure as they were with the British. whose blandishments did little to soften the inevitable. Howard, although even-handed. cannot deny the American feeling of being gulled at Casablanca, a feeling which remained persistently long after the event. Marshall was convinced, 'that every diversion or side issue from the main plot acts as a suction pump.'[84]

Marshall's metaphor of the Mediterranean as a 'suction pump' comes close to Howard's conclusion that Casablanca legitimized attritional warfare.[85] Marshall strongly opposed any campaign that would absorb untold amounts of men and equipment, that could result in unacceptably high casualties, exhaustion, and wastage. War is an act of attrition in absolute terms, but, in relative terms, a war can be defined either as a war of attrition or one of maneuver. Both sides must determine what is an acceptable level of attrition when measured against its strategic goals. Any commander must ask himself whether the attrition he is imposing on the enemy will be worth the attrition he is imposing on his own forces.[86] What seemed to be agreed, Allied unanimity of purpose at Casablanca, was a fantasy.

Brooke's diary account, quoted above, indicated that attacking Northwest Europe was the corner stone of American belief and strategy; to forgo their own plan in exchange for something British meant a great deal to them in 1943. Both American and British official histories as reports are informative, but they fail to interpret the interplay of fact and feeling between the participants and the events at Casablanca. The American historians Matloff and Snell have alluded to the aftermath with a mixture of reticence. reprimand, and renovation. The use of 'rearguard', and 'counteroffensive' are

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[83] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[84] CCS 58 meeting, Anfa, 16 Jan. 1943, Reel 1II.
[85] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.* ,p. 35.
[86] P. Seabury & A. Codevilla, *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

battlefield words associated with action against enemies, words not necessarily descriptive of actions around the negotiating table amidst partners:

> The indecisiveness of the Casablanca Conference on basic strategic issues – which appeared to the American staff to be a victory for the British Chiefs – brought home to the Army strategic planners the need to adjust themselves to a new phase of coalition warfare. The effect of General Marshall's rearguard action at the conference was to give them the time they badly needed to regroup for a 'counteroffensive' in their dealings with the British in 1943.... To this task of analysis, similar to that the British staff had long since made for the 'British position', the American planners would have to address themselves...the Army strategic planners would have to start anew in 1943 to plan for victory.[87]

Casablanca revealed the weaknesses of the existing American command structure, as a military-politico body. The JCS, as conceived by Roosevelt, not only had to grapple with the President's failure to define policy, but it had to plan strategy out of the policy's amorphous nature. Little was known of the nation's objectives and war aims because of the President's vagueness. 'In many ways, the Casablanca conference was a low point in the co-operation between the President and his military advisers.'[88] In sum, the Americans were handicapped in negotiating with the British for most of the war.[89]

Nevertheless, the Casablanca Conference tolled the death knell for the American 'either-or' school of strategic thinking. It was now 'this-and-that'. No longer would considerations, choices, and decisions be as simplistic as they once were prior to the conference, i.e., a Mediterranean versus a northwest Europe policy. From now on the strategic view would encompass all theaters, and would therefore be global in reach. Each theater, considered as part building-block of the total, would be connected and interrelated, its problems surveyed, its needs assessed. Precise relationships involving the combined air offensive, and the European and Mediterranean theaters, however, would remain the lynch pin and have top priority in American strategic planning. The JCS would determine the range of choices, the levels of commitment, and the resources

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[87] M. Matloff & E. Snell, *Op. cit.*, p. 382.
[88] W. Emerson, *Op. cit.*, p. 199.
[89] P. Seabury & A. Codevilla, *Op. cit.*, pp. 222-223.

and logistics required throughout to achieve victory. The strategic 'lode star' remained as always, the cross-Channel attack in 1944.[90]

The Americans left Casablanca believing that yet again they had been outwitted and outmaneuvered yet again by the British. They were determined never to let it happen again. In preparation for future meetings at Washington, Quebec, Cairo and Tehran, they would achieve negotiating equality by honing their skills with which to anticipate and counter every imaginable British strategic argument. American experts, armed with studies and statistics, stood behind the first rank. Their goal was presidential approbation in their quest for an inescapable British commitment to a cross-Channel invasion in 1944.[91] The counter-attack had begun.

American Attempts to Break the Casablanca Agreement

Dispirited, Marshall and King tried to thwart the enactment of the Casablanca agreement. During a CCS meeting in late April 1943, the JCS presented a paper, 'CCS-199', prepared by the US JSSC, which sought to clarify the decisions reached at Casablanca. According to the Americans, 'CCS-199' was to serve as a guide for future American actions. The key to the paper was the so-called differentiation between 'commitments' and 'undertakings'.[92] The COS was perplexed, since the precise wording of the agreement, 'CCS-155/1', had been discussed with meticulous care and unanimously approved at Casablanca. Although both nationalities used the same language, the British admitted that shades of meaning were sometimes interpreted differently, requiring additional discussion. Having resolved similar problems at past conferences, the British failed to understand why an entirely new document was required, unless the Americans wanted to change something in the mutually approved strategy. Unlike their American colleagues, the British understood 'CCS-155/1' quite clearly. The paper's integrity, if necessary, could be safeguarded by a line by line

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[90] M. Matloff, *Op. cit.*, p. 30.
[91] K. Greenfield, *Op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.
[92] JCS 71 Meeting, Washington, 30 Mar. 1943, p. 6, Reel 1.

interpretation or by agreed textual amendments. The COS affirmed that nothing would be gained by the production of a new paper, which could hardly fail to have its own shades of meaning different from those of the original paper. If changes were made in the existing manifesto, the British needed time to carefully consider any new interpretations and proposed amendments; these changes, in turn, had to be agreed by the CCS before being referred to their political masters, the President and the Prime Minister, for approval.[93]

Although 'agreements in principle' represented the 'spirit of the law' and 'formal interpretations' represented the 'letter', an ally could not be compensated to the aggrieved other's satisfaction, if a contract was breached. Much to the consternation of the aggrieved party, feelings as a cause for change were inadmissible. To this extent the partnership was weakened. The interplay between either country's military ethos and the contractual behavior it employed could be used to modify, if not abrogate, an existing agreement, as in the case above. Unlike disputes in civil law, neither party had recourse to binding arbitration or redress at the appellate judiciary level. Free of sanctions, neither side was immune to re-interpreting an agreement when it suited its purpose, whether it was the Americans over the Casablanca arrangement or the British over SLEDGEHAMMER.[94] Contractually, on the one hand, the British regarded American determination as inflexible behavior, exaggerated and insufferable. On the other, the Americans regarded British flexibility as equivocal, lacking both assurance and commitment.

TRIDENT

Five months passed before another major conference, code-named TRIDENT convened in Washington, to confirm earlier decisions, to clarify Anglo-American planning and to specify long-term military goals. As the conferees gathered, they were informed of

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[93] CCS 81 Meeting, Washington, 23 Apr 1943, 'Supplementary Minutes', p. 2, Reel III.
[94] Sir W. Jackson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

Allied dominance in North Africa, the Pacific, the Aleutians, at Stalingrad and in the Atlantic. The conference, originally suggested by Eden, recommended by Churchill and confirmed by Roosevelt, convened on 12 May; in attendance were the President, the Prime Minister and their military staffs. Brooke, representative of his British colleagues, was apprehensive of the American drift towards the Pacific since the Casablanca Conference, and in Washington would seek reassurance that the 'Germany-first' formula remained intact. Nor did he envisage an easy time of it, because, in his view, King continued to divert large forces to the Pacific, with Marshall's implicit support. Brooke dreaded the up-coming meetings, knowing that they would entail hours of argument with an ally trying to depart from the agreed basic strategy. Strained and depressed at the thought, he reasoned that if the Americans were allowed to succeed, if the Pacific were to absorb the bulk of the Allied effort, the war could go on forever.[95] Even though the Americans disagreed with his Mediterranean strategy, Marshall counted on Brooke to blunt some of Churchill's impractical schemes and Roosevelt was determined to see 'Germany-first' through to the end.[96]

The Americans Continue to Reorganize

Prior to TRIDENT, the American military establishment was in the midst of a major administrative reorganization, which, it was hoped, as one of a number of outcomes, would manifest itself in a more favorable negotiating stance against the British. Innovative procedures were applied by the military and business communities, both understanding that mobilization and production had to be linked to national policy and strategic planning. Since scientific management was first developed and widely applied in the United States early in the century, experience determined the appropriate mix of management, machines and manpower, the combination of which improved and grew as the war continued.[97] However, certain army doctrines impaired military effectiveness, specifically, the emphasis on daylight bombing and the de-emphasis of

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[95] FM Lord Alanbrooke,3/A/IX., 10 May 1943, p. 86.
[96] F. Pogue, *Op. cit.*, p. 310 'Brooke Interview', 18 Apr. 1961.
[97] T. Wilson, 'The United States Leviathan', *Allies At War*, W. Reynolds & A. Chubarian, (eds.), (London, 1994), pp. 186-188.

infantry, as evident in the European air and ground campaigns that followed. Martin Van Creveld overstated the drive towards industrial efficiency as robotic when he wrote, 'America, after all was the home of Taylorism; a system of management that tried to foresee and dictate the operative's very movement with the aim of turning him into a human machine as reliable as the mechanical ones he attended.'[98] The French considered *Taylorisme,* the wickedest word in their dictionary, dehumanizing and stubbornly resisted.'[99]

Van Crefeld's assessment is not only misleading but naïve, because Frederick Taylor, an American 19th century management engineer, equating men with machines, failed to consider the social, biological and psychological aspects of the worker, thereby rendering his theory both inappropriate and inapplicable, particularly in an American wartime economy. British studies of the effects of monotony and fatigue on World War I munitions workers demonstrated the fallacy of Taylor's views of motivation and compliance even before the First World War ended. Between the wars, new scientific theories of management evolved, founded upon 'human-factor psychology', a dimension missing in Taylor's bizarre conception of man as an indifferent machine.[100] During The Second World War, the American government, recognizing the need for a centrally co-ordinated wartime economy of maximum productivity, realized that the factory worker and the soldier would become its most importantly studied subjects: what were the bio-psychological restraints and limitations on their performance? As part of the overall effort, increased efficiency demanded that the JCS authorize studies covering standard policy procedures for all of its sub agencies, i.e., the Joint Administration Committee, Munitions Assignment Board, War Shipping Administration, Office of War Information, Joint Committee New Weapons and Equipment, etc., each with plenary powers. Moreover, it instructed the Joint Staff

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[98] M. Crefeld, *Fighting Power, German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945* (London, 1983), pp. 36-37; F. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management,* (London, 1972)
[99] V. Cronin, Paris, *City of Light 1919-1939*, (London,1940), p. 155.
[100] M. Rose, *Industrial Behavior*, (London, 1978), pp. 54-62, 98, 100.

Planners to prepare, recommend and submit a study on the organization of a Joint General Staff to function under the JCS.[101]

A Plethora of Committees

Although the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), led by Embick,[102] had been established in November 1942 to advise the JCS on broad, long range strategic planning, steps were taken to improve the effectiveness and co-ordinating functions of the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), related to strategy.[103] In May the newly created Joint Administrative Committee, soon to become the Joint Logistics Committee (JLC), was authorized to deal with logistics and material on a full time basis.[104] The Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), established in April, was subordinate and responsible to the JPS.[105] The JWPC was empowered to negotiate inter-service agreements on deployment and employment of American forces and to develop joint outline plans, papers and studies for future operations. These recommendations were to serve as a basis of agreement for the JCS, on which unified policy could be reached, defended and addressed in consultations with the British.

Marshall acknowledged how closely knit were the COS, its Secretariat, War Cabinet and the Prime Minister, to a Congressional sub-committee. Many of the impending changes were directed toward offsetting the COS.[106] With TRIDENT only a month away, The JCS directed the JWPC to compose the strategic papers and plans needed for the conference; this process was to become the template for all prospective coalition conferences.

The Americans learned that the British party consisted of ninety-four people, including Wrens, ciphering clerks, and Marines for security. During a JCS meeting on 8 May,

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101 JCS 79 Meeting, Washington, 10 May 1943. p.2.
102 R. Schaffer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-95.
103 JCS 8 Meeting, Washington, 7 Nov. 1943, Reel I.
104 JCS 79 Meeting, *Op. cit.*.
105 V. E. Davis, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in W.W. II, Organization Development*,. 2. (Washington, 1972), pp. 370-395.
106 CCS 79 Meeting, *Op cit.*

four days before the conference convened, the Americans refined their negotiating plans and expressed their apprehension in reaction to the efficiency of British inter-service co-ordination coupled with the abilities of its negotiators. A composite of pre-conference JCS meetings revealed that the American Chiefs continued to suffer from inferior negotiating skills and limited cohesion. Time was spent searching for the most effective method with which to overcome those defects, during the overall reorganization. The recommended line of action was as follows: the JCS agreed that it must stick to fundamentals and eliminate as many of the details as possible in order to avoid complications. However, if it could be anticipated that the British would raise the question of escorts and convoys, for example, the technical agencies concerned should be forewarned to have pertinent data readily available. Wedemeyer contended that the JCS remain non-committal on global strategy until the British revealed their intentions regarding post-HUSKY (Sicily) operations and European strategy in general. At the same time that Leahy urged that global strategy be discussed immediately, Marshall agreed to argue the JCS's point of view. Moreover, the JCS summoned its sub-agencies to compile papers with which to press home the attack with which to break down the COS's arguments. In addition, the JCS would seek presidential approval of these position papers at the earliest possible moment, to avoid previous breakdowns in consensus. The presented papers were to be brief, simply listing an opening recommendation, followed by a discussion. On the agenda were papers such as 'Outline Plan for the Seizure of Sardinia' (JCS 289), 'Conduct of the War in 1943-44' (JCS 290) and 'Invasion of the European Continent from the United Kingdom', 1943-44 (JCS 291 Revised).[107]

The Barrier of a Common Language

As a note of caution, King warned that for every subject introduced at Casablanca, the British had a paper ready. Wedemeyer suggested that the Americans should match every British paper with one of their own and recommended that the JSP edit its papers

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[107] JCS 78 Meeting, Washington, 8 May 1943, Reel I .

carefully before disclosing them to the British. As a matter of urgency, any objectionable or critical statements and unnecessary commitments could be deleted before presentation. Moreover, Wedemeyer indicated that words like 'current' or 'projected operations' would limit misinterpretation in context and should be used whenever papers were delivered to the British. He was firmly convinced that all of the papers should express the views of the JCS, and if they did not, they should be so amended.[108]

The JSSC recommended that the decisions of the coming conference be recorded in approximately the same form as 'CCS-199', which differentiated between strategic 'commitments' and strategic 'undertakings'. General Brehon Somervell, head of the Army's Service of Supply, concluded that as long as the definition of 'commitment' remained unclear and inconsistent, difficulties between the JCS and the COS would persist. This anomaly, he added, required immediate resolution if the nation's full resources were to be utilized.[109] Why the usage of these words caused problems is difficult to fathom, because their meaning is not the same; simply stated, 'commitment' is a promise, a guarantee, while 'undertaking' is an endeavor, an enterprise. Accepting these distinctions, it would follow that an agreement could be concluded on usage, regarding future consultations and contracts. If American resources were held hostage to these words, Somervell's concern demanded serious study.

Regarding the negotiations themselves, the principal American objective was to solicit British support for an early cross-Channel operation, for which the JCS had Roosevelt's backing for the first time. Even so, the difficulty of convincing the British of the operation's immediacy required a major change in their Mediterranean strategy. The Americans predicted that the British would respond half-heartedly to an incidental ROUNDUP tied to a German collapse. King, expressing irritation, said, 'The British 'limp along' with an attitude of expediency. Nothing will make us sure what

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[108] JCS 80 Meeting, Washington, 12 May 1943, p. 7, Reel I.
[109] JCS 78 Meeting, Washington, 8 May 1943; JCS 79 Meeting, Washington, 10 May 1943, Reel I.

operations can be anticipated in 1944, unless there is a firm commitment to do ROUNDUP.'[110]

After a conference at the White House on 12 May that included the major participants, both country's military advisors met the following day. Procedural arrangements remained high on the American agenda, attested by the following proposals: the JCS wanted a small grouping of JPS, JSSC and JLC officers present as advisors, who could quickly assist in solving the problems submitted for discussion.[111]

These were the assistants armed to anticipate and counter every imaginable argument whose briefcases bulged with studies and statistics.[112] Moreover, once the subject of global strategy had been considered in the first two sessions, the Americans requested that the Combined Planners prepare a detailed agenda. In addition, unless an 'agreed decision' was recorded in the meeting's conclusions, no interpretation as such could be read into the minutes. Furthermore, any preliminary reports presented to the President and the Prime Minister were to be regarded as 'tentative only' and in the final report 'approved' 'existing' and 'projected strategic undertakings` were to be placed in their order of priority. If successful, the attempt to limit the wiles of its competitor was worth while, so they thought.[113] Much of the requests were approved, but as the conference continued, business sessions slowed, because the Americans had greatly increased their attending staff and the British had followed suit. At most sessions there were at least twenty staff members arrayed behind and on each side of the Chiefs who sat facing each other.[114]

The Strategies Clash Again

The two delegations debated strategic issues for thirteen days. Roosevelt and Churchill met the CCS on six occasions at the White House, and the Chiefs usually met jointly or

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[110] JCS 81 Meeting, Washington, 14 May 1943, p. 3, Reel I.
[111] CCS 83 Meeting, Washington, 13 May 1943, Reel III.
[112] K. Greenfield, *Op. cit.*, p. 33.
[113] CCS 83 Meeting, *Op. cit.*
[114] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, IX, 19 May 1943, p. 9.

combined three or four times a day at the Federal Reserve Building near by. The two sides were deeply divided and the meetings were acrimonious. The British stressed the elimination of Italy from the war in 1943, and the Americans underlined the intensification of Pacific operations and the planning for a second front in northwest Europe instead of further Mediterranean incursions. To break the impasse, the COS proposed that each side present a paper describing how it would pursue the war in Europe. The British called their paper, 'Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Elimination of Italy First)'; the Americans: 'Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Concentration of the Largest Possible Force in the United Kingdom)'.

The Americans believed that,

> ...the concept of defeating Germany-first involves making a determined attack against Germany on the Continent at the earliest practicable date; and we consider that all proposed operations in Europe should be judged primarily on the basis of the contribution to that end...It is the opinion of the JCS that a cross-Channel invasion of Europe is necessary to an early conclusion of the war with Germany.[115]

Brooke read the British paper; in many respects its aims were similar to those of the Americans, i.e., supplying Russia, defeating the U-boats, conquering Sicily, securing Mediterranean communications, intensifying the pressure on Italy, enlisting Turkey as an active ally and expanding the bomber offensive. Little was surprising, because the combination of external threats required counter-measures and diplomatic assaults which were obvious; the conferees even agreed on a cross-Channel operation, but its purpose, timing and execution disclosed their strategic division.

> CCS have since approved a directive to General Morgan to prepare plans, among other things, for a full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early possible....The assembly of the strongest possible force...in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent, as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.[116]

Marshall's reaction to the British paper was immoderate. He was concerned that the landing of ground forces in Italy would establish a vacuum in the Mediterranean, in which Britain would demand more and more American means and unqualified support.

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[115] CCS 83 Meeting, *Op. cit.*, 'Annex A', p. 12.
[116] *Ibid.*, 'Annex B', p. 13.

That outcome would preclude the assembly of sufficient forces in Britain required to execute a successful cross-Channel operation. If Mediterranean operations developed, except for air attacks on Germany, part of 1943 and virtually all of 1944 would be accounted for in that theater. The war in Europe would be prolonged, and thus delay the ultimate defeat of Japan, which the people of the United States would find intolerable. He said, 'We were now at a cross-roads...if we were committed to the Mediterranean, except for air alone, it meant a prolonged struggle and one which was not acceptable to the United States'.[117]

When Brooke insisted that ending Mediterranean operations would prolong the war, contending that the Allies did not have the means to land and hold a Channel beachhead, thereby failing to assist the beleaguered Russian Armies, the strategic division between Marshall and him remained irreconcilable. The Conference verged on collapse. On 19 May Marshall set a precedent, amid an unmistakable air of tension, by recommending that the meeting should be cleared of all but the Chiefs of Staff, a procedure labeled as, 'going off the record'. Marshall and Brooke, in desperation, dismissed all the staff present and Ismay recalled the event, 'The arguments went back and forth, and occasionally got so acrimonious that the junior staffs were bidden to leave the principals to continue the battle in secret session.'[118]

King, for example, who never trusted the British, was most Anglophobic during regular meetings, more conciliatory during 'off the record' ones.[119] 'Going off the record', by meeting without staff and secretaries alike, did not insure an end to deadlock; it was an extreme procedure within a flawed system whose premise was adversarial rather than co-operative. Converting and reducing strategic differences into obligatory agreements, followed by mutual compliance was beyond the scope of the system. The following comparison between Allied negotiations and industrial bargaining highlights the problems that faced the Combined Chiefs: locked in a

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[117] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[118] Gen. Lord H. Ismay, *Op. cit.*, pp. 269, 298.
[119] Dill to Alanbrooke, 9 February 1944, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/39/B, KCL.

continual political-psychological struggle, the British and Americans fought to dominate the other. Although Henry Kissinger was writing about the Napoleonic period, a qualified parallel exists between it and the period under discussion:

> As long as the enemy is more powerful than any single member of the coalition, the need for unity outweighs all considerations of individual gain...But when the enemy has been so weakened that each ally has the power to achieve its ends alone, a coalition is at the mercy of its most determined member.[120]

Military versus Collective Bargaining

All the pertinent issues relating to military bargaining were rarely settled at once and thorny issues were usually tabled. Records were not kept during 'off the record' meetings, a loss of information that could not be overcome. An agreement was either broken or subverted without penalty, for any reason, real or imagined, if it no longer served the state, which alone remained accountable. If an agreement were delayed, a State's entity, infrastructure and body-politic were not threatened, because labor and management were indivisible at that level. Lacking adjudication, disputes were difficult to resolve. Without a sense of good-will, co-operation during negotiations was transitory.[121] Because of mutual dissatisfaction, both parties were easily chagrined, expectations were dashed and the relationship exacerbated. The Anglo-American search for a combined strategic policy was affected by either side's perception of power and images of strength, which were as important as the material factors. British sensitivity increased as their power decreased, an element which could not be overlooked. The Allies behaved as if they were two rival companies, not partners, competing for commercial dominance within the same industry, or as if they were two identical subsidiaries of the same company vying for a greater share of resources while seeking additional autonomy.[122] The struggle in achieving an agreement related to the depth of commitment: the application of political judgment in assessing national

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[120] H. Kissenger, *A World Restored*, (Boston, 1973), p. 109.
[121] C. Jenkins & B. Sherman, *Collective Bargaining*, (London, 1977).
[122] H. Nicholas, *The United States and Britain*, (Chicago, 1975), p. 4.

interests. Based on his 'mind-set', each negotiator was committed to and protective of his country's welfare, but how this was interpreted affected the negotiations in process.

Introduction to Collective Bargaining

By contrast, in industrial collective bargaining, the strength of either side, its capabilities, contributions and the areas of expertise are different, identifiable and required: labor supplies a skilled work-force that manufactures the company's product. The company, on the other hand, offers the means of production and proficient management. The company operates within the confines of its nation's infrastructure and within a geographical area. Time and mutual gain are essential and desired. Labor seeks improvements in wages, benefits and conditions; management seeks continuity, greater sales and increased profits. The conflict over profits and benefits reflects an agreement in which profits are either optimized or maximized. Sometimes the negotiators are more effective than ethical, more interested in profit than lives. These are the risks and manifestations of industrial ends and means working in an open society. If negotiations stall, unemployment and company contraction looms. Both sides can appeal to the government for understanding and to the public for support, but binding arbitration quickly settles most disputes, and the contract is signed. Agreements and portions thereof can not reopen without mutual consent.[123]

Common to both forms of bargaining are 'belief systems'. However, each Allied negotiator's belief system influenced bargaining strategies in such a way that agreements, in contrast to those in the civilian sector, rarely did more than codify some aspects of the status quo. There were numerous factors that influenced the choice of bargaining strategies. Some were fairly immutable, such as the relations within and between the parties. Others were mutable, such as the conditions under which negotiations occurred, the formality of the setting, the number of participants, the issues at stake and the stress of time and outside events. Belief systems were powerful

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[123] The following 'collective bargaining' portion was based upon eight company contracts that the author helped negotiate over a 20 year period from 1969-1989.

determinants of bargaining policy: how the facts were perceived, the identification of a pay-off structure, the interpretation of the adversary's proposals, the differentiation between capabilities and rhetoric and how previous negotiations were remembered and analyzed. Talbott characterized five mind-sets within the belief system category, the 'manichean', 'confrontational', 'competitive', 'co-operative' and 'pacifist'. King represented the first, with Brooke, Portal and Marshall, representing the second, third and fourth categories, in varying degrees, and Pound and Arnold, the last.[124]

Each side failed to convince the other, because they bargained for and were locked into fixed opposing positions, e.g., the cross-Channel attack versus the Mediterranean. The more the Americans had to defend their position against attack, the more committed and identified they became to it. The more the British tried to convince the Americans of the impossibility of changing their position, the more difficult it became to do so. If each side had accepted the legitimacy of the other and recognized a common interest that threatened neither, the range of possibilities, although limited, could have been greatly increased. Difficulty intensified as attempts were made to reconcile future action with past positions, e.g., future Mediterranean operations versus increased Pacific activity, making it less and less likely that any agreement would wisely reconcile the parties' original interests. Emphasizing positions accorded less attention to the underlying concerns of both sides, e.g., keeping Russia from collapsing. Agreement became less likely, because intransigence increased, e.g., American prevention of any operations east of Sicily. The result was frequently an agreement, compromised and less satisfactory to either side than it could have been. Fractious, recalcitrant behavior like 'dragging one's feet' increased, as meetings lumbered on. Tactics such as this added to the time, risk and costs of reaching agreement. In contrast to position bargaining, the principled negotiation method of focusing on 'basic interests', 'mutually satisfying options' and 'fair standards', typically results in a wise agreement. Negotiating out of a position endangered the relationship and generated bitter feelings for a long time.[125]

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[124] S. Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, (London, 1985).
[125] R. Fry & W. Ury, *Getting to Yes*, (London, 1991), pp. 3-6, 13-14.

The two sides suffered from commitments to certain positions bound by rigid instructions. The greater degree of role obligation demanded of the negotiators, the greater were the constraints on concession-making and the greater the probability of deadlocked outcomes.[126]

For example, to stress the need for elasticity while negotiating, Lord Halifax, during his tenure in Washington as the British ambassador, compared the negotiating stances of Hull, Roosevelt and Wilson:

> What has characterised the talks throughout has been Mr. Hull's acute and abiding consciousness of the disasters of 1918-19, and consequent efforts to avoid, at any rate, Wilson's errors. In particular, both Hull and the President have successfully avoided such defects in Wilson's handling of a similar situation, as his obstinate adhesion to a cut and dried plan, with rigid opposition to attempts either by the opposition party at home or by allied statesmen in Paris to modify it.[127]

Alone, the eight Chiefs had a 'heart to heart' talk, analogous to 'going off the record'; the exclusion of staff implied a need for privacy, which suggested an attempt at forthright conversation, hitherto unattainable, and the inclusion of admissible feeling. Newspaper reporter, Ernest Hemingway, when covering the Genoa Conference of 1922 at which David Lloyd George demonstrated his diplomatic mastery, observed that the ebb and flow of human emotions were less important than the decisions obtained, the best of which were often made on the basis of mutual interest and rigorous logic. Passion had no place in military-diplomatic affairs.[128] By force of circumstance, what emerged from this closed meeting led to the most important single decision of the conference, as stated in the paper, 'CCS-242/6', authorizing the Allies to launch a major offensive across the English Channel on 1 May 1944 with twenty-nine divisions, an operation originally called Operation ROUNDHAMMER, later changed to OVERLORD, that Churchill had resisted for over a year.[129]

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[126] B. Spector, 'Negotiation as a Psychological Process', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21, 4, (1977), pp. 613-4.
[127] Lord Halifax, 'Anglo-American Relations, 'Quarterly Report July, Aug., Sept. 1944', Washington, 1943, CAB 122/1035, p. 4.
[128] P. Griffin, *Less Than A Treason*, (Oxford, 1990), p. 131.
[129] 'CCS 242/6: TRIDENT Final Report to President and Prime Minister', 25 May 1943, *Papers and Minutes*, Washington, 1943.

Churchill's Attempts to Modify the Agreement

Concurrently, the paper stipulated the following: the transfer of seven divisions from the Mediterranean to Britain beginning 1 November 1943, re-arming the French and the continuance of Mediterranean operations and the bombing of Germany.[130] The concluding agreement reflected a mechanical splitting of the difference between final positions rather than a solution carefully crafted to meet the legitimate interests of the parties. Although the agreement was ratified by Roosevelt and Churchill at a White House meeting on 19 May, Churchill, having second thoughts two days later, tried to repudiate at least half of the paper, which had omitted the 'glittering' prize of an Italian campaign after Sicily and how twenty-nine divisions would be employed between August 1943 and May 1944. With the credibility of the COS at stake, Brooke advised him not to tamper with the agreement's particulars because of the increased American distrust it would engender. Apprised by Brooke and warned of Roosevelt's disapproval by Hopkins, Churchill desisted; and after altering some of the wording, but not the principles, he let the matter rest for the moment. Later that month, Churchill, unilaterally reopened the agreement, and interpreted the meaning of 'to conduct operations best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the greatest number of German forces',[131] to advance his Mediterranean objectives. He implored Eisenhower and Marshall, who, for their own reasons, grudgingly accepted his supposition, that operations after Sicily, against either Corsica, Sardinia or southern Italy, were viable options. His lobbying behavior would have been unthinkable and unacceptable in collective bargaining negotiations after agreement had been reached. Although Brooke's Mediterranean strategy reaffirmed the Casablanca decisions and had overcome American objections, Churchill's behavior demonstrated that the use of fixed positions could never serve in the place of basic interests or be as rewarding.

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130 *Ibid.*

131 'CCS 242/6: Final Report to the President and Prime Minister'. 25 May 1943. *TRIDENT Papers*, Office of CCS. Washington, 1943.

Moreover, Brooke was sure that the Prime Minister was unaware of how near they had come to failure.[132]

At the conclusion of the Conference, Brooke proposed that the Combined Chiefs re-confer at an early date, because the lapse of time between successive meetings was too long, to which the Americans concurred. The conferees agreed that Directors of Plans and JP teams should meet with greater frequency and that planning papers affecting combined strategy should be mutually exchanged.[133] During longer intervals, Brooke insisted, the views of each nation were more likely to become divergent.[134] Suspicions and doubts remained, as manifestations of incompatible principles. Even after sixteen months as Allies, Marshall could still warn the JCS during the Conference,

> We should be quite guarded in what we say and act like a unit...we must be very careful of casual commitments which might militate against us...It appeared that the British want to win the war in the Mediterranean, that the Prime Minister had used the word 'little' in regard to Mediterranean operations. What was his definition of 'little'?[135]

Disillusioned, aging and weary, Brooke concurred, admitting that each side's basic convictions remained unaltered.[136] Might these strategic convictions, if carried too far, border on myth? John Kautsky wrote,

> The point is that myths, no matter how untrue, do have very real consequences; that prophecies based on initially false perceptions can produce conditions that really exist (and thus fulfill the prophecy); that men react to symbols by real behavior, be it activity or quiescence. If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.[137]

Without recognizing the premise and quality of their bargaining, even if frequent meetings seemed essential, there was little likelihood that any fundamental transactional improvement would occur. Although the Americans were better organized, more aggressive and more realistic at TRIDENT than at any other time, they won very little from the British at the conference table. Because victory in the Pacific was still

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[132] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/VIII, 19 May 1943, p. 703.
[133] 'CCS 251/1: Proposals for Improving Combined Planning', 25 May 1943, *Ismay Papers*, VI/II.
[134] CCS 96 Meeting, Washington, 25 May 1943, Reel III.
[135] JCS 84 Meeting, Washington, 18 May, 1943, Reel I.
[136] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/VIII, 25 May 1943, p. 704.
[137] J. Kautsky, 'Myth, Self fulfilling Prophecy, and Symbolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict', *Conflict Resolution*, IX, 1, (1965), pp. 1-2.

dependent upon first defeating Germany, nothing in the agreement stipulated any change in strategy by which Germany's surrender could be accelerated. Moreover, the Americans accepted that portion of 'closing the ring' in which continued Mediterranean operations, however vague, would lead to an eventual cross-Channel attack. Opportunism corrupted strategy, but within this constraint, logistics, resources and manpower were dealt with adequately at the operational level. At least in the Pacific wastes, controlled as they were by the Americans, there was to be no 'limping along', because King's view prevailed. After the debacle that followed the 1942 Magnet Conference, how could the American contingent believe that the British would strive to make the cross-Channel attack a reality on 1 May 1944?[138] At the end of the Conference, Brooke, operating on will-power alone, manifesting signs of weariness and depression, could record that his Mediterranean strategy remained intact, but at a price.

> ...in the light of the results that ensued the 'compromise' that emerged was almost exactly what I wanted!...King, however, was the unconvertible one, and I knew well that shipping and landing craft would continue to be sucked up into the Pacific irrespective of the requirements for the war in Europe.[139]

Meeting in Algiers

Churchill's lobbying for an invasion of southern Italy continued during meetings with Eisenhower,[140] in Algiers between 29 May and 3 June, with Marshall, Brooke and Montgomery all in attendance. Curiously, the British and American Navies were not represented, although any future operation would be amphibious.[141] Churchill tried to overcome American instinctive distrust of his Mediterranean strategy, exerting great pressure on Eisenhower to gain his acceptance. By attempting to circumvent the JCS, American distrust increased. Churchill, according to Marshall, predicted the strategic outcome, brushed aside all questions, and engaged in a monologue that seemed to go

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[138] 'Analysis of Trident and Anfa Conferences', Washington, 25 May 1943, RG 165 OPD, Tab SS 106, ABC 381, SS Papers 96-126/3.
[139] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/VIII', 25 May, 1943, p. 705.
[140] Sir B. Liddell Hart, 'The Higher Strategic Decisions of the War', n.d., 15/15/24, p. 17.
[141] 'Minutes of the Algiers Conference', 7 June 1943, JCS Document, MR File, FDRL.

on long into the night. Never had the Chief of Staff heard anyone talk like this before. Impressed with his own ideas, the Prime Minister was uninterested in other people's opinions, and Marshall, like Hopkins, avoided being drawn in.[142] Churchill, Brooke and a cautious Marshall agreed in principle that Eisenhower's decision to invade Italy, would be predicated upon the German reaction to the Allied invasion of Sicily. Fears among some of the American planners were aroused: a commitment for a major operation had been decided once again without CCS participation.[143] At this meeting, Eisenhower emerged as the conservative, cautious realist, a quality he displayed for the remainder of the war, obviating his determined willingness to fight on the Norman beaches in 1942.[144]

Stalin's Reaction

When Stalin was notified of the TRIDENT decision, he castigated both Churchill and Roosevelt on 11 June, in a message warning that the Soviet Union would experience exceptional difficulties by the postponement of the second front until 1944. Possibly even more to the point, he stated:

> As for the Soviet Government, it cannot align itself with this decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent course of the war.[145]

Distressed, he withdrew his ambassadors from Britain and the United States. Soon after, Stalin accused Churchill of bad faith, but the troubled Prime Minister, attempting to mollify him in a lengthy reply, suggested a meeting of the three leaders at Scapa Flow that summer. Churchill did not know that Roosevelt had already fractured the 'special relationship' by excluding him from a scheduled mid-summer meeting with Stalin. When Churchill discovered the plot – it was Harriman who told him – he confronted Roosevelt in a letter on 25 June, in which he wrote,

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[142] Lord Moran, *Op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.
[143] Minutes, '1st meeting in Algiers', 29 May 1943, Official TRIDENT Conference Book, Office of the CCS, Washington.
[144] W. Churchill, *The Second World War*, III, *Op. cit.*, pp. 816-830; Gen. D. Eisenhower, *Op. cit.*, pp.185-187. See the 'Marshall Memorandum'.
[145] R. Edmonds, *Op. cit.*, p. 328: Sov-Angl. O, 1. 'Document 131'.

> You must excuse me expressing myself with all the frankness that our friendship and gravity of the issue warrant. I do not underrate the use that enemy propaganda would make of a meeting between the heads of Soviet Russia and the United States at this juncture with the British Commonwealth and Empire excluded. It would be serious and vexatious, and many would be bewildered and alarmed thereby...[146]

Roosevelt lied to Churchill and wrote:

> I did not suggest to Uncle Joe that we meet alone but he told Davies that he assumed a) that we would meet alone and b) that he agreed that we should not bring staffs to what would be a preliminary meeting....to cover much of the same ground with him as did Eden for you a year ago...[147]

Even if Roosevelt believed that he and Stalin were better suited than Churchill to settle post-war issues, the President failed to consider the letter's impact upon the 'special relationship'. In American terms, Churchill was a man of the past, Stalin a man of the future. Churchill understood from previous experiences with the President that American attempts to reduce Britain's gold reserves in the United States, plots to take over Britain's Middle East oil interests, disputes over Argentine beef, claims to sixteen islands in the south Pacific owned by Britain and New Zealand required for post-war world air routes, and negotiations culminating in an air agreement with the Irish Republic without informing the British, demonstrated that the 'special relationship' was relatively non-existent between Allies in the world of power politics.[148] Churchill circulated a War Office paper which read, 'ranging from the establishment of a *Pax Americana*, in substitution for the *Pax Britannica* to a definite American imperialistic policy which aims at the building up of American power and prestige in various parts of the world.' [149]

Instead of the Roosevelt-Stalin Conference, which never materialized, because of Stalin's disinterest, Churchill left for Quebec. Sailing from England aboard the Queen Mary to meet the American President in the French-Canadian city along the St.

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[146] W. Kimball, *Op. cit.*, II, 'C-328', 25 June 1943, pp. 278-279.
[147] *Ibid.*, 'R-297', 28 June 1943, pp. 283-284.
[148] *Ibid.*, 'C-582', 19 Feb., 1944, pp. 733-734.
[149] PREM 3 476 W.O. paper, 'Anglo-American Relations in Washington in the Autumn of 1942. Lord Halifax, 'Anglo-American Relations, Quarterly Report July, Aug., Sept. 1944', Washington, 1943, CAB 122/1035, p. 4.

Lawrence River, Churchill recognized that trans-Atlantic distrust persisted. The Quebec QUADRANT meeting was an event to which neither major participant looked forward.

CHAPTER FIVE

QUADRANT: THE QUEBEC CONFERENCE

Preparations

Preparations for the forthcoming 1943 Anglo-American QUADRANT Conference in Quebec, Canada, were preceded by a series of JCS meetings held between 6 and 10 August in Washington.[1] Offsetting the British influence was high on the American agenda. The mood was sanguine, with Marshall and his colleagues, veterans of two years of Anglo-American negotiations, believing that the time was ripe for a final decision on European strategy. One question demanding resolution, as part of JCS Paper 443 Revised, asked whether the main effort in Europe should be from the Mediterranean or from Britain.[2] A decision was necessary because, as Rear Admiral Charles 'Savvy' Cooke, the top American Naval planner, indicated, Eisenhower's staff was already planning to eliminate Italy from the war and to acquire bases in the Po Valley from which to bomb Germany. According to General Carl Spaatz, Deputy Commander Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, it was crucial that Rome remained a prize of war rather than be declared an 'Open City', because its surrounding airfields would obviate the need for those farther north in the Po Valley and the land battle required to take them. From Rome's airfields, the bombing of Germany would be just as effective.

As a result of conversations with Eisenhower's representatives, Cooke stressed that the JCS should choose between the two theaters and reach a decision as quickly as possible. King agreed, but he concluded that the British were doing much to prevent OVERLORD becoming a reality. For example, at TRIDENT the Americans were told that 132 British controlled Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) and Tank Ships in the Mediterranean, needed by COSSAC for OVERLORD, could not sail to England after 1

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[1] JCS Meetings 100-102, and White House, Washington, 6, 7, 9, 10 Aug. 1943, Reel 1.
[2] JCS 103 Meeting, 'Pre QUANDRANT: Agenda Priority', Washington, 10 Aug. 1943., Reel 1.

October because some of their number had foundered in heavy winter seas during previous voyages. King took umbrage with the British notion, indicating that TORCH had been mounted on 8 November. He further disparaged British maritime efficiency and experience by insisting theirs was a defeatist attitude. 'Surely some risk must be accepted', he complained, 'the consequences of which could largely be overcome by vigilance and good seamanship'. Moreover, King had gained the impression that Churchill and Brooke were taking counsel of their fears. He rejected the British idea that the Allies must wait until the German divisions in Normandy were reduced to 12 before OVERLORD became acceptable. He mocked British policy as one that delayed, lingered, waited and did nothing, and challenged his colleagues to reach a firm decision at QUADRANT regarding OVERLORD, if a realistic operation was to be forthcoming.[3]

Secretary Stimson's Influence on Negotiations

Stimson, having recently returned from a fact-finding tour of Britain, agreed, concluding that the Prime Minister and the COS were almost apathetic and certainly apprehensive about BOLERO. He maintained that if OVERLORD were to take place at all, Roosevelt and his military commanders had to assume the responsibility of leadership, because the shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkirk hung too heavily over the imaginations of Churchill and his military commanders.[4] Generals Wedemeyer and Kuter, Army and Air Corps planners, respectively, felt that if the seven battle experienced divisions consigned to OVERLORD were shipped from the Mediterranean to Britain in accordance with the TRIDENT agreement, it would reduce British pressure on the JCS for extensive operations in the Central Mediterranean. Eisenhower's chief planner, General Rooks, proposed that even without the seven divisions, he would still have sufficient force to fulfill planned operations in Italy, north of Rome, Sardinia and Corsica, and have 14 divisions available for an invasion of southern France. If seven new divisions replaced the seven veteran divisions, this excess would meet with

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[3] JCS Meetings 100-102. *Op. cit.*
[4] White House Meeting, 'Letter to Roosevelt'. Washington. 10 Aug. 1943.

Churchill and Eden's desires for an invasion of the Balkans, but this expansion of Mediterranean operations would have a disastrous effect on the main effort from Britain.[5]

Seeking improved negotiating results at the forthcoming QUADRANT Conference, Marshall suggested that certain position papers must be abstracted for the President's quick perusal, a compromise should be considered only in the privacy of a recess, and a fixed attitude should be maintained toward upcoming matters. Lastly, knowledge of the issues to which the JCS was bound or wherein they could compromise would be helpful.[6] Liaison between the JCS and the President had improved since TRIDENT. It is entirely possible that Roosevelt's general concurrence with his JCS at this stage was influenced by Stimson's perceptions of Anglo-American strategic divergencies, reflecting deep differences in national character; and that he feared the possible dangerous repercussions of British Mediterranean strategy on American wartime and post-war relations with Russia.[7] Leahy informed his colleagues that the President wished to see them before they left for Quebec to discuss questions relating to Mediterranean operations and other probable points of controversy and disagreement within the Anglo-American coalition. Stimson and the JCS met the President at the White House on 10 August. The President notified the JCS, on information supplied by Stimson, that Churchill was opposed to an operation against Sardinia, but favored one in the Balkans. He later reduced this to a supply operation against Eden's advice.[8]

The President indicated that the Britain was troubled by increased Russian influence in the region and wanted to get to the Balkans ahead of them. The President believed, however naïvely, that the Russians were more interested in establishing kinship with the Slavic people than enslaving them. In any event, he thought it unwise to plan

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[5] *Ibid.*
[6] JCS Meetings, 100-102 *Op. cit.*
[7] Stimson Diary, *Op. cit.*, May, Aug. 1943.
[8] White House Meeting, 10 Aug. 1943, Washington Reel 1..

military strategy based on a gamble tied to political results, and remained opposed to any Balkan venture.[9]

Regarding the cross-Channel attack, King and the President requested plans to postpone, abandon, or carry out OVERLORD without British participation. Marshall responded, 'The trouble with the plan would be that it would greatly overlook the availability of 15 British divisions now in Britain. There is no other spot in the world where 15 divisions can be placed in operation without large export and supply problems.'[10]

Before the meeting closed, the participants agreed upon or strongly advocated the following:

1.) an American commander to lead OVERLORD

2.) continuation of the present OVERLORD build-up

3.) no divergence from the main effort, and no future changes to be made in basic decisions except for minor modifications

3.) land approximately 15 divisions upon the French coast during the opening phases of OVERLORD, with several divisions to follow from Britain soon after

4.) avoid any secondary operations mounted on a 'shoe string'.

As an organizer, Marshall alleged that any operational change has effects which reach as far back as the Midwest in the United States, caused by the necessity for altering production schedules and special equipment for the loading of convoys.[11]

Although Marshall admitted to and complained of the lack of shipping and munitions, he miscalculated his reserve of infantry divisions, believing that no serious problem existed. The scarcity of infantry replacements during the fall and winter months of 1944, which caused havoc on the Western Front, forcibly disproved his presumption: the unknown author of an infantry regiment's printed account wrote. 'The group of replacements that had come to us at Remiremont disappeared rapidly and our resources became low. We were weary and tired. Morale was ebbing....Still we fought on.

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[9] White House Meeting. *Op. cit.*
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*

Rumors persisted, but the relief never came.'[12] Assessing the information given to him by the JCS, the President believed that American ends and means were well integrated.[13]

Proposing an Agenda

Five days before the first QUADRANT meeting, the JCS completed its agenda for the Conference: they would first insist upon acceptance of the TRIDENT agreement ('CCS-246/2') relating to the 1 May 1944 cross-Channel landing. Few problems were expected on this account, as revealed in 'CCS-291/1' by their secretary, but the JCS was concerned that the COS faced difficulties viewing OVERLORD as part of a global strategy involving all theaters, with each theater affecting the other, preoccupied as they were with the Mediterranean. Regarding this theater, the JCS learned that the British were anxious to discuss immediate and specific operations, such as post-HUSKY, and then to fit them into agreements within the over-all picture later. The JCS favored a survey all of the Europe-African areas first. Which ever proposal was tabled first, Marshall affirmed that CCS agreements were predisposed toward AVALANCHE, the Salerno landing near Naples, after BAYTOWN, the landing in southern Italy was underway. Even though the Americans could be as opportunistic as the British when it suited them, as typified in the projected Italian landings, they were determined to seek firm commitments on all implementations as applied to OVERLORD and Burma operations, because of time constraints.[14]

An exchange of paperwork between the Allied Chiefs revealed that the British's first priority was the elimination of Italy from the war, set forth by future Mediterranean operations, with defeat of Japan as the second ('CCS-228'). Whereas, 'CCS-228/1', the American counter proposal, required that progress and planning reports for both the Euro-Mediterranean and the Pacific-Asia areas must be submitted before a decision was

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[12] C. Peck, (ed.), *Five Years, Five Countries, Five Campaigns*, 141 Infantry Regiment, (Munich, 1945), p. 72.
[13] JCS meetings 100-102, *Op. cit.*
[14] *Ibid.*

reached on projected operations within them. The American agenda was too comprehensive for the British, who recommended that the first QUADRANT meeting be limited to:

1.) composition of the agenda
2.) the order in which it should be taken up
3.) the procedure to be followed at the Conference.[15]

Both sides sought the best procedure with which to exploit the other during the meetings; this implied that positions had not softened since TRIDENT. The tenor of American pre-QUADRANT meetings indicated that the JCS was as suspicious of British intentions as ever, consistently wary of many of their proposals and plans. To the extent that their prejudice was sweeping, the JCS had difficulty differentiating and assessing the British point of view on a case by case basis.[16]

Negotiating and Psychology

From one persuasive point of view, it can be argued that thinking and feeling are rival interconnected instruments of decision. Both are reasonable and internally consistent, but each works by its own standards. Thinking evaluates from the viewpoint 'true-false' and feeling from the viewpoint 'agreeable-disagreeable'.[17] 'Intentionality', the ability to question and evaluate objectively one's motives and purpose, to know what one is doing, through all the phases of planning and negotiating. This could contribute to increased rationality during negotiations,[18] but King rarely behaved in this manner. Being co-operative was more complicated than it seemed. When the two sides disagreed and personalities clashed, the result was usually deadlock. When the British and the Americans viewed the same facts differently, or did not consider the same possibilities, or did not foresee the same consequences, each had only an incomplete knowledge of the problem. In a perfect world, required was a combination of four

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[15] *Ibid.*, 'CCS 289' and '289/1', '242/6', 'CCS 300/1', 'CCS 303', 'JCS 443', 'JCS 442' & '442/1' (papers presented on European strategy during CCS meetings between 5-17 Aug. 1943), Reels III and IV.
[16] 'CCS 381: Conduct of the War, 1943-1944', Washington, 17 May 1943 RG. 165 JWPC.
[17] J. Jacobi, *The Psychology of C. C. Jung*, (New Haven, CT, 1968).
[18] C. Wilson, *Introduction to the New Existentialism*, (London, 1966), pp. 39-50.

processes: sensing to gather the relevant facts; intuition to see all measures that might usefully be taken; thinking to determine the consequences and feeling to consider the impact of these consequences on the people involved and the war as a whole. This might have been too much to expect considering the training, experience and personalities of the participants, including the planners, which either demonstrated a preference for organizing facts and principles related to a situation or organizing the situation itself and then to get it moving. Nevertheless, the pooling of their respective perceptions and judgments, however difficult, could offer the best chance of finding a solution valid for them each side.[19]

When Marshall disclosed that Allied operations against Italy were being planned, signifying agreement, the American argument over British intransigence had to relate to OVERLORD alone. Brooke was not so sure, estimating '...that Marshall could not see beyond the tip of his nose and was maddening.'[20] Although General Rook's evaluation of American force level sufficiency in the Mediterranean was wildly optimistic, the Americans had much to gain by attacking the Italian mainland in an opportunistic maneuver with the forces at hand. Trying to knock Italy out of the war could deter little from the BOLERO build-up, unless the object of the landings changed.

Marshall and the JCS, Brooke and the COS and their staffs convened QUADRANT on 14 August, at which procedural conduct became the primary subject. The CCS agreed to the continuation of the TRIDENT procedures, with specific reference to the recording of decisions, approval of the minutes, reports to the President and the Prime Minister and the form of the Final Report. They also agreed to a limit of twelve conferees per side, and, as long as one planner was present, the others were not required to attend meetings. Closed sessions were acceptable when needed.[21]

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[19] I. Myers, *Gifts Differing*, (Palo Alto, CA, 1980), pp. 65, 118.
[20] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*,3/A/IX, 24 July 1943, p. 746.
[21] CCS 106 Meeting, 'QUADRANT Conference', Washington, 14 Aug. 1943, Reel IV.

Reports on Strategy and the Air War

Turning aside from matters of protocol, Brooke reported on German-Italian dispositions in Europe. German divisions were 60 percent under strength and German manpower was stretched to the limit. Italian and satellite forces compounded Germany's problems by withdrawing from the Eastern Front. Some Italian divisions of the thirty stationed in the Balkans and southern France had made surrender overtures, which posed manpower replacement problems for Germany. Portal praised the effective use of daylight bombing in POINTBLANK, the continuing British based Allied air operation by which complete mastery of the air above Germany would be achieved. Thus far, POINTBLANK had been a great success, but the establishment of strong offensive air forces in northern Italy would expose southern Germany and 60 percent of its aircraft production to air attack, forcing the Luftwaffe to deploy half of its fighter force on the Western Front to counter this new threat.[22] Regarding the European air battle, Portal warned, '...If German fighter strength was not checked in the next three months, the battle might be lost, since it was impossible to judge the strength which the German fighter forces might attain by next spring, if our attack is not pressed home.'[23]

Arnold was less optimistic than Portal, and painted a gloomy picture of American air operations over Europe: early estimates, based on the British experience of replacements for men and machines had proved too low in the case of Eighth AAF operations. The crews were 'war weary' and in short supply, i.e., planes outnumbering air crews by two to one (800 to 400). He hoped that by January 1944 this discrepancy could be reversed by achieving a reserve of one air crew each for an aggregate of 1,900 planes. He questioned the maximum use of Britain as a bomber

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[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
[23] *Ibid.*

base in the winter months, because of losses due to bad weather [24] and believed that the North Italian air bases would prove valuable in this regard.[25]

CCS meeting 108 convened on 15 August and revealed that the rift and conflict over strategy remained. King believed that the COS had serious doubts as to the possibility of accomplishing OVERLORD. Brooke disagreed, insisting that if the three conditions formulated by Morgan in his paper were addressed and achieved, the COS would support OVERLORD:

> 1.) reduction in German fighter strength
>
> 2.) German strength and reinforcement in France and the Low Countries for the first two months must be kept at specified limits, and
>
> 3.) the problem of beach maintenance must be solved.[26]

Marshall responded as if he had not heard Brooke's statement, and if this were typical behavior, little could be accomplished in these sessions. Seemingly talking at cross-purposes, Marshall questioned whether the required conditions for a successful OVERLORD solely depended upon increased strength in the Mediterranean. Only if enemy resistance were weak would he agree to the seizure of Italian territory and the occupation of the northern Italian airfields, although just as much was achievable from the Florence area. Marshall insisted that the seven Mediterranean divisions be shipped to Britain and OVERLORD be given overriding priority, otherwise it would become a subsidiary operation. General Barker, COSSAC's American planner agreed, considering it mere speculation to think that an 'opportunist' operation would be cheaper in lives. He threatened:

> If we relied on this, we are opening a new concept which will weaken our chances of an early victory and render a re-examination of our basic strategy, with a possible readjustment towards the Pacific.[27]
>
> The CCS should now take a decision that OVERLORD should have overriding priority and maintain this decision, in order that the success

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[24] Interview with Lt. Gen. J. Doolittle, 14 Dec. 1981: When Gen. Doolittle assumed command of the 8th Air Force in Jan. 1944, he instituted procedures to lessen air accidents over the UK and improved the manpower replacement system.

[25] CCS 106 Meeting, *Op. cit.*

[26] Lt. Gen. Sir F. Morgan, 'Operation OVERLORD', QUADRANT Conference, appendix B, Washington, Aug. 1943, Ismay File.

[27] CCS 108 Meeting,QUADRANT Conference, Washington, 15 Aug. 1943, Reel IV.

> of the operation could be insured. Any departure from this concept must entail a reconsideration of our basic strategy.[28]

The British counter argument stressed that successful operations in France necessitated a preponderance of force, an essential element to avoid a catastrophe, which could seriously delay ultimate victory. Success depended, not on the absolute strength of the Allied forces available for OVERLORD, but on the overall strength of the Germans. This relative strength could best be achieved by operations in Italy, aimed at containing the maximum German forces there, and by air action from the best possible Italian bases to reduce the German fighter threat. The British were concerned that the withdrawal of seven divisions from the Mediterranean, risks taken in that theater could not only prejudice the success of OVERLORD, but prevent any chance of achievement. By fighting a weakened Allied Army to a standstill in Italy, German reserves could be transferred to Normandy to threaten the landing. In the American view OVERLORD was the main operation and all operations in Italy must be aimed at assisting OVERLORD.[29]

The Maintenance of Irreconcilable Differences

The irreconcilable positions, the question of emphasis, could not have been more clearly drawn. While the British viewed OVERLORD as the main operation, all operations in Italy were seen as assisting it. In the American view, OVERLORD would never materialize unless it was given overriding priority. Brooke wrote in his diary after the meeting ended:

> It was a most painful meeting and we settled nothing. I entirely failed to get Marshall to realise the relation between the cross-Channel and Italian Operations, and the repercussions which the one exercises on the other. It is quite impossible to argue with him as he does not begin to understand a strategic problem! He had not even read the plans worked out by Morgan for the cross-Channel operation and consequently was not even in a position to begin to appreciate its difficulties and requirements.[30]

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[28] *Ibid.*, 'CCS 303', 'CCS 304'.
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/IX, 15 Aug., 1943, p. 764.

The JCS reassembled on 15 August to consider the outcome of the last CCS meeting. Although Leahy expressed concern over the shifting of the seven battle-seasoned divisions without knowledge of the enemy situation, as advocated by the COS, Marshall disagreed. He argued that the seven divisions were not the problem, but British avoidance of TRIDENT was, an agreement they now found unacceptable. Since it would take six months to move those divisions from the Mediterranean to Britain in preparation for OVERLORD, the COS lack of adherence could delay the strategic time table.[31]

It was as if the COS were repudiating the TRIDENT agreement, much as Marshall and King had tried to repudiate MAGNET in 1942, suggesting that not only were either side's tactics similar, but there were only so many tactics from which to choose. Each involved permutations of avoidance and denial, in which one ingredient was some form of punishment, e. g. the withholding of supplies, the freezing of troop movements. The conduct of the war and the basic decisions achieved at prior conferences, all of which took months to accomplish, were at stake, and Marshall refused to become mired in another Mediterranean campaign not envisaged at TRIDENT, regardless of the British logic for doing so.

Consensually, the American position was hardening against the British, as expressed by Admiral Russell Wilson, a member of the elite JSSC. He observed that the British were undermining OVERLORD by adopting a well-tried technique: emasculation. The result, he perceived, would unnecessarily prolong the war in the Atlantic and, consequently, in the Pacific. The Americans reacted in turn by deprecating British strategy: the British would not make a decision until it had been determined what the enemy proposed to do, that the British endeavored to meet an emergency before it arose and that the British would create an emergency which would retain the seven divisions in the Mediterranean. Moreover, in their arguments, they had ignored the effects of

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[31] JCS 104 Meeting, QUADRANT Conference, Washington, 15 Aug. 1943, Reel II.

Russian successes and those of the bombing offensive, and had made the whole success of OVERLORD dependent on creating a favorable situation in Italy.[32]

Wedemeyer took the JCS through a sequence of British positions, from Casablanca onwards, that revealed the capricious nuances of their Mediterranean strategy. He described how HUSKY's purpose, according to them, was to open the Mediterranean and cause Italy's collapse. At that time, the COS believed it unnecessary to mount an attack on the Italian mainland, charging that it would fall by air action alone. He was sure that they had equivocated since TRIDENT, arguing that occupation of Italy was necessary, offering the weak excuse that the Germans must be denied the northern Italian airfields. Wedemeyer insisted that it would do the enemy little good, since the Allies had overwhelming air superiority in the area. He indicated that lower-level British officers agreed with the American OVERLORD planners, but due to political considerations and political pressure from above, they had to disagree. 'The British leadership believe we are wrong'.[33] To discover the extent that Wedemeyer's behavior was sycophantic and tendentious is difficult to assess, because his views were influenced by Embick, his father-in-law and interlocked with Marshall's, the strategy to which the JCS now acceded; he offered no solutions but sought substantiation for his prejudice. During their meeting, certain statements by JCS members sounded more like clichés:

> We should be firm in retaining the initiative and making the enemy conform to our decisions....We must retain the initiative and call the tune....The decision should be one that would be firm in order and that it could be vigorously executed....We would meet with reverses, in which case more forces would be required to sustain our troops.[34]

Marshall affirmed that the OVERLORD plan was based on contingencies, a condition the British needed to understand before acceptance. Polemics aside, it was Kuter who suggested a substantive arrangement for settling the seven division controversy.

> ...that the British would carry out OVERLORD if the proviso was put in 'CCS-303' – that future movements of forces from the Med would be

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[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*., p. 3.
[34] *Ibid.*

> subject to the approval of the CCS. This was about as firm an agreement as could be reached at this time.[35]

Marshall remained consistent to his need for planning, but he was concerned, as he had been over the TORCH decision, that Churchill and Roosevelt expected changes in plans to be made quickly and easily. Having little idea of how disruptive these changes could be, they were unappreciative of the far reaching results of change. True to his respect for civilian-military relations, he concluded that if the President and the Prime Minister decided on a Mediterranean strategy, he wished to receive a firm decision to that effect, so that definite plans could be made with reasonable expectation of their being carried out.[36] However, if Roosevelt needed an operation that would help him win political re-election in 1944, OVERLORD would be the operation of choice; there was not an operation in the Mediterranean that could match it for sheer drama, scope or decisive results.[37]

POINTBLANK conversations continued; an operation related to the European air war, it was one of the topics under discussion when the conference continued on 16 August. Best Joint Intelligence Committee estimates revealed that German morale has been seriously affected, casualties were heavy and great destruction of factories and private dwellings had occurred. Estimates indicated that some 422,000 workers were rendered homeless and an additional 1.8 million people had suffered damage to their homes, which was irreparable, since the necessary consumer goods to replace those destroyed were unavailable. Further, the bombing had affected the outlook of the population with regard to the regime, the war effort as a whole and the willingness to hold out. The estimate warned that unrelenting pressure had to be maintained to insure victory in the autumn. If this were not done, Germany, by a conservation of its strength and by the development of new defensive measures, might be in an unassailable position by spring.[38] Arnold added his own cautionary note to the intelligence findings:

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[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[37] J. Grigg, *Op. cit.*, p. 105.
[38] CCS 109 Meeting. QUADRANT Conference.Washington, 16 Aug. 1943. Reel IV.

> ...the losses suffered in the Ploesti raid were, of the one hundred seventy eight planes dispatched, fifty four, including fifty one crews, had been lost...the results had been excellent: of nine targets hit, five had been totally destroyed...It might be impossible to ask crews to sustain a loss of 33% in more than one operation.[39]

Great emphasis had been placed on air bombardment before the war as the economical and direct means of destroying an enemy's ability to continue fighting, but Roosevelt, like Portal, had lost faith in it.[40] Marshall and his adherents recognized that only OVERLORD, assisted by air, could actually do the job of defeating Germany, although he had diverted half of the available manpower to the AAF and weakened the Army. The Americans played their Pacific threat card *ad nauseam*, warning that if OVERLORD were reduced to a subsidiary operation, it could lead to a possible reorientation of their efforts.[41] Therefore, they sought acceptance of the TRIDENT proposals without British qualifications and reservations. The JCS introduced a new word, 'indirection', at their meeting of 16 August, to underline COS intractability, i.e., the British approach to OVERLORD was by indirection; attacking the enemy via Italy was by indirection, or a possible movement into southern France through the north of Italy and the Alps, discounted by the JCS as slow and ineffective.[42] Marshall recounted how Churchill felt differently now towards OVERLORD, proclaiming at dinner the night before, that every effort should be made to further it. Although Marshall proposed that the Prime Minister's inhibiting conditions remained unchanged, that of bolstering forces in Italy at OVERLORD's expense, Churchill responded, 'Give us time'. Marshall had informed Dill that the TRIDENT agreement needed to be fulfilled, that sudden changes in Churchill's plans after their meeting with Eisenhower in Algiers had resulted in convoys being diverted and 60,000 troops added to Eisenhower's forces, to accomplish those sudden changes. This was a condition the JCS would stand no longer, no further circumlocution, no further 'sucking in', resulting in the hand to mouth handling of

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[39] *Ibid.*, 'Arnold Report', p. 3.
[40] N. Parrish, *Behind the Sheltering Bomb*, (New York, 1979), p. 18.
[41] CCS 108 Meeting, *Op. cit.*
[42] JCS 105 Meeting, QUADRANT Conference, Washington, 16 Aug.1943, Reel II.

logistics. As Marshall saw it, Germany's only hope was either to divide, delay or play for an adjusted peace, but the Americans were going on the offensive.[43]

The COS had accepted the viability of OVERLORD in 1944, but found the American insistence of giving it overall priority too restrictive. Seeking to soften the American position with qualifiers, Brooke evoked a strong JCS response. His 'qualifiers' were seen as a British excuse to press for further Mediterranean operations or as a defence against being accused of breaking faith with their agreements. Aware that past British 'agreements in principle' ended up being little more than debating devices, led Marshall and his colleagues to seek a final showdown with the British team.[44] Churchill had arrived on the fourteenth; on the seventeenth Roosevelt and Hopkins arrived, soon followed by Eden. Although the President supported OVERLORD, the JCS, prior to his arrival, realized that after three days of intense debate, a compromise was developing in which the 'overriding priority' for the operation would be lessened.[45]

The CCS morning meeting on the nineteenth became so heated between the British and American delegations, between Marshall and Brooke, that half way through it, Brooke asked to go 'off the record' in an attempt to reconcile the Anglo-American differences. The room was cleared of the sixty odd administrative officers, an indication that the staff limits recommended at the beginning of the conference had been ignored.

> Our talk was pretty frank. I opened by telling them that the root of the matter was that we were not trusting one another. They doubted our real intentions to put our full hearts into the cross-Channel operations next spring, and we had not full confidence that they would not in future insist on our carrying out previous agreements irrespective of changed strategic conditions.[46]

According to the Americans, the British failed to realize the unprecedented complexity involved in properly arming and equipping forces that had to be carried thousands of

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[44] Gen. Sir W. Jackson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 104-105.
[45] CCS 110 Meeting, QUADRANT Conference, 'CCS 303/3: Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe',Washington, 17 Aug. 1943, Reel IV.
[46] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/IX, 19 Aug. 1943, pp. 439-433.

miles to the theaters in which they would operate. Improvisation, though perhaps an attractive approach, could not take the place of timetables.

The seriousness of the meeting was lifted somewhat by the introduction of a minor subject by Mountbatten. HABBAKUK, the code-name defining a floating seadrome or giant aircraft carrier, invented by Geoffrey Pyke, a British scientist, and constructed of 'Pykrete', a material formed from a frozen mixture of diluted pulp and water. It was regarded as a Pacific project for the air bombardment of Japan by Arnold and Portal. Approached by Mountbatten, at the beginning of the session, Brooke, who considered HABAKKUK a folly, shouted, 'The hell with HABAKKUK, we are about to have the most difficult time with our American friends and shall not have time for your ice carriers.'[47]

When the session adjourned, Brooke, with Marshall's agreement, extended it, thereby allowing Mountbatten to perform his experiment. He aimed to fire his revolver twice into two separate cubes, one of ice and one of 'Pykrete', in order to demonstrate 'Pykrete's' excellent armor-plate characteristics. The Combined Chiefs gathered behind the him; Mountbatten fired. The first bullet shattered the ice, the second rebounded off the 'Pykrete' and buzzed angrily around their legs. Brooke told the following story:

> It will be remembered that when the original meeting had become too heated we had cleared the room of all the attending staff. They were waiting in an adjoining room and when the revolver shots were heard, the wag of the party shouted: 'Good Heavens, they have started shooting now!'[48]

Perhaps the above vignette is apocryphal. It has been elaborated upon by Churchill, Arnold, Leahy and King and reflects the need to relieve difficult negotiations with a dash of levity. Adding to the humor and sense of unreality was the CCS agreement reached in order to continue HABAKKUK's research, development and construction.[49]

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[47] *Ibid.*, 'Notes For My Memoirs', 2/XI, 19 Aug. 1943, pp. 7-8.
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

The Conception of the ANVIL Plan

Operation ANVIL, as part of Operation OVERLORD was originally conceived during the Conference and included in the Chiefs of Staff's 'Final Report', of 24 August 1943. It stipulated that,

> Offensive operations against southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces) should be undertaken to establish a lodgement in the Toulon-Marseilles area and to exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with Overlord. Air nourished guerrilla operations in the southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated....The necessary resources would be drawn from the Mediterranean theater. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two division assault needed be pressed forward as fast as possible; if the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.[50]

The Results of QUADRANT

At the end of the conference, the Combined Chiefs directed Eisenhower, serving as Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, to submit an outline plan for a possible operation in southern France.[51] Eisenhower's October report lacked enthusiasm, because there were not enough resources to launch a full scale attack. He reasoned that only one division, used as a feint, could be in the initial assault, because of a shortage of landing craft. Even concerted operations in Italy might prove more valuable to OVERLORD than ANVIL itself, the report continued, the landing at best being a small-scale operation.[52] Morgan disagreed, asserting that OVERLORD and ANVIL must take place simultaneously if two of the German mobile reserve divisions, stationed in southern France, were to be tied down by formations under Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) control. He opposed Eisenhower's recommendation that the operation should be considered only as one of several possibilities.[53] British experts at the Conference disagreed with Morgan and at the first plenary session on 19 August the

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[50] CCS 116 Meeting, 'CCS 319/5: Final Report to the President and Prime Minister', Washington, 24 Aug. 1943, Reel IV.
[51] '328/1: Directive to Gen. Eisenhower', Washington, 27 Aug. 1943 RG. 165 OPD.
[52] CAB 79 (COS) 43 273 Meeting, 8 Nov. 1943.
[53] J. Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, V, (London, 1956), p. 9.

CCS presented the results of five days of continuous discussion to the President and Prime Minister:

> OVERLORD – target date, 1 May 1944, to land in France and strike at the heart of Germany and destroy her forces. Between OVERLORD and Mediterranean operations, the sharing of scarce resources to be distributed and employed to insure the former's success.
>
> Consideration of a northern Norway landing, (Operation JUPITER), only if OVERLORD is rendered impossible. Unremitting pressure on the German forces in Italy. southern France – a diversion and lodgment between Toulon and Marseilles, in conjunction with OVERLORD, with exploitation northwards. Air-nourished guerrilla warfare in southern France. Balkan operations limited to supply, special operations and bombing of strategic objectives.[54]

The Landing Craft Problem

Churchill and Roosevelt accepted the paper with reservations related to OVERLORD.[55] During the second plenary session on the twenty-third, the Prime Minister, favoring the OVERLORD concept for 1944, but fearful of excessive casualties, requested that a rule be applied, as prepared by Morgan, that if there were more than twelve mobile German divisions in France at the intended moment of the Allied landing, the landing would be canceled. He also insisted that the assault force, including landing craft, to be increased by 25 percent and Allied fighter superiority achieved before the landing. The perennial landing craft problem persisted, the shortages of which limited all prospective operations, including the passage to Italy. The two sides also disagreed over landing craft procurement. The British desired a definite allocation per month or a percentage of monthly construction, while the Americans wanted to allocate them as needed for specific operations. The Americans, whose Navy controlled landing craft production and distribution, refused to give the British Navy a 'blank-check', particularly when it was using the craft for net protection at Scapa Flow.[56] Even though 204 Landing Craft Tank (LCT) and Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) were to be deployed against Germany by

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[54] Minutes. 1st Meeting, CCS, 'President and Prime Minister'. QUADRANT Conference. Washington, 19 Aug. 1943. Office of the CCS.
[55] 'CCS 319/5, 'Final Report. to the President and Prime Minister'. QUADRANT Conference. Washington, 24 Aug.. 1943. Reel IV.
[56] 'JCS 108 Meeting', *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

December 1943,[57] lacking was an oversight bilateral committee to reduce the incentive for deception and manipulation and to insure proper apportionment. Concurrently, the inevitable Italian collapse, accelerated by the surrender of Sicily on 17 August, lured Allied forces toward Italy, certainly as far as Churchill suggested, beyond Rome to the Ancona-Pisa line and the northern airfields.[58]

Brooke's Deliberations

Brooke felt the two teams had failed to arrive at the best strategy, but grew philosophical, concluding that when working with allies, compromises with all their evils became inevitable.[59] Compromises, however, need not be evil. They are not laws unto themselves. Most agreements are based on compromise, but when one side or another is forced to compromise to avoid stalemate, the result is less than even minimal expectations. Only the reduction of fixed positions can speed negotiations and only compliance can enforce an agreement. Once the latter goal is accomplished, no one need resort to subterfuge or act in a disingenuous manner, because the consequences are clearly marked. When this is not the case, penalties and sanctions can be applied without explanation and without warning, adding to further alienation and distrust. Unfortunately, almost all Allied agreements lacked this basic protection and could be broken with impunity, against which the aggrieved party would retaliate. During the two month period between TRIDENT and QUADRANT, the COS, their intentions dubious, unilaterally ordered the seven divisions reassigned to Britain to 'stand-fast', thus breaking the TRIDENT agreement. Being hoist with his own petard must have added to Brooke's desultory mood. Personally, he felt '...flat and depressed, weary of battling against difficulties, differences of opinion, stubbornness, stupidity, pettiness and pig-headedness.'[60] The Americans were satisfied with the results at Quebec: they were mastering the art of military diplomacy, the JCS had the support of the President

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[57] M. Matloff, *Op. cit.*, p. 398.
[58] Minutes, 2nd Meeting: CCS, President and Prime Minister, QUADRANT Conference, Washington, 23 Aug, 1943, Reel IV.
[59] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/IX, 23, Aug. 1943, p. 775.
[60] *Ibid.*, 'Notes On My Memoirs', *Op. cit.*, 24 Aug. 1943, pp. 8-10.

who backed his Chief of Staff, and the Mediterranean would become more integrated with OVERLORD as the major operation (in conjunction with the bomber offensive). and the COS disavowed interest in the Balkans. Marshall felt closer to his goal of fighting a war with a minimum of loss, expense and time, as British power and influence were waning. Therefore, Brooke would be denied the most coveted command of the war, OVERLORD. That operation would fall to an American. With his role unchanged, Brooke was faced with making the most of British assets; moreover, it would behoove him to negotiate on the merits of a specific issue in order to establish a greater role for strategic principles as pitted against the raw physical and economic power of the United States. Nevertheless, Brooke had succeeded in keeping the bomber offensive intact and operations in the Mediterranean alive with the forces allocated at TRIDENT, to be applied according to the decisions of the CCS. Although the Americans chose to place OVERLORD above Mediterranean operations with regard to scarce resources, Brooke had prevented this from occurring. Instead, the CCS agreed that available resources would be distributed and employed as the means of ensuring OVERLORD's success.[61] QUADRANT was a critical conference in the evolution of Anglo-American strategy in the war against Germany. If planning at Casablanca represented the beginning of coalition warfare's offensive phase, and TRIDENT the halfway mark, QUADRANT was the beginning of the end, even though negotiations at Quebec fell short of the final showdown desired by Marshall.[62] Moreover French forces needed to be integrated into overall Allied planning, but the resolution of that issue would have to wait for another conference.

JCS Formulation of Policy on Assumptions

Whether Brooke needed any further corroboration regarding the quality of American thought processes and negotiating procedures concerning the formulation of policy, the following is a partial description of JCS Meeting 109: General Whitely reported that it

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[61] 'Papers and Minutes', QUADRANT Conference, Washington, Aug. 1943, pp. 87, 227, 24, Reel IV.
[62] M. Matloff, *Op. cit.*, pp. 242-243.

was Eisenhower's intention prior to the receipt of any instructions resulting from QUADRANT to hit the Germans whenever and wherever possible. King believed that Eisenhower had never received final approval of AVALANCHE, the invasion of Italy, from the CCS. General Handy (Marshall's Chief of the Operations Planning Division) had the impression that Eisenhower would mount AVALANCHE on 9 September. The Secretary had information which stipulated that Eisenhower had never been specifically told to implement AVALANCHE. The CCS had notified Eisenhower that he should go as far north in Italy as land-based aviation would cover his operations. Rooks was under the impression that Eisenhower had never received any specific directive. King had understood that the CCS had never approved of Eisenhower's stated intentions. Arnold indicated it had never occurred to him that Eisenhower needed any further directives.[63] One senior British officer wrote of Anglo-American confusion and misperception this way:

> Some Americans are curiously liable to suspect that they are going to be 'outsmarted' by the subtle British – perhaps because we sometimes do such stupid things that they cannot take them at face value but suspect them of being part of some 'dark design'.[64]

While the JCS searched for an answer, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, General Walter B. Smith successfully concluded Italian armistice negotiations at Casibile, Sicily. The results of this truce would be simultaneously announced with AVALANCHE, on 9 September.

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[63] JCS 108 Meeting, *Op. cit.*, p. 5.
[64] AM Sir J. Slessor, *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections*, (London, 1956), p. 358.

CHAPTER SIX

TEHRAN: The Second Front, the French Resistance and the French Army.

This chapter explores the relationship between the two amphibious operations, the tangled web of political-military procedures between the British, the Americans and the French; Russian demands, the emergence and role of the French Resistance and the creation of an 'Americanized' French Army.

OVERLORD and ANVIL, projected amphibious landings for 1944, were considered as inter-dependent parts of the same operation, the hammer and the anvil that would crush the German Armies in western Europe. Their acceptance and activation, however, were dependent upon the attitudes and changeable moods of the major participants, particularly those of Roosevelt and Churchill. Stalin, by contrast, was completely and steadfastly set on the Anglo-Americans invading northern France. Churchill viewed further Mediterranean operations as a means of countering Russian advances into central Convinced that the OVERLORD strategy, while satisfying a political expedient, he feared the result in defeat.[1] Roosevelt, however, remained unwilling to accept any delay or postponement beyond May 1944 to fulfill his second front promise to Stalin. Mounting a threat against southern France was first mentioned, then shelved at the TRIDENT Conference in May of 1943. The idea was revived by Eden in Moscow and accepted as a landing at QUADRANT.

Between 1939 and 1941, as the United States moved from ambivalent neutrality toward active belligerency, American and British policies toward Vichy France diverged. This disunity aggravated already delicate negotiations – particularly affecting ANVIL and Resistance activities. The integration of the Resistance into Allied planning was

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[1] J. Harvey, (ed.), *The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937-1940.* (Eden's Secretary), (London. 1970), pp. 313-314; FO 371/370, 31 Oct. 1943; 20 Oct. 1943, PREM 3/172/5.

dependent upon the decisions reached by Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin at the Tehran EUREKA Conference of November 1943.

Stalin's unexpected enthusiasm for the southern France operation and pushing ahead the timing of OVERLORD, at the expense of the Italian campaign, exacerbated the already difficult Anglo-American strategic conflict. Immediately accepted by Roosevelt, reluctantly endorsed by Churchill, the second front was characterized by Stalin as a giant 'pincer', composed of simultaneous landings in Normandy (OVERLORD) and Provence (ANVIL), with ANVIL assigned the subordinate role.[2] The debarkation points of the 'pincer' would be 500 miles apart; and were, consequently, less like pincers than two separate fronts (with all that entailed). Marshal Voroshilov of Russia and Brooke considered them to be critically important military operations; he suggested that the landings entailed the technical problems that might be encountered with a 'river crossing'. Marshall disagreed and warned, 'The difference between a river crossing, however wide, and a landing from the ocean is that the failure of a river crossing is a reverse while the failure of a landing operation from the sea is a catastrophe.'[3]

Tactical and logistical failures during the Italian winter and spring campaigns of 1943-1944, e.g., the transfer preparations of seven divisions to Britain after the Sicilian campaign, the Rapido River fiasco and the attritional battles at Monte Cassino and Anzio, precluded the a cross-Channel attack on the prescribed date.[4] ANVIL, the adjunct, was also delayed, its purpose and landing site repeatedly contested. At times, the operation verged on being canceled entirely.[5]

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[2] R. Lewin, *Churchill as Warlord*, (New York, 1973).
[3] *The Documents of the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, (Moscow, 1969), pp. 23-25.
[4] Gen. F. Walker, *From Texas to Rome: A Gen.'s Journal*, (Dallas, 1969), pp. 288-290; B. Holden Reid, 'The Italian Campaign 1943-45: A Reappraisal of Allied Gen.ship', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 13 1, (1990), pp. 143-144.
[5] *The Documents of the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, Op. cit.*, p. 14.

Toward a EUREKA Agreement

At a pre-EUREKA meeting on 11 November, the COS proposed (and were supported Eisenhower) that it was vital to maintain the momentum in Italy, capture Rome and take the airfields to the north without exhausting Allied armies.[6] Unfortunately, over the next five months, this decision would result in the loss of 7,000 troops killed, 36,000 wounded or missing and another 44,000 hospitalized for various non-battle injuries and illness out of a total of 125,000 men who landed on the Anzio beachhead. The infantry suffered 80 percent of the casualties. Officer losses in the infantry battalions actually exceeded 100 percent.[7] In an aide mémoire, the COS stated,

> ...We must not regard OVERLORD on a fixed date as the pivot of our whole strategy on which all else turns...With the Germans in their present plight...we should stretch the German forces to the utmost by threatening as many of their vital interests and areas as possible and, holding them thus, we should attack wherever we can do so in superior force.[8]

Marshall was less enthusiastic and regarded this as a continuation of opportunistic British military policies in the Mediterranean. For him, OVERLORD was the decisive battle in support of the Russians, but he consented to defer further arguments until Russian needs were assessed at Tehran.[9] What the British sought was a postponement of OVERLORD for one to two months, the time it would take, they thought, for the Allied armies in Italy to reach the Pisa-Rimini line north of Rome.[10] Once the Pisa-Rimini line was reached, Allied forces would, it was assumed, be poised to attack toward Trieste, Austria, the Balkans or France.

Conceding nothing to their two partners, the British knew that if this tactical move succeeded within the time allotted, the strategic importance to OVERLORD's launching would be invaluable. Rome's capture would be an added prize, a title deed to Italy, and a crowning public relations success in its own right. Stalin, concerned about the

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[6] 'Eisenhower to CCS', Washington, 24 Oct. 1943, RG. 165 NAF 486 WD Cable log.
[7] C. d'Este, *The Fatal Decision*, (New York, 1991), p. 413 .
[8] J. Ehrman, (ed.) *Grand Strategy*, V, (London, 1956), pp. 109-111.
[9] CCS 131 Meeting, Washington, 26 Nov. 1943, Reel IV.
[10] COS (43)(0), 'CCS 409: 'OVERLORD and the Mediterranean', EUREKA Conference., Washington, 25 Nov. 1943, Reel IV.

dispersal of Anglo-American forces, favored going onto the defensive in Italy and was willing to defer the capture of Rome. Instead, he concentrated on the landing in southern France; and catching the Anglo-Americans by surprise, he brushed aside any suggestion of operations in the Balkans.[11] Stalin boldly proposed that divisions in Italy be moved to facilitate ANVIL and endorsed Marshall's idea that ANVIL precede OVERLORD by two or three weeks. Stalin argued against a dispersal of forces, advancing OVERLORD as the basic operation for 1944 and suggested that once Rome fell, all available forces in Italy be sent to southern France. These forces would then fuse with OVERLORD after the invasion, in what was considered to be the weakest spot on the German front, France. He declared that his armies would synchronize their attacks to coincide with those of the invasion forces and submitted that OVERLORD and ANVIL be launched no later than 31 May. OVERLORD, Stalin asserted, ought to be a maximum effort, and ANVIL a two divisional one.[12]

Churchill, no longer the dominant partner, appalled that he could not count on Roosevelt's support, fought on with undiminished vigor for Operation ACCOLADE: capturing Rhodes, taking the Dodecanese, bringing Turkey into the war and opening a passage to the Russian Black Sea ports. However, Roosevelt refused to accede to any change that would prejudice OVERLORD or jeopardize operations in Italy. Eisenhower and Wilson (General Henry Maitland Wilson then C-in-C Middle East), meeting on 11 October 1943 at La Marsa, Tunis, concluded that ACCOLADE should be postponed for similar, but more detailed reasons.[13] Moreover, to further the success of the French landings, the Allies proposed that all future plans for operations in the eastern Mediterranean should be suspended, and major resources be allocated to the two assaults or to the campaign in Italy. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander Mediterranean, by arrangement with the CCS, was directed to redistribute the assault shipping between OVERLORD and ANVIL. The conferees recognized that the very

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[11] *The Documents of the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, Op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.
[12] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, pp. 55-58.
[13] 'Aegean Operations', 5-15 Oct. 1943, Map Room Papers 310, FDRL.

existence and magnitude of the operation was dependent upon the availability of landing craft and shipping.[14]

The Americans favored ANVIL for various reasons:

1.) Roosevelt's promise to Stalin.

2.) After Operation TORCH, the Americans had diverted precious equipment from their own units to reorganise and rearm the French Army.

3.) American planners believed that the reconstituted French divisions could play an integral role in the new front in southern France.

4.) the operation was essential to protect OVERLORD's southern flank once German resistance in Normandy collapsed.

5.) By joining ANVIL to OVERLORD would effectively trap enemy formations to the south and west of the Loire River, thus allowing greater French participation in their country's liberation.[15]

With the ANVIL and OVERLORD forces linking up for an advance against the whole length of the Rhine, the greatest concentration of troops would form on a line between Switzerland and the North Sea; from which they could quickly break into the heart of Germany and meet the Red Army advancing from the East.[16] The ANVIL plan of 1943 may have been instrumental in Eisenhower's controversial choice of a 'broad' over a 'narrow' front concept in the fall of 1944. This was a choice which General Bernard Montgomery, Commander of the British 21st Army Group, and others strongly disputed. The CCS closed the conference with an unequivocal statement of intent: 'OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations'.[17]

By reaching consensus, the Allies agreed that,

Within the limits of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces everywhere within enemy occupied territory in Europe, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence and guerrilla warfare.[18]

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[14] M. Stoler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 143-154.
[15] R. Weigley, *Op. cit.*, p. 330.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 330.
[17] 'CCS 426/1: Report to the President and Prime Minister', p. 301, 6 Dec. 1943, Reel IV.
[18] 'CCS 398 Minutes and Papers', EUREKA Conference, 18 Nov. 1943, p. 77, Reel IV.

Anglo-American and Free French political-military leaders had defined and interpreted the Resistance according to their own needs and purposes, and as a result, the Resistance suffered. Moreover, Anglo-American planners viewed it with limited expectations and placed it in 'quarantine'.

During 1938, in the wake of the Munich Conference, Roosevelt originated and followed a bifurcated foreign policy: first, appeasement over trade, planned to coincide with Prime Minister Chamberlain's attempts to placate Hitler and then, economic deterrence mobilized in support of the British and French.[19] Rather than assuming an active role in Anglo-French war plans, Roosevelt envisaged the United States as an arsenal of democracy. If war came, the United States would produce the arms for Britain and France that would contribute to a quick German defeat – a maximum benefit to the American economy at a minimum cost in American lives.[20] Throughout 1940, Roosevelt chose to await the turn of events, defined as *attentisme*, i.e., waiting to see if Britain would survive the summer, waiting to test a change in American political opinion in the November elections and awaiting the political and economic ramifications of the events in France after the Armistice.[21] Britain expected and the United States assumed that France would survive and repel any German attack upon its territory. Even when the French collapsed in June 1940, Roosevelt clung to his foreign policy. However, American public reaction to the French debacle was severe, and Roosevelt was accused by Governor Harold Stassen of Minnesota of being,

> ...too neutral...of having 'aided the manufacture of implements of destruction' that Russia used upon Finland, that Germany uses against the Allies, that Japan uses against China, that Italy uses against France. How belated is our now exclusive assistance to the Allies.[22]

Anthony Biddle, former American ambassador to Poland, eventually politically neutralized by Roosevelt, stressed 'moral factors', 'a nation gone soft', 'a bankruptcy

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[19] C. MacDonald, 'Deterrent Diplomacy: Roosevelt and the Containment of Germany, 1938-1940', R. Boyce and E. Robertson, (eds.), *Paths to War*, (New York, 1989), p. 300.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 323.
[21] J. Hurstfield, *America and the French Nation, 1939-1945*, (Chapel Hill, NC, 1986), p. 13.
[22] 'Governor Stassen Attacks the President', *PM*, 25 June, (New York, 1940).

of leadership', as the reasons for the demise of France.[23] Robert Murphy, First Secretary at the American embassy in Paris, soon to express bias against de Gaulle, entitled a chapter in his memoirs, 'Frenchmen Expect the Worst and Get It'.[24]

Marshal Pétain's Vichy government was seen as an arena representing various political groups fighting for pre-eminence, through which Roosevelt hoped to influence French policy. The President assured Leahy, the newly appointed US Ambassador to Vichy, in December 1940, that since the French people and its government approved of the Marshal, continued American recognition of the Vichy government presented no immediate problems.[25] Roosevelt wrote, 'Certainly the rulers at Vichy desired closer relations with the United States. As a source of material supply, as a prop to Vichy's legitimacy, as an arbiter in the desired compromise peace, the United States could exert an altogether welcome influence.'[26]

As a result of national experiences and perceptions, British and American policies were in opposition. Britain moved across a series of positions from its wartime alliance with the Third Republic: it had proposed political unification, experienced the French defeat, ended Anglo-Vichy relations, blockaded French Morocco, destroyed portions of the French fleet, opposed American economic aid (oil) to North Africa and (wheat) to Unoccupied (Vichy) France, and offered support to the alternative, rival Free French movement of General Charles de Gaulle. The United States, in contrast, shifted from providing moral and material aid to the Third Republic to economic aid to North Africa and recognition of the Vichy regime.

De Gaulle, Anathema to Roosevelt, a 'Cross of Lorraine' to Churchill

When de Gaulle failed to wrest the west African seaport of Dakar, presumed to be vital to American hemispheric and maritime defence, from Vichy, on 23 September 1940,

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[23] Biddle to FDR, 1 July 1940, PSF 39, FDRL.
[24] R. Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, (New York, 1964), Ch. 3.
[25] FDR to Leahy, Washington , 20 Dec. 1940, *Op. cit.*, FRUS, *Washington and Casablanca*, 2:425.
[26] J. Hurstfield, *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

the American administration dismissed him as an incompetent adventurer.[27] Roosevelt's opinion of and animosity toward de Gaulle stemmed from this period and never wavered. The President's policy supported Vichy sovereignty in North Africa, appeased her colonial administrators, disregarded Vichy threats leveled at British and Gaullist forces and sought entrance into French mainland and colonial markets. Roosevelt believed that his policy would protect American hemispheric interests and lead to the liberation of French North Africa. Once a bridgehead was established there, the liberation of metropolitan France would follow.

As long as Roosevelt could ensure that his policies would win the war in the shortest possible time, the public, poorly informed and plainly disinterested, was tolerant if not complacent. This kind of isolationism, defined as an attachment to a particular form of strategy, independent, expedient and short-term, appealed to the American public.[28] For that reason, having little idea of the issues, the public was prepared to endorse the government's various dealings with Pétain in 1940, Darlan, momentarily, in 1942, Giraud in 1943 and finally de Gaulle in 1944, all on the same principle of expediency, called for by American strategic requirements.[29]

Defending de Gaulle and depending upon American arms were two of the most convoluted and conflicting issues that Churchill faced. In 1942, Hull threatened him with cancellation of Britain's Lend-Lease arrangements if he did not smother his condemnation of American economic support for Vichy.[30] Although he described himself to Roosevelt as his ardent and active lieutenant, Churchill, by defending de Gaulle, risked the President's disapproval. Churchill and de Gaulle suffered from being the dependent partner in a combination of relationships, i.e., Roosevelt-Churchill, Roosevelt-de Gaulle and Churchill-de Gaulle. Keith Sainsbury described the result of such an arrangement, '...a relationship in which one side is so much

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[27] *Op. cit.*, FRUS, pp. 418-419, 579-87.
[28] J. Hurstfeld, *Op. cit.*, pp. 231-233.
[29] Gallup Polls of 10 May, 2 July, 23 Oct., 6 Dec. 1940, 16 Dec. 1942, 11 July 1943, 24 Apr. 1944, FDRL.
[30] R. Thomas, *Britain and Vichy: The Dilemma of Anglo-French Relations, 1940-1942*, (London, 1979), p. 110.

weaker than the other, and almost totally dependent, is bound to lead to an element of patronage in one partner, and to induce resentment in the other.'[31]

The seizure of St. Pierre and Miquelon, Vichy-held islands off the East coast of Canada, by de Gaulle's Free French forces, in breach of American Vichy policy and hemispheric obligations, threatened Churchill's defence of de Gaulle whose actions had created a diplomatic storm in Washington. Hull complained to Roosevelt that, '...according to my information and that of my associates, some 95 percent of the entire French people are anti-Hitler whereas more than 95 percent of this latter number are not Gaullists and would not follow him.'[32] Colonel William Donovan, head of the OSS, expressed concern over, '...the deplorable condition of the whole Free French movement in this country and [suggested that they] inquire into the advisability of possibility of getting out of France some leader, perhaps like Herriot...'[33]

Churchill's ambivalence toward de Gaulle increased, because of his difficult personality: While on a 1941 inspection tour of various Free French outposts, de Gaulle had taken the occasion to publicize his disagreements with the British, leaving, as Churchill commented, a 'trail of Anglophobia behind him.'[34] The Prime Minister thought that he '...had clearly gone off his head. This would be a very good riddance and will simplify our future course.'[35] While de Gaulle later placated Churchill, the advantages of personal 'court diplomacy', elements such as discretion, flexibility and independence of bureaucratic machinery, that they could have shared, were lost to both men in such rancorous episodes. Desmond Morton, Churchill's Downing Street aide, commented that, de Gaulle '...was anti-British, anti-democratic, vain and disloyal to Winston personally.'[36] Nevertheless, a bond between the Prime Minister and de Gaulle

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[31] K. Sainsbury, *Churchill and Roosevelt at War*, (London, 1994), p. 117.
[32] Hull to Roosevelt, FRUS, *Op. cit.*, 2 382. .
[33] Donovan to FDR, *Ibid.*, 2 404.
[34] Churchill Interview with de Gaulle, PREM 3 120/2, 12 Sept. 1941.
[35] Churchill to Eden, *Ibid.*, 3 120/5, 27 Aug.1941.
[36] 'Morton Minute',*Ibid.*, 3 120/10A 6 Jan. 1942.

was formed. Never an alliance, it was a sustained resistance to Hitler and Vichy from which the Free French would seek American aid for its salvation.[37]

Conflicting reports emanated from Vichy indicating that the Resistance and Gaullism were making inroads on a French public that was becoming increasingly disenchanted with Pétain. Leahy disagreed in a letter sent to Roosevelt on 28 July 1941:

> Even those Frenchmen who were noted for their British sympathies had little regard for de Gaulle...The radical de Gaullists whom I have met do not seem to have the stability, intelligence and popular standing in their communities that should be necessary to success in their announced purpose.[38]

The November 1942 Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, and the total German occupation of France in response diminished Vichy's creditability as a state entity. America's misguided choice of the faltering Giraud, the public outcry over Eisenhower's political arrangements with Darlan for a cease-fire and Darlan's subsequent assassination in Algiers, all contributed to the demise of the American Vichy policy. Lord Halifax, a keen observer of the American scene wrote:

> ... the effect of public opinion on the US national policy is worth noting: the initial flurry and public uneasiness over the Darlan deal....worried key official of the State Department sufficiently to make them desperately anxious to avoid a similar nightmare over Italy...Public opinion is in a very fluid state...The opposite seems true of the State Department, whose policy towards, e.g., the problems of French politics underwent no more than the minimum change necessitated by the march of events. Elasticity is not among the virtues of the molders of day to day foreign policy of the USA....[39]

Upholding the State Department's inelastic thinking, Leahy wrote in his diary that, 'If we the Allies succeed in crushing Germany, Admiral Darlan will join the centuries old galaxy of heroes of French history.'[40] As the attraction to Vichy ebbed, Hull favored working with weak local colonial French authorities and was against the establishment of a supreme political power, such as a provisional government. The British took the opposite view, preferring to deal with a single French authority. By 1943, de Gaulle,

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[37] FO 371/28545, from C-in-C ME to WO 88526, 4 Aug. 1941.
[38] Adm. W. Leahy, *I Was There*, (New York, 1950), pp. 534-536.
[39] CAB 122/103 Lord Halifax, FO Despatch 715 from JSM 29 Sept. 1943 '(2nd) Quarterly Report', 1943, *Foreign Affairs*, p. 4.
[40] Adm. W. Leahy, 'Admiral Darlan', 25 Dec. 1942, *William D. Leahy Diary and Papers*, Washington, Library of Congress.

supported by French public opinion that repudiated Vichy and mistrusted Giraud, consolidated his control over the French Forces of Liberation, the North African Army and the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL), a broad association of colonial forces, underground and resistance elements, political parties and trade unions. Churchill and Eden fought for recognition of the French National Committee, preferring to negotiate with it than de Gaulle alone. Roosevelt refused; he would go as far as limited-acceptance, because recognition implied that the Committee was the government of France.

Meanwhile, the President gave 'autocratic instructions' to the FNCL through Eisenhower that included the banning of further FNCL meetings and the retaining of Vichy Governor-General Pierre Boisson at Dakar, a doubtful and hesitating figure, who hated de Gaulle. Eisenhower considered some of the President's instructions politically de-stabilizing, more than the settlements concluded by de Gaulle and Giraud.[41] Despite French political trends expressing approval of the FNCL, Roosevelt insisted that, 'the constitution and government to be established for France must be determined by the French people after they shall have been afforded an opportunity freely to express themselves'.[42] Churchill, as usual, remained fiercely loyal to the President, and reported Macmillan's assessment of Eisenhower's wish to accept tentatively the FNCL. Roosevelt confronted Eisenhower by letter and sent Churchill a copy:

> Following is paraphrase of message I have sent to Eisenhower and Murphy: 'From London it is reported that recognition of the French Committee is being considered by you and Murphy. You are not to recognize the committee under any condition without full consultation and approval of the President. Of course it will be necessary to have joint action by British and US.'[43]

Eisenhower was perplexed by Roosevelt's directive, because he had never considered exceeding the bounds of his official brief. Churchill thought Eisenhower's deliberations disloyal, but separate British and American statements, expressing

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[41] Macmillan to Churchill, PREM 3, 181/7, 2 June 1943.
[42] W. Kimball, *Op. cit.*, II, Roosevelt to Churchill, 20 July 1943, pp. 337-340.
[43] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 311-312.

varying degrees of 'recognition' of the FCNL were published on 27 August.[44] Much time had been lost due to the previous political wrangling, a diversion that delayed the harnessing, organizing and activating of French military power, of which the Resistance was a part. Roosevelt's aversion for and Churchill's malevolence towards de Gaulle had stalled an agreement needed months before. For Roosevelt, faced with the dilemma of having publicly committed to Giraud, considered his removal as an embarrassment and an insult and abhorred having to share military secrets with the FCNL. According to Roosevelt's son, Elliot, the President insisted that de Gaulle was out to achieve one-man government in France. He distrusted him more than anyone, regarding his whole Free French movement as honeycombed with police spies and agents spying on the French general's own people. Leahy went as far as to described him as 'a dirty dog'. Roosevelt believed that de Gaulle's sense of freedom of speech meant freedom from criticism of him.[45] By writing letters in which these sentiments were expressed, the President stated that, 'I am fed up with de Gaulle...there is not the possibility of our working with de Gaulle...I agree with you that he would double-cross us at the first opportunity...I agree with you that the time has arrived when we must break with him.[46]...he is animated by dictatorial instincts and consumed by personal ambition...he shows many symptoms of a budding Führer'.[47]

Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill appreciated the histrionics; and both failed to understand de Gaulle's perception of his position and his circumstances. These were manifested by the French general's different modes of behavior, conduct and expression, which verged on the unacceptable in an Anglo-Saxon political environment. Without any real visible means of support with which to carry on the war, all that remained for de Gaulle was Gallic 'passion', considered an aberration in Anglo-American political-military traditions. The word 'passion' was an apt description and concordant with the mood of a volatile people. One of passion's major

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[44] FRUS, *Washington and Quebec*, 'Recognition and Acceptance of the FNCL', 27 Aug. 1943, pp. 1170-1171; A. Chandler, *Op. cit.*, 2, p. 1273; Churchill to Macmillan, 23 June 1943, *Op. cit.*
[45] E. Roosevelt, *Op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.
[46] W. Kimball, *Op. cit.*, Roosevelt to Churchill, 17 June 1943, p. 255.
[47] CAB 65/35 WM(43)99 14 July 1943.

ingredients is a romantic nationalism regarding one's own country, and in pursuit of its *gloire*, *défense* or *libération*: In late 1942, de Gaulle spoke to the French nation from London,

> ...Our Algeria, our Morocco, our Tunisia are to serve as a starting point for the liberation of France...Join our allies without reservation. Fighting France adjures you to do so. Don't worry about names and formulas. Only one thing counts: The salvation of the Motherland...thanks to France the war will be won.[48]

Passion was expressed by guile, tact, charm, temper, flattery, sulks and arrogance. De Gaulle fought tenaciously for French interests to such an extent that British and American commanders, as members of a profession requiring order and discipline, found him almost intolerable. Politicians and serving officers alike, with the possible exception of Eden, did not fully appreciate that the French general was fighting in a foreign political climate that reduced him to rage, despair, impotence, dissent and insubordination. Behaving like a *prima donna* was more prevalent and acceptable in the French Army. In the British and American Armies such behavior, while not unheard of, was considered less acceptable. Generals Patton, MacArthur and Montgomery were the obvious exceptions. In the beginning, distracted and distraught over the loss of mainland France, de Gaulle was not thought of as the champion of national honor. To the contrary, not only was he considered a dangerous irrelevance by Roosevelt, but Pétain and Wegand considered him to be disobedient and a tool of the British. De Gaulle suffered from the French surrender as did General LeClerc, with *une rage au coeur*, a passion that totally possessed him.[49] De Gaulle could wound with icy courtesy, as he did Churchill, by refusing to meet him in Algiers in 1944.[50] Although de Gaulle knew that Roosevelt was personally hostile toward him, the Frenchman had to come to terms with the President, because he held the key to French rearmament.

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[48] Gen. C. de Gaulle, *Op. cit., L'Unité*, p. 393.
[49] A. Clayton, *Three Marshals of France*, (London, 1992), pp. 2-7.
[50] PREM 3 121/3 Algiers 1436 12 Aug. 1944.

Creation of SOE

Distinct from Allied top-level diplomatic in-fighting, Churchill, upon becoming Prime Minister, directed his government to explore ways of disrupting the Nazi occupation on the European continent. Special Operations Executive (SOE), placed directly under Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare (MEW), became the agency created to conduct 'irregular warfare'. It was ironic that Chamberlain, as one of his final governmental functions, signed the paper on 19 July 1940 that created SOE. Three months later, the COS accepted the government's proposals for its creation.[51] Nothing in the inter-war years necessitated the establishment of either a British irregular warfare agency or a French chain of resistance, because neither government remotely contemplated the alacrity of the French defeat in June 1940 and its aftermath. That was beyond their comprehension and foreign to their expectations. Rather, in late August 1939, the French C-in-C, General Maurice Gamelin, expressed the view, prevalent on both sides of the Channel, that, 'Hitler will collapse the day war is declared on Germany...the German Army will be forced to march on Berlin to suppress the trouble that will immediately break out'.[52]

When France collapsed instead, time was needed to absorb the shock of being driven from the continent, to redirect British strategy, to assess the demands of clandestine warfare and to build the appropriate structures through which German occupied Europe would be attacked. Unfortunately time with which to find, train and direct the agents needed to punish the Germans, as part of an overall strategy, was in short supply. Even the Americans, enjoying the advantage of two years of graduated belligerency before Pearl Harbor, failed to properly utilize the time to establish an organization comparable to SOE. Lord Selborne (who replaced Dalton as Minister of Economic Warfare) later summarized the position facing Britain at this time. 'Underground

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[51] M. Foot, *SOE, The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946*, (London, 1984), pp. 19-21; 'Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy', Gen. Directive from the COS, 25 Nov. 1940, COS (40) 27 (0), CAB 80/56, CAB 65/14; CAB 65/8 WM (40) 209, 22 July, 1940.

[52] N. Bethell, *The War Hitler Won*, (London, 1972), pp. 5-6.

warfare was an unknown art in England in 1940; there were no text-books for newcomers, no old hands to initiate them into the experiences of the last war; lessons had to be learned in the hard school of practice'.[53] At its inception, SOE was described as 'no more than a hopeful improvisation devised in a really desperate situation.' [54]

British Government Reorganization

On 27 May some government agencies in Whitehall were reorganized. Secondary sections of the British War Office and Secret Service were consolidated and ultimately led to the formation of SOE. It was established to maintain contact with resistance groups in France through its own circuits. These circuits consisted of an organizer, his lieutenant and a wireless operator. All were infiltrated into France to train, supply and direct saboteurs recruited locally. In addition to the non-Gaullist F-Section, a Gaullist RF-Section was established to co-operate with the de Gaulle's *Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action [Militaire]* (BCRA). Moreover, under London's direction, both were to assist the French Resistance conducting operations against specific enemy targets, in conformity with the plans of the COS.[55] General Colin Gubbins, an early participant and later the leader of SOE, stated: 'Thus from the very moment of the fall of France and the commencement of total warfare against Germany, British officers and others, after due training, were parachuted into occupied territories to start the organization of resistance.'[56]

What Churchill said to his critics of the Anglo-French Alliance on 24 March 1939, still applied, 'But I can assure you in the pass to which things have come, we stand at least as much in need of the aid of France as the French do of the aid of Britain.'[57] Since

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[53] Lord Selborne, 'SOE Assistance to OVERLORD', 13 Oct 1944, WP(44) 570, CAB 66/56.
[54] B. Sweet-Escott, 'SOE in the Balkans', P. Auty & R. Clogg, (eds.), *British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece*, (London, 1975), p. 5.
[55] OSS/London, p. 12, Reel I.
[56] Gen. Sir C. Gubbins, 'Resistance Movements In The War', *JRUSSI*, (3 May 1948), pp. 213.
[57] R. James, (ed.), *Op. cit.*, p. 6125; Churchill to Roosevelt, PREM 3: 181/10, , 30 Jan. 1944.

'Republican' France no longer existed, all Dalton and the SOE could do was to try to subvert the German occupation of Europe, under Churchill's supervision.[58]

However, a fundamental consideration to the success of an undertaking of this magnitude was the state and condition of the resistance elements following the crushing defeat of France. Expectantly, SOE agents, initially drawn from the three military branches, from public schools and universities, the City and from industry, were trained in clandestine operations.[59] Whether acting singly or through networks, they represented an anti-Fascist 'fifth column', using various methods of subversion within the defeated countries and arms supplied by Britain, they would disrupt the German hegemony by fomenting economic discontent and indigenous revolt, e.g., industrial and military sabotage, labor agitation, strikes, propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots.[60] However, Dalton's view was that a left-wing political revolution by the industrial working classes lacked the practical precision needed to assist Britain in fighting the Germans. In addition, London based 'Governments in Exile', fearing retaliation and reprisals, opposed violent resistance, including assassination. Both views combined to limit prospective SOE activity in Occupied Europe.

'For the first two years of its existence, SOE was dependent upon the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) for its personnel, technical assistance and communications.'[61] The COS, acting on the 1942 recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee, directed that SIS be given priority over SOE in most of western European countries. With few planes and meager arms, SOE had little chance of seeing action.[62] Churchill wanted to aid the conquered people, to subvert the occupying power and to land an army of liberation at the appropriate. The ground troops would but come as policemen, to occupy, not to invade.[63] He believed that unlike the Great

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[58] 'SOE Charter', CAB 65/14; CAB 65/8 WM (40) 209, 22 July 1940.
[59] M. Foot, *Op. cit.*, pp. 46-48.
[60] Lord H. Dalton, *Memoirs 1931-1945; The Fateful Years*, 2, (London,1957), p. 368.
[61] D. Stafford, *British and European Resistance: 1940-1945*, (Oxford, 1983),, p. 38.
[62] CAB 84/85 JIC (42) 156 (0) 29 Apr. 1942.
[63] J. Moffat to J. Dunn, Washington, 16 July 1941, DF 740.0011, RG. 59.

War, The Second World War would be decided by an economic and psychological struggle rather than attritional warfare. The Future Operations Planning Section (FOPS) of the Joint Planning Staff cited in its report of 16 June 1941 that even with full American help, 'we cannot hope to defeat the existing German Army in the field and so open the road to Germany and victory.'[64] Doubting the British soldier's ability to prevail against his German adversary, a War Office report hypothesized how intricate those psychological factors were: 'Men may lose the will to fight while the means still exist, or resources may come to an end while courage is still high', if a nation is subverted.[65]

SOE was expected to play an every increasing role in European subversion and revolt. The original concept of partisan and guerrilla activity, as viewed by Dalton and integral to SOE's brief, was exchanged for indigenous secret armies and paramilitary organizations in support of an invasion.[66] The Resistance, which had begun subversive activities almost at the signing of the Franco-German armistice, had to be nourished, supplied and protected, if its morale were to be upheld. Late 1942 heralded two changes concerning France, the complete enemy occupation of the country by the Germans and the beginning of a London partnership between the American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) and SOE. The dissolution of the two French zones demanded that the disparate Resistance movements, in many respects operating independently and disconnected from each other, while representing the whole spectrum of political thought and aims, needed to be unified. Only one organization, the indigenous *Francs Tireurs et Partisans* (FTP), representing the Communist *Front National*, had operated across both zones. In the Occupied Zone, five major Resistance movements were active: *Ceux de la Libération*, *Ceux de la Résistance*, *Défense de la France*, *Libération-Nord* and *Organisation Civile et Militaire*. Resistance groups in southern France under such headings as Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie's *Libération* and Henri Frenay's *Combat* merged. These two organizations and the FTP united in March 1943 and

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[64] 'The Distant Future', CAB 79/12 JP(41) 444, 14 June 1941.
[65] 'Review of Future Strategy', WO, JP (41)144, 14 June 1941.
[66] *Dalton Diaries*, No. 4, 1941, 18/2 46.

established the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance* (MUR): the new umbrella organization recognized de Gaulle as head of the FCNL. In May 1943, Jean Moulin, de Gaulle's Resistance representative, who had worked tirelessly to establish the MUR, subsequently succeeded in forging *the Conseil National de la Résistance* (CNR), an all-encompassing Resistance organization composed of *resistants* from various backgrounds and professions, pledged to evict the enemy from France. Churchill and de Gaulle, on 27 October 1942, considered establishing an organization in France that would prepare the French people for a national revolt to conform with an Anglo-American invasion. Britain approved of the idea as long as SOE remained its responsible agency, allowed to contact Resistance organizers in France regardless of their political persuasion. Complications abounded: the FTP, which strode its own communist and military path, was suspicious of the military Resistance groups, such as the *Armée Secrète* (AS), de Gaulle's military wing, or the now defunct 100,000 strong Vichy Armistice Army, from which many soldiers formed a clandestine fraternity known as the 'Organization of Resistance of the Army' (ORA).[67] The FTP preferred the leadership and guidance of the Communist Party or the CNR within France, rather than the FCNL in Algiers, although both councils had declared de Gaulle as the sole leader of the French Resistance.[68] Contacts had been established early in the war between the Resistance in France and the BCRA, which tried to organize and co-ordinate clandestine activities against the Germans from London.

Contacts Between and the Proposed Merger of OSS and SOE

Even before the Americans entered the war, the Anglo-Americans were not idle. London-based OSS Special Operations (S0) and SOE, two of a number of Allied clandestine organizations, co-operated at the operational level. Sympathetic to Britain's plight, a small group of American secret agents, controlled from London, not Washington, assigned to the embassy in Vichy, operated throughout France during

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[67] J. Sweets, *The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944*, (De Kalb, IL, 1976), pp. 231-233.
[68] A. Funk, *Hidden Ally*, (New York, 1992), pp. 6-7.

1940-41. While avoiding direct contact between themselves and SOE agents in the field, the Americans sent their intelligence estimates to their controllers in London who shared them with the British. Since consultation between OSS and SOE was crucial to the operation, extended co-operation was sought.[69] Donovan and Sir Charles Hambro, his counterpart at SOE, signed an agreement, negotiated in London on 24 June 1942. The agreement specified 'world-wide spheres of influence', which automatically placed any future secret operations in western Europe under the control of SOE until OSS SO had achieved a level of independent operating fitness.[70] By 1943, SO operations were controlled by the European Theater US Army (ETOUSA), but by 11 November 1943 SO joined SOE under the control of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander (COSSAC),[71] because the two secret agencies were already collaborating with each other.[72] The British considered both organizations as a single subversive organization to assist a potential Allied invasion force, in spite of a JCS view to the contrary (the continuation of independent OSS operations controlled and directed by the Commanding General US Forces Europe). Even if assimilation appeared to be taken for granted in practice by both organizations since June of 1942, the JCS reserved judgment and failed to endorse a union until 1944. Washington's reluctance was in direct opposition to London's existing custom and practice, which pooled agents and resources. The JCS finally acceded to Eisenhower's recommendation that the *pro forma* integrative arrangement be allowed to stand.[73] The principle of joint administration, dual control and equal opportunity between the two clandestine groups superseded the 1942 agreement and fully merged SO with its British equivalent. The basic purpose remained the same, as detailed in a joint paper of 29 December 1943:

> To promote disaffection and if possible revolt or guerrilla warfare in all enemy and enemy occupied territories. To hamper the enemy's war effort by means of sabotage and subversive warfare in those areas and

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[69] OSS War Diary, 'Preamble to January 1944', p. xix., Reel I.
[70] *Ibid.*, pp. iii, xviii.
[71] *Ibid.*, Major Gen. R. Barker to COS ETOUSA, p. xiv
[72] *Ibid.*, COS paper COS (43) 603 (0).
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

> to combat enemy interests and fifth column activities by unacknowledgeable means.[74]

However, experiences in North Africa, Washington and London revealed that Allied personnel were not as co-operative as they might have been:

> In general SOE-OSS relations were a microcosm of the sense of historic antagonism which continued to exist along with the spirit of co-operation generated by the war so amply demonstrated in Anglo-American discussions about the future role of the British Empire in world affairs.[75]

Sir Robin Brook, who as liaison with OSS was responsible for western Europe SOE operations, concluded that co-operation at the operational level was tempered by friendship and mutual respect. Personnel of each agency planned and performed dangerous tasks together without any sense of antagonism.[76] However, at the command level, there seemed to be a remarkable lack of collaboration, interspersed with xenophobic outbursts and strong disagreements. When Eisenhower assumed command of SHAEF, which also served as the command structure for Allied ground forces in Europe, in January 1944, he inherited COSSAC's complexity of problems. These related to the preparations and plans for a full scale assault against the Continent of Europe. The problem of employing and controlling the French Resistance during the liberation of France was part of his inheritance.

Allied Planning and the French Resistance

Even in late 1943, COSSAC had expressed concern over a premature Maquis uprising based solely on rumor of an impending Allied invasion, the results of which would be disastrous.[77] Timing and politics aside, representatives of SOE and the British Army concluded that if a French general strike or an uprising were going to take place at all and succeed, it had to be done on a national scale, as part of Allied strategy.[78]

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[74] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[75] D. Stafford. *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-91.
[76] Interview with Sir R. Brook. London, 29 Mar. 1994.
[77] Lt. Gen. Sir F. Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, (New York, 1950), p. 102.
[78] 'Progress Report Operation OVERLORD'. Washington, 10 Sept. 1943. RG. 331 SHAEF G-3 file 322-7 II. Ops C.

Attempting to resolve the twin problems of resistance and civil affairs, Eisenhower, pressed for time and relying on COSSAC evaluations of the problem, requested and received from Roosevelt permission to deal informally with the FNCL, in the person of de Gaulle's military attaché, General François d'Astier de la Vigerie, Emmanuel's brother. Eisenhower, realizing that Resistance co-operation was necessary, tried resolve the muddle, by agreeing to rearm the Resistance with SHAEF assets, placing senior French officers on his staff as advisors and choosing General d'Astier as the Delegate of the FCNL responsible for all questions pertaining to all resistance action in France. Eisenhower also sought an arrangement that would utilize French divisions for the military occupation of France and in the ensuing battles on her territory, rather than employing Anglo-American divisions for occupational duty.[79]

While Eisenhower wrestled with these problems in London, two separate North African meetings, one between John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of State for War, and Henri Frenay and another between Churchill and Emmanuel d'Astier in January 1944, resulted in the same conclusion, i.e., that if the Allies were to obtain any benefit from the French Resistance the entire operation had to be co-ordinated with the Normandy invasion.[80] As soon as Churchill returned to London on 27 January 1944, he requested Lord Selborne, General E. E. Mockler-Ferryman, head of SOE and other important French and British representatives to attend an *ad hoc* meeting. Churchill may have hoped to force his ideas upon these men whom he could dominate, rather than risk open controversy with the Americans.[81]

Although the bombing of Germany was Churchill's ultimate priority, he insisted enough planes be diverted from Bomber Command to supply SOE supported Maquis in southern France, 20,000 of whom, between Geneva and Grenoble, were insufficiently armed. He refused to consider augmented assistance to other regions of France. By

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[79] D. Eisenhower, *Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945*, (New York, 1986), pp. 162-166.
[80] RG 165 OPD 336 France (Sec. III), Case 169, Washington, Jan. 1944, Kimball, *Op. cit.*, Churchill to Roosevelt, 30 Jan. 1944.
[81] A. Funk, 'Churchill, Eisenhower and the French Resistance', *Military Affairs*, XLV, 1, Feb. 1981, (1981), p. 30.

intensifying rearmament in the southeast, he might succeed in having ANVIL canceled. Therefore, Churchll promised unilaterally to double the aid to the Maquis in that region, a decision which so upset air drops in other areas, including Yugoslavia, that he was forced to relent, albeit reluctantly. In addition, Churchill agreed in March that greater priority would be given to the Resistance in northwestern France. Avoiding any mention of the 27 January meeting, in a letter to Roosevelt, he described Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie as the 'Scarlet Pimpernel' type, intrepid and resourceful.[82]

Concurrently, McCloy's summation of his meeting with Frenay, in which he wrote that, 'They [French Resistance] ought to be taken out of the OSS level and put on the basis of staff planning, and it should be done at once', was now in the hands of the JCS. They queried Eisenhower how his SHAEF Headquarters was related to the French Resistance.[83] Eisenhower requested SOE to formulate a response, not knowing that Churchill's subterfuge had already ordered a course of action for SOE and the Maquis. Eisenhower, briefed by SOE, replied: 'We have had contact in the past and are now continuing contact with and assisting French resistance groups through the French Committee of Action. Under my general supervision and direction is SOE/SO with whom we are working.'[84]

By 7 March 1944, Eisenhower ordered SHAEF to change the SOE/SO designation to Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ), as an indication that both secret bodies were now fully integrated and subject to the Supreme Commander's main and cover plans. There were two practical reasons for the change: the need for a common name and open mailing address and an obliteration of any reference to resistance groups in general as 'SOE controlled and supplied.'[85] By integrating, duplication of effort was avoided, competition in the field minimized and security increased.[86] The bonus of having friendly forces behind the enemy's lines was considered sufficiently likely and sufficiently valuable that extensive preparations were made to develop and control it.

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[82] *Ibid.*, p. 30; pp. 29-33; PREM 3 185/127, Jan. 1944.
[83] RG 165, OPD 336, *Op. cit.*
[84] RG 165, ABC 400.3295 Sec. 2A, Eisenhower to McCloy, Washington, 2 Aug. 1943.
[85] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, p. 4.
[86] *Ibid.*, 'Reasons for Integration', 7 Jan. 1944, 1, p. 11.

On 23 March SHAEF issued a directive to the newly designated SFHQ, the co-ordinating authority connected with sabotage and the organization of resistance groups, regarding their activities in western Europe and in support of OVERLORD.[87] The War Department inquired of Eisenhower on 30 April, 'if the Army needed continued and increased help from SO (OSS)?'[88] Eisenhower replied that, 'The OSS is definitely useful to the Army in this theater...There are highly important functions necessary to the success of the projected military operations which no agencies other than...OSS are prepared to fulfill.'[89]

Under SHAEF's direction, SFHQ controlled the activities of Resistance groups in occupied territory, co-ordinated with military forces, in support of a full scale invasion and sought to lower German military morale by sabotage.[90] Accounting for most foreseeable contingencies, such as an enemy withdrawal or an unconditional surrender, SHAEF had various instructions filed with the resistance through SFHQ. Contingency planning not withstanding, these possibilities smacked of earlier British wish-fulfillment and reality-avoidance, i.e., that Anglo-American air bombardment and naval blockade would so erode German morale and fighting power that an Allied invasion would become unnecessary.

SOE and OSS in North Africa had operated independently and co-operatively at the working level throughout the Mediterranean since November 1942. The SOE base, code-named MASSINGHAM, was headquartered near Algiers. One month before, Donovan and George Taylor of SOE met in Washington and decided that a common OSS/SOE establishment should be created. SOE Washington cabled SOE London with the agreed recommendations. Whether by accident or design, the notification was never circulated, while concurrently, a similar meeting had been held with top-level staff in London that came to the opposite conclusion. Donovan was furious, feeling he

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[87] RG. 331 SHAEF (44) 25, Operation Directive to SFHQ, Washington, 23 Mar. 1944, SHAEF G-3 File 322-8, Ops C.
[88] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*
[89] *Ibid.*, 'SHAEF Mes. S-51120', Washington, 2 May 1944, p. 20.
[90] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

had been double-crossed by SOE. The melee ended with SOE and OSS aborting the agreement and establishing two independent bureaus. with the attendant loss of efficiency and increased duplication, after the TORCH landings.[91]

At an Allied Force Headquarters meeting in January 1943. attended by Lt. Colonel Douglas Dodds-Parker, MASSINGHAM's newly appointed commander, Maj. General Colin Gubbins, executive director of SOE, Donovan, and Lt. Colonel William Eddy. head of OSS-Algiers, Eisenhower, AFHQ's commander, urged those present, as he symbolically entwined the fingers of both hands, to work even closer together.[92] This appeal for added co-operation was based on a CCS directive of December 1943. requiring Eisenhower to consolidate the two groups within a new single organization called Special Operations Mediterranean (SOM); the OSS tacitly declined to participate.[93] For reasons to be explained later, Eisenhower's sense of urgency for close co-operation with the secret services was not extended to the French.

To assist the projected Normandy invasion now under Eisenhower's command, a repetition of London's SOE/SO integration was finally accomplished in Algiers on 21 April, after a year's delay. Approved by SHAEF and in operation on 23 May. two weeks before D-Day, the newly created Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC), was detailed to organize resistance groups in southern France in support of OVERLORD.[94] For all practical purposes three colonels, assigned to SPOC, one American, British and French, acted in liaison to service the resistance in southern France in preparation for ANVIL, but the French were not permitted complete access prior to D-day. SPOC, its 'united group' known as the 'Operations Room', its four departments, French, Air, Jedburghs and OG's and Intelligence, linked to SHAEF through SFHQ in London. awaited instructions and orders. Supreme Allied Commander/Mediterranean passed control of these resistance groups on 21 May 1944 to SHAEF. Joseph Scribner. of OSS-Algiers, concerned about inter-allied competition

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[91] J. Beevor, *Recollections and Reflections. 1940-1945*. (London, 1981), pp. 84-85.
[92] Interview with Sir D. Dodds-Parker, London, 24 Mar. 1994.
[93] J. Beevor, *Op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.
[94] OSS War Diary. *Op. cit.*, 1., p. 28.

and the potential British domination of SPOC, viewed OSS participation as 'starting out behind the eight-ball; however, sufficiently intelligent [American] personnel in the 'Operations Room' ought to equalize our numerical disadvantage'.[95]

According to the German authorities, a 'terrorist' was defined as any person acting against the State alone or as a member of a French Resistance group. These groups, the Maquis, whose ranks were dramatically increased by young men openly evading the German imposed mandatory forced labor service, the *Service du Travail Obligatoire* (STO) in early 1943, became known as the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) after the invasion. From the Occupation's inception, men evaded enforced collaboration with the Germans and disappeared into the wilderness to form or join small bands of guerrillas, Les Maquis, a name originally used by rebels in Corsica 'who chose it because it was the name of tough undergrowth that proliferated in the mountains.'[96] A 1943 SHAEF survey revealed that an investment in the Resistance offered limited returns when compared to one in the bombing offensive; moreover, to expect the Resistance to engage in a national uprising was unrealistic and to control its activities, difficult.[97] Since SHAEF had chosen not to rely on the Resistance, it followed that any successes were considered a windfall. Although the Resistance had not been a strategic component of COSSAC's initial planning, in 1944 SHAEF upgraded irregular warfare from operational to strategic control by transferring it from ANVIL task force commanders to SPOC. 'Resistance', SHAEF now believed, 'is primarily a strategic weapon which should be used accordingly.'[98] For most of 1943-44, the belief that whatever the Resistance accomplished would be viewed as a bonus permeated the command structure.[99] Gervase Cowell, current SOE Adviser, stated:

> It would be in one sense correct, if brutal, to say that COSSAC plans did not take the Resistance into consideration, insofar as they did not include their possible contribution in their calculations, but viewed it as

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[95] *Ibid.*
[96] M. Pearson, *Tears of Glory*, (New York, 1978), p. 4.
[97] RG. 331 SHAEF, G-3 File, Outline OVERLORD, Report: 'Analysis of the Resistance Movement', 9 Dec. 1943.
[98] *Ibid.*, 'SHAEF and AFHQ directive', 2, p. 52-SPOC was advised (Memo SFHQ to AFHQ), 27 June 1944.
[99] R. Brook, *Op. cit.*, 1994.

> a potential bonus. In another sense, since the plans made by SOE to co-ordinate the activities of the Resistance groups with those of the orthodox invading armies were all approved by SHAEF, the activities of the Resistance did form part of the overall planning...[100]

If Cowell is correct, Resistance activities fell into the category of 'Operations', a connecting link between tactics and strategy, which '...encompasses the movement, support and sequential employment of large military formations in the conduct of military campaigns to accomplish goals directed by theater strategy or a higher operational formation.'[101]

By definition, not only did SOE send agents to contact the Resistance, but SOE/SO and later SFHQ and SPOC realized that its men required arms and supplies, if they were going to subvert the Germans and assist in the invasion as perceived by SHAEF. Before Allied air-drops increased the following year, the Maquis was ill-equipped to fight: armed with a few unreliable Sten submachine guns, under powered sporting rifles and ineffective grenades, action was hazardous. Although air-drops were the most practicable method, SOE efforts to supply the Resistance were always constrained by a lack of air transport otherwise needed for the bomber offensive. In 1942 and 1943 only 40 aircraft were available; in 1944, air-drops to the Balkans were 13 times greater than those to France.[102] Therefore, the demand for air support always outstripped the supply. However, Dodds-Parker recalled, '...that by June 1944, it was estimated that in response to radio messages on the BBC or Algiers Radio, over 4,000 Reception Committees could be alerted to receive a drop the same night in France alone.'[103]

Because of the logistical limitations imposed by scarce resources, on 15 June 1944, SHAEF warned General Pierre Koenig, head of the *État Major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* (EMFFI), 'that the FFI should avoid open clashes with the enemy in

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[100] Cowell to Weiss, *Allied OVERLORD Planning*, 17 Mar. 1994.
[101] Maj. G. Scott, 'British and German Operational Styles in World War II', *Military Review*, (Oct. 1985), pp. 37-41.
[102] Maj. H. Warren, *Special Operations: AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements*, (Washington, US Air History Office, 1947).
[103] Sir D. Dodds-Parker, *Op. cit.*.

which his superior weight in equipment would give him an undue advantage.'[104] Perhaps if similar directives had warned the Maquis on the alpine plateaus of the Vercors and Glières earlier in the year, two massacres, due to premature uprisings, might have been avoided. Sabotage, in comparison was an excellent weapon and more cost-effective than bombing, e.g., tank output at a French factory was slowed to a trickle and those that were used in battle either malfunctioned under operational strain or were destroyed by enemy shell fire, because of substandard armor plate. Moreover, the simple act of interchanging destination cards between railway goods-wagons wrought havoc upon the Germans and led to excessive time delays.[105] Political and public relations combined to intervene on the Maquis's behalf when de Gaulle thanked Churchill for British support. The Americans interpreted de Gaulle's remark as criticism of their participation in supplying arms to the Resistance, resulting in a JCS cable to Eisenhower on 19 April:

> We are informed by the State Department that the matter of arming resistance groups has become an important issue politically. With the French there is a widely held opinion that everything being done in this field is done by the British, and that America, for political reasons, is against arming the Resistance. We desire that, insofar, as it is consistent with the requirements of military operations, you take such action as lies within your authority to bring about an equalization of effort between American and Great Britain in supplying and delivering equipment to resistant groups.[106]

Eisenhower complied by conferring with Koenig and then assigned 25 more aircraft to Special Operations over the protests of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, 'who doubting the value of the Resistance movement, considered the increase unjustified.'[107]

Between 1941 and 1944, SOE was transformed from a British Action Service to an Allied Service, applying methods often based on Continental experience and later on American supplies. Dalton romanticized in 1940 that SOE's first task was to transform, mobilize and ignite left-wing opinion on the Continent into a revolutionary blaze that would force the enemy to flee. When the task was found to be beyond the

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[104] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, I, p. 39.
[105] Sir D. Dodds-Parker, *Op. cit.*
[106] JCS to Eisenhower, Washington, 17 Apr. 1944, RG. 331 SHAEF SGS File, 370.64 I.
[107] G. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, (Washington, 1951), p. 203.

scope and application of SOE, the most viable alternative, the training and employment of paramilitary forces in Britain co-ordinated with the raising of local French Resistance forces and 'Secret Armies' in France, armed and equipped by SOE in support of an Allied military invasion of Northwest Europe, was not. De Gaulle's ire was aroused, slowing Franco-British co-operation, because he resented SOE conducting clandestine operations on in what he considered to be his territory. Moreover, Hitler's invasion of Russia unleashed an upsurge of anti-Fascist feeling throughout France, most pronounced amongst professionally trained Communist groups, hitherto unavailable to SOE planners.[108]

Those originally 'specially employed' by the S2 (Subversion) arm of SOE had entered occupied Europe disguised as civilians, but as D-day approached, much of their work and others was accomplished in the uniform of the paramilitary units of Anglo-American and national regular forces.[109] One major question posed constantly by the Allies regarding any French project was, 'how could the Resistance elements best assist the invasion forces?' That required COSSAC to change its perception of the Resistance from an information-gathering device to a combat organization, integrated with the OVERLORD and ANVIL operations.[110] The Planning to follow would require more French participation and COSSAC's disclosure of the OVERLORD plan. SOE/SO were notified on 11 August 1943, but the accompanying proviso, as per instructions by the CCS, stipulated that the French, whose security was weak, were not to be involved in any detailed planning for OVERLORD. According to M. R. D. Foot, French wireless codes were easily broken by German Intelligence.[111]; Once corrected, COSSAC appealed on the grounds of impracticability to the CCS. The proviso was modified.[112]

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[108] Gen. C. Gubbins, *Op. cit.*, pp. 211-5; P. Wilkinson & J. Astley, *Gubbins and SOE*, (London, 1993), pp, 88, 94.
[109] Sir D. Dodds-Parker, *Op. cit.*
[110] A. Funk, 'American Contacts with the Resistance in France, 1940-1943', *Military Affairs*, XXXIV, 1, (1970), p. 20.
[111] M. R. D. Foot, IHR Seminar, London, 23 May 1995.
[112] W. Irwin, *Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project In Support of Operation OVERLORD* (unpublished master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1975), p. 87.

Even though the potential of the Resistance was an unknown quantity, through the spring and fall of 1942, plans were made and approved at SOE headquarters in London to form and train three-man teams called Jedburghs to assist the Resistance.[113] Parachuted into France, 'these teams acted as focal units, in uniform, from D-day onward for contact, communication and control with Resistance forces within the orbit of the invading troops.'[114] During the early spring of 1943, as the idea of invasion assumed greater importance, SOE's participation in a field exercise called SPARTAN proved conclusively that Jedburghs dropped behind enemy lines during the invasion and the use of staff detachments in direct contact with the Resistance, would be of inestimable value. On 11 December 1943, SOE Planning Section presented a paper to G-3 Operations Division HQ's COSSAC, listed the possibilities for Resistance Groups and the consequent effects on SOE/SO activities on D-day.[115] By 1944, there were 550,000 *résistants* in western Europe of which 25 percent were Maquis, to whom the Jedburghs delivered instructions from the Supreme Commander.

Although the Maquis were initially deficient in stores and money, air drops increased once air supremacy over western Europe was achieved in the spring of 1944. With the introduction of operation 'CARPETBAGGER', massive daylight air supply missions, the Maquis became customer-members in business with the Jedburghs.[116] Eighty-two Jedburgh teams were dropped into France during June, July and August 1944. Thirteen OSS Operational Groups, consisting of approximately 30 paratroopers each, were dropped into southern France from Algiers during June, July, August and early September. 'Safe houses' and receptions committees had been established in enemy-held France earlier for incoming Jedburghs by Monsieur Millet, a French SOE organizer. The Special Air Service (SAS) had 2,000 men operating behind the main combat areas, which included French parachute units. During the summer, these airborne commandos, purposefully trained to harass the enemy's rear lines in the

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[113] *Ibid.*, p. xxxvii.
[114] Sir R. Brook. *Op. cit.*
[115] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, I., 'State of Resistance Groups'.
[116] *Ibid.*

coastal area to a depth of 40 miles. The remaining 500 to 700 SAS, held as a reserve for operations in the French interior, were either dropped to reception committees, or operated in heavily armed jeep patrols as far as 80 kilometers behind the enemy lines. Many assisted, all co-operated with the FFI. As late as July, close liaison between SFHQ and SAS (Special Air Squadron) had not been achieved, although certain arrangements had been made at SFHQ for this purpose. Lacking a common planning structure, concerted action between SFHQ and SAS suffered, e. g., SAS plans and actions for Brittany, conceived at a separate airborne headquarters, were only partially shared with SFHQ.[117]

De Gaulle instructed Koenig to take full control of the Resistance. With the invasion imminent, Eisenhower agreed to a tripartite administrative structure known as *État Major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* (EMFFI), commanded by Koenig, which was established within SFHQ's table of organization. Although the change-over occurred on 6 June, the first fully integrated section was not in operation until 2 August, much too late to have assisted the Normandy landings.[118] Gubbins considered some of the politically ambitious French senior officers too inexperienced to handle the technicalities of Special Operations and offered his reaction to an aide, 'The taking over of French Resistance by Koenig has led to a first class battle here lasting six weeks. I have got most of my own way through sheer force of logic of events, but I feel that Koenig will make an awful mess of the whole thing.'[119]

Two joint Anglo-American-French authorities were responsible to Koenig for those operations incorporated under OVERLORD and ANVIL. In London, SFHQ directed the *Bureau de Renseignements et d'Action de Londres* (BRAL) and OSS/SOE special operations in France. In Algiers, SPOC directed BCRA and OSS/SOE special operations in southern France. Steps were taken to incorporate more French staff into SFHQ sections, but control of aircraft and communications would remain, as always,

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[117] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, 2, p. 62.
[118] *Ibid.*, 2, pp. 34-38.
[119] P. Wilkinson & J. Astley, *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

with SFHQ and not with Koenig who had the authority to veto any SHAEF contemplated Resistance action.[120] SFHQ never intended to relinquish power and control of financial, communications and distribution resources that it held in practical fact.

The successful conclusion of the first phase of the Normandy landings increased French involvement at the planning level. With the secret of D-day now history, and with the possibility of a breakout into Brittany by Patton's Third US Army a strong probability, EMFFI was asked to analyze the possibility of active participation between the SAS and Resistance forces in that province. To organize the FFI in Brittany on a military basis, Koenig suggested the nomination of a ground force Resistance commander to serve under him, charged with co-ordinating his group's activities with those of the Allied armies. Thus, the field commander would be well positioned to negotiate directly with Army ground force commanders, while maintaining operational control of the SAS, OG's and Jedburghs.

The important SAS teams activated under the 'Brittany Plan' were 'Dingson', 'Cooney', 'Samwest', 'Derry' and 'Dickens'. Commandant Bourgoin, the one armed commander of 4 French Parachute Battalion (4 SAS) took part along side 'Dingson' and 'Cooney' in early June 1944, in which a total of 204 men and four jeeps were dropped by parachute between St. Malo and Vannes in Brittany, establishing a base from which they organized the local Resistance, interdicted enemy forces and managed to cut a number of railway lines.[121] The June and July SFHQ Reports disclosed that

> Results of FFI activities...generally with OG, SAS and Jedburgh assistance greater than expected, despite lack of arms. Potentialities if arms supplied more fully, would be immense...Brittany forces crystallizing round 400 uniformed SAS troops of 4th French Parachute Bn. and Jedburgh teams. In Brittany, on 1 July there were 30,500 resistance troops, of whom 5,000 were armed. Resistance to be built up to 77,000 men and Field Headquarters...by the end of July to create a military diversion. Brittany resistance aided advancing Allies by attacking moving columns, attacking isolated groups, protecting bridges from destruction, etc. Also mopped up behind Allied thrusts and kept

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[120] A. Funk, *Op. cit.*; Interview with R. Brook interview. *Op. cit.*
[121] P. Darman, *A-Z of the SAS*. (London, 1992), pp. 27, 39.

Lines of Communication open as Allies advanced into Peninsula in August....[122]

The first Jedburgh team, called 'Hugh', dropped blind (without a reception committee) near Chateauroux, a town 100 kilometers Southeast of Tours, during the early hours of 6 June; two other teams followed three days later: team 'George' accompanied SAS team 'Dingson' and team 'Frederick' went in with SAS team 'Samwest' on 9 June.[123]

To finance the Resistance in relation to OVERLORD, SOE, as the principal British procurer of foreign funds, purchased 700 million francs worth of French currency on the black markets of Europe and Asia. The difference between the official and 'black market's' rates of exchange saved the British government almost a million pounds sterling per month. Since January 1944 SOE secretly obtained for the Bank of England well over 1.7 million pounds sterling worth of foreign currencies including 445,000 French francs in notes of small denominations.[124] SOE had also acted as paymaster for the British Treasury, by turning over sums of up to 100 million francs per month to the FNCL, who apportioned it among the Resistance in France, based on unit participation.[125] Weapons were not the only supplies that were air-dropped. Each Jedburgh officer, jumping into France carried 100,000 francs in an army issued money belt, while the W/T operator carried 50,000. During September 1943, Colonel Roger Heslop, 'Xavier', the leader of SOE's MARKSMAN circuit, landed in eastern France with 500,000 francs for his personal use; although he was requested to keep an account of expenses.[126] OG paratroopers were issued French Louis d'Ors, valuable gold coins with which to bribe their way out of a tight situation.[127] OSS headquarters in Berne distributed 4 million French francs per month to those French regions adjacent to Switzerland. During the period 29 March 1943 to 20 November 1944, Berne's total

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[122] CAB 106/982, File SGS 319/1/10, 'Monthly SFHQ Reports, June, July 1944'.
[123] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, 4, pp. 26-40.
[124] Lord Selborne, 'SOE Activities: Summary for the Prime Minister', Quarter: July to Sept. 1944', PREM 3, 408/1, 24 Oct. 1944.
[125] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, 3, p. xxiv.
[126] *Ibid.*, Preamble to 1 Jan. 1944, p. 24.
[127] *Ibid.*, vol. 13, Book 8.

disbursement reached 66 million French francs.[128] By 9 June, 5.5 billion francs were in circulation with the Allied armies in France,[129] but agents in the field signaled their complaints, regardless of the totals: 'Must receive 5 million francs to feed men send soonest'. or 'Destroyed 8 railway bridges, 3 trains, 14 engines. 3 observation posts. made 40 prisoners. You must send us arms, ammunition, explosives. We can not fight with our bare hands.'[130]

Anglo-American antipathy towards de Gaulle and French security measures hampered and delayed tying the Resistance to OVERLORD planning. The excellent reputation of 74,000 French soldiers fighting in Italy, or the availability of ten recently armed French divisions for action in an ANVIL type operation had little effect. The Anglo-American military and political hierarchy considered a number of talented and experienced French officers to be poor security risks and deliberately chose to limit their involvement in OVERLORD planning, until after D-day. The OSS War Diary states: 'No French officer was ever taken into confidence and given the slightest bit of advance information on the date selected for the opening of the second front. Prior to D-day, Koenig was completely bypassed by SHAEF.'[131]

W. H. B. Mack who served as British Foreign Office Political Liaison Officer with Eisenhower observed at a COS meeting that the Chiefs disliked de Gaulle intensely and vetoed his return to Britain from Algiers on D-2.[132] Roosevelt's pursuance of Vichy policy and his choice of Giraud, excluded de Gaulle and his chosen generals from the center of policy and planning. De Gaulle, bitterly anti-American over Roosevelt's lack of support in 1940, responded in kind. In spite of Churchill's ambivalence towards de Gaulle, he remained loyal to him, as illustrated by a willingness to share the date of the TORCH landings, a decision that Roosevelt immediately vetoed. SHAEF Directive of 23 March 1944 to SFHQ, which prohibited the disclosure of military intentions, aimed

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[128] *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.
[129] CAB 106/982. 'SAC Eisenhower's Despatch: French Resistance Miscelllanea'. SGS File 337/11. 9 June. 1944.
[130] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, 3 'Signals of 8, 18 June 1944', . pp. 229-230
[131] *Ibid.*, 1, p. 26.
[132] W. Mack. 'Mack to Cadogan'. PRO, 31 May 1944. FO 371/41993.

to keep de Gaulle in the dark, although the other Allied government (in exile) were banned as well. SOE/SO was not permitted to discuss any aspect of future Resistance group planning that might reveal or compromise military plans. However, French representatives were included in SOE/SO planning for Jedburghs and assigned French patriots to be dropped on and after D-day, but the exact date was not revealed.[133] By 31 May 1944, Churchill insisted that de Gaulle be told of OVERLORD, in spite of COS feelings to the contrary. Churchill invited de Gaulle, then in Algiers, to come to London, from where he hoped that de Gaulle would broadcast a radio message to the French nation, calling for the Resistance to unify in order to help the Allies during the critical D-day period. With Eisenhower's concurrence, Churchill briefed de Gaulle on 4 June concerning the invasion plans, believing that security was safe at this late date. As a precautionary measure, de Gaulle and his Chief of Staff were sworn to secrecy.[134] The Prime Minister discovered on 5 June that de Gaulle not only refused to broadcast, but he would not send French liaison officers with the invasion force. Cadogan recorded Churchill's reaction at a Cabinet meeting:

> We endured the usual passionate anti-de Gaulle harangue from the PM. On this subject, we get away from politics and diplomacy and even common sense. It's a girls school. Roosevelt, PM, and, it must be admitted de Gaulle, all behave like girls approaching the age of puberty. Nothing to be done.[135]

Excluded by political and military prejudice, French general officers were not considered part of the Allied team. Eisenhower said as much at a meeting with press correspondents on 31 August 1944:

> Relations with French generals were not easy: they had not grown up as members of this team. They were liable to suffer from an inferiority complex after events of 1940. It has not been easy to get them doing things, the way if we turned to a British or American Commander and asked him to do so and so; we have to use a little strong-arm method.[136]

John Bross, an OSS officer stationed in London, concluded that from the outset, the British were against any French participation in Allied planning. The British were

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[133] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, 12, p. 75.
[134] CAB 106/982, *Op. cit.*, SCAF 45, 4 June 1944.
[135] D. Dilks, *Cadogan Diaries*, 1938-1945, (London, 1971), p. 635.
[136] CAB 106/982; *Op. cit.*, Eisenhower: 'Relations with the French', 31 Aug. 1944.

afraid of it for political and security reasons. French breaches of security and the possibility of French political factions fighting each other rather than the Germans, increased their objections. For this reason, they were strongly opposed to organizing the Resistance on a national basis and wanted it decentralized.[137] Lord Selborne concluded, as Bross did, in a report to Churchill, that Gaullist groups in France were playing for political stakes at the expense of military action. Increased Resistance casualties, a result of unrestrained temptation to over-centralize and increased Gestapo activity, had occurred.[138] Even if de Gaulle were considered reliable, the FCNL was not. A number of leading FCNL representatives, their attitudes and purposes complex and unpredictable, had lived in the Unoccupied Zone before TORCH and several had been recruited from various colonial administrations. German Intelligence had easily penetrated this group, and since it was impossible to know whom among the French could be trusted, no one would be trusted, including de Gaulle.[139] Since D-day could not be disclosed, Allied military talks eventually broke down. This resulted in the British and Americans co-ordinating most of the details of the French participation in OVERLORD. SHAEF organized men, transport, and aid for Resistance, funded by the British.[140] Under these conditions, detailed plans for direct French support of the initial phase of OVERLORD were not made until the last week before the invasion. As for French military participation, they insisted on the right to by-pass SHAEF and to intercede with the United States and British governments, in lieu of CCS representation. The Allies refused to admit the French to the CCS, or to accord any special rights.

Jean Moulin: Security and his Arrest

Jean Moulin, President of the CNR, considered to be the most impressive figure in the whole French Resistance, had returned to France, in part, to improve Resistance

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[137] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, Bross Interview 3 Dec. 1944, 1, p. 25.
[138] Lord Selborne, *Op. cit.*, 'Summary, Jan. to Mar. 1944'.
[139] D. Eisenhower, *Op. cit.*, p. 165.
[140] Sir R. Brook, *Op. cit.*

security. He had planned to reorganize it along classical lines to minimize the risks of capture or penetration, this to be accomplished by forming cells, 'no one cell to know another; only the leader to know the identity of his superior and propaganda services to be separated from para-military groups.'[141] Before these security measures were applied, Moulin inadvertently breached them himself in Lyon and was captured and tortured to death by the Germans in June 1943. Moulin's seizure and demise was part of a ferocious German counterattack on French Resistance groups during that year: many F and RF circuits were attacked, penetrated and smashed, their leaders either killed or in hiding.[142] As a result of over-centralization, a group of senior French Secret Army officials meeting in Switzerland in June were exposed to the Gestapo. When the visiting French officials returned to France, they were arrested by the Germans who seized many important incriminating documents.[143] By contrast, the Communist FTP, whose members numbered 100,000, suffered less casualties, because it organization was cellular rather than centralized. A proposed Maquis Plan was considered to alleviate the over-centralized Resistance command and its consequent top heavy communication systems, by establishing self-contained elite forces dropped by parachute into appropriate sub-regions of France. These elite groups, at the disposal of and under the control of the Allied High Command in London, would be hidden and placed in readiness for D-day. In addition, small groups of Allied officers would be attached to the various district Maquis chiefs, thereby eliminating an overall central Resistance Headquarters. Once these military missions were established, SOE advised that the general direction of the Resistance movement be kept out of France entirely.[144] It was doubtful how a national uprising by the French people could have been organized without these changes. 'The institution of the Maquis Plan represented both

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[141] J. Beevor, *Op. cit.*, pp. 154-155.
[142] M. Foot, *SOE in France*, (London, 1966), pp. 257, 266, 289-290; D. Stafford, *Op. cit.*, pp. 127-130.
[143] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, 3, p. xviii.
[144] *Ibid.*, p. xix: 'The Maquis Plan': Maquis' Memo No. 3, 26 Oct. 1943:

the beginning of the paramilitary movement and the first inclusion of the French on any basis of equality with the American and British.'[145]

Co-ordinated Military and Resistance Action in Normandy

At the tactical level, however, according to the coded action messages transmitted by the BBC from London on 5 June to the various Resistance networks, the invasion and an insurrection were imminent. SHAEF's BBC coded messages such as *Dîtes à quartorze que la terrasse de la reine est large. Les terrassiers ont vu la reine dimanche.* and *C'était enfin le roi et pas la reine qu'ils ont vu.* were a few that set all of the eight 'color-coded' rail, transport, power, telecommunication, fuel and ammunition storage sabotage plans throughout France in motion at once. Interference on roads, misdirection of traffic, the prevention of reinforcements, particularly armored formations, from reaching the coast, guerrilla actions taken against German Army formations and headquarters and defence against German acts of destruction and demolition were also included as Resistance objectives.[146]

Under SPOC control, the organization and direction of the Resistance in southern France developed in two phases to insure maximum assistance to ANVIL. The first phase of 15 July was to provide equipment for major Maquis missions in all the regions of south and central France: 2,136 tons of stores were dropped in July from Britain and Algiers. On 1 August, two weeks before ANVIL, the second phase developed with the expansion of these Maquis regions into 3 main areas: the Rhone with 25,000 armed men and the Massif Central and the Pyrenees with 12,000 armed men each. In addition to the 'color-coded' sabotage plans, one specific task was assigned to the Resistance in southern France: the protection of the port facilities at Marseilles, Toulon and Sête. Other events followed: 500 men parachuted in to assist in the heavy fighting that broke out on either side of the Rhone; the Spanish frontier was closed to escaping German troops; the large towns of Limoges, Chateauroux and Poitiers were liberated; public

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[145] *Ibid.*, p. xxi.
[146] *Ibid.*, 2. p. xiii; vol. 3.

utilities were seized and the enemy withdrawal disrupted. 20,000 German troops was taken prisoner between 11-13 September. Resistance accomplishments in support of ANVIL were the equivalent of four or five divisions, according to Gen. Alexander Patch, the American task force commander.[147]

Within the first week of OVERLORD, 960 railway demolitions out of a planned 1,055 had been carried out. On D+1, 26 trunk lines were unusable, including the main lines between St. Lô, Avranches, Cherbourg and Caen, due to Resistance activity in the north. Three hundred rail cuts were confirmed between 6 and 27 June. Enemy reinforcements were delayed between 48 and 72 hours, while the 2nd SS Panzer Division was delayed 12 days trying to reach Normandy from southwest France. The two main railway lines along the Rhone river were closed to German divisions trying to reach the battle area from southern France for most of the crucial D-day period. With much of the telecommunication network sabotaged by Resistance groups, the Germans were forced to use wireless communications, allowing for easy intercepts by Allied tactical Intelligence. June diversionary Resistance activities in central and south-eastern France absorbed the attention of 16,000 German soldiers and the 11th Panzer Division.[148] Notifying SHAEF, American General Omar Bradley, Commander of 12th US Army Group, indicated that he had received excellent co-operation from Resistance forces. The most spectacular contribution made by the Resistance was the liberation of Paris in which 30,000 to 50,000 patriots participated in a *levée en masse*. Armed with whatever weapons they could assemble, they fought through the streets against the Germans, seeking to destroy them on whatever terms.[149] Eisenhower, who believed that the Resistance had surrounded the Germans with a terrible atmosphere of danger and hatred which ate into the confidence of their leaders and the courage of their soldiers,[150] wrote to Gubbins in May 1945,

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[147] *Ibid.*, 1, pp. 80-84.
[148] Gen. C. Gubbins, *Op. cit.*, p. 217; D. Stafford, *Op. cit.*, pp. 154-155; G. Garrison, *Op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.
[149] OSS War Diary, *Op. cit.*, 1, p. 68, 85.
[150] CAB 106/892, *Op. cit.*, File SGS 370.64 'France, Employment of FFI Agreement between Eisenhower and Koenig', 26 Aug. 1944.

> While no final assessment of the operation value of resistance action has bet been completed, I consider that the disruption of enemy rail communications, the harassing of German road moves and the continual and increasing strain placed on German war economy...by the organized forces of Resistance, played a very considerable part in our complete and final victory.[151]

Evidence from many quarters, including the unsolicited testimonials of high ranking German prisoners of war, has indicated that the Resistance played a great part in the defeat of the Germans in the West.[152] However, it remains difficult to measure the exact contribution and effectiveness of the Resistance, because operational records were not kept, for obvious security reasons. Strategic deception, in which the Resistance guided by SOE, played an important part, succeeded in hoodwinking the Germans in believing that the chosen invasion site was the Pas de Calais and not Normandy. Pre-D-day diversions, further afield, included false action radio messages, an increased tempo of air-dropped supplies and stepped-up guerrilla attacks, which were used to thwart and confuse the enemy, as part of two deception plans, BODYGUARD and FORTITUDE. As a result, in March 1944, the Germans increased their garrison of first-class troops in Denmark from four to eight divisions, and Hitler defended Norway with more divisions than necessary. He feared the military presence of General Andrew Thorne, GOC Scottish Command, a former British military attaché in Berlin during the thirties, who had fought as enemies in the same World War I battle [153] had impressed the Fuhrer with his military skill and knowledge.[154] Believing that the British Fourth Army under Thorne might invade Norway, Hitler insisted that approximately 50 U-boats be stationed along the Norwegian coast to serve as a deterrent, a decision that deflected their use from the Atlantic convoy routes. As a consequence, the British released a large number of escort vessels from convoy and support duties to protect the Normandy landings from submarine attack.[155] Those officers, who had devised deception plans BODYGUARD and FORTITUDE, were

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[151] Gen. C. Gubbins, *Op. cit.* p. 218.
[152] Lord Selborne, *Op. cit.*, Summary from July-Sept. 1944.
[153] Battle of Gheluvelt Crossroads, 29 Oct. 1914.
[154] Sir D. Dodds-Parker, *Op. cit.*; Interview with Lt. Col. Sir P. Thorne, London, 17 May 1994.
[155] A. Burn, *The Fighting Captain*, (London, 1993), pp. 146, 160.

quick to seize on any opportunity to insure the success of OVERLORD.[156] Integral to these deception plans, the Resistance contributed to the lodgement, breakout and pursuit of the Allied armies beyond the expectations of the Anglo-Americans, the results far exceeding the expectations of the military.[157]

Preoccupied with fighting the war in a conventional manner, the Allied military hierarchy devoted little time to the Resistance and clandestine warfare. The bombing of Germany was an Allied strategic cornerstone, that demanded the combined utilization of an extraordinary amount of intelligent, well-trained personnel and sophisticated technology, two resources in short supply. These shortages in personnel, aircraft and supplies imposed tight restrictions on irregular warfare. Moreover, poor security within the French political-military system and German infiltration and destruction of many Resistance networks hampered SFHQ and Resistance efforts. At best, successful execution was seen as an adjunct to the great land battles in northwest France. Much more could have been accomplished by timely planning and execution of selected operations, if the major participants had been willing to exhibit the level of trust required. French officers, with an intimate knowledge of their own people and country, if invited to participate at the strategic level, could have made an important contribution to OVERLORD; instead, a major resource was lost. Few men addressed the issues of trust and co-operation, however delayed, with the candor of Eisenhower in a statement to de Gaulle:

> I shall need your support in France...I can not tell you on what theoretical basis my government will instruct me to deal with you! But above principles, there are actions. I would like to tell you that, where action is concerned, I shall recognize no other authority in France but yours.[158]

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[156] Sir D. Dodds-Parker, *Op. cit.*
[157] Sir R. Brook, *Op. cit.*.
[158] Gen. C. de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre*. 'Note établie par le Cabinet du Général de Gaulle et du général Eisenhower, à la villa des Glycines, le 30 Décembre 1943'. (Paris, 1956). p. 676.

Arming the French

As American wartime production increased between 1941 and 1943, the United States extended Lend-Lease, in principle and with modifications to the Gaullists. This removed an enormous burden from Britain's financial concerns. After the November 1942 invasion of North Africa, the question of American large-scale and rapid rearmament assistance to the French demanded resolution. Prior to that time, Free French Forces operated under the control of the British who assumed the responsibility for their maintenance, training and supply. This practice was formalized by a CCS directive of 24 March 1942 in which either one of the two Allies would supply members of the United Nations, subject to the agreement: the Free French Forces remained within the orbit of British provisions and training.[159] De Gaulle's two infantry divisions, which had fought with the British Eighth Army were augmented by thousands of poorly clad volunteers from the French African Army that had been maintained under the Franco-German armistice of 1940.

De Gaulle's Need for American Material

At the mercy of the United States for war material,[160] de Gaulle, in the Spring of 1942, sought to implement a rearmament program in preparation for the eventual return of French forces to metropolitan France. This included, not only the re-equipping of existing French forces, but additional forces expected to be recruited.[161] A revitalized modern army, whatever the practical ramifications, would restore the prestige and national pride of the French. However, Marshall refused de Gaulle's proposals for an increase in direct US aid, not only because armament was needed elsewhere, but increased French demands for material were unwarranted.[162]

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[159] CCS 13 Meeting, Washington, 24 Mar. 1942, Reel III.
[160] J. Vernet, 'Les Projets de réorganisation de l'Armée de terre Française de 1945 à 1946', *Revue historique des Armées*, (1979), p. 228.
[161] *Ibid.*
[162] Marshall to Hull Washington, 20 Nov. 1943, Rg 165 OPD, 336, France, Sec. 1.

Churchill's and Roosevelt's personal dislike of de Gaulle intruded once again at the military level and hampered the French Army's rearmament and training, necessarily dependent upon Allied goodwill and commitment. Churchill expressed his concerns in a letter to Roosevelt on 18 June 1943, but evaded the President's recommendation to break with the French leader directly:

> It is imperative that the French Army in North West Africa should be in loyal and trustworthy hands especially on the eve of the great operations which impend. I agree with you that no confidence can be placed in de Gaulle's friendship for the Allies...and I myself could not be responsible...if our bases and lines of communication in North Africa were disturbed or endangered through the existence of a French Army under potentially hostile control....I am glad therefore to learn the clear instructions you have given General Eisenhower not to 'Permit de Gaulle to direct himself or to control through partisans of any committee the African French Army, either in the field of supplies, training or operations.'[163]

At a secret meeting of 23 October 1943, Roosevelt's military emissary in North Africa, General Mark Clark, pledged assistance to the 137,000 strong French North African Army, providing, of course, that it would join the war on the Allied side. Agreement was reached between Clark and Darlan on 22 November, two weeks after TORCH. Augmenting the French forces was 60,000 secretly trained colonial militia, previously unknown to Clark, and 103,000 additional men mobilized the same day. If the infrastructures of West and North Africa had been more efficient, the total would have gone beyond the 300,000 available effectives.[164]

The Anfa Plan of 1943

During the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt and his protégé, French General and Commander in Chief, Henri Giraud, conferred and formulated a set of principles, known as the Anfa Plan, pertaining to French rearmament. This included, among other items, the delivery of enough material for three armored divisions and eight motorized divisions as well as an air force. In return, France would furnish 165,000 tons of shipping to the inter-allied pool. Since Roosevelt preferred Giraud and disliked de

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[163] FRUS, *Washington and Quebec*, 1943, 159-60.
[164] M. Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, (Washington, 1957), pp. 9-13.

Gaulle, the President excluded both Churchill and de Gaulle from the decision-making process. Upon discovery, the Prime Minister objected. His protest changed the way French rearmament was handled, i.e., it became subject to the military priorities and decisions of the CCS and not to the Americans alone.[165]. Rearming a French Army, a complicated issue involving training, production and supply, created additional problems between the three Allies concerning the allocation of scarce resources, particularly global shipping. Regarding these sacrifices, Churchill expressed his apprehension, 'The commanders have been told they must cut their requirements to the bone.'[166] The British COS felt that the combination of limited shipping and an increased allocation of scarce military supplies to the French instead of other Allied troops would prejudice supply assignments required in operations such as HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily.[167] The Americans interpreted the shortages of tonnage and escort facilities experienced during the early phases of the North African campaign as limiting factors which would soon be overcome. Although the tonnage situation had eased, North African port capacity had become more acute because of HUSKY.[168] The British were not satisfied, declaring that French rearmament cut into commitments to other Allied forces. They insisted that French rearmament was not required to implement agreed strategy and could not be justified militarily. The 12 March CCS meeting came to a complete deadlock, its members agreeing that the President and the Prime Minister would have to settle the French rearmament and shipping crisis.[169] However, by 18 May the CCS concluded that, 'The rearming and re-equipping of the Free French Forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipping will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirement of British and American forces in various theaters.'[170] Although the Anglo-Americans were satisfied, the French were not, because the agreed pace of

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[165] Gen. J. Deane to JCS, 22 Washington, Apr. 1943, RG. 165 OPD 400 France, Sec. 1.
[166] Churchill to Roosevelt, Doc. 216, 24 Mar. 1943, FDRL.
[167] CCS Meeting 75, Washington, 12 Mar. 1943, Reel III.
[168] CCS, Special Meeting, 'Giraud', Washington, 8 July 1943, Reel III.
[169] CCS 75 Meeting, Washington, 12 Mar. 1943, Reel III..
[170] CCS 87 Meeting, TRIDENT', Washington 18 May 1943, Reel III.

rearmament and training, when crippled with the 24 percent French casualties suffered in Tunisia, would slow the creation of a modern army.[171]

Apportioning Scarce Supplies

Moreover, in the light of world-wide strategy expressed in the practical terms of shipping, armament and production schedules, how binding was the Anfa agreement? Did the Americans in 1943 view Anfa as an 'agreement in principle', as the British had perceived SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942? And were the French insisting, like the Americans had insisted during SLEDGEHAMMER, that it was a firm commitment? Would the choice of an interpretation, with each side at variance, one side preferring the spirit, the other the letter, result in an irreconcilable conflict? How these questions were treated, follows.

When the President wrote the words, '*oui, en principe* ' in the margin of the original document, he may not have understood how much firmer a commitment it was than the less binding translation 'yes in principle', subsequently used in the official text.[172] However straightforward some statements are, their intensity, denotation and implication vary from language to language. Not only did these semantic differences contribute to misunderstandings among the Allies, associated in waging a coalition war, but the phrase 'in principle', a non-binding statute of US and British real-estate law, translated differently by each of the Allies.

Although supply shipments were underway, the current allocation of 25,000 tons per convoy was not enough to reach the eleven-division target set by the Anfa Plan. The Americans attributed this short-fall to the shipping demands of the Tunisian campaign, but according to Giraud, the Americans were not pushing the plan vigorously enough. Eisenhower warned that a critical situation was brewing between the Americans and the French in North Africa, if French uneasiness over rearmament was not dealt with on

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[171] M. Vigneras, *Op. cit.*, p. 58.
[172] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

the political level immediately, 'I have here to face the insinuation that we are not straight-forward, that we are long on promises and short on performances. This impression must be dispelled before the situation deteriorates.'[173]

To assuage French fears that the Americans would forsake their rearmament commitments, the President informed Robert D. Murphy, his political representative in North Africa:

> You can tell them [the French in North Africa] that at no time did I or General Marshall promise equipment for the French divisions at any given date. What was agreed on was the principle of rearming them to be done as soon as we found it practicable from a shipping point of view...The French must remain calm and sensible.[174]

Giraud attended a special meeting of the CCS on 8 July 1943, hoping to exchange archaic Franco-German weapons, issued under the 1940 Armistice agreement, for modern ones. In spite of this handicap, ten French divisions had participated in the five month-long Tunisian battle, ending with the Germans defeated and the French suffering severe casualties. The French lost 15,000 men out of a total of approximately 75,000; many of those lost were officers. Moreover, Giraud indicated that inadequate replacements, scarce resources and the heavy wastage of clothing and equipment in the that campaign had resulted in French troops being left practically in rags. Discontent and damaged morale among the men were evident. He urged that an initial installment of clothing and equipment for 100,000 men be delivered immediately. Assessing combat effectiveness, Giraud reported that certain units of the French Army, supplied with modern American equipment, had clearly benefited and were now capable of undertaking active service in Europe, particularly in France. In exchange for this material, the French offered a secure North African base that included ports, airfields and communication facilities.[175]

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[173] Eisenhower to OPD and Marshall, 17 Feb. 1943, Rg 165 Message 1453.
[174] Roosevelt to Murphy, Washington, 20 Feb. 1943, RG 165, OPD. Exec. 1
[175] CCS, Special Meeting, 'Giraud', 8 July 1943, *Op. cit.*

Promises Made, Deliveries Delayed

To demonstrate good faith, Marshall tried to replace Roosevelt's 'agreement in principle' with a firm offer i.e., American depots would supply the French with the needed material, but only by delaying the activation of a number of American divisions in 1943 and by suspending delivery of the supplies they needed. At the same time Marshall observed when speaking with the President, that the Americans were committed to equip the French to the extent of 11 to 12 divisions, unless the matter was dropped soon.[176] Political implications overshadowed the military aspects of the North African situation to the extent that although preferential economies favored the Americans activating, training and supplying their own divisions in preparation for the anticipated European land battles, they were forced to accept the time consuming process of converting a tattered foreign army into a modern one instead. Wartime destruction of French defence industries was so complete that they were not truly productive until ten years after the war. French military leaders were difficult and sometimes unrealistic in their demands, but these were typical complications, however convoluted, of coalition warfare. Lack of a common language and culture separated the protagonists and provoked misunderstandings. Differences in customs, dietary habits and clothing sizes added to the pressing problems of Allied shipping, of port, storage and distribution facilities and the trained personnel to handle this infrastructure with efficiency. To the French, rearmament symbolized the return of their prestige and position among nations. To the Americans, it was an inconvenience, driven by politics, over which they equivocated for three months. Nevertheless, one benefit of having France supply manpower, however complicated the rearmament arrangements, meant less disruption to the American civilian work-force already in place and fewer Americans in combat.

Some of the participants were dissatisfied with the time and direction rearmament was taking. Some were openly distrustful: Eisenhower was stymied by Roosevelt's

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[176] JCS Meeting with the President, Washington, 15 Nov. 1943.

indecisiveness; Murphy reported that the French thought they were being 'hoodwinked'; Giraud complained that there was opposition to rearmament, if not deception; Roosevelt advised that an 'agreement in principle' did not involve detailed commitments and Marshall agreed, implying that Giraud had knowingly misrepresented the facts, an opinion which distorted reality.[177] King believed that de Gaulle was constantly increasing his prestige and would certainly take advantage of these 11 divisions to further strengthen his position and Leahy thought that de Gaulle planned to use 9 divisions to enhance his reputation in France. If de Gaulle got into France, with about 10 well equipped divisions, Leahy ruminated, he could readily take charge of the government by force.[178] The President understood that Eisenhower wanted these French divisions rearmed and trained. Marshall suggested that the JCS should remain silent about this matter until its members had an opportunity to speak with Eisenhower, who thought that it would be possible to determine within 60 days whether or not rearmed French units were going to prove worthwhile. If they did not, Eisenhower could opt out of the agreement by simply providing the French with discarded American equipment left behind by American forces quitting North Africa. Marshall concluded that the Americans would not ship any new equipment to the French but simply supply them with existing equipment already on site.[179] Subterfuge aside, Jean Monnet, a French financial expert approved by the Anglo-American governments, flew to Algiers to brief Eisenhower and Giraud on the rearmament case, as seen from Washington, in an attempt to dissipate their doubts and misgivings.[180]

During this running controversy, Colonel William Bessell of the OPD investigated the alternatives to the building up foreign forces, such as the French, as opposed to arming American troops. He considered the possible effects of either alternative on the American manpower situation and on Allied efficiency in prosecuting the war.

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[177] Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 Feb. 1943, Murphy to Sec. of State for President, 20 Feb. 1943; Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Feb. 1943, JRC 902/II 'Rearmament Plan', RG. 165 Exec. 1.
[178] JCS Meeting with the President, *Op. cit.*
[179] *Ibid.*
[180] Hopkins to Monnet, Washington, 22 Feb. 1943, JRC 902/II 'Rearmament Plan', RG. 165. Exec. 1.

Reporting to the JCS, he and his committee observed that the United States was not only the 'arsenal of democracy', but was also a source of trained and equipped manpower. American continental military facilities could train up to 60 divisions a year and keep almost 11 million men in uniform indefinitely. Replacing civilian manpower losses remained the key factor. He concluded that if the war became a slow attritional process, the American public would soon tire and refuse to countenance any unnecessary prolongation. Because of time constraints, little could be gained by equipping and training the French beyond projected 11 divisions, but he urged their maximum use once accomplished.[181] Combat-ready troops were always in short supply, because the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) failed to appreciate or emphasize their value. These planners also considered cutting back the Army's personnel needs as the war progressed[182] These combined miscalculations adversely affected the fall campaign of 1944 on the Franco-German border. To reiterate, the campaign was fought by poorly equipped, under powered and undermanned American infantry divisions, the combat teams of which experienced unnecessary hardships during a sequence of attritional frontier battles.[183]

Problems in Rearmament and Training the French

During the same meeting, General Rooks, Assistant CoS (AHFQ) reported that two French infantry divisions were combat ready, an additional division could be ready on 1 November and a fourth the following month. Unfortunately, the major inhibiting factors centered on the limited access to training facilities and the lack of organization within the French formations. In his own vernacular, perhaps revealing a prejudice, if not a doubt of French ability, Rooks believed that although certain cadres of French troops were trained in the uses of American equipment, those divisions in Tunisia, composed mostly of low-class colored troops with a small proportion of white officers

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[181] JCS 101 Meeting, 'Bessell Report', p. 3, Washington, 7 Aug. 1943, Reel III..
[182] *Ibid.*, p. 3; Wedemeyer to COS, 28 April, 1943 RG. 165 OPD 381 Security, 118.
[183] Col. V. Lockhart, *T-Patch to Victory*, (Canyon, TX, 1981), pp. 131-137; C. Gabel, *Op. cit., pp. 30-34.*

had not; therefore, combat-effectiveness and organizational cohesion suffered.[184] Among these African troops, serious shortages of trained technicians prevailed and the replacement of combat losses could not be provided for until the liberation of Europe. Historian Arthur Funk, serving as a young American naval lieutenant in Casablanca, stated 'that many of the French quartermaster personnel lacked the language facility and mechanical ability to assemble crated equipment in timely fashion. Most of the instructions, therein contained, were written in English.'[185] Until the reunification of the *Armée d'Afrique,* originally a force of a 100,000 French soldiers stationed in North Africa, with the Gaullists after TORCH, Free French military operations were more symbolic than real.

Rearming the French remained a complicated task for the Americans, because the solution did not rest on logistics alone: conflict between both parties arose when the French decided to concentrate only on combat units, leaving supply duties to the Americans; on the other hand, they insisted on a balance of combat and support units, matching their own table of organization.[186] American rearmament was linked to American military organizational techniques; for the French, acceptance was all or nothing. They considered it unheroic to raise support units, traditionally despised in the French Army, at the expense of combat formations, particularly to a population starved of battlefield victories. Even with American insistence, it took the French most of the war to develop a true appreciation of the balance between logistical and operational concerns within their forces. This defined the difference between a decentralized French system and a highly centralized American system, a conflict that was modified but never resolved. Moreover, the Americans insisted that the doctrine of combined-arms task organization be applied, replacing a French system of separate commanders for each individual arm: infantry, artillery and cavalry within each army division. ANVIL's time constraints demanded that training the French how to apply

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[184] JCS 101 Meeting, *Op. cit.*, p. 4.
[185] Interview with A. Funk, 29 Sept. 1994, Rennes, France.
[186] Marshal A. Juin, *Mémoires*, (Paris, 1960), pp. 300-302.

this equipment within the concepts of maneuver warfare and integrated air/ground co-operation had to be done quickly.[187]

Compared to American commanders who would complain to higher authorities if supplies were delayed, French commanders remained traditionally passive. However Giraud complained to the Americans when they narrowly interpreted and breached a section of the Anfa Plan: their substitutions of modern equipment for obsolescent weaponry and tanks was affecting combat efficiency. The French demand for weapon equality between both armies was denied by Lt. General Wilhelm D. Styer, CoS, Army Service Forces on 4 November 1943, because he believed that the assignment of a few substitutions such as the M-3 gun for the 74-mm and the M1903 rifle for the M1 had not handicapped French units in any appreciable way and was still 'equipment of the most modern kind.'[188]

The French Training Section

American assistance in the French training program was specifically geared to technical instruction alone under the rubric of the US Fifth Army's French Training Section (FTC). After consultation with Giraud, Marshall, on 18 April 1943, approved of a two month training cycle for existing infantry divisions, three months for existing armored regiments and six months for technical units to reach combat-effectiveness and technical efficiency with American material.[189] FTC's purpose was twofold: to give maximum training assistance and assurance by means of inspections that the units were adequately trained and properly equipped. Suggested by the Americans and approved by the French, the establishment of divisional schools to which students selected from individual sections of the division were assigned, became the most successful method of training. American instructors, on duty at each divisional school, collaborated with

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187 Gen. J. de Tassigny, *Histoire de la Première Armée Française*, (Paris, 1949).
188 Steyer to Eisenhower, Msg. 2627, 16 Nov. 1943, RG 165, JRC 400.1/007 'Substituting From Theater Stocks'.
189 Marshall to Eisenhower, Washington, 18 May 1943, RG. 165, Messages 6213 & 8565, Eisenhower to Marshall, 1 May 1943, JRC Cable Log.

their French colleagues to train each division's cadre in the most efficient manner. French members of the FTC co-operated with various schools in the United States and later in North Africa, to train thousands of French personnel to become specialists in all branches of the military. If any problem existed, it was not the implementation of the course-work, but the questionable proficiency of English, as a second language, among some of the students.[190]

By October 1943, not only were seven divisions receiving technical training from American personnel, but five of these divisions were designated for amphibious training as well. Although the training program had reached a satisfactory level, progress had been impeded by the lack of officer supervision and equipment and training aids. Sometimes the French failed to take advantage of American offers and by the end of October training of service units still lagged behind schedule. Courses in regimental signal communications and chemical warfare suffered, because of poor co-ordination or flagging interest. To improve the level of training commensurate with battle conditions, instructors accompanied infantry divisions into combat and then reported their findings upon returning to North Africa.

Throughout the war, French commanders were acutely conscious of their manpower limitations. Addressing this problem, three training centers were established during mid-May 1944 in Italy to serve the *Corps Expéditionnaire Français* (CEF) to meet its combat replacement and skilled manpower requirements. When the French Expeditionary Force grew to five divisions, the Americans turned over an American training camp in North Africa capable of housing 8,000 to 10,000 men to them. However, General Patch, C-in-C of the US Seventh Army, assumed the general direction of CEF training ten days before the ANVIL landing, because technical training remained insufficient. On 10 September, almost one month after ANVIL's launch, Patch recommended that the French take responsibility for and control over the training of their personnel. When British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson became Supreme

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[190] RG 165 Memo, G-2 MIS WD for ACOS OPD, 28 Aug. 1943, OPD 226.2 France, Sec. 1.

Allied Commander Mediterranean (SACMED), three FTS training centers operated in southern France. By late October, as the battles moved northward, the training of French troops under American guidance in North Africa ended.

Political ramifications had delayed the creation and implementation of a French rearmament program. The administrational structures needed to rearm and train the French had been piecemeal, dependent upon the demands perceived at various times. However, most of the supply and training problems were finally overcome in time for the French participation in ANVIL. When the war ended, approximately 700,000 French men were deployed, 11 divisions and 300 supporting units served; all of the supporting units and eight of the divisions had received the latest American equipment, which represented over three million measured tons. Ever bound to the Americans for logistical support, French divisions proved highly efficient in combat during the Italian campaign. By early 1944, the French Army was ready to join its Allies in the invasion of the European continent and the liberation of its homeland, 'winning American confidence and overcoming British skepticism',[191] but political issues and military prejudices delayed this final operation, of which ANVIL was a part. Much argument and wrangling followed before the latest tactical methods and the geographical areas were agreed upon by the western Allies and applied.

Prior to D-Day, since the Anglo-American French policy towards France remained in disarray, de Gaulle declared the FNCL to be the Provisional Government. As its chief representative, he demanded that the Corps Expéditonnaire Français (CEF) fighting in Italy under General Juin and the ten French divisions mounted in North Africa under General de Lattre de Tassigny play a leading role in the liberation of southern France. Realizing that the success of ANVIL depended upon French participation, as the opportunity to free his country loomed, he agreed to the formulation of those plans.

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[191] M. Vigneras, *Op. cit.*, p. 404.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANVIL, OVERLORD and the ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

This chapter explores the final aspects of the Anglo-American strategic controversy, in which the interplay between the military, economic, political and psychological factors intensified.[1]

Before the Tehran (EUREKA) Conference, Churchill requested a summit meeting in Cairo (SEXTANT I) was preceded by a summit meeting in Cairo (SEXTANT I), requested by Churchill, to resolve and co-ordinate Anglo-American strategic policy before meeting the Russians. Because of disastrous British ventures in the eastern Mediterranean, which were proving highly prejudicial to a deteriorating Italian campaign, Churchill sought a modification of the QUADRANT Agreement, in which seven Mediterranean-based divisions and 60 LST's were scheduled for transfer to Britain, beginning in November 1943.[2] The attritional battles south of Rome, in which 11 ill-prepared and under-manned Allied divisions encountered 19 experienced and well-positioned German divisions, foreshadowed a long arduous winter campaign. To relieve growing anxiety over the front's tactical imbalance, Churchill and the COS sought to cast the seven idle divisions and the 60 landing craft, designated for the cross-Channel attack, into the battle.[3] Churchill petitioned Roosevelt, questioning the practicality of the relevant QUADRANT decisions, as measured against the deteriorating conditions in Italy. Churchill felt that accepting the QUADRANT commitment, despite Roosevelt's insistence, would be both negligent and irresponsible. Even if the British and the Americans disagreed about the objectives, the Italian campaign. Churchill's willingness to negotiate more openly represented a change from the artful positioning of previous summit conferences, particularly the MODICUM and SYMBOL meetings.

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[1] M. Stoler, *Op. cit.*, (London, 1977), pp. 132-135, 140-154.

Most labor-management agreements have a clause that allows for the re-opening of negotiations based on a specific issue, but acceptance usually requires the assent of both sides, a stipulation absent from Anglo-American military agreements. Even without it, Roosevelt entertained Churchill's entreaties related on the following issues: increased American support for British efforts in the eastern Mediterranean, Operations ACCOLADE and HARDIHOOD,[4] and the merger of the two Mediterranean commands into one, subsumed under one commander.

However, Roosevelt, preoccupied with the possibility of a personal meeting with China's Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in Cairo, considered the QUADRANT Agreement and its decisions related to the cross-Channel attack as settled. Both he and his JCS were alarmed and irritated at Churchill who sought to re-negotiate these salient features of the agreement. It appeared to them that the Prime Minister was again abandoning OVERLORD in preference for an intensified Mediterranean policy.[5]

The subordinated Italian campaign had the following effect upon Major General Fred L. Walker, commanding the American 36th 'Texas' Infantry Division, fighting on the Cassino front during the winter of 1943. Unknown to Churchill, but inextricably linked to him in this regard, Walker wrote,

> The Italian campaign will not be finished this week, nor next. Our wasteful policy or method of taking one mountain mass after another gains no tactical advantage, locally. There is always another mountain mass beyond with the Germans dug in on it, just as before. Somebody on top side, who has control of the required means, should figure out a way to decisively defeat the German Army in Italy, instead of just pushing, pushing, pushing.[6]

Men like Walker suffered the consequences of Allied indecision: the British would raise the level of the Italian campaign, the Americans would preserve the sanctity of OVERLORD. The object of this competition was the kind of craft. known as Landing Ship Tank type (LST) capable of sailing between theaters of war. Brooke believed that

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[2] F. Loewenheim, et al, (eds.), *Op. cit.*, pp. 386-388.
[3] CAB 79 (COS), 14, 19 Oct. 1943.
[4] F. Loewenheim, et al, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 370-374, pp. 312-313.
[5] 'JCS 117 Meeting, Washington, 5 Oct. 1943, Reel II.
[6] Gen. F. Walker, *Op. cit.*, p. 290.

the Americans had misinterpreted the British position, which was to maintain pressure in the Mediterranean to further weaken the Germans, thereby making OVERLORD and a landing in southern France more practicable.[7] According to the American Ambassador to Britain, John Winant, the British believed that the psychological moment for launching OVERLORD could not be fixed months in advance. Moreover, the British feared that the contract and agreement of terms signed at QUADRANT took precedence over subsequent changes in the military situation. He concluded that the principal difference of opinion between the two parties was simply one of timing.[8] What he did not know was that the Russians expected the Anglo-Americans to stage OVERLORD at the earliest possible moment.[9] If the Americans seemed inflexible to the British, the British seemed opportunistic to the Americans. Both observations contained a degree of truth, but the Americans, fighting a two-ocean war, considered logistics as the primary factor for creating such opportunities. Although the Americans remained focused on a May OVERLORD, they were not indifferent to the problems raised by Churchill regarding the attritional warfare unfolding under appalling weather conditions and shortages on the Italian peninsula. Unfortunately, Churchill and Brooke overstated their case and aroused American suspicions by advocating further British operations in the Dodecanese, a group of islands off the Turkish coast, of which Kos and Leros had recently fallen to two German battle groups.[10] Churchill's urging to postpone OVERLORD in favor of Mediterranean operations was resented by Roosevelt, Marshall and Stimson. Conversely, Brooke complained of American intransigence that prevented them from realizing the benefits of British Mediterranean policy. Writing in his diary on 1 November,

> If only I had sufficient force of character to swing those American Chiefs of Staff and make them see daylight, how different the war might be. We should have been in a position to force the Dardanelles by the capture of Crete and Rhodes. We should have had the whole of the Balkans ablaze by now, and the war might be finished in 1943![11]

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[7] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 2/VIII, 20 Nov. 1943, 829.
[8] FRUS *Cairo and Tehran*,1943, Washington, 22 Nov. 1943, pp. 301-303, 327-330.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] J. Holland, *The Aegean Mission*, (New York 1988), pp. 169, 172.
[11] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/X 1 Nov. 1943, 808.

Although Roosevelt agreed to meet Churchill on the 22 November in Cairo, he carefully avoided meeting him privately, thereby deferring a decision on grand strategy until they met with Stalin at Tehran. 'Roosevelt was an artist in avoiding discussion of issues he did not want to discuss. On the other hand he was affable enough to make Churchill reasonably optimistic about the conference.'[12] Not knowing the preferred Russian strategy, the President avoided reaching a decision on Mediterranean versus OVERLORD issues that could leave him open to Russian criticism. He did not want the Russians to conclude that the British and the Americans were ganging up on them. It followed that Churchill's hopes for further Mediterranean action were dashed. Brooke wanted to thrash out policy and strategy for Germany's defeat with the Americans and then present a united front to Stalin. This was exactly what the Americans did not want. Roosevelt intended that the Anglo-Americans would go to Tehran without a common plan.

Cairo: SEXTANT I

The participants at the Cairo Conference of 22-26 November tried to do to much work into too little time, exhausting the participants before they traveled to Tehran. Churchill's attitude did not help. Brooding over the near-disaster at Salerno, he was convinced that a planned invasion of France would fail. He was ready to explode at the slightest provocation. All the spark that he required was discovering that 25 percent of the landing craft assigned to strengthen OVERLORD were to be transferred elsewhere. Hopkins considered Churchill's behavior obstreperous.[13] Brooke believed that Churchill's reaction to his loss of prestige was to secretly entertain the formation of a purely British theater in the Mediterranean on which all the battle laurels would fall.[14]

According to John Eisenhower, son of the General, SEXTANT I was laden with such acrimony for several reasons: an accumulation of unpleasant decision deferred from

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[12] K. Sainsbury, *Op cit.*, p. 177.
[13] Lord Moran, *Op. cit.*, p. 152.
[14] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/X, 18 Nov. 1943, 823.

previous conferences, leaving basic disagreements unresolved, the loss of British partnership dominance, the concern over the meeting with Stalin and the presence of Chiang and his wife in Cairo.[15] According to Stephen Mings, the Anglo-Americans 'compromised on areas where their interests were either disparate or in direct opposition.'[16] Superficially that may be true, but compromise does not necessarily mean satisfaction or a willingness to fulfill partnership obligations under an agreement. The meetings became 'dysfunctional' as participants began paying lip service, supporting hidden agendas and being passive-aggressive. These were the usual behavioral components, manifested by criticism, contempt, defensiveness and withdrawal.[17] Compounding these problems on a functional basis, CCS meetings were lengthy, overcrowded and their participants were frequently bad tempered. Marshall's memo to the COS, prior to the meeting, noted that approximately 50 officers in the American party would attend, to which General Handy took exception. He considered the amount of staff insufficient to fulfill the needs of the American representatives.[18] Accompanying them were officers, security and office personnel, communications specialists and messengers, protecting reams of boxed classified records containing top secret strategic information. Brief cases in which important secret papers were stuffed, were called 'albatrosses', because they were chained to their owners until they arrived safely in Cairo.[19]

The Conference registered two tripartite plenary sessions, five CCS meetings, in which two were attended by the Chinese military representatives, five COS and five JCS meetings, each body meeting separately, and numerous informal military and political meetings, and working luncheons. Nine of the items on the agenda pertained to Southeast Asia and four related to OVERLORD/Mediterranean.

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[15] J. Eisenhower to Author, 2 Aug. 1994.
[16] S. Mings, *Stategies in Conflict, Britain and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941-1943*, (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Texas, 1975), p. 386.
[17] J. Gottman, *Why Marriages Succeed Or Fail*, (New York, 1994), pp. 71-102.
[18] JCS 120 Meeting, Washington, 26 Oct. 1943, Reel II.
[19] Richard Collins Papers, 'Details for SEXTANT',quoted in T. Parrish, *Roosevelt and Marshall*, (New York, 1989), pp. 374.

The JCS considered the British proposals in 'CCS-409', which recommended shifting the war effort in Europe to the Mediterranean with a subsequent delay of OVERLORD for perhaps two months. If the delay were acceptable, the other proposals made by the BCOS presented no particular difficulty, but if the delay was unacceptable to the JCS, the problem appeared insoluble. King believed, that due to the slow progress in Italy, the British had a valid request, but certain issues, i.e., advance to the Po, Trieste and southern France needed further clarification by Eisenhower. It was a question of landing craft production, availability and distribution.[20]

The CCS met for the last time in Cairo on 26 November at one of the most crucial meetings of the whole conference. Before adjourning, the JCS, anxious that the Russians at Tehran might advocate a Balkan-Mediterranean policy or a Turkish entry into the war in preference to OVERLORD, persuaded the COS to consult privately with them on the issue before committing the Allies to an Anglo-American position. Brooke approved of this proposal and accepted the American suggestion of a unified Mediterranean command, but rejected the idea of an overall commander for Germany and an overall strategic bombing commander based in Washington, to which AOC Bomber Command Harris would never accede. The Americans, in a conciliatory mood on these issues, were willing to accept a limited postponement of OVERLORD.[21]

Eisenhower presented his views on the same day. As AFHQ Commander, in the central Mediterranean, he supported an all-out winter offensive in Italy and a build-up of Allied forces capable of moving east or west beyond the Po. Due to the shortage of landing craft, he considered a cancellation of an invasion of southern France. If additional means were available, he recommended limited operations in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans, and garnered support from his British colleagues.[22] Marshall was not deterred, recognizing that Eisenhower, like all theater commanders, fought for his own corner and said, 'that the JCS tentatively accepted the British

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[20] JCS 131 Meeting, Washington, 26 Nov. 1943, Reel II.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*

proposals implied in the capture of the Rimini-Pisa line and the capture of Rhodes, but that further discussion would take place on these proposals when the CCS returned to Cairo after Tehran.[23]

Eastern Mediterranean versus Far Eastern Operations

The real quarrel began, not over OVERLORD, but over the relative merits, political implications and priorities of operations in the eastern Mediterranean versus those in the Far East. The extent of American flexibility on OVERLORD was tied to the British approving the Andaman Islands, BUCCANEER, operation in the Far East, which would have precluded an amphibious attack on Rhodes. When Brooke suggested that BUCCANEER be canceled and the freed landing craft be deployed to the Aegean, Marshall's reaction was severe. A heated argument developed with each operation heavily defended, that Brooke called, 'the father and mother of a row'.[24] King became so angry with Brooke's arrogance regarding shipping resources that he almost climbed over the table to get at him.[25] Because of Roosevelt's secret commitment to Chiang regarding BUCCANEER, the operation was not negotiable. Marshall had not changed his mind about the eastern Mediterranean. At a previous dinner meeting, attended by Churchill and his COS, Marshall was unshaken by the Prime Minister's bombast calling for an invasion of Rhodes. Marshall described the following scene to his biographer, Forrest Pogue, after the war.

> Churchill was red hot and all the British were against me. It got hotter and hotter. Churchill stood before me, his hands clutching his lapels and declared, 'His Majesty's Government can not have its troops staying idle. Muskets must flame'. I responded sharply, 'God forbid if I should try to dictate, but not one American soldier is going to die on that Goddamned beach.'[26]

Because of these disagreements and the increased emotional content expressed at the meeting up to that point, the conference room was cleared of staff, while the major

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[23] *Ibid.*
[24] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/X, 26 Nov. 1943, 830.
[25] J. Stilwell, T. White, (ed.), *The Stilwell* Papers, (New York, 1948), p. 245.
[26] CCS 128 Meeting, SEXTANT Conference, Washington, 24 Nov. 1943, Reel IV.; F. Pogue Interview with Marshall quoted in T. Parrish, *Op. cit.*, p. 390.

participants went 'off the record' to conduct their business in private. Sometimes even the secretaries, interpreting their roles as more than mere recordists, tried to break the deadlock by discussing an issue between themselves. By approaching their respective negotiators with a suggested impartial course of action, the impasse might be broken. Sometimes disputes arose from causes no deeper than the different shades of meaning given to some simple word, e. g., British 'demand' versus American 'request' If their attempts at conciliation failed, the remaining 'off the record' meeting lost any hope of being officially transcribed, eliminating any opportunity for further assessment and interpretation of the business conducted. Nor were the British less thorough in the presentation, although they outwardly demonstrated light-heartedness. However, behind this outward aplomb, they held their position to a man. British planners viewed high-level war preparations impersonally and based much of their operations on mathematical calculations, because the war had gone on much too long; to them, having had much experience with a variety of operations, an operation was worth while if it were cost effective.[27] Therefore, they sought no third party such as Stalin, the least impartial of third parties to arbitrate in their clash over strategy with the Americans.

The Tehran Agreement

Five days later, the Americans returned from Tehran with a binding agreement, based on Soviet strategic preferences comparable to their own, regarding operations in the West. Binding, because it was as if the Americans had written the agreement themselves, thereby eliminating any attempts to subvert it, as they had done with past Anglo-American agreements. Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Dodecanese were made obsolete in three days during the full length of the EUREKA meeting of 28-30 November. Replacing these activities in the Mediterranean were OVERLORD and ANVIL, considered by Stalin as a single, indivisible military undertaking.[28] Both were planned to coincide with a Soviet summer offensive and

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[27] Col. C. Donnelley, quoted in T. Parrish, *Op. cit.*, pp. 384-86.
[28] CCS 132 Meeting. EUREKA Conference, 30 Nov. 1943, Washington, Reel IV; G.A. Harrison, *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

increased Allied operations in Italy. Moreover, Stalin insisted that a Supreme OVERLORD Commander be named quickly. Roosevelt and Stalin had achieved primacy over an angry Churchill, who, feeling excluded and disappointed by Roosevelt's successful attempts to curry favor, however naïve, with the Russian leader, eventually had no other course but to comply. He disliked having to leave Cairo without a decision on combined plans for Europe in 1944, and then having to argue with the Americans against their overall plan in front of the Russians at Tehran.[29]

Cairo: SEXTANT II

By 2 December the major participants had returned to Cairo exhausted, only to be locked in debate for another five days upon arriving. The Americans had left Cairo for Tehran in a despondent mood, believing that Stalin wanted an Allied operation close to his own front, in the Eastern Mediterranean, which would conform to the British position. When instead Stalin supported the American view, the British were astounded. They said the southern France operation could not be done due to a lack of resources, but when American plans, organized on the spot, demonstrated it could, they lost the argument.[30] The Americans returned to Cairo elated. One major issue, Operation BUCCANEER, and three subsidiary issues relating to the allocation of resources for the Italian campaign, southern France (ANVIL) and operations in the Aegean demanded resolution. The British were dumbfounded when the Americans announced that policy-making at SEXTANT II had to be completed in three days. There were no apologies, but Churchill expressed his apprehension over an early separation. Before the Conference closed, Churchill wished Roosevelt to abandon BUCCANEER, because landing craft were desperately needed in the Mediterranean. BUCCANEER's fate seemed doomed when Mountbatten requested three times the manpower and material than originally sought for the operation. Roosevelt hesitated

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[29] CAB 65/40 WM(43)169, 13.Dec. 1943.

[30] Gen. T. Handy Interview Washington, 28, Sept. 1956, RG 165, 'Plan for Invasion of Southern France'; JPS 249, Washington, 5 Aug. 1943, 'Study, Operation Against Southern France'; 'ABC 384 Europe' (5 Aug. 1943), 9-A, 29 Nov. 1943, RG 165 WPD.

and his Chiefs were divided. As with the aborted SLEDGEHAMMER operation, the British were being asked to supply the bulk of the forces. The British and Americans remained deadlocked and British recommendations for a smaller operation in order to break the impasse were denied by the President. Finally, Roosevelt capitulated; BUCCANEER would not be implemented, because he accepted that there were not enough resources to mount both it and OVERLORD on the required scale.[31] The deadlock was broken and the British, who had persevered, were pleased, but it remained one of the bitterest strategic arguments of the war. At the third plenary session on 4 December, Churchill called on Brooke to express his views of the Conference.[32]

> This Conference has been most unsatisfactory. Usually at all these meetings we discussed matters till we arrived at a policy which we put forth to the Prime Minister and the President for approval and amendment. And that we subsequently examined whether ways and means admitted of this policy being carried out. Finally putting on paper for approval which formed our policy for the future conduct of the war. This time such a procedure had been impossible.[33]

Nevertheless, the British military hierarchy remained dominant in the Mediterranean. Wilson assumed supreme command of a unified Mediterranean Theater on 24 December 1943, Alexander was appointed C-in-C Italy and Cunningham, Naval C-in-C Mediterranean. Eisenhower relinquished his Mediterranean command and transferred to OVERLORD as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF). Under the agreement 68 landing craft would remain in the Mediterranean until January 1944 as part of projected amphibious operations in Italy and the intended Allied advance to the Pisa-Rimini line. In addition, Aegean operations were left to the discretion of SCAEF, and finally, to allow enough time to mount the aforementioned Italian operations, OVERLORD was postponed from 1 May to 1 June [34] The end of the toughest Anglo-American summit thus far loomed in sight. Prior to adjournment, Brooke recommended that each COS should study how best to reduce the enormous

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[31] *Papers and Minutes of Meetings*, SEXTANT Conference, (Washington 1943).
[32] FRUS, *Cairo and Tehran*, *Op. cit.*, p. 699-705.
[33] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/X, 4 Dec. 1943, p. 858.
[34] 'Papers and Minutes of Meetings', SEXTANT Conference, *Op. cit.*

work-load of future conferences, warning that they would undoubtedly have to occur at shorter intervals. Yet nine months were to pass before the Allies convened at Second Quebec (OCTAGON) in September 1944, having achieved the longest separation since America had entered the war which seemed to stand as an act of avoidance and defiance by each side.[35]

On 31 December 1943, the US Secretariat and the COS suggested to the CCS ways and means of improving the working conditions and agendas of future conferences, in recognition of the negotiating debacle at SEXTANT.[36]

The Cairo and Tehran meetings were tripartite summits whose results represented a form of coalition warfare based upon an alliance of distinct parties combining to fight a common foe, but not united enough in their efforts to form a co-ordinated strategy. The Second World War coalition was an *entente cordiale* between the three great powers, in which all the participants had a common goal of defeating the Axis, but this did not amount to a Grand Alliance. The two alliances pursued separate policies and Stalin only influenced but never truly co-ordinated them, and their separate military offensives rarely became a triangular military effort.[37] Moreover, as Churchill's influence with Roosevelt waned after 1943, the President responded to Churchill's two page letters either by cable or through a third party, such as Hopkins or Harriman, and many important military questions were hardly addressed.[38] This turnabout may have been partly due to Roosevelt's declining health, diagnosed after Tehran as hypertension, hypertensive heart disease and congestive heart failure.[39]

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[35] R. Parkinson, *Alamein to VE Day*, (London, 1974), pp. 197-208.
[36] 'Preparation for Future US-British Conferences', Washington, 31 Dec. 1943, Rg 218.
[37] A. Perlmutter, *FDR and Stalin*, (London, 1993), p. 55.
[38] D. Kaiser, 'Churchill, Roosevelt and the Limits of Power', *International Security*, 10:1, (Summer, 1985), 204-221.
[39] H. Bruenn, MD, 'Clinical notes on the Illness and Death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt', *Annals of Internal Medicine*, (April 1970).

The ANVIL versus Italian/Balkan Debate

The decision on the timing, preparation and size for both French operations was unavoidable, because of the May guarantee. Reporting to the CCS on 17 January 1944, Eisenhower weighed the requirements of OVERLORD, increased from three to five divisions, against the feasibility of a simultaneous three divisional ANVIL. Generals Montgomery, Smith and Morgan deemed ANVIL unfeasible if mounted simultaneously with OVERLORD, due to the shortage of landing craft. If ANVIL could not be eliminated entirely, they suggested, it should be used as a diversion and reduced to a one divisional threat.[40] Eisenhower refused, insisting that ANVIL would be most effective as an operation. The commitment to the Russians and the financing of a French Army meant as far as Eisenhower was concerned, that ANVIL was not negotiable.[41] In addition, Eisenhower and Marshall realized that these forces would stagnate (or be appropriated for some British scheme) in the Mediterranean, if ANVIL were canceled.

Eisenhower was willing to postpone OVERLORD beyond 1 June in order to keep ANVIL alive, a postponement to which both the COS and the JCS subscribed. During early January when the COS debated ANVIL's cancellation, Portal and Cunningham recommended ANVIL as a useful two divisional diversion to OVERLORD. On 4 February, Churchill concluded that OVERLORD and ANVIL were not strategically entwined, as perceived by Stalin. Consequently, Churchill doubted ANVIL's diversionary value, even with limited resources.[42] In part, this was a reaction to the worsening of the Italian campaign and the Allied failure at Anzio. Brooke concurred, writing, 'We had a long COS meeting about the wire to send the American COS to convince them that with the turn operations have taken in the Mediterranean, the only thing to do is to go on fighting the war in Italy and giving up any idea of a weak

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[40] COSSAC (44) 5, Op. ANVIL, Washington, 6 Jan. 44, RG. 331, SHAEF SGS FILE 370.2/2 I.
[41] CCS 142 Meeting., Washington, 21 Jan. 1944, Reel IV; J. Hobbs, *Dear Gen.: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall*, (Baltimore, 1971), pp. 131-48.
[42] 'Firm Recommendations with Regard to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD', RG. 331, SGS File 370.2/2 I; CCS Meeting 144, 'CCS 465/4', Washington, 4 Feb. 1944, Reel IV.

landing in southern France.'[43] Marshall remained obdurate. He responded in a strongly worded statement, which noted the irreconcilable differences Brooke and him: ANVIL was essential to the success of OVERLORD as was the use of French forces. Marshall saw it as an instrument for reducing the enemy build-up against the OVERLORD lodgement during the critical period of Allied consolidation and expansion. Although the availability of landing craft was, as ever, critical, adequate resources would be found to provide for an expanded assault lift for both OVERLORD and ANVIL. Marshall discounted the recommendation to transfer French troops from the Mediterranean to Normandy as impractical, because of shipping shortages. He agreed that the actual date of assault might have to be delayed to 2 June, but sufficient latitude was permitted SCAEF by designating 31 May as the target date. With the defeats at Cassino and Anzio, the Italian campaign continued to deteriorate – further upsetting Allied logistical and tactical time-tables. Marshall considered the theater was,

> ...a vacuum demanding our time and resources in a region which never will be decisive militarily, and...the partial diversion of our strategic bombing effort against the Reich in support of surface operations...
>
> ...Although it is agreed that the campaign in Italy has not developed according to expectation, it is not agreed that this situation affords a sound basis on which to intensify the Italian campaign at the expense of ANVIL....
>
> Therefore, we consider that on balance, the results to be achieved by slow and costly progress north in Italy as compared to a stabilized strategy combined with ANVIL in support of OVERLORD, weigh heavily in favor the latter.[44]

Roosevelt and Churchill had proposed that the CCS meet in either London or Washington to settle the matter.[45] Brooke, convinced that trans-Atlantic cables were ineffective as instruments for resolving the existing level of conflict, invited Marshall to London. Marshall demurred because of pressing Pacific concerns; instead, he authorized Eisenhower to represent the JCS in any forthcoming negotiations with the COS, stipulating that the JCS would accept the results as binding.[46] The COS agreed,

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[43] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op., cit.*, 3/B/XI, 19 Jan. 1944, p. 895.
[44] JCS 'Record of SHAEF on OVERLORD and ANVIL', Washington, 5 Feb. 1944, Reel II.
[45] Eisenhower to CCS, 'Meeting, London', 8, 9 Feb. 1944, RG. 165, Exec. 10, Box 54.
[46] CCS 145 Meeting.,Washington, 11 Feb. 1944, Reel IV.

provided that in the event of disagreement, the question would be referred back to the CCS.[47]

If OVERLORD were to be the climactic battle of the war in which America would destroy the German Army first and foremost, Marshall's behavior is open to question. Although he should have accepted Brooke's invitation to resolve the strategic conflict *in camera*, it is possible to conclude that his management and leadership techniques led to his refusal, i.e., Marshall preferred to delegate authority to someone trustworthy like Eisenhower. 'Marshall only picked officers who were confident in the outcome of the actions they were undertaking.'[48] Whatever his intentions within the short time available, by placing Eisenhower between him and Brooke, Marshall removed himself from direct involvement.

On 4 January, Generals Bernard Montgomery, C-in-C 21st Army Group, Walter B. Smith, Eisenhower's CoS and Admiral Bertram Ramsey C-in-C Allied Naval Expeditionary Force (ANCFX)), met in London and agreed to a diversionary role for ANVIL, thereby compounding the confusion.[49] By approving ANVIL, they hoped to please Eisenhower, who, in turn, hoped to please Marshall, all at severe cost to OVERLORD. Brooke intervened and stopped the foolishness, at least on the British side, remarking sarcastically, 'What a way to run a war!' [50] Marshall expected Eisenhower to accomplish these conflicting Herculean problems facing him, not only as the newly appointed Supreme Commander, but also as the agent for the JCS. Eisenhower, saddled with this added burden tried to compose a command team, determine OVERLORD's parameters and compensate for Marshall's elusiveness. Concurrently, Eisenhower, recalled to Washington, missed preliminary Anglo-American staff conferences in London, crucial to his new appointment. This state of affairs complicated and needlessly prolonged negotiations with the British. One of

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[47] Eisenhower, Memo 'OVERLORD/ANVIL Conference', London, 11 Feb., 1944, RG 165, Exec. 10, Box 54.
[48] Col. P. Munch, 'Gen. George C. Marshall and the Army Staff', *Military Review*, lvxxiv, 8, (Aug.,1994),14-23.
[49] FM Lord Wilson, *Report by the SACMED to the CCS on Ops in So. France August 1944*, p. 8.
[50] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/B/XI, 16 Feb. 1944, 902.

Eisenhower's messages read, 'Late developments in Italy create the possibility that the necessary forces required cannot be disentangled in time to mount a strong ANVIL.'[51] Marshall accused him of *localitis*, a pejorative term that Eisenhower interpreted as succumbing to the British point of view. Eisenhower denied the charge. No one was more loyal to Marshall than Eisenhower; Marshall could have lessened his fears, if he had agreed to negotiate in London.[52]

Negotiations by Proxy

Two meetings convened on 21 February 1944; a JCS morning meeting and a JCS-Presidential afternoon meeting, the same subject dominated both meetings: the need for a simultaneous ANVIL.[53] Marshall's failure to negotiate with the COS in London became apparent. At the earlier meeting, Marshall believed that an impasse had developed between the COS and the JCS in connection with OVERLORD-ANVIL. To break it, he proposed two alternatives for consideration: if the Allies failed to reach Rome by 1 April, they ought to defer ANVIL and release approximately 40 percent of its landing craft to OVERLORD – or fight a defensive war in Italy and make their main Mediterranean offensive through southern France. However, he was sure Montgomery and Churchill would disagree.

Marshall urged that a telegram be sent to Eisenhower referring to 'COS(W) 1156', the British directive which urged complete abandonment of ANVIL and to inform him that as their agent conferring with the COS on OVERLORD-ANVIL, he had failed to furnish the JCS with an in-depth report related to the results reached. By not complying with the JCS request, Eisenhower had complicated an already complicated issue. Marshall was prepared to stand by Eisenhower, but the COS had already by-passed the Supreme Commander rather than risking a clear-cut break. From the

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[51] Eisenhower to Marshall, Washington, 6 Feb. 1944, RG. 331 'OVERORD/ANVIL' SHAEF SGS file 381.
[52] Marshall to Eisenhower, *Op. cit.*, Washington, 7 Feb. 1944, CM-OUT 277; J. Hobbs, *Op. cit.*, 134, 138-141.
[53] JCS 147 Meeting; 'Meeting with the President', Washington, 21 Feb.,1944, Reel II.

American point of view, Eisenhower had to seek an immediate conference with the COS and either reach an agreement or, failing that, prepare a carefully stated rebuttal for which the JCS. Acknowledging Eisenhower was under great pressure, the JCS dispatched a message to him, 'CM-OUT 8770' with an added closing phrase, 'and the JCS will support your decision subject of course to the approval of the President.' King thought it best to settle the ANVIL question in Washington, rather than risk compromising Eisenhower's position any further. He added that the President should be informed of the deadlock in view of the commitments made at Cairo and Tehran. The JCS agreed, that during the afternoon meeting with the President, they should propose a definite program for action rather than merely describe the present OVERLORD-ANVIL impasse.[54]

COS Proposals to Break the Deadlock

At the afternoon White House meeting, the President was informed of the COS request to cancel ANVIL, its need for an immediate response and an invitation to the JCS to come to London for talks. Moreover, the COS gave first priority to the deteriorating Italian campaign, insisting that there were not sufficient resources to mount ANVIL, destroy the German forces in Italy and accumulate the means to mount a re-enforced five divisional OVERLORD. Since Eisenhower maintained that he had enough landing-craft for both operations, the JCS strongly opposed its cancellation. The President agreed, noting that ANVIL's cancellation would displease the Russians. They had insisted, however upon transferring two or divisions to OVERLORD, if ANVIL could not be mounted.[55]

Roosevelt concurred with the message sent to Eisenhower, but cautioned SCAEF that the United States was committed to a third power, who would not abandon ANVIL in the light of previously broken promises. Roosevelt preferred not to talk with the Russians about the possibility cautioning, if not moralizing, that since the United States

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[54] *Ibid.*
[55] *Ibid.*

had broken its promises in the past, it had better not do so again.[56] His premise was self-serving, defending a position which ignored the situation in Italy. By avoiding a Russo-American dialogue, he also limited his strategic options. While the President, unlike Marshall, conceded that 'Eisenhower was badly pushed and placed in a difficult position as the JCS representative in the OVERLORD-ANVIL conversations,'[57] but he did nothing about it.

With little time remaining, the President inquired if the JCS were familiar with a British proposal to send a joint expeditionary force into Yugoslavia led by an American general? Marshall said, 'No', and added, 'that it would be very bad indeed and probably (would) result in a new war'. The President assured the JCS that Yugoslavia was not an option, because he and the American public wanted to get the Army out of Europe as quickly as possible. He had told Churchill as much. In an aside, the President observed that the British were selling US Lend-Lease tires through a commercial company at exorbitant prices.[58] No discussion followed, and the purpose of President's 'British-bashing' remained in doubt. Certainly, these accusations did little to improve the immediate negotiating climate.

Eisenhower's Search for Compromise

Eisenhower, as JCS agent, was not only more flexible than Marshall, but more realistic. Being Supreme Commander, as well as a co-operative personality, helped. He searched for a compromise between Marshall's insistence to mount ANVIL and Brooke's desire to cancel it. Depending upon Cunningham in Naval matters, Brooke charged his planners to find provision for a balanced logistical and tactical lift, if both amphibious operations were to be attempted simultaneously. On 19 February Eisenhower's compromise plan was attacked by 21st Army Group Planners and rejected by the COS, because it discounted the tactical side, which sacrificed separate

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[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] *Ibid.*

assault lifts for special forces and eliminated that ready combination of assault and reserve forces on the same ship.[59] The American planners made a fundamental error that bedeviled calculations for months to come; having failed to consult with either COSSAC or British GHQ Home Forces, they concluded that an LST's capacity was 30 tanks, the figure for stowage in transit. When loading tanks for an assault landing, the true figure was 25.[60] Minimum OVERLORD assault loading requirements were nearly satisfied but fell short by tantalizing small percentages, i.e. 0.07 percent for men and 0.05 percent for motor vehicles.[61] Eisenhower realized that only by weakening OVERLORD could he mount a simultaneous ANVIL; and both were held hostage by events in Italy. This exercise highlighted how landing craft, a finite resource, hampered strategic amphibious operations throughout the war. Coupled with upper echelon indecision, the shortage continued to played havoc with the required minimum standards and calculations on which the success of an amphibious operation depended.

Competition from Anzio

At the end of December, Churchill, convalescing with pneumonia at Marrakech, discussed future Italian operations with his Mediterranean Commanders, Wilson, and Alexander. With Brooke in London, Churchill, as Minister of Defence, exercised his 'military talents' on these appointees with a free hand. When Churchill's doctor and confidant suggested that Churchill, like Hitler, not only directed the policy, but even planned the details of war, Churchill responded, 'Yes, that's just what I do.'[62] He pressed for a landing at Anzio and the capture of Rome, before the Allies undertook OVERLORD and ANVIL. Churchill, Wilson and Alexander concluded that a two division assault, supported by airborne troops and followed up by an armored formation, based on the elements of a third division should be sufficient to achieve their objectives in Italy. Unfortunately, any systematic attempt to predict both the enemy's

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[59] Special Meeting, 'OVERLORD/ANVIL', London, 17, Feb. 1944, RG. 331 SHAEF SGS File 381 I.
[60] Interview with Sir R. Kilner Brown, London, 22 Oct. 1994.
[61] 'Battle of Numbers', Washington 8 Feb. 1944, RG. 165 OPD Exec. 10. Item 522.
[62] Lord Moran, *Op. cit.*, p. 180.

capacity or will to resist or his strategic reaction later was missed at Marrakech. Even though on 3 January, just three weeks prior to the landing at Anzio, Operation SHINGLE was defined as a high-risk venture, none of the Allied commanders were willing to argue against the Prime Minister's enthusiasm.[63] The decision-making process unraveled, because the implications of decisions at each level were not pursued downwards or was two-way communication maintained. Six Corps General John P. Lucas, designated to lead the Anzio assault, had not even been invited to Marrakech. On 9 January he attended a meeting at General Alexander's Italian headquarters and later wrote in his diary,

> I felt like a lamb being led to slaughter but felt entitled to one bleat so I registered a protest against the target date as it gave me too little time for rehearsal. I was ruled down....The real reasons can not be military...[64]

SHINGLE would be executed, but with far less means than originally planned. Although the demands of the Italian campaign overrode ANVIL's intent, Allied preoccupation with ANVIL gave little assurance that SHINGLE would succeed. If SHINGLE failed, the operation would not serve strategy and policy would suffer. The slow pace of the Allied advance in Italy, reports of assault shipping departing the Mediterranean for the UK, leaving the remainder too weak to mount another Anzio-type operation, prompted Hitler to issue a formal directive on 4 October 1943. Not only would the Germans choose to resist and fight for central Italy, but they even considered going on the offensive. Hitler deduced that the Allies aimed at securing the political prize of Rome and using Italy as a base from which to attack southern France or the Balkans.[65] Hitler's prescience was borne out by Wilson's summation of the central Italian campaign, in which SACMED made the error of assuming that German and British intentions for Rome were identical: 'The political effects of the capture of Rome would, in my opinion, be as important as the military consequences. The prestige of

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[63] F. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, III, Pt. I, (London, 1984), p. 185; CAB 121/592, NAF 577, 3 Jan. 1944.

[64] Maj. Gen. J. Lucas, 'Meeting. Alexander's Headquarters', 8 Jan. 1944, *J. P. Lucas Papers*, as quoted in D. Graham & S. Bidwell, *Tug of War*, (London, 1986), p.138.

[65] F. Hinsley, *Op. cit.*, pp. 173, 176.

possession of the Italian capital, like Stalingrad, was equally important to the enemy as ourselves...'[66]

Wilson's elevated Rome from the 'Eternal City' to the 'Sacred City' on a par with Verdun; the reasons for reciprocal escalation in 1916 were inappropriate in 1944. Nevertheless the Italian campaign had developed into a war of attrition. French General Alphonse Juin, Commander of the French Expeditionary Force during the battles for central Italy, commented on the high price paid for a politically-driven campaign:

> Once again we have run into one of the stumbling blocks of coalition warfare: the Allies cannot come to an agreement and co-ordinate their efforts. Questions of prestige are shaping events, each one wanting to make the entry in to Rome. History will not fail to pass severe sentence.[67]

Even with the benefit of ULTRA intercepts,[68] the insufficiencies of Anzio, like Salerno before it, reminded Eisenhower that without military dominance, the invading OVERLORD forces could be driven into the sea or suffer from the same sort of stalemate.[69] A post-war indictment read:

> The 43,000 casualties suffered on Anzio were the result not of compelling military logic but by frivolous political forces and a tragic series of faulty assumptions. Specifically, the landings lacked a single clear objective; the turning movement was too shallow and the most glaring defect was the inadequate size of the landing force.[70]

The popular historian, Alaistair Horne, in his biography of Montgomery ignored Churchill's responsibility for Anzio and the diversion of landing craft elsewhere. They were needed to supply and reinforce the six divisions on the beachhead, and consequently jeopardized ANVIL. Horne chose to blame the Americans instead, citing as the major factor contributing to the shortfall the production of destroyer-escorts and escort carriers in 1942 and most of 1943, urgently needed in the Battle of the Atlantic.[71]

In 1942, Britain's design and production difficulties seriously slowed the landing craft

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[66] FM H. Wilson, *Report by SACMED to the CCS on the Italian Campaign, May to December 1944*, Pt. II, 1946, p. 2.
[67] G. Boulle, *Le Corps Expéditionnaire Français en Italie, 1943-44*, (Paris, 1973), p. 310.
[68] F. Hinsley, *Op. cit.*, pp. 173-181.
[69] R. Bennett, 'Intelligence and Strategy in World War II', K. G. Robertson, (ed.), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, (London, 1987), pp. 142-143.
[70] Maj. F. Galgano, 'The Landings at Anzio', *Military Review*, (Jan. 1994), pp. 69-71.
[71] A. Horne & Lord D. Montgomery, *Monty, The Lonely Leader*, (London, 1994), pp. 78-79.

program down to a trickle. In a memorandum to the President, Marshall warned, 'that more shipping that is now in sight is essential if the national war effort is not to be neutralized to a serious extent.'[72] Unfortunately, the conversion to landing craft came too late to offset the shortage in 1944.[73] Other factors contributing to the problems in the Mediterranean included King's tight control over the release and distribution of landing craft [74] and Montgomery and Eisenhower's demands for a reinforced five divisional OVERLORD. Moreover, Horne does not substantiate his claim that during the ANVIL debate, Churchill clearly expressed the desire to project an ANVIL force into the Balkans.[75] Both Horne and Nigel Hamilton have distorted reality by writing that landing craft were sent from Britain to the Mediterranean rather than the other way round, an error perpetuating a belief that the Americans were not only intransigent, but strategically naïve.[76]

On the 19 February Eisenhower and the COS agreed that Italy required immediate assistance, ANVIL would revert to the scale originally intended, planning would continue and 20 British LST's (Landing Ship Tank) and 21 British LSI's (Landing Ship Infantry), in exchange for 6 US AKA's (Attack transports) would sail from the Mediterranean to Britain, on 20 March.[77]

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) on 12 January assisted the Joint Planners in examining SHAEF's recommendation that OVERLORD should be strengthened and ANVIL reduced to a threat. It suggested that the land opposition to OVERLORD was 'unlikely' to be less, and in the early stages might 'exceed', what the COSSAC Plan had allowed. Opposition would not be any greater if ANVIL was reduced to a threat. There was no evidence that any reduction of ANVIL would lead to substantial changes

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[72] Gen. G. Marshall, 'Shipping', Washington, 18 Feb. 1942, PSF, box 3, FDRL.
[73] 'Gen. B. Somervell and Adm. F. Horne to Roosevelt: Landing Craft for BOLERO', Washington, 14 May 1942, RG 165 WDCSA 400 (S); R. Weigley, *Op cit.*, pp. 330-331.
[74] R. Lewin, *Montgomery As Military Commander*, (New York, 1971), pp. 175-176.
[75] M. Matloff, 'Wilmot Revisited: Myth and Reality in Anglo-American Strategy for the Second Front'., Eisenhower Foundation (eds.), *D-Day, The Normandy Invasion in Retrospect*, (Lawrence, KS, 1971), pp. 104-129; A. Horne, et al, *Op. cit.*, p. 78; J. Grigg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 198-203.
[76] *Ibid.*, Horne, p. 79; N. Hamilton, *Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944*, (London, 1983), p. 526.
[77] COS to JSM, 'Landing Craft', Washington, 19 Feb. 1944, RG 165 OPD CM-IN 14255.

in enemy dispositions. British Intelligence emphasized, on 24 February, that if the Allied plan of tying down German formations in Italy were to succeed, Hitler had to be deceived about Allied intentions and resources in the Mediterranean. If it failed, German formations would transfer to Normandy to augment the forces already there. The JIC evaluations indicated that the enemy 'appeared' nervous about a threat to southern France, but suggested an assault in the Adriatic on the Istrian Peninsula, immediately after OVERLORD, would offer greater assistance than ANVIL.[78]

The onerous conditions in Italy prompted Montgomery to reverse his position, and on 21 February he wrote the following petition to Eisenhower: 'I recommend very strongly that we now throw the whole weight of our opinion onto the scales against ANVIL. Let us have two really good major campaigns, one in Italy and one in OVERLORD.'[79] It took one more month of discussions for Eisenhower to accede to Montgomery's recommendations which echoed those of the COS and Churchill's. However, on 21 February he wrote the following to Montgomery, 'OVERLORD would have no real support from the Mediterranean. This bothers me.'[80]

Conferring on 18 February in Italy, Wilson and Alexander agreed that either a one divisional assault in the spring or a two divisional assault later against southern France was dead.[81] Marshall and Eisenhower sought compromise by:

> 1.) suggesting that the reallocation of assault shipping should take effect in April
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> 2.) by planning ANVIL as a two divisional assault composed of 88 LST's, 90 LCI's, 60 LCT's and 8 LSI's
>
> 3.) reviewing its feasibility on 20 March.

If it were concluded that ANVIL was impracticable on that date, anything above the lift for one division would be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and assigned to OVERLORD. By 24 February all of the principals involved agreed to the above

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[78] F. Hinsley, *Op. cit.*, pp.24-26.
[79] Montgomery to Eisenhower, Washington, 21 Feb. 1944, RG. 165, Exec. 9, Book 15, Box 45.
[80] Eisenhower to Montgomery, *Op. cit.*
[81] FM. H. Wilson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 7, 11-12.

arrangement, amidst the search for landing craft. The Italian campaign was granted 'overriding priority over all existing and future operations in the Mediterranean' and given 'first call on all resources, land, sea and air' within the theater.[82] Since ANVIL was being crushed between the demands of OVERLORD and the Italian campaign, Eisenhower, with CCS approval, canceled ANVIL on 21 March.[83] Therefore, SHINGLE had not served strategy and policy suffered. At one stroke, by agreeing to postpone ANVIL until Rome was captured, the Americans threw away their most important card, the operation conceived to siphon German reserves from OVERLORD. The 'hammer' without its 'anvil' was compromised. The JCS claimed that the Germans had gained the strategic initiative by default, and disagreed with the COS that the capture of Rome was worth the heavy engagement in Italy: 'After the bridgehead and the main front have been joined, there will remain, in our opinion, no further military objectives in Italy which justify the time-consuming land costly effort to attain them.'[84] Even with America's phenomenal production capacity, a *sine qua non* of coalition dominance, it failed to achieve the actual power needed to force British compliance. Marshall, the 'Westerner', a believer in the concentration of effort at the decisive point in France failed to convince Churchill, the 'Easterner', a believer in diversionary operations in the Mediterranean, that to change was worthwhile.[85] This may be an out-dated description of and slightly unfair to Churchill, 'because Britain not only had a position to defend in the Middle East, but the resources which could be put to immediate effect against the enemy.'[86]

The Proposed Transfer of Pacific Landing Craft

The JCS opposed serious continuation of the Italian campaign beyond Rome. It was becoming obvious that it and alternative operations suggested by the COS (a big offensive north of Rome coupled with amphibious operations near the Po Valley and in

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[82] CCS 147 Meeting, Washington, 25 Feb. 1944, Reel IV.
[83] Eisenhower to Marshall, Washington, 21 Mar. 1944, RG 165 OPD CM-IN 15429.
[84] CCS 151 Meeting, 'OVERLORD and ANVIL 'CCS 465/14', Washington, 24 Mar. 1944, Reel IV.
[85] L. Hankey, *The Supreme Command, 1914-1918*, (London, 1961), pp. 244-245.
[86] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

Istria). would only feed the campaign's insatiable appetite. Marshall agreed to ANVIL's postponement, but refused to cancel it. He proposed that if the COS would accept a two divisional ANVIL, mounted on 10 July in support of OVERLORD, the JCS would transfer 26 LSTs and 40 LCI(L)] from the Pacific to the Mediterranean.[87] King concurred and the COS accepted the American proposal, assuming that when the strategic situation was reviewed in June, the additional landing craft would be used in a Mediterranean operation offering the most support to OVERLORD, e.g., Italy or ANVIL.[88] The British meaning of ANVIL changed, and becoming non-specific and non-exclusive. This assumption was in direct opposition to the JCS interpretation, who had consigned the Pacific landing craft to ANVIL only. On 29 March Dill warned the COS that the JCS was not receptive to any deviations. An irritated JCS maintained that ANVIL was the July support operation for OVERLORD[89] and protesting the British view, cabled,

> ...that the delayed ANVIL will be vigorously pressed and that it is the firm intention to mount this operation in support of OVERLORD with the target date indicated'. The USCOS are firm in their conviction that a decision must be taken to launch ANVIL on a specific date. They consider it is clearly evident that the operation will not be launched unless such a decision is taken....[90]

As the debate continued Brooke viewed the JSM, his representation in Washington, as no more than a post office delivering messages from the COS in London.[91] He preferred that they not express their own views or opinions, as if they too were suffering from *localitis*. Given his dissatisfaction, Brooke shrugged off the possibility of traveling to Washington. Like Marshall, he refused to grasp the nettle, and by avoiding direct confrontation, mismanaged and prolonged the negotiations.

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[87] CCS 158 Meeting, Washington, 28 Mar.1944, Reel IV.
[88] *Ibid.*
[89] CCS Meeting, Washington, 29 Mar. 1944, Reel IV.
[90] *Ibid.*
[91] FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/B/XII', 22 Mar., 1944.

An Alternative to ANVIL

On both sides of the Atlantic, attention focused on OVERLORD and the logistical support required for its success. Speculating on the consequences of a canceled ANVIL, General Roberts of the OPD wrote a memo to his superior, Handy:

> We get into political difficulties with the French; Overlord will lose at least ten fighting divisions. Our service forces continue to support the western Mediterranean. Our divisions and French divisions will be committed to a costly, unremunerative inching advance in Italy. The people of both the United States and France may or may not take this indefinitely and once committed to Italy, we have our forces pointed towards southeastern Europe and will have the greatest difficulty in preventing their use for occupation forces in Austria, Hungary and southern Germany.[92]

Roberts' argument in support of a southern France landing as the sole alternative not only increased American Anglophobia, but disregarded the possibility of a drive into northern Italy by a combination of all existing and newly created Allied divisions. For example, if ANVIL had been canceled, its seven divisions, released from a ten week amphibious training schedule, could have carried the May DIADEM offensive beyond the Franco-Italian border. Allied fighting power, already dominating sea and air, would have increased by a 5:1 ratio; more than enough to further damage the already weakened German Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. Roberts assessment, in support of Marshall's prejudice, that a land move into France from Italy was too slow, may have discounted Alexander's generalship, which, like Montgomery's, failed at the breakout and pursuit phase of a battle.[93] In theory, if the German Army, faced with unremitting Allied pressure, had collapsed on both the Norman and Italian fronts in July, rather than September, the Allies would have gained two more months of fine fighting weather, time enough to effect a linkage on the Franco-German border for the advance into Germany in 1944.[94] Only Churchill had considered an attack on southern France from Italy as a possibility. However, the Prime Minister weakened his case when he

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[92] Brig. Gen. F. Roberts to Gen. T. Handy, 'What Shall We Do About ANVIL?', Washington, 23 Mar. 1944, , RG. 165 OPD Exec. 9 Book 16.
[93] B. H. Reed, 'The Italian Campaign 1943-45: A Reappraisal of Allied Generalship', *JSS*, 13 1, (1990), pp.128-161.
[94] D. Graham & S. Bidwell, *Op. cit.*, pp. 398-404.

placed it on par with a move into Istria, thus raising American suspicions and opposition.[95]

The Istrian Alternative

Regarding an Istrian option, in early 1944, Alexander, supported by many of the military principals in the Mediterranean, including Wilson and General Mark Clark (Commander, Fifth Army), considered a plan, Operation ARMPIT, to break through the Apennines and carry the Ljubljana gap, no more than 30 miles wide, through which the main road and railway run from Italy into northern Yugoslavia. Vienna lay at the end of this 250 mile narrow road network, an objective of great political and psychological value.[96] Landings in Istria were also considered, but Admiral Hewitt, commander of the US Eighth Fleet in the Mediterranean, disagreed with Clark, suggesting that naval operations in the northern Adriatic would put too much strain on the US Navy. US General Jacob L. Devers, Wilson's theater deputy, agreed with Hewitt. One survey of the region revealed that, 'The western shore of the Istrian peninsula is made up of numerous cliffs, scattered coves, occasional anchorages, a few tiny beaches and nowhere is it suitable for the classical, broad scale, textbook style of landing.'[97] Alexander, his CoS, Lt. General Sir John Harding, Allied Armies Italy (AAI), who had devised a plan that would fulfill Churchill's dream of a British advance on Vienna, either minimized or ignored the experience of the Italian campaign in which it had taken their troops over a year of fighting to reach northern Italy. Lt. General Sir Sidney Kirkman, GOC British 13th Corps, did not. Describing the egregious problems along the Gothic Line, he wrote to Harding repudiating Alexander's view,

> The enemy has a superiority of two to one of our heavy or medium guns. This is a most serious state of affairs for a major offensive. We have never been in such a position before. At Cassino our superiority of guns for counter battery fire was about two to one...As long as these conditions exist, offensive operations in Italy are likely to incur very heavy causalities, and owing to the tiredness of our infantry, may well

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[95] PREM 3/333/19, Churchill to Gen. Ismay for COS, 19 July 1943.
[96] Sir M. Howard, *Op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.
[97] T. Barker, 'The Ljubljana Gap Strategy: Alternate to Anvil/Dragoon or Fantasy?', *JMH*, 56, (1 Jan. 1992), pp. 73-74.

> fail. Without an adequate quantity of ammunition, the enemy will not be effectively neutralized, and troops who have been fighting for so long without rest, are unlikely to reach their objectives.[98]

Kirkman continued that 'Central Europe as a goal was political and military moonshine',[99] and that Alexander's June cables to London, stating that his armies were ready to assault the Apennines and the Alps, were 'pipe dreams'.[100] The whole dispute, bitter as it was, had nothing to do with a conflict between a Balkan and Western Strategy, because the object of the British and American tactical commanders in March and April 1944, was still limited to breaking through the German winter line, capturing Rome, and reaching the Pisa-Rimini axis. The possibilities beyond that still lay in the realm of speculation. Two weeks after the Normandy landings, Eisenhower cabled the following message to Marshall, 'It is my belief that the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff are honestly convinced that greater results in support of OVERLORD would be achieved by a drive toward Trieste rather than to mount ANVIL.'[101]

Discounting the frightful winter weather and poor Istrian infrastructure, it was doubtful that a force of more than six divisions could have been sustained through the Ljubljana Gap to invade the Danube Valley; perhaps not that many, because the railroad through the gap had plenty of tunnels vulnerable to destruction by German demolition experts.[102] Alexander closely questioned Lt. Colonel Peter Wilkinson of SOE in March 1944 concerning the feasibility of an Istrian landing. Wilkinson replied, 'that it contained formidable technical difficulties and great risks.'[103] Roosevelt agreed, and in a letter to Churchill, expounded further: he was convinced that not only was it an area of poor beaches, limited natural cover, undeveloped mountain roads, impassable in winter's heavy snows, and easily defended exits leading to the Danubian plain,

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[98] Lt. Gen. Sir S. Kirkman, *Private Papers*, 5537/G, 25 Nov.-16 Dec. 1944.
[99] D. Graham. &. S. Bidwell, *Op. cit.*, p. 400.
[100] Brig. C. Molony, *Official History of the Second World War*, VI, Pt. I, (London, 1956), p. 313.
[101] Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 June 1944, RG. 218, JCS, Box 4, Chair. File.
[102] R. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, (Bloomington, IL, 1981), p. 332.
[103] T. Barker, *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

through the Ljubljana Gap, but that an operation here did not support OVERLORD and therefore was unacceptable.[104]

Until July 1944, the German General Staff, OKW, believed that the Allies were planning a large scale amphibious attack in the Gulf of Venice, the objective being Austria and southern Germany.[105] If German invasion predictions were satisfied by Allied amphibious forces threatening the northern Adriatic, enemy troops would have been diverted from Normandy. Although the Anglo-American political and military positions varied, a Balkan excursion, opposed by Stalin, remained no substitute for ANVIL, defined as a drive into southern France from Italy. Exchanging ANVIL for a Balkan operation would have inhibited Allied concentration in western Europe and probably lengthened the war by several months.[106]

British Misperceptions

The COS failed to realize that their response to the magnanimous JCS offer to reroute 66 Pacific landing craft was considered a rejection. Moreover, the Americans did not intend to squander additional resources for an indeterminate operation or to simply increase the general supplies in the Mediterranean. The JCS was shocked by the COS position, concluding that the British had missed the connection between an American public pressuring its government for a swift German defeat followed by an immediate escalation of operations against Japan. In sum, any momentum achieved in the Pacific would not be sacrificed for an ambiguous ANVIL. The COS had accepted the American legacy of landing craft, but disregarded the terms of the will, ANVIL. The JSM advised the COS to send Wilson a draft directive ordering him to proceed vigorously with plans and preparations for a 10 July ANVIL, while maintaining flexibility and allowances for alternatives. The JSM presumed that this would satisfy

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[104] 'JCS Operations to Assist OVERLORD', Washington, 29 June 1944. Reel VII.
[105] Dr. Kehrig, Director of German Military Archives. 'Le Débarquement de Provence; Le Point de Vue Allemand', *Terre*, 57, (Sept. 1994), pp. 22-23.
[106] T. Barker. *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

the JCS.[107] Marshall believed that Churchill had agreed to ANVIL at Tehran. Churchill insisted that the strategic situation had changed vastly since then, and that Rome could not be sacrificed today for an ANVIL tomorrow. The landing craft shortage continued to drive both men to distraction.[108]

American Productive Might

During 1943, American shipyards built more than 19,000 assault craft of which two or three types were British. King, who assumed control over all landing craft, allocated the meager sum of only 1,000 of this number for use in Europe. The maximum capacity of British shipyards was about 350 a month, which produced a total of 4,000 by May 1944. Even with the addition of the American 1,000, a total of 5,000 specialist ships could only lift three OVERLORD divisions.[109] In Mid summer 1943 Landing craft programs were increased significantly from the existing directive. This presumed the conversion of certain ship yards, the re-allocation of carbon and alloy steel needed in landing craft production, the cancellation of 2,200 medium Army trucks in 1944 in order to release labor in the Detroit area and the expansion of GM diesel engine manufacturing facilities, the most critical component of all.[110] The Evansville, Indiana Shipyard, a 30 month old gigantic facility created on the site of a municipal dump along the Ohio River, met the government's frantic call for stepped up production by producing 20 LSTs in April-May 1944. Known as 'The World's Champion LST Builder', its 19,000 shipyard workers set all kinds of production records.[111]

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[107] JSM 1613, JSM to COS, 31 Mar. 1944, CAB 105/45; FMD 183, Dill to COS, 1 Apr. 1944, CAB 105/85.
[108] Dill to COS, Washington, 1 Apr. 1944, RG 165 Exec. 10 Item 66; Churchill to Dill for Marshall, Washington, 16 Apr. 1944, Rg 165 Exec 3 OPD.
[109] Sir R. Kilner Brown, *Op. cit.*, London, 22 Oct. 1994.
[110] Adm. E. Cochrane, 'Additional Landing Craft Program', CCS 560, Sec. 2', Washington, 17 Aug. 1943, RG. 218, JCS.
[111] T. Wilson, 'The United States Leviathan', W. Reynolds & A. Chubarian, (eds.), *Allies At War*, (London, 1994), p. 191.

Momentary Compromise in Anger's Wake

Feelings remained tense in London and Washington. At a rare and urgently called Saturday CCS meeting, Dill found Marshall obdurate towards the British view point and remained unwilling to withdraw landing craft from the Pacific to assist a weak course of action in Italy.[112] Moreover, he planned to reappraise further American resource allocations to the Mediterranean.[113] Brooke, who thought Marshall was hopeless as a strategist, wrote, 'History will never forgive them for bargaining equipment against strategy and for trying to blackmail us...by holding the pistol of withdrawing craft at our heads.'[114] Cunningham wrote that, 'the Americans. had consented ungraciously to abandon ANVIL.'[115] Without the extra landing craft, ANVIL, in support of OVERLORD was dead, regardless of Anglo-American strategic differences. The COS proposed a compromise to break the deadlock in the form of a directive to Wilson, which in summary, stipulated that actions against the Germans in the Mediterranean offered OVERLORD the greatest possible assistance, particularly by an early all-out offensive in Italy, and that a threat developed against southern France and the seizure of any opportunity with available amphibious forces, either arising in southern France or elsewhere, would be most beneficial.[116] The JCS agreed to the draft proposal, but added two amendments, although mutual suspicions concerning intent and purpose remained: all offensive action in Italy would be discontinued when the mission was accomplished. ANVIL would be given a high priority. Although Dill considered the agreement flawed, he recommended that the COS accept it.[117] He wrote, 'No formula can be a substitute for honest agreement.'[118]

The JCS was informed in late April that Wilson, Eisenhower and the COS planned to meet in London to consider the future of forces in the Mediterranean made redundant by

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[112] S. Parker. *Op. cit.*, p. 140; Rg 331 SHAEF SGS Files 381 1. '387/11'.
[113] 'CCS: OVERLORD and ANVIL'. Washington, 8 Apr. 1944. Reel IV.
[114] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/B/XII. 19 Apr. 1944, p. 937.
[115] *Op. cit.*, ADD, MSS 52577. *Cunningham Papers.*
[116] 'CCS 465/22', Washington. 17 Apr. 1944. Reel IV.
[117] CAB 105/45 JSM 1620. JSM to COS, 10 Apr. 1944.
[118] CCS 154 Meeting, Washington, 8 Apr. 1944, Reel IV; CAB 105/85, Dill to COS. 4 Apr. 1944.

Italian operations. The JCS interpreted this review as a means of resuscitating ANVIL. If ANVIL were revived by an agreement reached in London, King would allocate a month's production of landing craft for the operation. The COS had in mind a possible landing, mounted from North African ports, along either the southern or western coasts of France three weeks after OVERLORD.[119] As soon as the conference's results were recorded, the COS would submit its proposals to the JCS. The tension of many weeks quickly subsided and the atmosphere brightened perceptively in Washington.[120]

American Joint Staff Planners, ordered to study and submit recommendations on 'CCS-561', felt only a landing, the landing west of the Rhone River was worthy of the extra Pacific landing craft proposed by King. It was doubtful whether a landing in western France could have succeeded, because of certain disadvantages, i.e., a long ocean journey, sole dependence upon carrier-based air-cover, prey to the U-boat menace in the Atlantic, a poor supply situation and increased distances from Mediterranean bases.[121]

Operational Considerations and a Balkan Adventure

The results of the Wilson/Eisenhower meeting were contained in 'CCS-561/2' and implied how intertwined were operations DIADEM, ANVIL and OVERLORD. Since Eisenhower depended upon the seizure of a deep water port and a breakout from the lodgement area, he could not release landing craft and airborne units to the Mediterranean before that occurred. Once the operations in Italy and France succeeded, Wilson recommended any of three locations for an amphibious assault: Sète, west of the Rhone, the Gulf of Genoa and Civitavecchia, forty miles north of Rome. By 7 June it seemed clear to Wilson that he could prepare for an amphibious landing against southern France by 15 August.[122] Although some French and American units were already engaged in amphibious training, Wilson continued to emphasize operations in

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[119] CCS 158 Meeting, Washington, 28 Apr. 1944, Reel IV..
[120] 'CCS 561':'Operations in Support of OVERLORD', Washington, 27 Apr. 1944, Reel IV.
[121] *Ibid.*, 1 May 1944.
[122] *Ibid.*, 7 May 1944.

Italy, a drive to Vienna and an Adriatic amphibious operation in September, which echoed the argument of the COS.[123]

Prior to flying to Europe on 8 June to visit the Norman beaches, the JCS won approval on 26 May for a closed session to be held at the conclusion of every regular CCS meeting. No reasons were given for this change, and, as usual, no records of these sessions were to be kept, but the arrangement might have had something to do with the COS stalling on ANVIL.[124] Eisenhower warned Marshall in late June that,

> ...I have the further impression that although the British Chiefs of Staff may make one more effort to convince you of the value of the Trieste move, they will not permit an impasse to arise, and will, consequently, agree to ANVIL. I feel that their idea would be to keep intact the tactical ground and air staff that has been functioning so well in Italy. They would then frankly recognize the Italian area as a secondary one and turn over the troops there to General Clark or other qualified officer.[125]

On 10 June, four days after OVERLORD, the COS took exception with Wilson's French assessment and postponed the choice of the landing site, until the battles raging in France and Italy were decided. The COS believed that ANVIL, like any other operation, depended upon a most careful balance of strategic factors; it was false to assume that it was the only alternative; nor could the intrusion of unforeseen events be excluded from eliminating ANVIL and deeming it inappropriate within the larger European picture by 15 August.[126]

On 19 June, Wilson informed Eisenhower that landings in western France were too difficult; Instead, he recommended that the Allies advance eastward beyond the Po, through the Ljubljana Gap and into the Danube Plain, possibly supported by a September amphibious operation at the head of the Adriatic.[127]

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[123] FM H. Wilson, *Report by the SACMED to the CCS on Ops in So. France August 1944*, (London, 1946), pp. 21-25.
[124] CCS 160 Meeting, 'CCS 454/6: Review of Conditions. in Europe', Washington, 26 May 1944, Reel IV.
[125] Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 June 1944. *Op. cit.*
[126] *Op. cit.*, 10 June,1944, 'CCS 561/5': from AFHQ, Wilson in COSMED 120 is aiming at a target date of 15 August for ANVIL and CCS 162 Meeting, 'CCS 561/5', Washington, 10 June, 1944, Reel IV.
[127] CAB 122/1246, B 12995 Wilson to Eisenhower, 19 June 1944.

The ANVIL controversy flared once again between the two staffs when Eisenhower's forces suffered logistically from a severe Channel storm that lasted from 19-24 June and jeopardized the time table of the 21st Army Group. General Sir Miles Dempsey's Second British Army's enveloping offensive toward Caen was postponed for a week. The delayed attack, held hostage by the storm, demonstrated the need for the additional port that ANVIL could provide.[128] At a 16 June meeting in Naples between Marshall and Wilson, who seemingly had converted to the American side of this issue, reversed himself, and opposed any limitation on DIADEM's successful advance. Rejecting Marshall's recommendation to seize a major French port, (Cherbourg had not been captured), Wilson instead proposed ANVIL's cancellation in exchange for his Italian/Balkan alternative, formalized in writing to Eisenhower and the CCS three days later. Eisenhower appreciated Wilson's wish to pursue his Italian offensive, but remained committed to ANVIL, and opposed a thrust towards Vienna.[129] Eisenhower's anxious concerns were expressed in a cable to Marshall, 'AFHQ apparently fails to appreciate that achievement of a successful bridgehead in France does not of itself imply success in operation OVERLORD as a whole...that it will be in urgent need of any assistance possible from elsewhere for sometime to come.'[130] The two ports under consideration were Marseilles and Bordeaux. Marseilles, if cleared quickly, was much better suited to handle large scale replacements than Bordeaux, which, although closer to the battle area, had constricted beaches.

The JSM was authorized to send a copy of Wilson's telegram to Eisenhower to both the COS and the JCS, but the JSM did not receive its copy until 27 June.[131] The delay led to further misunderstanding. In the meantime, the JCS received Eisenhower's report, which included a summary of Wilson's comments, four days before than the JSM copy arrived. Eisenhower repeated in his report Wilson's Italian and Balkan

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[128] Lt. Col. R. Leigh, *48 Millions Tons to Eisenhower*, (Washington DC, 1945), pp. 17-21.
[129] FM H. Wilson, *Report by SACMED to the CCS on the Italian Campaign*, II (London, 1948), pp. 33-36; Wilson to COS, AFHQ, Washington, 24 June, 1944, RG. 218, Box 4, JCS Chairman's File.
[130] A. Chandler, (ed.), *Op. cit.*, p. 1938.
[131] LETOD 150, Redman to Hollis,CAB 122/1246, 27 June 1944.

recommendations, which ran contrary to his strong preference for ANVIL over any other alternative. He noted that Wilson was prepared to carry out ANVIL, if the decision were made.[132]. The JCS quickly accepted Eisenhower's proposals, rejected Wilson's and ordered him, in a proposed draft directive, to launch a three divisional ANVIL against southern France by 15 August.[133] The JCS stated:

> We are convinced that the best use to which we can put our resources in the Mediterranean is to launch an ANVIL at the earliest possible date. This is the only operation which: will provide early and maximum. support for OVERLORD, provide for an additional major port required by SCAEF and will put the French forces into the battle for their homeland... The resources to be employed in ANVIL will be predominately US and French. We do not believe that extensive and long preparation to achieve perfection of arrangements is necessary or justifiable.[134]

The Disagreements Intensify

The COS reacted with a firm rejection of an ANVIL landing and insisted that Wilson continue the battle for Italy, while mounting a threat against southern France.[135] The JCS was dumbfounded by the COS reaction, since the COS had already agreed to closing the Allied advance on the Pisa-Rimini line. Moreover, the COS had reacted without seeing Wilson's report. Consequently, the JCS considered the British proposal a contravention of the agreement reached in London and a reversion to the old argument of ANVIL versus Italy. While the JCS had succumbed to this argument two months before, they would not do so again. Strong objections were raised against the COS proposal. The Americans insisted that effective employment of large forces in the Mediterranean and those awaiting transportation from the United States be initiated at the earliest possible date, demanding that their directive be accepted and sent to Wilson immediately.[136] In unequivocal terms, it read that,

> ANVIL will be launched at the earliest possible date. You will use every effort to meet a target date of 1 August. You will prepare for the operation on the basis of approximately a 3 division. assault, an

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[132] Ike to CCS, CAB 122/1246 SCAF 53, 23 June 1944.
[133] CCS 166 Meeting, 15 June, 1944, Reel IV and 'CCS 603 Operations to Assist OVERLORD', Washington, 24 June 1944.
[134] *Ibid.*
[135] COS to JSM, CAB 122/1246COS (W) , 26 June 1944.
[136] JSM 114, JSM to COS, CAB 122/1246 27 June 1944.

> airborne lift for the equivalent of 1 division and a build-up to at least 10 divisions as quickly as the resources made available to you will permit, having in mind in your preparations the steady reduction in German capacity to resist and the vital importance of prompt support of the OVERLORD operation.
>
> You will use all available Mediterranean resources not required for ANVIL to carry out your present directive with regard to operations in Italy...[137]

On the 26 June, the British Chiefs defied the Americans and turned ANVIL down.

They pressed for the destruction of all German forces in Italy, citing, 'Any compromising of the prospects of the destruction of the enemy armies in Italy as this critical phase in the war, without a compensation in the early destruction of equal forces elsewhere, would be wrong.'[138] They advocated that Eisenhower's demands for additional Allied Mediterranean forces to be met by shipments to the Breton and Norman ports closest to the battle area.[139] The Americans countered the next day,

> The proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff to abandon ANVIL and to concentrate on a campaign in Italy is unacceptable. The fact that the British and US Chiefs of Staff are apparently in complete disagreement in this matter at this particular moment when time is pressing presents a most deplorable situation. We wish you to know now, immediately, that we do not accept the statements in your answer in general with relation to the campaign in Italy as sound and as in keeping with the early termination of the war.[140]

The Americans brought the negotiations to a standstill. They concluded that no reason existed to continue the discussions, which could only delay a required decision needed to be made. 'The wording of the directive we have proposed in 'CCS-603' give sufficient latitude to the commanders concerned, both as to resources and target date. We ask that it be sent to Wilson immediately.'[141]

The JSM had become alarmed at the sharpness of the American response. To soften the impact of the American reply, the Mission sent a private message to London explaining the reasons for the American reaction: failing to have received a copy beforehand of Wilson's report, the JCS was shocked by its content. The Americans

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137 *Ibid.*
138 'CCS Ops to Assist OVERLORD', Washington, 27 June 1944, Reel IV.
139 *Ibid.*
140 *Ibid.*
141 *Ibid.*

were outraged by what seemed to be a complete reversal of the agreements reached in London. They were adamant that ANVIL must not be reduced to a threat in favor of a major campaign in Italy beyond the Pisa-Rimini. line. In view of the hardened American. attitude, the JSM suggested that the COS should either agree to ANVIL with good grace or make a straightforward confession that the fundamental issue had not been clarified in London and must now be aired and resolved.[142]

A Pivotal ULTRA Intercept

JSM efforts to ease matters achieved little. The American reply, described as 'rude' by Brooke and 'rather tough' by Cunningham, only served to get British backs up. Believing their strategy correct, the COS agreed, on 28 June, to stand fast.[143] Their position was augmented by new Ultra intercepts that the Germans were prepared to fight for northern Italy, south of the Apennines, to prevent a breakthrough into the Po Valley, the loss of which would have severe military and political consequences. Moreover, the intercept supported Churchill and Brooke's views on ANVIL, i.e., nothing would be gained by a landing in the south of France which was not already ensured by the Italian campaign. Cryptographic difficulties delayed the delivery of the intercepts. If presented earlier, the Americans might have opted for a quick and overwhelming victory in Italy, an end to the war in 1944 rather than ANVIL and a different partition of Europe.[144] The British were sure that ANVIL would impair the possibility of destroying Kesselring's forces. They deemed it 'unthinkable for want of patient discussion to risk taking a false step at this critical period of the war.'[145] Side-stepping the COS appeal and dismissing German intentions, the Americans chose to defeat the Germans in Normandy, rather than to destroy them in Italy.[146]

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[142] S.L. Parker, *Attendant Lords: A Study of the British JSM in Washington, 1941-1945*, (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Maryland, 1984), p. 263.
[143] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, Vol. 3/B/XII, 28 June 1944; ADD, MSS 52577, *Cunningham Papers*, BL.
[144] R. Bennet, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-45*, (London, 1989), p. 362.
[145] 135, COS to JSM, CAB 122/1246 COS (W) 134, COS (W), 28 June 1944.
[146] R. Bennett, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945*, (London, 1989), p. 362.

As the Washington 29 June negotiations ended in deadlock, the JCS, their minds made up, stood firm against the points stressed by the JSM, embattled surrogates of the COS.[147] Cunningham recorded: 'It was decided that though militarily we were quite unshaken in our views, since the Americans appear to be so set that we had better agree to carry out ANVIL. I feel myself that taking the long view we shall gain by this seeming surrender.'[148] The divergent Anglo-American military positions were best expressed in a flurry of letters, which included charts and lengthy staff-constructed supporting documents. These were exchanged between 28 June and 1 July, in which a pleading Churchill was thwarted by an unyielding Roosevelt.

Churchill to Roosevelt:

> The Deadlock between our Chiefs of Staff raises most serious issues. I most earnestly beg you to examine this matter in detail for yourself. I think the tone of the US Chiefs of Staff is arbitrary and, certainly, I see no prospect of agreement on the present lines.[149]

Roosevelt to Churchill:

> It seems to me that nothing can be worse at this time than a deadlock in the Combined Staffs as to our future course of action...You and I must prevent this. ANVIL, mounted at the earliest possible date, is the only operation which will give OVERLORD the material and immediate support.[150]

Churchill persisted:

> We are deeply grieved by your telegram. The splitting up of the campaign in the Mediterranean into two operations neither of which can do anything decisive, is the first major strategic and political error for which we two have to be responsible...
>
> ...I fear a costly stalemate for you...What can I do Mr. President when we are to see the integral life of this (Italian) campaign drained off into the Rhone Valley in the belief that it will in several months carry effective help to Eisenhower so far away in the north?
>
> If you still press upon us the directive of your Chiefs of Staff to withdraw so many of your forces from the Italian campaign, His Majesty's Government, on the advice of our Chiefs of Staff, must enter a solemn protest. It is with the greatest sorrow that I write to you in this sense.[151]

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147 JSM 118, JSM to COS, CAB 122/1246, 29 June 1944.
148 *Cunningham Papers, Op. cit.*
149 W. Kimball, et al., *Op. cit.*, 'C-717', 'C-718', 28 June 1994.
150 *Ibid.*, 'R-573', 28 June 1944.
151 *Ibid.*, 'C-721', 1 July 1944.

Roosevelt was obdurate, but replied,

> I appreciate deeply the clear exposition of your feelings and views on this decision. My Chiefs of Staff and I have given the deepest consideration to this problem and to points you have raised. We are still convinced that the right course of action is to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date. I do not believe we should delay further in giving General Wilson a directive...Will you ask your Chiefs to dispatch it to General Wilson at once.[152]

COS Attempts at Conciliation versus Churchill's Anger

According to Brooke, Churchill, Wilson and Alexander had ruined Allied chances of destroying German forces in Italy in 1944 by introducing the Balkan alternative. He also noted that the some of the President's reasons for choosing ANVIL were more political than military. Roosevelt advised Churchill that he would not have survived politically if OVERLORD had suffered the slightest setback due to large forces being diverted to the Balkans.[153] Brooke dissuaded Churchill from sending another letter to Roosevelt, in which the Prime Minister stated that he would do anything 'to end this deadlock except become responsible for an absolutely perverse strategy'. If Roosevelt desired, he continued, 'I would come at once across the ocean to Bermuda, or Quebec, or, if you like, Washington, given good weather and a fast aeroplane'. Brooke believed Churchill was spoiling for a fight, one that would lead to a fatal rupture with the Americans. Churchill felt that he had every right to expect some consideration from his friend, Roosevelt, since their joint ventures had 'dazzled the world'. Feeling petulant, he expressed his resentment on 1 July, certain that by meeting, as he so frequently proposed, they would have settled matters.[154] 'All right', Brooke wrote of the current Anglo-American relationship in his diary, 'If you insist on being damned fools, we shall be damned fools with you, and we shall see that we perform the role of damned fools damned well.'[155]

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[152] *Ibid.*, 'R-577', 1 July, 1944.
[153] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/B/XII, 29 June 1944, p. 971; Roosevelt to Churchill, 'R-574', 29 June 1944.
[154] Churchill to Roosevelt, *Op. cit.*, 'C-721'
[155] *Ibid.*, 30 June, 1944, p. 971

The CCS directed Wilson on 2 July to launch a 3 divisional ANVIL as soon as possible with a target date of 15 August.[156] Cunningham observed that Churchill could 'never give way gracefully'. 'He must always be right and if forced to give way gets vindictive and tries by almost any means to get his own back.'[157] Churchill was furious and wanted to impress upon the Americans how ill-treated the British felt.[158] Visiting London at the time, Harold Macmillan, who knew little of the protracted negotiations, decided that

> in my view of the heavy contribution of American forces to the European campaign and the general situation, we should have to give in if Eisenhower and Marshall insist upon ANVIL. We can fight up to a point, we can leave on record for history to judge the reasoned statement of our views, and the historian will also see that the Americans have never answered any argument, never attempted to discuss or debate the points, but have merely given a flat negative and a somewhat Shylock-like insistence upon what they conceive to be their bargain.[159]

John Winant, American Ambassador to Britain, who was familiar with the exchange of messages, sent one of his own to the President at Hyde Park, in which he said that, 'I wanted you to know how deeply the Prime Minister has felt the differences that have ended in his accepting your decision. I have never seen him as badly shaken. He believed completely in the program he was supporting...'[160] So convinced of the perversity of American strategy was Churchill that in his outrage he considered resigning.[161] Cognizant of his loss of power within the coalition, Churchill maintained his view in an exhortation to the COS,

> ...Let them take their seven divisions...Let them monopolise all the landing craft they can reach. But let us at least have a chance to launch a decisive strategic stroke with what is entirely British and under British command...I am not going to give way about this for anybody. Alexander is to have his campaign...if we take everything lying down, there will be no end to what will be put upon us.[162]

Seeking conciliation and clarification, the COS sent a position statement sent to Washington on 12 July. The COS declared that the JCS should have no doubt

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156 COSMED 139, Box 310 (ANVIL), 2 July 1944, FDRL.
157 *Cunningham Papers*, *Op. cit.*, 5 July 1944.
158 John Ehrman, *Op. cit.*, p. 361.
159 H. Macmillan, *Op. cit.*, p. 420.
160 Winant to Roosevelt, Box 310 (ANVIL), 3 July, 1944, FDRL.
161 Sir A. Bryant, *Triumph in the West*, (New York, 1959), p. 168.
162 M. Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill, Road to Victory, 1941-1945*, (London, 1986), p. 843.

whatsoever about the British attitude towards Mediterranean operations. In addition. both His Majesty's Government and the COS emphatically declared that ANVIL was not the correct strategy; but having accepted ANVIL, the British intended to do their utmost for it to succeed.[163] By retreating before the Americans on this issue, they were not trying to gain their point by delaying tactics.

The JSM in Washington considered these remarks inflammatory, a continuation of the controversy, and decided to omit them from a forthcoming COS message. Several days later, the JSM received word that the COS intended to inform the JCS of these remarks, using the JSM as its transmitting agent. The JSM concluded that three options was open to it: to put forward an additional paper, explain the matter, or present it as an item for discussion in a closed session at the next CCS meeting.[164] Admiral Noble informed the COS that he was quite willing to speak to Marshall, to which the COS replied that it wanted their remarks placed on the record at a CCS closed session.[165]

On 28 July during a CCS closed session, Noble, wishing to avoid further controversy, explained that COS remarks were merely a statement of fact and should not be construed, in any way, as an attempt to reopen the debate. The CCS took note of the statement and thought that the long, contentious debate over Anvil had ended.[166]

Breakout in Normandy and Churchill's Machinations

On 27 July 1944, Churchill requested that ANVIL be renamed DRAGOON; chosen to deceive the Germans, it also stood for the contempt he felt for the operation. 'Done', he later wrote, 'in case the enemy had learned the meaning of the original code

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[163] 166, COS to JSM CAB 122/1308, COS (W.), 12 July 1944.
[164] Redman to Noble, CAB 122/1308, 18 July 1944.
[165] Noble to COS, CAB 122/1308: JSM 142, 19 July 1944,
COS (W) 183, COS to Noble, 20 July.
[166] CCS 168 Meeting.,28 July 1944, Reel IV., JSM 159, JSM to COS, 27 July 1944, 'Excerpt of Min. of Operations to Assist OVERLORD'; CAB 122/1308. JSM 163 JSM to COS, 28 July 1944.

word.'[167] Cherbourg fell on 29 June and the first cargo ships arrived on 16 July. During the last week of the month, successfully using a massive tactical carpet bombing technique, American forces broke through the German lines, poured out of the Normandy bridgehead and opened the way for Patton's Third Army to sweep into the heart of France. By contrast, Wilson informed London that Alexander, after taking Florence, had called off his Italian offensive for three weeks, due the loss of American and French troops transferred from his command to that of DRAGOON. Moreover, Allied air power in Italy would be reduced to provide the necessary air cover for the same operation.[168] Although Marshall said, '...we will do our utmost to support Wilson in the two battles he has to fight in southern France and Italy',[169] it did not square with COS apprehensions. These concerns faded, for the moment, when Churchill announced to the COS that on 4 August had Eisenhower decided to cancel DRAGOON and ship its divisions to Brittany instead. Brooke agreed that this was the best solution, although the Americans had discounted this British idea earlier. The Prime Minister gave the impression that Eisenhower had already wired the President. Churchill, against the advice of his military chiefs, who felt he was side-stepping the JCS, sent a telegram to the President concerning the elimination of DRAGOON, in which he wrote, 'I beg you will reconsider the possibility of switching DRAGOON into the main and vital theater where it can immediately play its part...'[170] He insisted on COS support in the guise of a telegram sent to the JCS. On the 6 August Brooke discovered to his consternation that not only did Eisenhower never send a telegram, but he opposed any change in DRAGOON. Whoever double-crossed whom, Churchill had done little to improve relations with the Americans.[171] It was Churchill, who considered DRAGOON to be the last straw and sheer folly who had the most to gain, if his one last chance to persuade Roosevelt succeeded. The Prime Minister mused on the

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[167] W. Churchill, *The Second World War*, VI, (London, 1953), p. 58.
[168] CAB 122/1308 MEDCOS 167, 5 Aug. 1944.
[169] M. Matloff, *Op. cit.*, p. 473.
[170] W. Kimball, *Op. cit.*, 'C to R', C-742, 4 Aug. 1944.
[171] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/B/XII, p. 992.

eve of the landing, 'If only those ten divisions could have been landed in the Balkans.'[172]

Refusing to give way gracefully, Churchill pursued his argument with Eisenhower at a 5 August meeting in Portsmouth. Eisenhower's aide, Captain Harry Butcher, described Churchill as someone obsessed with shifting DRAGOON to the Brittany ports. In the face of Eisenhower's emphatic opposition, he refused to take no for an answer. Eisenhower, having argued for so long and patiently, observed later that the Prime Minister would try again.[173] Churchill's argument lasted a total of fifteen days, his longest of the war with Eisenhower. In spite of Churchill's persistence, both Eisenhower and the JCS firmly agreed that DRAGOON would not be canceled.[174] Resources allocated for DRAGOON would not be considered available for landings in Brittany. Churchill appealed to Hopkins, his sounding board and confidant during much of the war, for assistance,[175] and wrote on 6 August,

> I am grieved to find that even splendid victories and widening opportunities do not bring us together on strategy...The ten divisions now mounted for DRAGOON could be switched into St. Nazaire...If we are forced to make a heavy attack from the sea on the well fortified Riviera coast...we start 500 miles away from the main battlefield instead of almost upon it at St. Nazaire...If you feel able to embroil yourself in these matters, I should be glad if you would bring my views before him (Marshall)...[176]

Hopkins warned Churchill on 7 August that the President would reject his proposal. When Roosevelt replied the following day, he denied Churchill's appeal and supported Eisenhower, stating, '...it is my considered opinion that DRAGOON should be launched as planned at the earliest practicable date and I have full confidence that it will be successful...'[177]

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[172] Lord Moran, *Op. cit.*, p. 181.
[173] M. Miller, *Ike the Soldier*, (New York, 1987), p. 674.
[174] R. Ferrell, (ed.), *The Eisenhower Diaries*, (New York, 1981), pp. 111-125.
[175] F. Harbutt, 'Churchill, Hopkins and the 'Other' Americans: An Alternative perspective on Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1945', *IHR*, VIII, (May 1986), p. 252.
[176] W. Churchill, *Op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.
[177] W. Kimball, III, *Op. cit.*, R to C, 'R-596', 8 Aug. 1944.

Acting as if it were his personal 'Dunkirk', Churchill invited Eisenhower to 10 Downing Street on 9 August to consider his last hope of stopping DRAGOON: continue loading the ships, set sail through the Straits of Gibraltar and enter France at Bordeaux. The idea of abandoning a carefully planned operation, shift it 1,600 miles on the eve of its execution, alter the balance of the whole campaign in western Europe and abandon a strategy having the appearance of finality, was a complete abdication of responsibility.[178] Astonishingly, the British Chiefs of Staff supported Churchill in his folly. When Churchill threatened to resign, Eisenhower, who knew the Prime Minister well, realized he was bluffing. Nevertheless, he could not understand why Churchill, obviously agitated and despondent, attached such importance to DRAGOON.[179] On 10 August, five days before DRAGOON's implementation, the CCS informed Eisenhower that with the Brittany diversion dead, he was to proceed with ANVIL/DRAGOON as originally planned.[180] Churchill's frustration and prolonged preoccupation with this one campaign illustrated his inability to direct strategy and influence Roosevelt, his grudging admission of American domination of the coalition, his fear of the Russian threat and his uncertainty regarding the fighting spirit of the British soldier and Britain's emerging manpower crisis.[181]

ANVIL's Metamorphosis

Planning for ANVIL had gone through many stages, since its beginning on 19 December 1943, when AFHQ asked Patton's Seventh Army Headquarters planning staff to consider drawing up plans for an amphibious operation. During the last week of December, they were instructed to plan an operation, code named ANVIL, which would involve American and French forces. The scale of the assault, increased from

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[178] JSM to COS, CAB 105/46, JSM 180, IZ 5728, 7 Aug. 1944.
[179] Eisenhower to Marshall, Washington, Aug., 1944, RG. 165 CM-IN.
[180] CCS to Eisenhower, CAB 122/1309, 10 Aug. 1944.
[181] T. Ben-Moshe, *Op. cit.*, p. 264; J. Strange, 'The British Rejection of Operation SLEDGEHAMMER, An Alternative Motive', *JMA*, 46, (February 1982), pp. 6-15.

three to ten divisions, and required the acquisition of the port of Marseilles and the seizure of naval base at Toulon.[182]

On 12 January 1944, Force 163, the cover designation for General Garrison H. Davidson's US Seventh Army planners, which included representatives from the three services, took over from AFHQ. By 28 February, Clark, relinquished his ANVIL responsibilities as Seventh Army Commander 'designate' to General Alexander Patch, a veteran of the Pacific 1942 Guadalcanal campaign. As the ANVIL debate raged at the higher levels, Force 163 planners, groping for something definite on which to plan, believed that the operation had been relegated to a 'Command Post Exercise'. Was ANVIL to be abandoned, postponed, diminished or expanded? Was the meaning of 'abandoned for the time being' synonymous with 'postponed indefinitely'? If an operation is abandoned, what is the purpose of planning for it? General Jacob Devers at AFHQ insisted that planning continue, Patch asked for a firm target date. In early spring, Force 163 planners were joined by French staff officers who shared their knowledge of the French Provençal coast and its surrounding area; French Resistance fighters, in support of the landings, increased their supply of tactical intelligence information.[183]

On 29 April ground, naval and air plans were presented, modified and accepted by Wilson with Eisenhower's subsequent approval. However, the target date remained indefinite. On 15 March, de Gaulle visited Wilson in Italy and, after withdrawing his demands that a senior French general serve as ground commander, declared his full support for the operation. A month later, de Gaulle chose de Tassigny to command ANVIL's French contingent. Force 163's logistical planning continued and supplies ordered in January began to arrive in April. By 15 July SACMED ordered American General Lucian Truscott's VI Corps in Italy to release the 45th, 3rd and 36th Divisions, two French divisions and certain auxiliary troops to be assigned to Force

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[182] *US Seventh Army: Report of Operations in France and Germany*, (Heidelberg, 1946), pp. 1-29.
[183] A. Wilt, *Op. cit.*, pp. 50-53.

163 for administration, planning and training. Finally an agreement was reached: ANVIL would take place on 45 miles of coastline between Cannes and Cavalaire and east of Toulon not later than 30 August.[184] Paratroopers and Special Force units landed on the night of 14 August, D-1. On D-Day, 15 August 1944, after nine months of Anglo-American wrangling, the ANVIL invasion force, having embarked from various Mediterranean sea ports and air fields, attacked the French coast. Set in motion were 1,300 ships, 4,000 planes, and 250,000 men. Visibility was 4 miles, hazy and improving with a gentle shifting wind and negligible sea.[185] The landing proceeded on schedule against light opposition. Pre H Hour bombing and gunfire were extremely effective and very little naval gunfire was required later.[186] The airborne landings went off as scheduled, the assaulting infantry successfully breached the beach defences and no Allied aircraft were reported lost.[187] It was a major tactical success, as described in the following message from Wilson to the Allied command centers:

> Secret operation DRAGOON slight opposition only encountered by 36th Division landing on beaches either side of Agay road. Isle Port Crus captured. Pre 12 hour gunfire reported very effective. No air attacks up to noon. Two small enemy ships sunk during initial assault.[188]

The assaulting infantry divisions were followed by similar elements of the American Seventh and French First Armies. Three hundred and eighty thousand troops crossed the beaches in little more than a month. Movement was swift. French forces took Toulon in 11 days rather than the predicted 20; Marseilles fell in 13 rather than 45 days, even though Hitler designated both ports as fortresses. Task Force Butler and elements of the 36th 'Texas' Division drove 190 miles in seven days to liberate Grenoble in the French Alps on 22 August.[189] Eisenhower wrote to Marshall in late summer, 'Every day I thank my stars that I held out for ANVIL in the face of almost overwhelming pressure.'[190] Having battered the weakened and dispirited German Nineteenth Army,

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184 J. Turner & R. Jackson, *Destination Berchtesgarden*, (London, 1975), pp. 28-38.
185 Author's personal experience: 15 Aug. 1944.
186 Gen. Sir H. Wilson, 'DRAGOON', 16 Aug. 1944, Sp. Files, box 300, FDRL.
187 Adm. H. Hewitt, 'DRAGOON', 15 Aug. 1944, Sp. Files, box 300, FDRL.
188 Gen. Sir H. Wilson, *Op. cit.*
189 J. Clarke & R. Smith, *From the Riviera to the Rhine*, (Washington, 1993), pp. 80, 142.
190 J. Hobbs, *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

retreating before ANVIL's tactically well-planned and well co-ordinated operation, experienced and accomplished veterans of the three services performed with considerable mastery. The landing, the liberation of southern France, the advance northward astride the Rhone valley that trapped 79,000 Germans, and large amounts of equipment captured or destroyed attested to their success.[191] On 12 September Seventh Army elements made contact with Patton's units at several points near Dijon and Autun, thereby sealing the fate of thousands more German troops.[192] On 15 September Eisenhower assumed operational control of Devers newly constituted 6th Army Group under which the American Seventh and French First Armies served. In less than one month, not the three that Churchill had gloomily predicted, these Franco-American Armies had surged northward 400 miles from the Mediterranean.[193] 'The lines of communication at the end of the first 45 days were twice as long as the plans for the operation had estimated.'[194] Considered by Liddell Hart as an operation that went according to plan, but not according to timetable, ANVIL came ten weeks too late to help OVERLORD strategically or to suit him.

Eisenhower claimed in, *Crusade in Europe*, that 'There was no development of that period which added more decisively to our advantages or aided us more in accomplishing the final and complete defeat of the German forces than did this secondary attack coming up from the Rhone Valley.'[195] His postwar view did not support American military doctrine, that of inflicting a massive defeat upon the German Army. Only four under strength German divisions, composed of a high proportion of ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, over age native Germans and impressed Poles, Russians and Czechs, were stationed south of the Loire and in Provence.[196] Five divisions had already headed north to participate in the Normandy battles of June and July. Those left behind were incapable of defending against ANVIL.

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[191] J. Clarke & R. Smith, *Op. cit.*, pp. 197-198; R. Weigley, *Op. cit.*, p. 237.
[192] W. Gould, *The Campaign in Southern France*, Air Ministry, London, AHB/II/117/13, p. 90.
[193] A. Wilt, *The French Riviera Campaign of August 1944*, Carbondale, IL.
[194] Lt. Col. R. Leigh, *Op. cit.*, p. 46.
[195] Gen. Sir W. Jackson et al, *Op. cit.*, p. 200.
[196] J. Carke & R. Smith, *Op. cit.*, pp. 59-61.

Thus ANVIL's professed objective, to keep German reserves occupied in the south and away from OVERLORD, failed. Moreover, ANVIL's ground forces were given the role of protecting Eisenhower's southern flank in August when air power having functioned in this role since the Normandy breakout, could have continued to do so. On the 17 August ,Ultra intercepts demonstrated that Hitler's response to ANVIL was not reinforcement but evacuation; Ultra had unmistakably pointed to this conclusion, and indicated that a southern France invasion would accomplish no more than threatening to do so.[197] A threat no longer, ANVIL sounded the alarm for the German Nineteenth Army to begin a hasty but well co-ordinated retreat northward. ANVIL's timing served the Nineteenth well, whose retreat coincided perfectly with the German forces retreating headlong from Normandy. The Nineteenth joined them at the extreme left of the front being hastily organized to defend the upper Rhine in September. If ANVIL had simply threatened the Nineteenth, it would have been cut off by the OVERLORD forces advancing eastward.[198] Instead, ANVIL was part of Eisenhower's broad-front strategy and reflected the American Army's preference for moving directly forward behind overwhelming firepower and massive resources, rather than by feint, exploitation and maneuver.[199] ANVIL's strategic shortcomings were overshadowed by the arrival of the Franco-American Armies whose presence inspired the French people to join in their liberation.

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[197] R. Bennett, *Op. cit.*, pp. 296-297.
[198] W. Deakin et al, *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
[199] Maj. G. Higgins, 'German and US Operational Art: A Contrast in Maneuver', *Military Review*, (Oct. 1985), pp. 22-29; R. Weigley, 'To the Crossing of the Rhine: American Strategic Thought in World War II', *Armed Forces and Society*, 5, 2, Feb., (1979), pp. 303-320.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusions

Democracies during the inter-war period, as typified by the Britain and the United States, suffered from an unwillingness or inability to provide for timely protection against potential enemies – even when threatened with increased levels of military aggression. Japan was as much a threat as Germany. How to be safe and solvent remained an immutable question. National political administrations expected an unknowing or apathetic public, entrenched in its prejudices and relying on its government for protection, to heed a call to arms if and when war came. A composite and mutual failure between the government and the governed resulted in neither Britain nor the United States being prepared for Hitler's onslaught in late 1939. If the main purpose of the State is self-perpetuation, both countries defaulted. Due to the Great Depression, US military inductees were in generally poor health, and one in five was functionally illiterate.[1] The House of Representatives, in August 1941, extended the Selective Service Act by just one vote, 203 to 202, denying the events in Europe. The results of the First World War and Great Depression may have been contributing factors, from which Britain and the United States forfeited the necessary monetary appropriations for the building of a suitable defence against an unlimited war. Even in the appropriation of manpower, they ran into difficulties. A commitment in theory to universal military obligation came into direct conflict with an aversion in practice to compulsory national service.

Britain was handicapped by limited manpower and scarce materials. Money alone could not increase its meager resources. Once embroiled in the war and fighting for her survival, Britain, having exhausted her ability to buy supplies on a cash-and-carry basis, facing bankruptcy, was forced to appeal to the United States to defer payment.

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[1] L. Kennett, *The American Soldier in World War II*, (New York, 1987), pp. 15-17.

During 1940 and part of 1941, Roosevelt's sympathetic words were not matched by deeds, because the American business community seized the opportunity for pecuniary gain and exploitation of Britain's crisis – entering British commercial markets, buying British companies and leasing British western hemisphere island real-estate, all under 'disaster-sale' conditions. If this opprobrium were not enough, the beleaguered country had to satisfy the equivalent of an American means test: a testament of its will to fight. But how could Britain fight without the tools with which to finish the job? This senseless condition represented an example of the 'double-bind', in which to lose is the only outcome. American offers of aid in the shape of antiquated weaponry were no match against Hitler's modern equivalent. That was the conundrum which many Americans failed to realize, that Britain was fighting for both countries.

Roosevelt's lethargic behavior reflected the American political scene and the varying attitudes of the electorate to which he was finely attuned. However, he did little to educate his constituents regarding the magnitude of the threat or the consequences of a British defeat. He preferred to follow the opinion polls and seek consensus, even posing some questions with which to test public opinion. Whether Roosevelt was pragmatic or misinformed, he played Britain off against his wish to remain in office, in spite of his professed sympathies.

Moreover, equally as maddening for Britain was Roosevelt's preoccupation with the war that he and his military advisors expected to fight, a war that had little in common with the one raging in Europe. His advisors suggested that a far more immediate and direct threat to American security was the possible German seizure of strategic Caribbean islands, Atlantic outposts and parts of South America, followed by an invasion of the United States through Mexico or the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. Entangled in these perceptions, obsessed with hemispheric defence and lacking any military training or experience, Roosevelt remained indecisive. The President considered provoking an enemy act of aggression to justify an American declaration of war. Churchill warned against waiting too long. For the British people, courage alone

was not enough. Refusing to stir, America was not militarily or psychologically prepared to enter the war until the attack on Pearl Harbor forced the issue. Total American mobilization was delayed, Britain's sovereignty jeopardized, but in 1940-41, Roosevelt refused to hazard the risks of domestic and international confrontation that accompanied bold and aggressive leadership. Germany's 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union offered a relief, but not a solution, for Britain's survival. The odds remained poor.

Lend-Lease to Russia developed slowly because the British and American Chiefs predicted her immanent defeat. When that failed to occur, Roosevelt resolved to give Russia all possible aid to keep her in the war. By 1942, the President realized that the Russians were killing more Germans and destroying more equipment than the western Allies put together. Later that year, a massive concentration of 226 divisions, totally more than six million men, faced each other on the Eastern Front.[2] Even if 25 Allied divisions were able to advance on and take Vienna in April 1945, it seems doubtful that an Allied military presence there would have had any lasting geographical or political impact on the advancing Red Army and its commissars.

The parliamentary system was better equipped to mobilize the British nation for war than its American counterpart. As Prime Minister, Churchill represented a coalition government – an instrument of the people and the expression of its combined political will. Civilian responsibility characterized by the decision-making power of the War Cabinet, willing to improve the functioning of the war economy quickly, related to a committee system that had deep roots in British constitutional practice. By establishing, for example, a Man Power Committee for munitions labor, a Controller for Raw Materials, a Concentration of Production program and new Ministries of State when needed, Britain achieved a level of economic mobilization in a 'command economy' unmatched by the United States. If the British complained that American

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[2] O. A. Rzbesbevsky, 'The Soviet Union-The Direct Strategy, D. Reynolds, W. F. Kimball & A. O. Chubarian (eds.), *Op. citt.*, pp. 41-43.

strategy was sometimes based on political rather than strategic considerations, they were correct. The presidential elective process remained in force during the war. To remain in office, Roosevelt had to win re-election. In power, he had to out-maneuver his political rivals and adversaries and overcome varying degrees of Congressional dissent, if his policies were to be accepted or enacted into law. Even for a healthy man, this would have been an arduous process; and Roosevelt was not in good health.

Unlike Britain, America saw itself to be an unhurried slumbering giant that once awakened could accomplish anything including winning the war. Unlike its British counterpart, American industry and labor did not co-operate as willingly or with the same sense of urgency in 1940-41. Not only did industry demand ironclad guarantees before it was willing to expand production, it also insisted that the government accept cost–plus-fixed fee contracts. 'The outcome was lack of control, overrun costs, and the squandering of scarce resources.'[3] The emerging defence program suffered from waste, favoritism and lack of direction, with government agencies doing business with larger rather than smaller companies. Roosevelt created government offices to cope with industrial expansion, such as Office of Production Management and the Office of Price Administration. But oversight was not enough, because these newly created offices lacked the authority to decide major policy questions. Cost overruns, misuse of manpower, pricing violations, poor resource allocation, excessive corporate profits, divisive industrial action which were not brought under control until 1943.

Even with the proliferation of inefficient government agencies and Roosevelt's disorganized, uncoordinated and loose-handling of the economy, American industry and labor produced an overwhelming total of 300,000 aircraft and 51 million tons of merchant shipping, besides a variety of essential military products, during the war. This underlines what Geoffrey Crowther wrote in 1940. '...if a country has more well-trained men that its enemies, more equipment and more raw materials to replenish its stocks and feed its people, even the most appalling financial bungles can hardly

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[3] T. Wilson, The United States Leviathan', *Op. cit.*, pp. 175.

prevent it from winning the war.'[4] The advent of unconditional Lend-Lease aid (an 'Act to Promote the Defence of the United States') and the establishment of a number of Combined Boards for munitions, war output, raw materials and transportation, to name a few, enabled Britain to gain access to America's colossal productive and technological resources, but there was a price to be paid. Britain had tied her supply position to American foreign policy; and fixed her dependence upon the United States.

In April 1941, British and American nucleus military missions were exchanged and established in both Allied capitals. Organized as representatives of their respective COS, they were intended, in part, to collaborate in the formulation of military plans and policies, once the United States entered the war. Subsequently, the British-American military committee (CCS), created at the ARCADIA Conference, with offices and staff to be established in both Washington and London, was changed to Washington only. The American equivalent in London of the senior British officers (JSM), representatives of their COS, left behind in Washington was struck from the agreement. Hence, Washington became pre-eminent in combined planning and only the JSM would meet regularly with the JCS. This arrangement had unfortunate results: the Americans lost the opportunity of becoming familiar with the personalities, the customs and practice of the COS in London. The insights and evaluations that could have been gained by recurrent meetings and by learning to 'speak the same language', invaluable aids to a negotiating process, were lost. An American with Dill's ability would have grasped similar opportunities in London, if the American mission had not been abolished by Roosevelt. Gone would be Brooke's suspicions of American duplicity after SEXTANT II.

Throughout much of the literature, particularly in the official histories, emphasis has been placed on 'getting along', as if senior participants blandly negotiated and calmly reached their decisions, descriptions of which run contrary to their own personal writings. Moreover, if the planners, whose role was to advise and support their

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[4] G. Crowther, *Paying for the War*, (Oxford, 1940), p. 3.

Chiefs, failed to do so, as was the case in proposing Sardinia over Sicily, Brooke insisted they revise their planning.[5] The Chiefs created the thrust, direction and 'big picture' of the war, leaving it to the working planners to interpret their meaning and to formulate plans. They faced the complexity of fighting a global war and learned that logistics, the gathering and transporting of men and supplies, in and timely fashion, to fulfill an operational directive, was an awesome consideration. The civilian industrial work force aside, for every soldier at the front, eight others toiled behind the combat area in support. Chiefs of Staff decisions were left to others to implement along the whole chain of command; how these men succeeded, thousands of miles from home in a war zone, can be measured by time it took to achieve dominance over the enemy: five years. Marshall and Brooke, had chosen known and qualified subordinates to get the job done; some failed and were replaced; others failed and were not..

One contributing factor, may have been a level of self-deception in American strategic thought. Such commanding figures as Marshall and Stimson espoused the traditional American doctrine of Grant's mass concentration of men and material at the vital point to utterly destroy the enemy. Putting the theory into practice was another matter, and when the attempt was made, territorial advance seemed more important. As in SLEDGEHAMMER, the British refused to gamble their meager resources upon a plan based upon a doctrine antithetical to their own. However ambitious the American plan, another 18 months would pass, after December 1941, before the United States could field a trained, albeit an inexperienced force. Finally, after three Mediterranean amphibious operations, they encountered the full force of the German Army. By 1943, massed concentration was eroded by the scuttling of the preconceived 200 divisional American Army to 80 divisions, with approximately half of its 7.7 million men assigned to Air Corps; and by the year's end, the United States was still deploying more men against Japan than against Germany. 'Germany-first' was a misnomer. Victory through air power alone may have been modified and de-emphasized, but the

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[5] FM Lord Alanbrooke, *Op. cit.*, 3/A/VIII, 21 Jan. 1943, p. 610.

ground forces lacked the talent and intellect required to defeat the Germans quickly in the imagined final encounter. The manpower and logistical crisis beginning in the fall of 1944, eliminated any serious attempts, regardless of effort, to employ and fulfill American doctrine. Brought into conflict was the question of the broad and narrow front concepts. Pressure for individual United States infantry replacements increased exponentially and fathers with children were drafted for the first time. These shortages eliminated any possibility of ending the war in 1944.

In theory, the American replacement system might keep an army in the field, but the short 13 and then 17 week basic training periods were designed to convert civilians into soldiers by mass production methods. Small group cohesion and leadership, required to survive the rigors of attritional warfare, would have to be learned on the battle field. The average combat soldier was poorly served by the generals commanding, if the battles of northwest Europe were any measure, i.e., the butchery of the Normandy hedge rows, the failure to trap the enemy at Falaise, the costly confusion along the Franco-German frontier, the bloody fumbling in the Heurtgen Forest and the debacle in the Ardennes, to say nothing of the problems of the Italian Campaign. British and American generals suffered from conservatism and unimaginative caution. For the most part, they lacked the ability to achieve operational success consistently, were inferior to the Germans in leadership and were predisposed to conduct careful campaigns with limited objectives. The US First Army, relying on infantry tactics rather than combined arms, whose successes were offset by a lack of flexible exploitation, buried more dead than any other American Army.[6] If any doubts pervaded Marshall's thoughts regarding the American soldier's ability to defeat the German in combat, they was not apparent. Certainly not in the way that it disturbed Churchill and cast doubts upon the tenacity of the British combat soldier. Time after time he found the Army inadequate, better organized for fighting a colonial war insuring imperial pacification than smashing the Germans. Using the Alam el Halfa

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[6] Maj. D. Bolger, 'Zero Effects', *Military Review*, (May 1991), pp. 61-72.

and the Normandy battles as examples, much of the British staff and tactical leadership failed to believe in initiative and flexibility insofar as their application was instinctive and automatic.[7]

Churchill would have showed less concern, if more time had been available for organizing the Army's combat arms, a two year task. This argument is based upon the intense preparation and training methods used for airborne troops in which physical fitness, small team cohesion, morale and initiative are stressed, before entering combat. Lord Lovat trained Fourth Commando in Scotland for a year prior to combat. Unfortunately the bulk of both Armies was improperly trained and poorly indoctrinated for the combat roles and tasks ahead. Training was completed in combat, if a soldier survived that long. *The Why We Fight* series of documentary films, produced in Hollywood for the US War Department, visually described infantry combat according to the trench warfare of the Great War, a poor preparation for the battles to come. In late 1944, some experienced American infantry divisions formed their own training centers, in which newly arrived replacements were indoctrinated into each unit's method of fighting before going up front. When Montgomery arrived in the western desert in 1942, he revised and improved the training techniques of his new command, the Eighth Army. For commanders to expect citizen-soldiers to perform at a professional level in combat without proper training, and then complain when they do not is demanding too much.

The Anglo-American service chiefs who fought the war were at the top of their profession. In Marshall and Brooke were to be found the most outstanding soldiers of their generation. However, as soldiers, they had not been chosen to lead based on their negotiation skills. In conference, Brooke's demeanor irritated Marshall and King. On the other hand, it was Dill, more than any of the others, who demonstrated the necessary negotiating skills that usually led to compromise and agreement when none

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[7] Maj. G. Scott, 'British and German Operational Styles in World War II', *Military Review*, (Oct. 1985), pp. 38-41.

seemed to exist. He understood and could interpret the American position, and got along exceedingly well with Marshall, thus saving many of the coalition negotiations from collapse.

The 'indirect approach' in the Mediterranean, a war on the periphery, served as the only area for the effective use of British arms. Reality not theory intruded, i.e., to fight the Italians in North Africa rather than the Germans in northern France was within British capabilities To the Germans, North Africa was a side-show, to the British it was their main theater of operations where Hitler could be attacked at his weakest link. The Americans, eager to appropriate Britain's dwindling resources to further their own definition of 'Germany-first', discounted the art of the possible and failed to appreciate the value of attacking through the Mediterranean, as an intermediate step, albeit diversionary, toward Germany's destruction. Even though Roosevelt approved of TORCH and the Casablanca Agreement, Marshall repeatedly disavowed further offensive action in the Mediterranean with a smoldering anger and suppressed resentment. He, King and Wedemeyer did not properly assess Britain's strategy on its merits. And rather than defend their own strategic concepts, they remained preoccupied with deflecting Brooke's recommendations.

Both John Grigg and Keith Sainsbury believed that a Normandy beachhead was possible in 1943, if the Anglo-Americans agreed to forego the opening up the Mediterranean for shipping and the benefits of Italy's collapse. On year earlier, a cross-Channel landing in 1942 would have been even more problematic, i.e., a small beachhead frontage, too few men and little reserve against a well fortified and aggressive enemy. If a Normandy landing had succeeded in 1943, the potential for the beachhead becoming another Anzio was high, because of the strength of the German Army and Air Force. Of primary concern to the British was the relative speeds of build-up between the Allies and the Germans. Until 1944, the enemy could bring overwhelming strength to bear against any landing. Moreover, the amphibious

technology, the additional Allied manpower reserve and the elimination of the enemy air force was yet to happen in 1943.

There are a number of 'ifs' on which to speculate: what if Tunisia had been taken at Christmas 1942 rather than the following May? What if the Allies had bypassed Sicily in 1943, had stayed clear of Italian entanglements and island hopped from Sardinia to Corsica, then to southern France? What if ANVIL had remained a threat in 1944 and the intact 15th Army Group (AAI), during September of that year, broke through the Gothic line in northern Italy with the coast road to France open?[8] Note that forty-seven years later, during the Desert Storm phase of the Gulf War, seaborne US Marine combat teams threatened Iraqi ground troops stationed along the coast with an amphibious landing, while allied ground forces were set to execute the decisive action elsewhere. Allied 'Special forces operated throughout the theater' to keep the enemy off balance.[9]

Did ANVIL live up to its planners' expectations? To answer, one must ask: 'What plan is under discussion?' Originally, ANVIL was conceived as a simultaneous operation to OVERLORD, it then became a feint only, and re-emerged, in its final form, as a three divisional assault. Tactically, it was a successful, professional and superbly executed amphibious operation. Strategically it failed, because it was non-synchronous with OVERLORD, no longer its anvil. 'The actual landing in southern France only encouraged Hitler to withdraw its substantial garrison back to reinforce the main [Norman] front, whereas if a feint had been employed, there was more chance of trapping them when Eisenhower broke out from the Normandy beachhead.'[10] ANVIL established Eisenhower's broad front policy, a sign of his military conservatism. ULTRA decrypts revealed that Hitler's response to ANVIL was not reinforcement, but

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[8] Interview with K. Sainsbury, London, 14 Mar. 1995.
[9] *U S Army Field Manual 100-5*, (McClean, VA, 1994), pp. 6-16.
[10] Jackson to Author, *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

evacuation. ULTRA had unmistakably pointed to this conclusion, and indicated that the Germans considered the southern France invasion as nothing more than a threat.[11]

The strategic debate changed to one of logistics with the inclusion of Marseilles and Toulon. As seaports they served their designated purpose: six divisions passed through them in October and December 1944,[12] and by the end of the war, almost a million troops disembarked, the equivalent of 45 divisions. Monthly supplies reached 30 to 40 percent of Eisenhower's needs, and over four million long tons of cargo were unloaded.[13]

The introduction of American-armed French forces as part of ANVIL was more political and psychological than strategic. The Italian campaign suffered when French troops under Juin were withdrawn. If ANVIL had been abandoned, Eisenhower planned to have those French forces enter France through Normandy.

'The growing flow of US manpower and supplies to France assured the triumph of Marshall's concept of a concentrated, decisive war, an objective reinforced by the addition of the 'unconditional surrender formula'.[14] Britain had no choice but to follow. The ANVIL debate defined the fundamental differences between British and American thinking. The United States with its vast resources, could afford head on colliding power-drives applying the 'direct approach'. The British, using allies to make up for her lack of resources and prizing economy of effort to succeed, relied on the 'indirect approach'. This kind of warfare had to be flexible and opportunist.[15]

Therefore, Brooke and the British did not gull and outmaneuver Marshall and the Americans; the American reaction to conference negotiating results was a symptom not a cause, maintained by the JCS's accumulative perceptions of the British. Historically, as described earlier, Anglophobia and anti-colonialism pervaded sections of the

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11 R. Bennet, *Op Cit.*, pp. 296-297.
12 W. Jackson, et al, *Op Cit*, p. 200.
13 A. Wilt, *Op Cit.*, p. 168.
14 M. Matloff, 'The Anvil Decision, Crossroads of Strategy', *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, (Annapolis MD, 1958), p. 389.
15 Jackson, *Op. cit.*

American public and the civilian-military leadership. Moreover, American military planners believed that Britain's national policy and strategy considered the defence of her empire to be incompatible with American interests, a policy that could influence and infect the United States, resulting in a disastrous subordination of American forces, strategy, and interests to those of a foreign power.[16] To the extent that London's perceptions of Britain and the Empire, as part of an interdependent global system dependent upon Middle Eastern oil, among other things, dictated a defensive and dispersed strategy, that was true. It did not mean, however, that Britain sought to subvert the United States or bend its will, any more than American Western Hemispheric defence could corrupt Britain's strategy and concerns.

Unfortunately for British interests, Embick, Chairman and Army representative on the JSSC was hostile to Britain throughout the war. By 1942 and early 1943, his committee and the S & P of the US Army's General Staff, studied the political aspects of the British Mediterranean strategy. To reiterate, S & P was primarily responsible for strategic thinking and war planning within the Army and for liaison work with the other military services and the State Department. JSSC and S & P concluded that British strategy was militarily unsound, politically inspired and contrary to American interests.

Separate from what motivated American behavior, during an interview in 1948, Major General Ian Jacob, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, agreed in principle with Liddell Hart's suggestion that,

> if we had not been driven by American confidence and enthusiasm we would never have dared to make the cross-Channel assault,...if the Americans had not been restrained by the British determination to guard against every mishap and to plan and prepare to the last detail the assault would almost certainly have been a ghastly failure.[17]

The American military leadership's fixed beliefs and prejudice poisoned and jeopardized inter-allied negotiations. To argue the relative merits of different strategic view points is to be expected; to argue strategy as a means of subverting one's coalition

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[16] M. Stoler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 325-6.
[17] Sir B. Liddell Hart, *Op. cit.*, 15/15/1, p. 5.

partner is not. To suggest that British strategy was used to gain unfair advantage for secret purposes, at American expense, resulting in control of places and events, smacks of fraud and deception, by which all other issues pale. In addition, separate from their military merits, OVERLORD and ANVIL may have symbolized to the Americans neutralization of British Mediterranean strategy and the end of Britain's alleged secret intentions in the Mediterranean. Although Britain had no secret master plan, the British, by their demeanor, did little to assuage American fears and suspicions. For the good of the coalition, Churchill's importunate Balkan suggestions ought to have been tempered or diverted by his military advisors. Grudging concessions on each side were made for the sake of coalition accord, but the suspicions of intention by either group were amply justified. If there really was a special relationship between Britain and America, it was of contention and argument.[18]

The coalition prevailed, because the external threat, with all its variations, was greater than its internal discord and dissent. Its citizen armies, whose many officers performed as middle and upper management within the various integrated headquarters, knew little of the prejudiced and competitive nature of the leading regular military men above; willing to comply and co-operate, in the spirit of good fellowship, these younger officers, and the men they led, worked to end the war as quickly as possible.

Although Allied grand strategy suffered at the hands of the Anglo-American leadership and the use of hidden agendas and subterfuge impeded its implementation, the coalition can be explained as a representation of the human condition; fraught with uncertainty and imperfections, it was also effective and competent to the extent that policies such as 'Germany-first' prevailed over 'Japan-first', that Combined boards and staffs, established to oversee all aspects of the higher direction of the war, performed well and that their planning satisfied the needs and sorted out the complexities of global warfare. The system was good enough–just.

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[18] Interview with Mark Stoler, 4 Nov. 1994, FDRL.

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